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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This dissertation studies the relationship between virtue and deification in the thought of the ascetic 
intellectual Maximos the Confessor (580–662). It would be no exaggeration to note that Maximian 
studies enjoyed a renaissance in the twentieth century on which the twenty-first century built an 
impressive collection of outstanding monographs and articles. So, while I concur with Aidan Nichols 
that the (western European) modern study of Maximos the Confessor can be traced to 1857, when 
Karl Joseph Hefele published “Sophronius und Maximus über die zwei Willen in Christus” in the 
Theologische Quartalschrift and Klaus Oehler released his edition of the Confessor’s most important work, 
the Difficulties (or Ambigua), concerted intercontinental interest in his work only developed in earnest 
in the wake of the Second World War. For the following decades, the work of Maximos was studied 
from a wide variety of historical, theological, and philosophical subfields or for thematic threads, 
including Christology, spirituality, ecclesiology, anthropology, the essence-energies distinction, the 
politics of the seventh century in the Roman Empire, deification, and the perennial question regarding 
his relation to Classical and Hellenistic thought and, specifically, to so-called “Neoplatonism.”1 
To date, however, no study extensively considers the interrelationship between his aretology (i.e., 
doctrine of virtue) and deification despite their prominence in his theological and philosophical 
system. Certainly, studies of one or the other theme, largely in isolation from each other, have been 
penned. For instance, Jean-Claude Larchet’s encyclopedic La divinisation de l’homme selon Saint Maxime 
le Confesseur (1996), a volume nearly eight hundred pages in length, remains a field-defining piece of 
Maximian scholarship, specifically with regard to deification. But even here, Larchet does not explore 
the relationship between virtue and deification in depth.2 Needless to say, far from being a 
shortcoming of his study, this absence bespeaks Larchet’s regard for a manageable scope. Regardless, 
the gap remains. 
Further, the methodological approaches to Maximos’ work have, with a few very recent exceptions, 
remained in the tradition of an exclusively historical-theological mode of analysis. This method 
certainly enjoys considerable explanatory power for some, but surely not all, aspects of the Confessor’s 
oeuvre. Thus, while numerous other aspects and figures in early Christianity have been explored by 
means of critical-theoretical modes of analysis, these modes’ usefulness for illumining Maximos’ 
thought-world have yet to be substantively probed.3 Accordingly, in what follows I avail myself of a 
                                                 
1 For Christology see: Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, García, “Seréis como dioses,” 
Zañartu, “Las naturalezas.” 
For spirituality, see: Völker, Maximus Confessor, Blowers, Exegesis, Dalmais, “L’anthropologie spirituelle,” “L’oeuvre 
spirituelle,” and “La doctrine ascétique,” Hausherr, Philautie, Montmasson, “La doctrine,” 36–41, Viller, “Aux sources,” 
156–184, 239–68, 331–336. Wilken, “Maximus the Confessor,” in Wimbush and Valantasis, 412–423. 
For ecclesiology see: Riou, Le monde et l’église. 
For anthropology see: Prado, Voluntad y naturaleza, Renczes, Agir de Dieu, Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, De Angelis, 
Natura, persona, libertà, Mondin, L’uomo secondo il disegno di Dio, Kattan, Verleiblichung und Synergie. 
For the essence-energies distinction, see: Larchet, Le théologie des énergies divines, Karayiannis, Maxime le Confesseur.  
For his involvement in seventh-century politics, see: Lackner, “Der Amtstitel,” 63–65, Booth, Crisis of Empire, Pareti, 
“Verdi e azzurri,” 305–315, Olster, The Politics of Usurpation, Riedinger, “Die Lateran Synode,” in Heinzer and von 
Schönborn. 
For his doctrine of deification see: Savvidis, Die Lehre, Larchet, La divinisation, Perl, “Methexis,” Jili, “The Doctrine of 
Theosis.” 
For his relationship to “Neoplatonism”, see: Moore, “The Christian Neoplatonism,” Von Ivánka, Plato Christianus, 
Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers. 
2 See e.g., Larchet, La divinisation, 482–488. 
3 Paul Blower’s recent monograph, Maximus the Confessor (2016) is perhaps a pioneer in this regard in that he uses Jean-
Luc Marion’s “saturated phenomenon” to illumine Maximos’ liturgical theology. 
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constellation of methods, including certain features of historical theology, critical and comparative 
philology, and literary analysis. But I will also adapt the critical angles of Hispanic post- and decolonial 
theory, as constructed, for example, by Leopoldo Zea, Ramón Grosfoguel, and Santiago Castro-
Gómez, to expose an array of colonial assumptions and prejudices at work in the historiography of 
philosophy in late antiquity. I also turn to some of Michel Foucault’s and Michel de Certeau’s insights 
into “technologies” or “practices” of the self to elucidate Maximos’ ascetic doctrine and will combine 
this analysis with Derridean grammatology to explain the dynamic model of virtue as Maximos 
envisions it. 
The methodological salience of these choices requires some elucidation. Foucault and de Certeau 
investigated, in their own way, the various acts that the self can perform on the self to pattern the self 
on a certain desirable model. In this regard, Foucault’s idea of “technologies of the self” is especially 
important, because he believes that the human subject can “attain” certain states by means of these 
technologies.4 As we will see, that is true for some early Christians and late ancient non-Christian 
philosophers, but it does not aptly describe the constitutive dynamism of Maximos’ aretology. Rather, 
Michel de Certeau paints a somewhat different picture (though, admittedly, for a different context). 
In La invention du quotidien, de Certeau describes the scene of a tightrope balancing act where the 
appearance of stability can only be achieved by an incessant process of adjustments and interventions. 
Thus, stability is a paradoxically-formed illusion that relies on an incessant dynamism and process of 
recalibration to create the semblance of fixity.5 
This image bears striking resemblances to Derridean grammatology and poststructuralist linguistics 
generally.6 On Derrida’s analysis, language does not signify by an ontological or necessary link between 
signifier and signified; rather, following de Saussure’s “first principle” articulated in his Cours de 
linguistique générale,7 Derrida held that the link between these two is entirely arbitrary. Accordingly, 
signification is made possible by an infinite network of differences that mark a language’s simultaneous 
sedimentation and correlative insufficiency. While repeated use of certain phrases and linguistic 
conventions creates the appearance of fixity by the sedimentation of linguistic practices, language is 
always liable to change and can thus be otherwise. 
In my study, I ask whether such a model of linguistics may also share a parallel with Maximos’ 
ethics that can by extension illumine the dynamics at play in “becoming virtuous.” In other words, 
what does it mean “to be” virtuous? Can one “attain” the “state,” as Foucault called it, of virtue? Or 
is it, rather, that one negotiates one’s ethical identity from step to step on an infinite, heavenward 
tightrope of moral discourse that is both the condition of and for an elusive virtue? The fluidity of 
language as described by poststructuralist linguists has great appeal for elucidating this dynamic model 
of ethics. After all, if virtue must be interstitially negotiated by means of certain practices of the self, 
the teleological locus of human effort shifts from a transcendent reality and unattainable end to an 
embodied representational theo-drama wherein divine and human ephemerally coincide. This, 
Maximos calls the “incarnation of God in the virtuous”8 and an “evermoving rest” (στάσις ἀεικίνητος).9 
In this dissertation, I argue that the Confessor articulated the struggle to become virtuous as a 
process of moral recalibration that is under incessant negotiation. In my take, this dynamic model of 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Foucault, Ethics, 225. 
5 He writes: “Danser sur une corde, c’est de moment en moment maintenir un équilibre en le recréant à chaque pas grâce à 
des nouvelles interventions; c’est conserver un rapport qui n’est jamais acquis et qu’une incessante invention renouvelle 
en ayant l’air de le «garder».” De Certeau, L’invention du quotidien, 143. 
6 Here I have particularly in mind the project widely conceived in De la grammatologie, as well as in a series of essays like 
“La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines” and “Signature, évenement, contexte.” 
7 Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, de Mauro, ed., 100. 
8 E.g., Ambigua to Thomas, prol. 2; Ambigua to John, 7.21–22; 10.2, 4, 9, 27, 35, 41, 85, 119; 48.6, etc. 
9 E.g., Thal 59, ll. 123–131. 
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ethics derived from Aristotle’s moral philosophy, particularly from the Nikomachean and Eudaimean 
Ethics. Such a proposition, however, is likely to meet much sedimented scholarly resistance. There are 
several reasons for this pushback. First, it has long been a scholarly commonplace to juxtapose 
Platonic and Aristotelian thought as if they were opposite poles on a greyscale spectrum of 
philosophical identities. Second, the story continues, because there were hardly any Aristotelian figures 
in late antiquity—one can think of perhaps a handful—it is improbable that Peripatetic philosophy 
functioned as a dialectically-constitutive agent in Christian intellectual identity formation. Rather, the 
argument goes, Christians widely used Platonic and Stoic ideas, but generally dismissed Aristotle or 
were simply unfamiliar with his thought. Third, the case of Maximos’ relationship to Aristotle is 
particularly compounded by the fact that a substantial cadre of Neothomistic scholars has sought to 
rehabilitate the Confessor’s use of Aristotelian ideas over the past sixty years. These scholars, however, 
have been repeatedly (and even harshly) critiqued for introducing a Thomistic Aristotle into Maximos’ 
world. For that reason, present attempts to elucidate Maximos’ thought by recourse to the Stagirite’s 
philosophy are likely to encounter resistance due to the reasonable concern for conceptual 
anachronisms that are endemic in his field of studies. 
The first two sedimented assumptions are highly problematic, as chapter one demonstrates. Recent 
trends in the history of philosophy have challenged the assumption of Aristotle’s and Plato’s 
ideological incompatibility.10 Among late ancient philosophers, especially so-called “Neoplatonists,” 
Aristotle was widely regarded as second in authority and philosophical sublimity to Plato alone. In 
effect, they considered him Plato’s intellectual progeny and possibly the best expounder of his thought. 
Accordingly, most late ancient philosophers presupposed and sometimes elucidated Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s agreement on most matters. Thus, it is not inexplicable that the “Neoplatonists” collectively 
wrote more commentaries on Aristotle than on any other figure, Plato included. Moreover, I 
interrogate the foundation for a radical juxtaposition of Aristotle’s and Plato’s philosophy by 
examining the available sources that Gemisthos Plethon, at the twilight of the Roman empire (ca. 
1439) employed to argue for Plato’s superiority over Aristotle (the fact that he was not arguing for 
their opposition but for a ranking suggests that even he situated them within a coextensive matrix of 
philosophical identity). Instead, I draw a different picture of Aristotle’s place in late antiquity by 
turning to quantitative data analysis of digital humanities resources for the study of late antiquity, such 
as the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. I contend that all the evidence points to late antiquity as the “golden 
age” of Aristotelian studies in the Greek language (with two further, though not as sustained or 
intensive, peaks during the renaissances under the Komnenoi Palaiologoi) and that interest in his work, 
it bears mentioning, was not limited to non-Christians. In effect, he often enjoyed greater attention 
from both Christians and/or Hellenes than Plato. And yet, the significance of these findings has yet 
to be probed for the representation of Christian intellectual history. 
The third point listed above must be understood against a larger discursive backdrop, also 
presented in chapter one, that interrogates the invention of so-called “Neoplatonism.” For this 
purpose, I resort to the analytical resources of the postcolonial and decolonial Hispanic academies, 
including the work of Ramón Grosfoguel, Leopoldo Zea, Santiago Castro-Gómez, and others. The 
objective is to expose colonial prejudices in the western European narrative of late ancient philosophy. 
Of particular interest is the sustained dismissal of “Neoplatonists” as non-Europeans due to their 
mixture with “Oriental” ideas and their consequent erasure from the history of “western” philosophy. 
In other words, Neoplatonists were intellectual hybrids of Greece and Orient for whom no discursive 
space existed in the colonizing narratives of modern western European self-invention that were 
                                                 
10 Two landmark monographs were published nearly simultaneously in this regard: Lloyd Gerson’s Aristotle and Other 
Platonists (2005) and George Karamanolis’ Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? (2006). 
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predicated on the imaginary inheritance rights to a tradition they never in fact had owned. Such a 
position is not only problematic for its endemic racist and Eurocentric worldview, but for its systemic 
distortion of all intellectual agents engaged in late antiquity, such as Maximos. My response to these 
three problems is to create a thick description of Maximos’ thought world through an interdisciplinary 
approach that transgresses long-held disciplinary and methodological boundaries. Perhaps this is in 
keeping with the decolonizing sensitivities of this project and its embrace of methodological hybridity. 
Chapter two aims to present a radical revision of Maximos’ early career that is consistent with the 
reconstructed matrix of cultural production articulated in chapter one. This task becomes immediately 
complex due to the existence of two strikingly different accounts of his early years, one in Syriac and 
one in Greek. The Syriac account was written by one of Maximos’ contemporaries, George, the bishop 
of Resh‘aina, whose distaste for the Confessor’s person is on lavish display throughout the account. 
Of particular importance is the author’s claim that Maximos was born in Palestine, the questionable 
result of a trinket-selling Samaritan’s fornication with a Persian slave girl. Some scholars have defended 
the credibility of this account’s broad outline, noting that his birth in Palestine can successfully account 
for Maximos’ seemingly longstanding friendship with Sophronios of Jerusalem (as gleaned from 
Maximos’ Epistle 8), who would have been a monk in a monastery not far from the Palaia Lavra, where 
the Confessor was taken after his parents’ (arguably symbolic) deaths. Moreover, a Palestinian origin 
also explains Maximos’ concern with Origenism (as articulated, most famously, in Difficulty 7), such as 
it is purported to have returned in Palestine in the sixth and seventh centuries. After all, the Palaia 
Lavra was headed, if George of Resh‘aina is to be believed, by a certain Pantoleon ( ܠܐܛܢܦܢܘ ), “wicked 
and Origenist” (Syriac Life 7). 
The Greek account, in fact a complex of three complexly interrelated recensions and a number of 
other biographical materials from which it was culled, tells a poignantly different story. On this 
account, Maximos was born of pious Christian aristocrats in the imperial capital, received the standard 
training in rhetoric and philosophy to which illustrious youths were entitled by rank and wealth, and 
in 610 became the chief of imperial records under Herakleios’ new regime. Three years later he took 
the cloth and spent the rest of his tumultuous life steeling monastic resistance against imperial heresy, 
for which he paid with a literal pound of flesh. Some of this account’s historical errors (such as 
imputing Maximos’ departure from Roman bureaucracy due to its implication with Monenergism, 
which would not come about for another two decades) and its infancy’s striking similarity to the Life 
of Theodoros Stoudites have thrust its credibility into question.11 Its proponents point to Maximos’ 
knowledge of aristocratic jargon and his correspondence with powerful figures in the imperial 
entourage, such as an imperial κουβικουλάριος (koubikoularios) called Ioannes, as evidence for his high-
born Constantinopolitan provenance. The problem, then, is that the Greek life, like the Syriac life, has 
certain strengths as a relatively reliable source for reconstructing Maximos’ youth, but they surely 
cannot both be right (and perhaps neither is). The end scene, then, is that of a scholarly stalemate 
concerning Maximos’ early life. 
 Chapter two argues that both accounts are unreliable. Because the Greek lives, particularly the 
third recension, which details Maximos’ early years, were the established account of Maximos’ origins 
for the better part of a millennium, the majority of critical scholarship has undermined these, and not 
the Syriac, telling of things.12 Critics of the Syriac account have largely dismissed its details as 
outlandish and incensed fabrications of an ill-disposed adversary—the account features Maximos’ 
brother mauled to death by a camel and his mother’s death as she falls from a pomegranate tree. But 
the Syriac account has yet to be contextually analyzed from within the discursive complex of Syriac 
                                                 
11 In this regard, see especially Wolfgang Lackner’s “Zur Quellen und Datierung der Maximosvita BHG 31234.” 
12 The most sustained and to a degree successful effort on this count is Phil Booth’s Crisis of Empire, particularly chapter 
four, “Maximus and the Mystagogy.” 
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literature and cannot so lightly be cast aside—not, especially, after compelling arguments have been 
penned in its favor. Accordingly, much of chapter two offers the first in-depth linguistic and literary 
evaluation of the Syriac infancy narrative in order to underscore its literary and creative features. Only 
a few details can be gleaned, indirectly and with some degree of uncertainty, about Maximos’ 
provenance through such a reading, but they are not, for that, insignificant. For instance, I interpret 
certain turns of phrase and symbols in the Syriac account to argue that Maximos was, in effect, from 
wealth extraction (though likely not from Constantinople). In light of this analysis, my suggestion is 
to disregard both the Greek and Syriac infancy narratives with respect to his place of origin and to 
consider the remaining evidence to attempt to reconstruct Maximos’ early life. 
I grant that his place of birth is now lost to us, but add that it is not as significant for his intellectual 
development and his contextualization as the place of his upbringing. Indeed, even by the Syriac 
account’s chronology, Maximos was conceived in Tiberias, born in Hesfin, and raised for most of his 
youth in the monastery of the Palaia Lavra and the account still fails to explain, primarily by omitting 
nearly forty years of the Confessor’s life, how Maximos acquired the very philosophical acuity that 
enrages his authorial detractor. Mobility, in this view, was a permanent fixture for many late ancient 
people so that birth in any given place did not permanently cloud one’s future horizon of possibilities.  
My reading of the available and reliable evidence, primarily Maximos’ epistolary corpus, dossiers 
surviving in his name, and a few other tangential writings by his contemporaries, leads me to conclude 
that, wherever Maximos may have been born, he was most likely raised in Alexandria and had received 
substantial philosophical training there, perhaps under the late-sixth century Aristotelian commentator 
David himself. In this respect, it is telling that scholarship has long denied the legitimacy of attributing 
a collection of notes on David’s lectures on Porphyry’s Eisagoge and Aristotle’s Categories to Maximos, 
under whose name they survive in manuscript witnesses. The logic, of course, has been that Maximos 
could not have studied under David because he was in Constantinople (or Palestine), and not in 
Alexandria. But if the claims of both infancy accounts are questionable, the objection is no longer 
valid. Moreover, the bulk of the Confessor’s correspondence points, as Christian Boudignon has 
already argued, to Alexandria.13 My case goes further in pointing out that Maximos is not only a regular 
correspondent with the highest echelons of Alexandrian power through some inexplicable historical 
serendipity, but with all of its social echelons—aristocratic, bureaucratic, scholarly, clerical, and ascetic 
(including male and female monasteries). An amalgam of these various levels would suggest more than 
a passerby’s stint in the capital of Roman Egypt. 
If my tentative reconstruction of Maximos’ life has merit, it would substantially alter the portrait 
of his career trajectory and the conceptual framework of his ideas. On such an account, Maximos 
would have been fully immersed in the philosophical tradition of the late ancient commentators on 
Aristotle, particularly the tradition that was housed at Alexandria. In effect, there are numerous clues 
in his work that suggest such a background, though recent scholarly trends have tended to minimize 
them or outright misrepresent them; they attribute them, at best, to doxographical knowledge that any 
relatively educated person in late antiquity may have possessed. I contend that such representations 
are tendentious, distort the Confessor’s ideas, and, especially for our purposes, render numerous 
tensions (and resolutions thereto) illegible by erasing their robust Aristotelian framework. Accordingly, 
the second part of the dissertation—chapters three to five—elucidates the relationship between virtue 
and deification in Maximos’ thought by dialectically showing the various features of Aristotle’s 
philosophy that undergird the Confessor’s logical frame of mind. 
Chapter three begins with the articulation of the driving tension that holds the study together by 
identifying the underlying Aristotelian logical structures that inform the Confessor’s theology and 
                                                 
13 See Boudignon, “Maxime le Confesseur, était-il Constantinopolitain?” 11–43. 
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philosophy. Specifically, the difficulty is squaring Maximos’ interrelated claims that virtues are deifying, 
that virtues are natural to humans, and that deification cannot be attained by the actualization of any 
natural potentialities of the human substance. By all appearances, these three claims, presented as 
propositional content, seem to suggest at least a tension, at worst a contradiction, in the Confessor’s 
doctrine of deification. The objective of the dissertation is to address this conundrum by emphasizing, 
more than most studies to date, the numerous Aristotelian dimensions at play here. 
Therefore, chapter three deals with Maximos’ appropriation of Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics, 
specifically to understand the semantic and conceptual range of the term ousia (οὐσία), which can be 
variously rendered as “essence,” “substance,” or “quiddity,” though long-held Aristotelian studies 
preferences gravitate toward “substance.” Currently, scholarly engagement with Aristotle’s ideas for 
the sake of comprehending Maximos’ work has been unsystematic and meager, typified by little more 
than footnotes referencing Aristotelian passages for the sake of vague comparison. Chapter three goes 
further by analyzing the various logics of Aristotle’s ontology through contextual immersion in the 
imaginable limits of the Confessor’s time. The hermeneutic principle, then, is not simply to point to 
Maximos’ bald use of Aristotle’s terminology, but to understand his active role in learning from, 
contributing to, and transforming a millennium-old trajectory of the reception among Platonic, 
Aristotelian, and Christian commentators on the Stagirite’s contested concepts. 
Thus, we underscore the philosophical liminality and complexity of the Peripatetic ontological 
apparatus, one that recent cultural studies, particularly in queer, gender, and racial studies have all too 
frequently represented reductively as the point of origin of western “essentialism” (other theorists, 
like Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray have transmuted this locus of essentialization to Plato’s Timaios).  
Certainly, there is a historical precedent to which these critical views respond and there is undoubtedly 
a multi-tiered systemic injustice rooted in essentialism that they have necessarily and successfully 
destabilized; simultaneously, however, I would challenge the validity of imputing the origin of such 
views to Aristotle. Rather, later intellectuals, perhaps as early as Latin Scholasticism, are themselves to 
blame for promoting a somewhat static and “essentializing” take on Aristotle’s ousia. Such a view, 
however, is inextricable from the forming colonial discourse of western superiority birthed during the 
Crusades that sought to create a universal category of “essential” humanity as a discursive matrix 
wherein to organize, class, and hierarchize its individual members. 
Accordingly, what ought to be critiqued is not Aristotle’s work (western-centric teleologies and 
colonially-prejudiced discursive strategies ironically inform such approaches), but the mistranslation 
and misappropriation of his work, such as Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda’s misrepresentation of Aristotle’s 
concept of “slaves by nature” (φύσει δοῦλοι)14 in his Democrates alter de justis belli causis apud Indios to 
justify the enslavement of the Mexica (incidentally, he also employed Proverbs 11:29 to justify 
slavery).15 Needless to say, even then his interpretation of Aristotle was contested by contemporaries, 
like Friar Bartolomé de las Casas, who proposed an alternate vision of humanity in Christ in his 
Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias. We must then ask why an anachronistic, misappropriated, 
medieval-to-modern conception of Aristotle’s ousia should figure in our analysis of late antiquity at all. 
The only connection, it seems, is to extricate the Peripatetic’s work from fights he never picked and 
to understand him on his own terms and in light of other Greek commentators on his ideas. 
Once we take this step, it is clear that Aristotle did not even have a univocal understanding of ousia. 
In the Categories, for instance, the term has a relatively fixed meaning and refers to a specific existing 
something (τόδε τι), like a horse, a man, or a plant, that is the subject of varying predicates (κατηγορία 
or kategoria in Greek means “predicate” or “attribute”). In the Metaphysics, by contrast, Aristotle tells 
                                                 
14 Politics 1254b16–19. 
15 See Demócrates Segundo; Coroleu, “A Philological Analysis,” 175–195; Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians; Losada, 
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda; Mechoulan, L’antihumanisme de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. 
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us that ousia has no fewer than four meanings.16 He devotes much time to explicating each of these 
meanings.17 What may be remarkable here is the intrinsic, indeed, inescapable dynamism of 
chronologically-distended existence that Aristotle attributes to ousiai. If there is any principle of fixity 
to be found in an ousia, it is, precisely, not the ousia, but the definition of the ousia expressed through 
the unwieldy phrase “what is was being for it to be existing” (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, e.g., Metaphysics 1029b13–
14). It was this phrase that Latin Scholastics rendered, presumably for simplicity’s sake, as essentia or 
quidditas. In effect, even in this phrase the verb “to be” (εἰμί) surfaces twice and in both cases the tense 
(imperfect, present) expresses an ongoing process of existential (re)definition that in no way conveys 
a sense of ontological closure. Such interpretations are not unknown in Aristotelian studies, but their 
consequences for understanding late ancient thinkers like Maximos have yet to be systematically 
examined. Chapter three addresses that deficiency. 
If, then, the Confessor’s ontology is informed by the dynamism of Aristotle’s ousia, what does that 
mean for an embodied asceticism? Chapter four picks up this question by investigating Maximos’ 
moral psychology and the formation of the deiform subject through the strategic negotiation of virtue. 
Specifically, we examine the roots of the Confessor’s psychology—or doctrine of the soul—and 
challenge a longstanding consensus that it is primarily of Stoic derivation. In effect, this chapter 
articulates the numerous ways in which Stoic ethics themselves had drawn on Aristotle’s aretology and 
accordingly offers a radical reinterpretation of the commonplace ascetic term apatheia—variously 
rendered as “dispassion,” “impassibility,” or, as I prefer, “emotionlessness.” Of central importance to 
this question is the matter of deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) and self-determination (αὐτεξούσιον). How 
did Maximos understand the deliberative process and what was its moral charge? 
Here, certain patristic figures like Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrios of Pontos are especially 
important for contextualizing Maximos, given their critical development of the term apatheia and early 
notions of the will (θέλημα, βούλησις) and their promotion of their centrality for ascetic subjectivity. 
While the Confessor had extensively read both of these authors, his take on apatheia is markedly 
different in several regards. Most important is his position that apatheia signifies a condition of the soul 
that is only with difficulty moved toward vice (δυσκίνητος). The reason this is significant is because of 
the dynamism it again introduces into the negotiation of moral selfhood—apatheia is ultimately not 
the final stage of human progress, but divinely-granted deification, the only surety for remaining fixed 
in the good. Just as important is the fact that by contrasting apatheia with vice, Maximos implies that 
apatheia does not simply refer to the absence of the passions (or vices), but of the emotions “in 
themselves,” so to speak. Surely, this position may seem prima facie problematic. After all, the lion’s 
share of early Christians not only affirms the constitutive function the emotions play in humanity, but 
insist on their usefulness for pursuing the divine. 
Maximos is not at odds with this tradition, though his extended meditations on the human will, 
which was especially fine-tuned by the dialectical cross-examinations of Monothelitism, led him to 
invest the depths of human decision-making with new and original meanings. For him, the emotions 
as such are faculties of the soul that are potential and can only be considered “in themselves” through 
abstraction and analytical conceptualization; they are not, however, separable from their active 
exercise. If so, the emotive faculties can only ever be engaged in ethically-charged ways. That is to say 
that the emotive faculties of the soul, when operative, are irreducibly agents of subject formation and 
cannot, accordingly, be morally neutral. Any exercise of the emotive faculties implies in itself the 
disposition-forming character states or habituations (ἕξεις) that are termed virtues or vices, depending 
on use. Thus, to speak of a “neutral” emotion is to speak of an inactive, analytically-derived feature of 
                                                 
16 See Metaphysics 1028b34–1029a3. 
17 This discussion takes place primarily in books 3 and 4 of the Metaphysics. 
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the human soul that has no direct bearing on embodied subjectivity or on progress in the ascetic 
struggle. I contend, therefore, that for Maximos all practices (in effect, Maximos subtly included the 
reading of texts with a specific disposition as part of these practices) were irretrievably ethical, that is, 
habituating, and accordingly morally-charged. If so, the most quotidian of deeds have micro-level 
morally-formative force for human subjectivity. 
The solution that Maximos proposes is to transcend, to the degree that it is possible, the very 
process of deliberation through Christomimesis; virtue, needless to say, is intrinsic to this process. In 
the Confessor’s aretological articulations, Christ is in effect the ousia of the virtues, that is the 
embodied, active performance of the divine life in the willing human subject. Christ becomes flesh in 
the virtuous human subject, while the human subject, through Christification, is exalted to deification. 
Scholars, nonetheless, have drubbed this position because it is predicated on the denial of Christ’s 
deliberative or gnomic will. Some have pointed to the soteriological problematic such a position raises, 
particularly in light of Gregory of Nazianzos’ oft-quoted aphorism in his Letter to Kledonios “what is not 
assumed is not healed.” 
Chapter four challenges the validity of these objections to Maximos’ Christology by demonstrating 
their incomplete grasp of the ascetic intellectual’s anthropology and, again, Aristotelian ontology. The 
gnomic will is not a universal human predicate, but refers to a dynamic, ongoing, and incessant manner 
of use of the existential resources of psychosomatic being. In other words, there are no two identical 
or even similar gnomic wills, even if the abstraction of this descriptive principle (i.e., gnomic will) for the 
purposes of analysis may lead to the belief that it is in fact a constitutive aspect of human nature. Thus, 
it is as ontologically incoherent to suppose that Christ could “assume” a gnomic will as it is for him 
to assume one, and only one, human hypostasis. Rather, Christ’s natural will (that is, the opposite of 
the gnomic will) is the model for the believer’s Christification through mimesis Christou, but of a particular 
sort: the complete surrender of the volitional faculties to the Father (“yet not as I will, but as you 
[will],” Mt 26:39; cf. Lk 22:42). 
Thus, chapter four ends on a controversial note that only escalates in chapter five. Maximos himself 
anticipated the reader’s skeptical response to his call for the radical transcendence of the will in an act 
of passive surrender to the divine. And yet, because the Confessor firmly holds that no potentiality of 
the human substance, when actualized, can accomplish deification, humans necessarily undergo God’s 
activity in themselves for deification. A problem arises here. If humans can do nothing to attain 
deification and therefore deification is altogether a gracious divine gift that—Maximos makes it 
unambiguously clear in Opuscule 1—is not the result of aretological meritocracy, what is the object of 
ascetic struggle? In effect, does not Maximos here foreshadow Calvinistic doctrines or at a minimum 
vaguely echo Augustinian teachings (though he was almost certainly unaware of these latter)? 
It is precisely at this crossroads that the Aristotelian subtext of Maximos’ eschatology must be 
underscored. The Confessor articulates what I call the “paradox of active passivity,” which I argue is 
modeled on a key concept that Aristotle develops in On the Soul. In this treatise, the Stagirite speaks of 
the elevation of a passive subject to the state of an active agent. For Maximos, this phrase can signify 
the operation of the divine in human subjects who have rendered themselves receptive (rather than 
averse) to the divine energy. While the divine energy is not naturally their own, by their virtuous self-
constitution they have rendered themselves capable of receiving it in a way appropriate to themselves 
(ἀναλογικῶς). 
This point is crucial. With this maneuver, Maximos affirms humanity’s inviolable self-
determination—a self-determination that even the divine does not transgress. Simultaneously, he 
validates the unique character of each and every individual and the concomitant uniqueness of each 
individual’s experience of the divine. Some, based on their self-configuration through virtue, will be 
able to undergo the divine energy, allowing it to be active in themselves when it operates through the 
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channels their virtue has carved on the surface of their moral self. The grace of deification, accordingly, 
operates in a way consistent with and through hypostatic particularity, as defined by the moral course 
of one’s life and actions, and not irrespective of it. In effect, Maximos identifies, qualifiedly, the divine 
and human activity in deification: it belongs to God by nature, but to the human by participation; just 
as the action of burning is intrinsic to fire, iron heated in the forge manifests the same attributes as 
the fire wherein it participates because it is susceptible to the flames. 
 
Note: All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Wherever possible, I have transliterated Greek, 
Syriac, and Arabic names, but thoroughgoing consistency is impossible. Some names have become 
sufficiently sedimented in the English language that to transliterate them would make the figure 
unrecognizable. Thus, Aristotle and not Aristoteles, John the Evangelist and not Ioannes or 
Yuhannon, Cappadocia and not Kappadokia, Constantinople and not Kontantinoupolis. Some names, 
however, receive both Greek and Latin spelling, and wherever possible, I have favored the original. 
Thus, Maximos and not Maximus, Nazianzos and not Nazianzus, Georgios Gemistos Plethon and 
not George Gemisthus Pletho. Perhaps a future project may be envisioned where non-Latin figures 
are again called by their own names and not those that their self-proclaimed heirs gave them as part 
of a larger scheme of cultural plundering and hierarchization, but sufficient battles lie ahead; this one 
must be fought a different day. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
SPECTERS OF ARISTOTLE: 
CHRISTIAN INTELLECTUAL IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARISTOTLE’S 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
In critical vocabulary, the word precursor is indispensable, but one ought to 
attempt to purify it from any polemical or rivalrous connotation. The fact is 
that every writer creates his precursors. His labor modifies our conception of 
the past, as he is to modify that of the future. In this correlation, the identity 
or plurality of men does not matter. 
 
  —Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka y sus precursores” 
 
The works which philosophers of our time addressed to her bear witness to 
her love of learning, works concerning those writings of Aristotle on which 
commentaries had not been written until her time, but the explanation of 
which was transmitted orally in every kind of form . . . 
 
  —Georgios Tornikes, Funerary Oration on Anna Komnene 
 
Introduction 
 
On February 22, 163218 the Grand Duke of Tuscany Ferdinando II de’ Medici received the first 
printed copy of the Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (A Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems) from his “most humble and devoted servant and vassal Galileo Galilei,”19 which set the 
Florentine’s tête-à-tête with ecclesiastical authorities in motion. The Dialogo compares the merits of 
the Copernican and Ptolemaic systems over the course of a four-day dispute arbitrated by a 
presumably neutral observer, Sagredo, named after Galileo’s friend Giovanni Francesco Sagredo. The 
contenders are Salviati, a philosopher from the Accademia dei Lincei, who advocates for the 
Copernican system, and Simplicio, whom a scholar has perceptively dubbed a “diehard but intelligent 
Aristotelian”20 and whose burden it is to defend the Ptolemaic system. What is noteworthy for our 
present objectives about Galileo’s portrayal of Simplicio as a “diehard Aristotelian,” is that the 
historical figure he represents, Simplikios of Kilikia (c. 490–560), was the last Platonist of late antiquity. 
How could Galileo make such a mistake? Perhaps we may attribute his confusion of philosophical 
allegiances and outlook to his historical distance from Simplikios, then dead for over a millennium. 
More likely, however, is that Galileo knew of no real and significant distinction between a late ancient 
“Platonist” and a late ancient “Aristotelian.” After all, this radical distinction rests, I will argue, on a 
fiction that lay at the heart of the invention of a modern western European intellectual identity. 
                                                 
18 Gindikin, Tales of Physicists and Mathematicians, 62. 
19 Galilei, Dialogo, 4. 
20 Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis, 3. 
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The belief that Plato and Aristotle founded two diametrically opposed philosophies that remained 
opposed for over two millennia requires no interminable footnoting to be taken for granted. This 
belief pervades the modern academic study of classical, late ancient, medieval, and renaissance cultural 
productions to such a degree that we may speak of a socially-sedimented commonplace of western 
intellectual discourse that has achieved the rank of Pierre Bourdieu’s well-known habitus. By the 
nineteenth century this commonplace was already well ensconced in western culture. For instance, the 
famed English poet and essayist Samuel Taylor Coleridge claimed—without eliciting a contemporary 
negative riposte—that “Schools of real philosophy there are but two,—best named by the arch-
philosopher of each, namely, Plato and Aristotle. Every man capable of philosophy at all (and there 
are not many such) is a born Platonist or a born Aristotelian.”21 He explains further: “I do not think 
it possible that any one born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist 
can ever change into an Aristotelian.”22 Coleridge’s words here are not only significant for us because 
they signal an entrenched division that seemingly was taken for granted; his words are also noteworthy 
because they resort, with no apparent reason, to a biological metaphor to express the firmness or fixity 
of this dichotomy. One is “born” either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, just as much as one is born 
European or non-European. The metaphor may seem inane enough, particularly because 
contemporary culture has taken great strides in reclaiming “birth-as-x” as a symbol of empowerment 
and normalization of historically marginalized groups (e.g., in queer theory). Needless to say, these 
imaginative possibilities are far from Coleridge. On the contrary, I take it he meant to evoke an 
unchanging status by recourse to terminology that would have readily echoed with his audience, that 
is, biological terminology. This deliberate semantic choice requires further exposition, which will be 
resumed in the first section of this chapter. 
Arthur Herman has recently (and for a more popular audience), articulated the dichotomy known 
to Coleridge on a dramatic cosmic-history stage. The dialectic of opposition between Plato and 
Aristotle emerges in his aptly-titled book, The Cave and the Light: Plato versus Aristotle and the Struggle for 
the Soul of Western Civilization. Toward the beginning of his work, he introduces the golden thread that 
weaves the study together: “For the next two thousand years Aristotle would become the father of 
modern science, logic, and technology. Plato, by contrast, is the spokesman for the theologian, the 
mystic, the poet, and the artist . . . . One shaped the contours of Christianity; the other, the ideas of 
the Enlightenment . . . . One inspired Europe to lift itself out of the Dark Ages; the other inspired the 
greatest artistic works of the Renaissance.”23 He continues: “Seen in this light, the West’s greatest 
thinkers, theologians, scientists, artists, writers, and even politicians have found themselves arrayed on 
one side or the other in a twenty-four-centuries-old battle between the ideas of Plato and Aristotle 
and the two paths to wisdom they represent.”24 While this sweeping portrayal of the philosopher’s 
role in western history can be disputed, what is again salient for us is Herman’s metonymizing of Plato 
and Aristotle into dueling philosophical “sides” from whose (presumably autochthonous) discourse 
western intellectual civilization was birthed. Let us be unequivocal about what has happened here: like 
Coleridge, Herman has inhabited and colonized a foreign space with a hegemonic narrative that not 
only “Occidentalizes” history by tracing what is a fictive and teleological line between the Eleatics and 
the unavoidable outcome of western Enlightenment modernity, but implicitly “otherizes” and thus 
                                                 
21 Coleridge, “Notes on Hooker,” 33. 
22 Coleridge, “Notes on Hooker,” 33 (see note of editor). 
23 Herman, The Cave and the Light, 6. 
24 Herman, The Cave and the Light, 14. 
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displaces from the arc of intellectual history those very thinkers whose agency made western European 
modernity possible. Perhaps this assessment is too harsh for a popular piece, but it is precisely the 
popular nature of the piece that makes it all the more nefarious. 
The prejudices we have presented in sketch form above have palpably determined late ancient 
historiography and especially the reception of the classical and Hellenistic traditions by Grecophone 
Christians. We cannot consider all instances, but only that which is most relevant to our study. For 
that reason, we will attempt indirectly to detect the spectral presence of the aforementioned prejudices 
by looking to the systemic (conscious or unconscious) omission of early Christians’ imaginative 
possibilities as they relate to Plato, Aristotle, and their mutual relationship. It appears that one of the 
most enduring assumptions in this regard is twofold: first, scholars of late ancient Christianity largely 
take for granted the irreconcilable nature of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical projects; second, the 
scarcity of self-designated “Aristotelians” during late antiquity is taken as persuasive evidence that 
Peripatetic philosophy was negligible in the formation of a Christian intellectual identity. Even the few 
Christians who do express doxographic knowledge of Aristotle’s works and figure express their 
criticism, dissatisfaction, or outright reject him altogether. George Karamanolis has recently, and with 
some misgivings, summed up the bulk of scholarship that paints precisely this picture: “early Christian 
thinkers (second to fourth century) were as a rule critical or even hostile to Aristotle. Unlike Plato, 
who is often strongly praised and frequently quoted by early Christians, Aristotle is rarely mentioned 
or cited, and when this happens, it usually serves a polemical aim: either Aristotle is taken to task for 
views that are considered to be at odds with the relevant Christian ones—mainly his views on the soul, 
providence, cosmology, or the contribution of external goods to happiness—or a Christian thinker is 
criticized for heresy, being charged with following Aristotle’s doctrines.”25 
Karamanolis grants that this description undoubtedly fits some early Christian authors, especially 
Tatianos the Assyrian and Eusebios of Caesarea, but suggests that it misrepresents the complexities at 
stake in the interplay of ideas during late antiquity. For example, he argues that Eusebios forcefully 
promoted the radical opposition between Plato and Aristotle as part of his larger project of anti-
Hellenic propaganda.26 By contrast, he demonstrates that thinkers like Clement of Alexandria, 
Nemesios of Emesa, and the Cappadocian brothers used Aristotle’s philosophy in significant ways.27 
On Karamanolis’ analysis, then, it is inaccurate to speak of a monolithic Christian reception of 
Aristotle’s thought in late antiquity. 
The bulk of scholarship on late ancient Christianity, however, has replicated the position that the 
Stagirite’s philosophy was virtually inconsequential for Christians in this time frame. This tendency 
can be appreciated in the following examples. Gustave Bardy, following a thesis initially proposed by 
Jacques-François Denis in 1884, claimed that: “Origen will adopt more than anything, with regard to 
Aristotle, an attitude of defiance; he is not, in any case, familiar with his thought and he never regards 
him as his inspirer.”28 Henri Crouzel, Owen Chadwick, and Panayiotis Tzamalikos have followed this 
assessment without any substantial contradictions or corrections.29 Eugène De Faye and Hal Koch, 
                                                 
25 Karamanolis, “Early Christian Philosophers on Aristotle,” in Falcon, ed., 460–1. 
26 Karamanolis, “Early Christian Philosophers on Aristotle,” 462. 
27 Karamanolis, “Early Christian Philosophers on Aristotle,” 464–470, 475–477. 
28 Bardy, Origène, 83. See Denis, De la Philosophie d’Origène, 16. 
29 See Crouzel, Origène, 208. See for a more expanded version Origène et la Philosophie. While Crouzel is correct in pointing 
out some of the aspects of Aristotelian philosophy that Origen rejects, not only does this presuppose that Origen is to 
that extent familiar with his philosophy, but Crouzel also overlooks rather positive mentions about other Aristotelian 
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perhaps milder in their dismissal of Aristotle, still deem his relevance for Origen to have been marginal, 
and indirect at that.30 Other philosophically-minded early Christians like Gregory of Nyssa have 
likewise been approached without much attention for the various ways in which Aristotle may have 
informed his thought. For instance, Hans Boersma has recently sought to elucidate Gregory’s theology 
of embodiment and virtue through ample references to both Platonic and Stoic philosophy; Aristotle’s 
relevance for the monograph, however, is constrained to a single passing mention in a footnote.31 
Boersma’s approach is squarely situated in the interpretative tradition of Gregory’s work promoted by 
Harold Cherniss’ landmark monograph, The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa (1930).32 The few who have 
argued for the relevance of Aristotle’s thought for the Nyssen—in particular for his dialectic, 
anthropology, and moral psychology—remain marginal and frequently unacknowledged voices.33 
The case of Maximos the Confessor is perhaps unique in the scholarship of Greek late antiquity, 
for at least four distinct interpretative “traditions” of his work have formed in the course of the past 
seventy years. In his entry on classical influences on Maximos’ thought in the Oxford Handbook of 
Maximus the Confessor, Marius Portaru classes these scholarly traditions as being of 1) an Aristotelian, 
2) a (Neo)Platonic, 3) an Orthodox Christian, and 4) a philological persuasion. The first tradition has 
promoted the view that Maximos’ cosmological framework is primarily Aristotelian and that his 
corpus can be meaningfully elucidated by recourse to the Stagirite’s works.34 This tradition, however, 
has been amply criticized by highly-regarded Maximian scholars, most notably Irénée Hausherr and 
Jean-Claude Larchet.35 These two scholars have challenged what they consider an anachronistic, 
Neothomistic interpretation of Maximos’ work that shares more commonalities with the Aristotle of 
the Latin Scholastics than with the learned monastic context of a seventh-century Roman. As a result, 
promoting Aristotle’s relevance for Maximos’ thought has become riskily associated with this cadre 
of scholars and their methodological pitfalls. 
By contrast, other scholars have championed what Portraru refers to as a framework “of a neo-
Platonic nature.”36 What is curious about this tradition is that it inexplicably assumes that it must come 
at the expense of hermeneutical sensitivity for Aristotelian resonances in the Confessor’s oeuvre. That is, 
one must choose whether to read Maximos as an “Aristotelian” or a “Neoplatonist.” This line of thought 
was promoted by Walther Völker (1964) and on Portaru’s assessment has since been “decisively 
confirmed and developed by a great number of scholars.”37 I find Portaru’s assessment accurate—and 
                                                 
doctrines, especially noting that Aristotelianism corresponds to human needs and rationally accepts the value of good 
things in life more than any other system of philosophy. 
Compare to Treatise against Kelsos, 1.10, pp. 102.18–104.20. See also Chadwick, “Origen,” 83–102, where Chadwick does 
not mention the Aristotelian elements at play in Origen’s defense of the resurrection. 
Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology, 339. 
30 De Faye, Origène, 87; Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, 205. 
31 Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue, 172. 
32 E.g., Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus; Daniélou, Platonisme et théologie mystique; Konstantinou, Die Tugendlehre; Radde-
Gallwitz, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Reciprocity of the Virtues”, 537–552; Siniossoglou, “Plato Christianus, in Hummel; 
Ullmann, “Der logische und der theologische Sinn,” 150–171. 
33 See Zachhuber, Human Nature; Smith, Passion and Paradise; Salés, “Can These Bones Live?” 
34 E.g., von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie and 2nd ed. Kosmische Liturgie; Doucet, “Vues récentes,” 267–302; Garrigues, 
“L’Énergie divine, ” 272–296 and Maxime le Confesseur; Léthel, Théologie de l’agonie du Christ; Lévy, Le Créé et l’incréé; Piret, Le 
Christ et la Trinité; Prado, Voluntad y naturaleza; Renczes, Agir de Dieu; Riou, Le monde et l’eglise; Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua. 
35 See Hausherr, Philautie, 140–141; Larchet, La divinisation, 482–488, as well as his reviews of Renczes (2003) and Lévy 
(2006) in Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 100/1 (2005), 185–187 and 103 (2008), 967–976. 
36 Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences: Aristotle and Plato,” in OHMC 133. 
37 Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences,” 133. 
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for that, unsettling.38 The third and fourth interpretative traditions offer what Portaru defines as 
“theologically and philosophically neutral research” and a “balanced attitude to the details of his 
interaction with classical philosophers,” respectively.39 Portaru himself espouses the view that a 
Platonic framework “is essentially helpful in giving an intellectual account of much, but surely not all, 
Christian thinking,” including Maximos’ own work.40 So, it is hardly surprising that he closed his entry 
on Maximos’ use of classical sources thus: “I conclude that we cannot speak of any direct and 
significant influence of Aristotle on Maximus.”41 
A general picture of scholarly assessments of Aristotle’s relevance for late ancient Greek Christians 
emerges from these examples. In their view, these Christian intellectuals chose the philosophy of Plato 
and his acolytes at the expense of Aristotle’s. They were either unfamiliar with the Peripatetic corpus 
and therefore did not appropriate it for their theological projects, or they were openly hostile to the 
Stagirite and treated with contumely those who viewed him positively. By contrast, Plato and 
“Neoplatonism” were ubiquitous in the intellectual culture of late antiquity and largely congenial to 
Christian intellectual goals. That the bulk of scholarship is inclined to interpret this time period in 
ways largely consistent with this characterization is, I take it, a well-known fact. In this regard 
Maximos’ specific case is unusual, since a cadre of scholars has advocated for Aristotle’s significance 
for his theological apparatus in the interest of casting him as a proto-Thomist. And while I concur 
with Hausherr and Larchet that this interpretative tradition is anachronistic, it is nonetheless 
noteworthy that Maximos’ writings would attract the attention of these scholars when other early 
Greek Christians did not. 
This chapter is concerned with challenging the two-step assumptions overviewed above: that Plato 
and Aristotle represented opposed philosophical systems and that the latter had become negligible in 
late antiquity, particularly for Christians. The complexity of this objective calls for an interdisciplinary 
approach that avails itself of post- and decolonial theory, comparative philological analysis, and 
quantitative data analysis of digital humanities resources. This approach will allow us to outline the 
imaginative limits of the Confessor’s inherited interpretative traditions of classical sources in the 
interest of comprehending his intellectual milieu better. At present, it is difficult to know with 
precision the operative limits of his terminology, in part, I would propose, because the above-
mentioned assumptions have veiled and distorted a remarkably complex cross-pollination of 
philosophical and theological ideas between Christians and non-Christians. For these reasons, this 
chapter argues that Maximos’ intellectual milieu should be reassessed in light of the following two 
claims that respond to each of the assumptions named above: first, that the pre-modern evidence for 
a radical opposition between Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy is surprisingly sparse, and second, that 
late antiquity—and especially the generation immediately before Maximos—was the single most 
productive pre-modern period of research on Aristotle in Greek. 
 
1. Philosophical Essentialism, Intellectual Hybridity, and the Invention of Neoplatonism 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator; De Angelis, Natura, persona, libertà; Mondin, L’uomo; Kattan, Verleiblichung und 
Synergie; Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology; Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ; Granados García,“Seréis como dioses,” 105–155; 
Zañartu, “‘Las naturalezas,” 21–55; Völker, Maximus Confessor; Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy; Dalmais, 
“L’anthropologie spirituelle de saint Maxime le Confesseur,” 202–211, “L’oeuvre spirituelle de saint Maxime le 
Confesseur,” and “La doctrine ascétique,” 17–39; Savvidis, Die Lehre; Perl, “Methexis”; Jili, “The Doctrine of Theosis.” 
39 Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences,” 133. 
40 Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences,” 133. 
41 Marius Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences: Aristotle and Plato,” in OHMC 144. 
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 Coleridge’s transposition of biological language to philosophical schools is symptomatic of a wider 
and largely unexamined phenomenon in western European historiography of late ancient philosophy. 
As we will see in brief, Coleridge’s application of biological categories to intellectual history is neither 
an isolated nor an innocent instance. Rather, a cursory glance at nineteenth-century western European 
scholars of this philosophical time frame reveals an alarmingly high incidence of terminology 
otherwise found in legal and political documents regulating ethnic and cultural mixture in the context 
of colonial relations beyond the European mainland. Of course, this terminology had to be applied 
analogically and metaphorically, but this measure only complicates our task of identifying the colonial 
dimensions of this discourse and its impact on later scholarship. The result of the sustained application 
of what is at core colonial terminology to late ancient philosophy was the invention of a purportedly 
monolithic school of thought called “Neoplatonism” that never in fact existed. To be clear, I am 
contending that the western European invention of Neoplatonism in the nineteenth century was 
founded on colonial discursive strategies that determined the subsequent study of late ancient 
philosophies. 
Recent scholarly trends in medieval Roman studies, and in eastern Christian studies more generally, 
have resorted to postcolonial analysis to expose historiographical assumptions about the non-western 
other.42 I find this welcome turn of events illuminating, particularly as it has uncovered an extension 
of colonial-era presuppositions about the “oriental” in historical and cultural studies of the Christian 
east, which have in turn yielded problematic portrayals of this geographical spread. Broadly, this 
section is a continuation of this trend, with the significant difference that it primarily draws on 
Hispanic postcolonial theorists that remain little known in western European and Anglo-American 
circles of early Christian studies, though we should note that they are often complementary to their 
Afro-Caribbean, Asian, and African counterparts and share similar concerns. The purpose of 
appealing to these theorists is to expose two specific colonial strategies that undergirded the invention 
of Neoplatonism: first, Orientalizing and Occidentalizing discourse, and, second, hybridity. To be 
more precise, I am especially concerned here with understanding the interpenetration of these two 
strategies in nineteenth-century western European scholarly representations of Neoplatonism. It 
appears to me that Orientalizing, Occidentalizing, and hybridity discourses functioned in parallel to 
create Neoplatonism; the two were never far from each other. 
The first of these terms, “Orientalism,” is commonly associated with the work of Edward Said by 
the same name; as is well known, other scholars subsequently developed the various dimensions of 
this discourse, including Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi Bhabha. In Orientalism, Said broadly 
contends that western European representations of Orient were less a descriptive exercise of the 
cultures of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa than they were European political stratagems aimed at 
justifying the domination of ostensibly “inferior” peoples. Said’s analysis is not constrained to 
academic discussions; it includes, for instance, a revealing critique of Joseph Conrad’s literary work 
and thus points to a multidimensional cultural phenomenon. Although Said’s work does not show 
knowledge of the earlier work of a number of Hispanic postcolonial (or proto-postcolonial) theorists, 
the similarity of his insights to theirs is striking and deserves attention, elsewhere, in its own right. 
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The idea of a postcolonial condition and identity in Hispanic America began to be articulated rather 
early in the twentieth century and looked especially to economic and ethnic dimensions of colonialism. 
In this regard, one of the pioneering studies was Alfredo Colmo’s La revolución en la América Latina 
(1933), which spoke specifically of either a “postcolonial” (postcolonial) or “independent” (independiente) 
conundrum for countries who had emancipated themselves from European powers, but especially 
from Spain.43 In 1957, Leopoldo Zea published América en la historia (America in History, 1957), which 
went further than Colmo’s work in that it explored discursive dimensions in the exercise of colonial 
power as both a mechanism of social control and a narrative of western European self-invention. In 
his study, the term “occidentalismo” is especially important. He uses it to describe a western European 
self-representative discourse that necessarily birthed its constitutive alterity, an alterity that it rapidly 
relegated to the margins. 
In his analysis, it was altogether unsurprising that Latin America was consigned to the periphery;44 
what sparked his interest was the fact that Spain and Russia had ultimately been excluded from this 
process as well, in what he considered a somewhat ironic inversion of Hegelian dialectic that played 
out the visions of Marx and Engels in non-western-European European margins.45 What matters 
about his study for us is that he posits the idea that Occidentalism functions by eliminating the “other” 
from what he calls the “presente de la historia” (present of history);46 that is, Occidentalism makes 
itself possible by precluding the non-European other from a Hegelian self-realization in history to 
which the “Occidental” alone has access. The other is thus not just marginalized from history, but has 
no history, is not history, except inasmuch as it represents, mimics, or conforms to the Occidental by 
becoming it in order to attain historical being. 
Santiago Gómez-Castro, who developed much of Zea’s thought, elucidates this idea further in 
claiming that “The co-existence of diverse ways of producing and transmitting knowledge is eliminated 
because now all forms of human knowledge are ordered on an epistemological scale from the 
traditional to the modern, from barbarism to civilization, from the community to the individual, from 
the orient to occident . . . By way of this strategy . . . Europe acquires an epistemological hegemony 
over all other cultures of the world.”47 At the root of Castro-Gómez’ observation is again Zea’s 
concept of the “presente de la historia”; in Castro-Gómez’ hands, this historical present takes on an 
additional dimension, since it does not just refer to the “present moment,” so to speak, but rather, to 
the historical validity of a specific historical present that pretends it is not a historical present at all. 
He calls this idea “la hybris del punto cero,” (the hubris of point zero): it is a fallacious abstraction 
from history that dehistorizes and absolutizes itself by concealing its situationality and by “de-
presenting” (depresentar) its point of view as no point of view at all. In short, it is a perspective 
pretending ontological and epistemological totality that glosses over its historical insufficiency through 
the suppression of its constitutive other. 
This discourse of suppression was inseparable from the invention of racial purity and hybridity in 
a Hispanic colonial setting. After all, there must have been a way to regulate bodies according to 
specific parameters of social control. In Hispanic America, racial hybridity—or mestizaje—functioned 
as this tool of political, ideological, and identity disenfranchisement. In Colonial America, only criollos 
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and peninsulares (i.e., Spaniards born in America or in the Iberian Peninsula) could enjoy the full benefit 
of the law, including, especially, inheritance rights to property and titles. The remainder of the 
population was virtually reduced to legal or functional slavery through the system known as encomiendas. 
Accordingly, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, the priest who led the first independentist overture on 
September 15th/16th, 1810, abolished slavery in December of the same year and this measure remained 
at the forefront of every Mexican revised constitution since (1824, 1857, 1917). What was 
accomplished by law, however, could not so easily be shaken from the psychological constitution of 
the Mexican people. The problem of hybridity and race preoccupied twentieth century Mexican 
theorists, including José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), Samuel Ramos (1897–1959), Octavio Paz (1914–
1998), and numerous others. 
This latter in particular explored the psychological dimensions of coloniality in El laberinto de la 
soledad (1950) by analyzing the significance of an imposed biological hybridity founded on the 
systematic rape of the Mexican peoples between 1519 and 1810 and, just as important, on the social 
discourse that accompanied it. Especially important is his finding that biological hybridity is 
inextricably linked to a colonizing narrative of what Zea would later call an Occidentalizing nature. 
The objective of this narrative is to equate biological bodies of a certain type with a historical trajectory 
to which a “pure” body allows an access that is barred to those who are “mixed.” In this way, bodies 
can be narrativized into a historical trajectory through a mixed metaphor. Hybrids are not part of the 
unfolding Hegelian dialectic that undergirds history simpliciter, that is, they are not part of 
Occidentalism and thus, are not history at all. Here we see the function that the Occidentalist narrative 
has in the erasure of bodies from a history that pretends it is History, Hegel’s Absolute Spirit. 
The foregoing findings allow us to discover a series of colonial prejudices and assumptions at work 
in nineteenth century historiography of late antiquity, particularly as concerns the invention of so-
called “Neoplatonism.” Let us be clear: Neoplatonism never existed—or, what is more precise to say, 
Neoplatonism only began to exist at some point over the course of the nineteenth century as a 
discursive category that served colonial purposes in the invention of an Occidental identity.48 It is 
curious, as we will see below, that Spanish and Russian historians were marginal during this time to 
the Occidentalist discourse that western European scholars infused into late antiquity. 
In this regard, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann’s Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie (1820) may be 
accounted one of the most influential texts, as it was also translated into English, Italian, and French 
and was widely known and cited by nineteenth-century scholars as far as Russia. Tennemann’s 
definition of Neoplatonism ensconces the prevalently negative attitude toward it that characterizes 
modern scholarship. In his words, Neoplatonism (der neue Platonismus) is “1) The decline of the true 
(ächt) Greek spirit, and the increasingly greater fusion (Verschmelzung) of the same with the oriental, 2) 
the growing orient-like tendency (Hang) toward rapture (Schwärmerei) under the pretext of divine 
revelation and the depreciation of Plato.”49 
The Marburg scholar’s word choice implies a series of culturalist and essentialist assumptions that 
pervaded his context. The essential character of this “Neoplatonism” is a hybrid of a decadent Greek 
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spirit mixed with the inferior, superstitious, and seemingly irrational spirit of an unspecified Orient. 
One of Tennemann’s most notable, albeit remarkably subtle, moves in this passage is to transpose 
physical language into what is by any of his contemporary definitions immaterial. One may ask: how 
do “spirits” (which are immaterial) “fuse” (an action that by definition implies the melting and mixture 
of two physical elements)? Tennemann has—ironically, given his cultural presuppositions about 
purity—mixed metaphors. These mixed metaphors, however, are a mechanism that bridges the 
(purportedly) physical dimensions of racial discourse with the conceptual dimensions of intellectual 
discourse, partly, as it serves an Occidentalizing discourse. In this way, he can cast Neoplatonism as a 
form of “intellectual hybrid” that like a “racial hybrid” is irreducibly inferior to the purer (i.e., 
European) form from which it degenerated by mingling with a lesser breed. His use of terms like 
“true” (ächt), “fusion” (Verschmelzung), and “rapture” (Schwärmerei) reflect exactly such assumptions. In 
particular, Verschmelzung and Schwärmerei are tellingly harsh terms: the prefix ver- often denotes a quality 
of corruption, diminishment, or movement away from the original possession or state (e.g., 
Verfälschung, verwirren, verführen, vergessen, verkaufen, verformen), while the standard German deprecatory 
ending -erei shows his condescension for the philosophical enterprise he describes here. 
Tennemann’s assessment was far from marginal. A few years later, Georg Ast underscored the 
familiar distinction between (Neo-)Platonism and Peripatetic thought, while implicitly endorsing 
Tennemann’s juxtaposition of European rationalism against Oriental emotionalism. He writes: 
“Besides Neoplatonism, and in part as opposition, the sober Peripatetic philosophy preserved itself in 
its purity (Reinheit).”50 Elements at work in Tennemann’s Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie emerge 
here again: Aristotelian thought is clearly demarcated as a “sober” (nüchterne) form of philosophy—
and antithetical to (Neo-)Platonism; it is, on Ast’s assessment, its sobriety that preserves its “purity” 
(Reinheit), a purity that presumably lends it its European character. Like Tennemann before him, Ast 
dismisses Neoplatonism as “bare mysticism” (blosse Mystik), which Ammonios Sakkas “transformed” 
(umbildete) when he “imported” (übertrug) “Mysticism as an oriental absorption (Versunkenheit) and 
enthusiasm into Greek philosophy.”51 Ast’s analysis consistently contrasts the sobriety or rationality 
of Aristotelian thought with the rapturous and emotional traits of an Orientalized Platonism. 
The work of Friedrich August Carus also attests to this widespread attitude toward Neoplatonism 
and its lack of European purity due to the hybridity of its character. The section in his Nachgelassene 
Werke: Geschichte der Psychologie dedicated to late ancient philosophy goes by the telling title: “From Plato 
to Orientalism in European Philosophy or From the Original (ursprünglichen) and Pure (reinen) Platonism 
to the So-Called Neoplatonism.” Like the two scholarly assessments already overviewed above, Carus 
here likewise contrasts an original and pure form of European, Platonic philosophy, with an 
Orientalized form of it that he manifestly holds in low esteem. His unflattering views of Neoplatonism 
in this section and elsewhere visibly stem from the intellectual hybridity he implicitly attributes to it.52 
A similar attitude pervaded scholarly assessments of “Neoplatonism” across western Europe. For 
instance, the Italian scholar Giovanni Campiglio, who was familiar with Tennemann’s work,53 likewise 
derided Neoplatonism as a philosophy that Plotinos “definitely founded on mysticism” (la fondò 
definitivamente sul misticismo)54 and which Proklos united with “the most credulous superstition” (la più 
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 23 
 
credula superstizione).55 In this same work, he traced the transmission of Aristotle’s philosophy into the 
Arabic-speaking world and poignantly claimed that: “They [Arabs] did not so much as (neppure) know 
this philosopher [Aristotle]; for they received the corpus of his works through the fallacious (fallace) 
intermediary of Neoplatonism, and in inexact translations. Therefore, their Aristotle was an Aristotle, 
so to speak, reconciled with Plato, who must have pleased them, fomenting their natural disposition 
to contemplation and enthusiasm.”56 Like the German scholars previously overviewed, Campiglio’s 
work demonstrates a set of recurring characteristics. Neoplatonism, in his analysis, is a degraded form 
of philosophy that has lost its original Platonic character. As he sees it, the influx of oriental credulities 
has not only hybridized its nature, but, indeed, has for that very reason precluded it from any 
significant role in the transmission of Aristotle’s philosophy. That is, Neoplatonism loses its role in 
Occidental history, a legacy that we can appreciate when reviewing most “introduction to the history 
of philosophy” courses in the west. Campiglio clearly thinks little of the idea of reconciling Plato and 
Aristotle, which again suggests his aversion to hybridity and reinforces the idea that their philosophies 
are diametrically opposed. This much is clear when he refers to “their Aristotle,” virtually, it would 
seem, as though he were a fiction. Finally, we should note his attribution of a “natural disposition” 
(naturale disposizione) to “contemplation” and “enthusiasm” to the Arab people: these stereotypes echo 
the prejudices already identified in the work of the German scholars overviewed above. Let us note 
that Campiglio’s views are not an isolated instance in nineteenth-century Italian scholarly attitudes to 
this subject matter.57 
Further instances of nineteenth-century scholarship on Neoplatonism could be examined in detail, 
but a clear pattern emerges from the cases thus far considered: they jettison the “purity” and rationality 
of the European against the irrational hybridity of Neoplatonism, whose chief fault is to have allowed 
an (often unelaborated—and likely imagined) Oriental character into its intellectual formation. It bears 
mentioning that these scholars either entirely elided or downplayed the fact, already recognized by late 
ancient Platonists like Porphyrios,58 that Aristotle was regarded as the most valuable interpreter of 
Plato and an inseparable part of the late Platonic curriculum. It is tempting to attribute this significant 
omission to an effort to dissociate Aristotle—widely recognized as the father of western European 
rationalism—from Neoplatonism, tarnished, as it ostensibly was, by its hybrid nature and 
“emotionalism.” And yet, there existed contemporaneous alternatives in formulating Neoplatonism’s 
relationship to ideals beyond the Greco-Roman pale that veered away from colonial discourse. In this 
regard, Russian treatments of Neoplatonism point to a different socio-cultural frame of reference. 
Indeed, perhaps their most salient feature is their insistence on the Greek character of Neoplatonic 
philosophy, even while recognizing the impact that eastern ideas had on it. In this, Russian scholars 
staked their own counterclaims to the right of inheriting Classical antiquity through their Orthodox 
identity, which they associated with the medieval Roman Empire, of which they believed they were 
the direct descendants. 
For example, Vasiliy Polisadov explained that: “Without Alexandrian philosophy [i.e., Alexandrian 
Neoplatonism], Greek philosophy would have been nothing but a book without an ending. 
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Neoplatonism (Неоплатонизмъ) was the last and indeed the closing word (послѣднимъ и при томъ 
окончательнымъ словомъ) of the philosophical works of Thales, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Plato, 
Aristotle, and Zeno. Even if it [Alexandrian philosophy] was animated with a new spirit, even if the 
influence of the east (Востока) and the times . . . vigorously impacted its teachings (могущественно 
коснулось ея ученiй), it was nonetheless (тѣмъ не менѣе) Greek philosophy.”59 In his description, 
Polisadov differs from the foregoing western European assessments of Neoplatonism in two 
meaningful regards and perhaps in opposition to Tennemann’s and other Europeans’ theses, with 
which he, too, was acquainted.60 First, although he defends a predictable “Greek essentialism” of 
Neoplatonism, he nevertheless regards this last stage of Greek philosophy as an uninterrupted 
continuation of the Eleatic and Attic forebears. Second, while he acknowledges that some eastern 
ideas made their way into Neoplatonic thought, he employs no recognizable biological language to do 
so (e.g., коснулось—impacted, touched) and decidedly did not consider this influx to have altered the 
intellectual value or Greek integrity of Neoplatonic philosophy as his western European counterparts 
had. He does not use the western colonial term “Orientalism” (ориентализмъ) to contextualize 
Neoplatonism, but opts, instead, to employ the relatively neutral Russian term восток (east). 
For our objective in this chapter, the western European trends overviewed above hint at three 
important points. First, Aristotle seems to have been largely precluded from careful consideration in 
the intellectual formation of Neoplatonism and, by extension, from that of early Christianity. Second, 
the modern scholarly construction of Neoplatonism largely associates it with an “Oriental” character 
that infused the otherwise respectable philosophy of Plato with a tendency toward “enthusiasm” and 
“contemplation” that conferred upon it its “mystical” aspects. This philosophy, needless to say, was 
not “purely” European. Third, Neoplatonism was reified into a monolithic philosophical-mystical 
amalgamation that brushes over its significant points of internal difference, philosophical preferences, 
and varied hermeneutical strategies. While it would be unfair to characterize contemporary scholarship 
as unqualifiedly sharing these three early modern points, there are, mutatis mutandis, significant points 
of similarity and continuity between them. In what follows, we will examine and assess the first and 
third point in particular by turning to the last great philosophical debate that took place in the Roman 
Empire on the eve of the Italian Renaissance. The second point, I take it, is prima facie highly 
problematic and needs no extended elaboration here. 
 
 
 
2. Plato and Aristotle at the Twilight of the Roman Empire 
 
In 1439, the borders of the Roman Empire dangerously swayed under internal administrative 
inadequacies and external geopolitical machinations that were accentuated by the meeting of the 
fateful Unionist Council at Ferrara-Florence. That same year, Georgios Gemistos Plethon (ca. 1355–
1454) delivered a series of highly controversial lectures in Florence that he published immediately 
thereafter under the title On Aristotle’s Differences from Plato (Περὶ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Πλάτωνα 
διαφέρεται=On Differences).61 This work sparked the last major philosophical debate in the Empire. As 
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the title indicates, Plethon set out to underscore Aristotle’s differences from his teacher, but his treatise 
was not an innocent exercise in comparative philosophical philology. Plethon was concerned with 
demonstrating Plato’s superiority over Aristotle, as well as his greater congeniality with Christianity. 
Given the date of composition and his Florence lectures,62 it is difficult not to interpret it as a 
reactionary response to what he perceived to be a (Thomistic-Aristotelian) Latin encroachment on 
Greek theology. The upshot of this work was an exaggeration of Greek Christianity’s indebtedness to 
the Academy as its idiosyncratically-differentiating characteristic. As such, Plethon may have been 
responsible for setting in motion the now common separation of the Christian confessional divide 
into “Latin Aristotelians” and “Greek Platonists,” even if he himself could certainly not have foreseen 
this consequence. 
Plethon’s premises predictably struck the majority of his learned contemporaries as tendentious 
and problematic. Five years later, the future bishop of Ottoman-occupied Constantinople, Georgios 
Gennadios Scholarios (ca. 1400–1472), responded with Against Plethon’s Difficulties Regarding Aristotle 
(Κατὰ τῶν Πλήθωνος ἀποριῶν ἐπ’ Ἀριστοτέλει=Against Plethon).63 In this rather involved reply, 
Scholarios challenged some of Plethon’s central theses, but did his best to avoid conceding the validity 
of Plethon’s sharp juxtaposition of Plato and Aristotle. A number of intellectuals joined the fray in 
the wake of Scholarios’ Against Plethon: Matthaios Kamariotes, Theodoros Gazes, Andronikos 
Kallistos, and Georgios Trapezountios largely took Scholarios’ side, while Plethon found some 
qualified support in his students Michael Apostoles and Cardinal Basilios Bessarion.64 
This dispute will be relevant for our purposes for several reasons. For one, it will put in sharp relief 
the striking dearth of sources in Greek that attested to the belief that Plato and Aristotle were as 
diametrically opposed as is now taken for granted. Also, it will show that even Plethon himself did not 
strictly espouse the foregoing view. Rather, Karamanolis has described his assessment of Aristotle in 
On Differences as “a degraded Platonist who preserves a confused picture of the Platonic heritage.”65 In 
other words, Plethon was not strictly arguing that Plato and Aristotle were the founders of two 
competing philosophical ideologies; rather, he held that the latter was simply a flawed Platonist exegete 
of his master’s thought. But perhaps most importantly, this dispute exhibits the widespread consensus 
among late medieval Roman scholars (regardless of whether they preferred Aristotle or Plato) that 
Plato and Aristotle had promoted two largely congenial and often complementary philosophies. 
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Scholarios’ Against Plethon was meticulous enough to elicit a more carefully-studied argument from 
Plethon in his next philosophical round, Against Scholarios, penned some five years after Scholarios’ 
riposte. This second work was intended to undermine Aristotle’s credentials by divesting him from 
the elaborate Christian garb in which centuries of his Greek and Latin Christian interpreters had robed 
him. Ironically, Plethon’s success in removing their interpretative fabric was a pyrrhic victory, for he 
simply substituted a positive Christian appraisal of Aristotle for a negative one, that of Eusebios of 
Caesarea, to be exact. It is possible that Plethon was already familiar with Eusebios’ works before 
Against Scholarios (for example, the title of On Differences may be an indirect reference to a line in 
Eusebios that urges “let us observe in the mind in how many other things Aristotle differs from 
Plato”66 and there are other minor similarities, such as a section on merology67), but he seems to have 
availed himself of the Caesarean polemicist in earnest only as he crafted his reply to Scholarios. 
Plethon scoured the textual evidence that could afford him arguments in favor of his position; he 
did not find much. All the evidence points to his indebtedness to Eusebios of Caesarea’s On the 
Preparation for the Gospel, to which he must have had first-hand access. Numerous passages confirm this 
suspicion, such as this brief excerpt originally from Plato’s Timaios 29d7–e3 that is reproduced in both 
texts: 
 
Eusebios, On the Preparation for the Gospel Plethon, Against Scholarios 
Λέγωμεν δὴ δι’ ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ 
πᾶν τόδε ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν· 
ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε 
ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. τούτου δὲ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα 
ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια 
ἑαυτῷ (11.21.2.3–6) 
λέγωμεν δὴ δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν 
τόδε ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν. ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ 
δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται 
φθόνος· τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα 
ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ (10.55–
59) 
 
While both Eusebios and Plethon identify Plato as the source, both authors’ versions minimally, but 
significantly, differ from those handed down in Plato’s recensions. This excerpt can be found quoted 
only in a few other sources: the spurious On Fate attributed to Ploutarchos (573b11–c4), Theodoretos’ 
The Cure of Greek Maladies (4.33.1–2), and Simplikios’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (CAG 9, 43:9–10; 
CAG 10, 1360:31–33). An orthographical difference in the texts has made the original source 
identifiable: Plato’s Timaios reads: συνιστὰς συνέστησεν; pseudo-Ploutarchos’s and Simplikios’ versions 
read: ξυνιστὰς συνέστησεν; Theodoretos’ version reads: ξυνιστὰς ξυνεστήσατο. Only two extant 
versions in the Greek corpus read ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησεν: Eusebios’ and Plethon’s. While we could 
speculate further on the transmission history of these citations, it is only salient for our purposes to 
                                                 
66 πρόσσχωμεν τὸν νοῦν ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις διαφέρεσθαι τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην. Eusebios of Kaisareia, On the Preparation 
for the Gospel, 15.7.7.11–12. 
67 The possible similarity can be seen in this parallel comparison of the two texts: 
 
 
Eusebios, Apostolic Preaching, 12.52.22.6 Plethon, On Differences, 3.35–36 
μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχὶ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα 
ἀπεργάζεται (.  . . the part indeed is for the sake of the 
whole and the whole is not brought about for the sake of 
the part) 
ἕως ἂν μὴ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους μεῖζον ᾖ 
(. . . lest the part be not greater than the whole, but the 
whole than the part) 
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note that Plethon must have copied this quote directly from an available version of Eusebios’ text that 
had this specific—and, we must underline, unusual—spelling and only modified the passage slightly 
to fit his syntactical order and rhetorical flourishes. This passage is not an isolated instance, which 
indicates that Plethon was reading the Classical source material in tandem with the most influential 
Christian popularizer of Plato’s and Aristotle’s adversarial relationship, Eusebios of Caesarea.68 
Plethon’s extensive, perhaps exclusive, reliance on Eusebios’ text suggests that he only had access 
to a limited proverbial storehouse of anti-Aristotelian ammunition, which leads me to the following 
conclusions. First, previous instances where a Christian’s intimate association with Aristotle resulted 
in ecclesiastical condemnation, such as the case of Ioannes Italos and Michael of Ephesos some four 
centuries prior, had not become part of Greek collective memory by the fifteenth century so that he 
could readily invoke it and thus bolster his claims. Second, the sources that promoted a radical 
distinction between Aristotle and Plato had either not survived or had not garnered the sustained 
attention that would have rendered them a curricular topos in philosophical training during the medieval 
Roman Empire. Indeed, it appears that exactly the opposite was true: the scholarly consensus as late 
as the fifteenth century—much to Plethon’s and Apostoles’ chagrin—was that Plato and Aristotle 
agreed on most matters and often complemented each other’s ideas. 
Scholarios had made precisely such a point in his Against Plethon, referring to “the ancients” (οἱ 
ἀρχαῖοι), such as Porphyrios, Syrianos, and Simplikios, as his witnesses to the fact that Plato and 
Aristotle were largely of one accord or otherwise supplemented each other’s philosophical projects.69 
Indeed, he goes so far as to call into question Plethon’s belief in a unified or monolithic tradition of 
“Platonists” (οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα),70 arguing that his adversary was advocating for a specific interpretation 
of Plato, namely, that of Proklos Diadochos.71 In his reply to Scholarios, Plethon tendentiously 
reported that it had been “Simplikios alone” (Σιμπλίκιος μόνος) who believed that Aristotle and Plato 
agreed on most matters.72 Thus, to favor Aristotle over Plato was on Plethon’s account a betrayal of 
the tradition of “the ancients.” “But,” as Karamanolis interjects, “such a claim is historically a gross 
oversimplification. Scholarios will justifiably point out that many ancients preferred Aristotle to Plato, 
like the Peripatetics, for instance, but, more significantly, that many Platonists in antiquity had a great 
respect for Aristotle . . . . Indeed, the majority of the Platonist commentators in late antiquity were 
devoted students of Aristotle, as they maintained that Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy are quite 
compatible and rather complementary.”73 Karamanolis unambiguously concludes: “Simplicius was not 
an exception but rather a typical case among late ancient Platonists.”74 
The continuation of Plethon’s mission fell to his student, Michael Apostoles. Scholarios’ ally, 
Theodoros of Gazes, had written an examination and criticism of Plethon’s exposition of οὐσία 
                                                 
68 See e.g., On the Preparation for the Gospel 11.32.3.2–3/Against Scholarios 10.48–49; On the Preparation for the Gospel 
12.27.4.4/Against Scholarios 27.39, 43; On the Preparation for the Gospel 15.12.1.4–15.12.2.1/Against Scholarios 31.75; On the 
Preparation for the Gospel 15.22.51.5 – 7/Against Scholarios 29.14–15, etc. 
69 See Contra Plethonem, 3.1–34. A case in point is Simplikios’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories: “I think it is also necessary 
for one not to look only at the letter of those things uttered by Plato to determine a discord between the philosophers [i.e., 
Plato and Aristotle], but, looking at the sense (νοῦν), to seek their concord on most subjects.” (δεῖ δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τῶν πρὸς 
Πλάτωνα λεγομένων αὐτῷ μὴ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ἀποβλέποντα μόνον διαφωνίαν τῶν φιλοσόφων καταψηφίζεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸν νοῦν 
ἀφορῶντα τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις συμφωνίαν αὐτῶν ἀνιχνεύειν. In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, CAG 8, p. 7.29–32.) 
70 Georgios Gemistos Plethon, Contra Scholarii 26.60, 27.87, 29.88. 
71 Letter to the Princess of the Peloponnese, Opera 4, p. 153.23–24. See Karamanolis, “Plethon and Scholarios,” 262. 
72 Contra Scholarii 1.20–2.12. 
73 Karamanolis, “Plethon and Scholarios on Aristotle,” in Ierodiakonou, 261–262. 
74 Karamanolis, “Plethon and Scholarios on Aristotle,” in Ierodiakonou, 261–262. 
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(substance) in Aristotle by the title In Reply to Plethon, On Behalf of Aristotle (Πρὸς Πλήθωνα ὑπὲρ 
Ἀριστοτέλους), which prompted Apostoles’ In Reply to the Defenses on Behalf of Aristotle Concerning Substance 
against Plethon of Theodoros of Gazes (Πρὸς τὰς ὑπὲρ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ οὐσίας κατὰ Πλήθωνος Θεωδόρου 
τοῦ Γαζῆ ἀντιλήψεις=Against Gazes), a treatise that he addressed to Bessarion. In Against Gazes, 
Apostoles noted that Attikos, Plotinos, and Porphyrios had vehemently attacked Aristotle, particularly 
his doctrine of the soul as the entelechy or actuality (ἐντελέχεια) of the body and mentioned various 
other points of alleged disagreement between Plato and Aristotle.75 What is telling about Apostoles’ 
criticism, however, is that like Plethon, its debt to Eusebios’ On the Preparation for the Gospel is readily 
and unsurprisingly apparent. Following are some instances of his direct borrowing from Eusebios, a 
borrowing, we should note, that he curiously never attributes to his original source, even if he 
elsewhere lets on to his first-hand knowledge of the fourth-century historian and polemicist.76 
 
Eusebios, On the Preparation for the Gospel Apostoles, Against Gazes 
ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια 
πιστά οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν 
ἔχουσιν, οὕτως οὐκ ἔστι Πλάτωνι καὶ 
Ἀριστοτέλει φιλία (15.4.21.1–3) 
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια 
πιστά, οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν 
ἔχουσιν, οὕτως οὐδ’ ἔστι Πλάτωνι καὶ 
Ἀριστοτέλει πρὸς ἀλλήλω φιλία (2.3.9–11) 
ὁ μὲν γὰρ μετασχὼν καὶ ἐφικόμενος αὐτῆς 
πάντως εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειφθεὶς καὶ 
ἀδυνατήσας θεωρὸς γενέσθαι πάντως ἄμοιρος 
εὐδαιμονίας καταλείπεται (15.13.2.3–
15.13.3.1) 
ὁ <μὲν> μετασχών τε καὶ ἐφικόμενος, πάντως 
εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ’ ἀποληφθεὶς καὶ ἀδυνατήσας 
θεωρὸς γενέσθαι εὐδαιμονίας ἄμοιρος 
καταλείπεται (3.6.12–13) 
φησι καὶ τὴν τούτων νόησιν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι 
καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, δι’ ἧς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος 
καὶ ἡ μακαριστὴ βιοτὴ παραγίνεται 
(15.13.5.13–14). 
νόησιν φήσας σοφίαν εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμην, δι’ ἧς 
τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος καὶ ἡ μακαριστὴ βιωτὴ 
παραγίνεται (3.6.17–18). 
 
I have here bolded identical words found across both texts. The first of these passages stands out 
especially for both its ingenuity and extreme position on the relationship between Aristotle and Plato: 
“For just as there are no trustworthy agreements between lions and men, or as wolves and sheep have 
no like-minded thought (ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν), in this way there is no congeniality (φιλία) between Plato 
and Aristotle.” Eusebios had adapted Achilles’ oft-quoted aphoristic reply to Hektor’s request for 
funerary rites for the vanquished of their duel (Iliad 22.247–264); presumably, he did so to strengthen 
the cultural resonance this phrase would have in order to accentuate the disagreement between the 
philosophical pair by founding it on one of the greatest adversarial relationships known to Greek 
literature. By directly borrowing an identical turn of phrase, Apostoles likely aimed at the same goal. 
Further examples could be offered, but it would seem that the most salient anti-Aristotelian passages 
that Apostoles employed were originally penned in the fourth century and as part of a sophisticated 
and relentless anti-Hellene rhetorical campaign. But what Plethon’s and Apostoles’ borrowings 
likewise show is that the material available for them to make their case was disappointingly thin. Thus, 
                                                 
75 Apostoles, Ad Theodori Gazae, 3.6.3–9. 
76 See Karamanolis, “Plethon and Scholarios on Aristotle,” in Ierodiakonou, 265. Karamanolis has also claimed Apostoles’ 
direct dependence on Eusebios’ text. For Apostoles’ reference to Eusebios and his Ecclesiastical History by name, see Ep. 
105.4. 
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their knowledge of the few instances where the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle had come 
into sharper focus was mediated, almost certainly, through a single polemical source. 
A closer look at the sources to which Apostoles refers (Attikos, Plotinos, and Porphyrios)77 as 
critical of Aristotle, would have likely tempered his polemical tone, for of these three Platonists, only 
Attikos was notably hostile to Aristotle, a position, we should note, that was shared by very few other 
Platonists, perhaps only by Noumenios of Apameia.78 While Apostoles is correct in noting that all 
three of these Platonists were critical of Peripatetic psychology, and specifically of the belief that the 
soul is the entelechy of the body, his tone and approach are meant to give the impression that this was 
just one of many late ancient Platonic criticisms of the Stagirite. But Plotinos’ criticism of Aristotle is 
largely constrained precisely to psychology,79 whereas he otherwise is generous to Aristotle and even 
appropriated large swaths of his thought, as Blumenthal has convincingly demonstrated.80 No other 
than Porphyrios, Plotinos’ own disciple, unambiguously declared (positively, we should add) of his 
teacher that “in his collected works are mixed both the elusive Stoic doctrines and the Peripatetic.”81 
Porphyrios, in turn, was known to the Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Armenian, and Latin traditions as the 
commentator on Aristotle par excellence and as the author of one of the most copied and translated 
texts in the premodern era, the Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (or the Introduction/Εἰσαγωγή). 
Unsurprisingly, twenty-five manuscripts in various recensions of the Greek text are still extant—more, 
by comparison, than the thirteen manuscripts that directly or indirectly attest to Maximos’ greatest 
work, On Difficulties (or The Ambigua). The text was likewise translated into Syriac early on under the 
title ܠܐܩ ܬܢܒ ܫܡܚ ܠܥ ܣܘܝܪܦܪܦܕ ܝܓܘܣܝܐ (The Eisagoge of Porphyrios on Five Categories), such that approximately 
in 645 Athanasios of Balad, a member of the highly prolific Syrian school of Qenneshrin, already 
deemed a revision necessary for further study of Aristotle at that school; this fact also points to the 
prevalence of Aristotle’s philosophy outside exclusively Greek-speaking geographical limits.82 Two 
other Syriac translations are preserved, one in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France as Parisinus Syriacus 
161 and one in the Biblioteca Escorial de Madrid as Códice 652. In the following century, the Persian 
Rōzbih pūr-i Dādōē, better known as Abū Muħammad ‘Abd Allah Rūzbih ibn Dādūya ibn al-Muqaffa 
translated the Introduction into Arabic on the basis of a Syriac text, giving it the Arabicized title derived 
from the Greek, يجوغاسا, which subsequently received numerous commentaries, such as Abū al-Faraj 
‘Abd Allah Ibn al-Ţayyib’s in the eleventh century.83 Toward the beginning of the tenth century, the 
text was again translated from Syriac by Abū ‘Uţman al-Dimašqī with the more extensive title of 
يروصلا سويرفرفل يجوغاسا.84 Two Armenian manuscripts, Parisini Armeniani 105 and 106 are extant that 
also include a translation of Pseudo-David’s late sixth-century Greek commentary on the Introduction. 
Finally, the Introduction entered the Latin world just over a century after its composition when Marius 
Victorinus translated it in full, though this translation has only survived in small fragments from 
Boethius’ own rendition of the text, the Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, 
                                                 
77 See Apostoles, Against Gazes, 3.6.7–9. 
78 See Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, 29 and 197–199. 
79 En. 4.7.85.16–19 and En. 4.7.85.43–44. 
80 See Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Psychology, 135. 
81 Ἐμμέμικται δ’ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι καὶ τὰ Στωικὰ λανθάνοντα δόγματα καὶ τὰ Περιπατητικά. Vita Plotinii, 14.4. 
82 See Brock, “The Earliest Syriac Translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, I Edition,” 316–366 and “Some Notes on the 
Syriac Translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge,” 41–50. 
83 See Ibn al-Tayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge: Arabic Text. 
84 See Isāġūjī li-Furfuriyūs al-Şūrī naql Abī ʿUţmān al-Dimašqī, 67–94. 
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completed in the sixth century. In brief, Porphyry’s Introduction was a remarkably famous work that 
spanned numerous geographical spaces, languages, cultures, and religions. 
The reason this is especially significant for our purposes is that this famed companion to Aristotle’s 
Categories states in its preface to Chrysaorios that one must understand the Categories as an essential step 
in approaching the Peripatetic’s teaching and the assignment of definitions. Porphyrios’ telling 
assumption here, which would have colored the subsequent reception of Aristotle and his relationship 
to the Platonic school, is that his (Platonist) readers were in fact interested in understanding Aristotle’s 
work and teachings. In light of this evidence, it would appear that in the fifteenth century Apostoles 
was recreating a polemicized version of Platonic-Aristotelian rivalry that never existed with the furor 
he ascribed to it. 
Finally, Bessarion took up Plato’s case in this ongoing fifteenth-century debate. Although the 
cardinal believed that Plato was Aristotle’s philosophical superior and that his teachings were more 
compatible with Christianity, he rescinded the sharp juxtaposition that Plethon and Apostoles had 
taken over from Eusebios. Indeed, as he notes in the beginning of his First Examination of the Blasphemies 
against Plato, it is his express goal to strive for a certain even-handedness in his treatment of the subject 
matter he considers; we should note, in fairness to him, that he did remarkably well in that 
undertaking.85 The negative views that Scholarios, but especially his intellectual confreres, had 
expressed about Plato had struck the cardinal as unfair and required correction;86 he did not, however, 
correspond their vitriol. In this regard, Craig Martin has observed that “Bessarion was more interested 
in defending Plato and his accord with Christianity than in attacking Aristotle”87; and that is precisely 
how the First Examination of the Blasphemies against Plato reads. Absent from the treatise is the critical 
attitude toward Aristotle that Plethon and Apostoles had exhibited, as is also the radicalization of their 
incompatibility and irreconcilable disagreement. Rather, the tone of the apology on Plato’s behalf is 
highly reminiscent in its attitude toward Aristotle of the late ancient Platonic commentaries on the 
Peripatetic corpus. 
Bessarion approached this subject matter thus because he found limited historical precedent among 
the “wise exegetes” for the alleged conflict of the two philosophers. On the contrary, he underscores 
that the bulk of their relevant texts were concerned with evidencing the concord (συμφωνία) of 
Aristotle and Plato.88 In this spirit, he validates how his adversaries rightly exalt Aristotle, “for the man 
is worthy of great repute” (μεγάλης γὰρ εὐφημίας ἄξιος ὁ ἀνήρ), but censures how they scoff at Plato 
as if he were pariah (ἐξ ἀμαξῶν).89 What is significant about Bessarion’s position is that he implicitly 
undermines the validity of Plethon’s and Apostoles’ disjunctive premise, even if he agreed with them 
about Plato’s superiority and greater congeniality with Christian doctrine. Put differently, as late as the 
fifteenth century, the suggestion that Plato and Aristotle were mortal philosophical adversaries was 
not only met with considerable resistance, but was also regarded as a largely contrafactual fabrication 
with sparse historical precedent. In this light, the modern radicalization of the disagreements between 
Plato and Aristotle has popularized and standardized what was a marginal late ancient Christian 
polemical tradition that rarely, if ever, formed part of medieval Roman philosophical curricula. As I 
                                                 
85 First Examination, 1.1.1.1–1.1.3.24. 
86 In calumniatorem Platonis, 1.1.1.30–36. 
87 Martin, Subverting Aristotle, 41. 
88 See Bessarion, In calumniatorem Platonis, 2.11.1.12–19. 
89 In calumniatorem Platonis, 1.1.2.12–14. 
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have argued in the preceding section, this modern move can be partially attributed to colonialist 
assumptions that bled into academic discourse. 
 
3. A Quantitative-Analytical Approach to 
Late Antiquity as the Greek Golden Age in the Study of Aristotle 
 
In light of the foregoing sections, it seems necessary to reconsider Aristotle’s role in the formation 
of late ancient intellectual identities by offering a counternarrative that accords him a more prominent 
seat at the table. To that end, this section demonstrates that late antiquity was the most productive 
period in the study of Aristotle’s philosophy in pre-modern Greek and that this fact is hardly 
unremarkable given the widespread interest in Plato. I have argued briefly that the assumption that 
Aristotle did not figure in the picture during this time can be in large part attributed to the colonial 
prejudices of modern historiography and the belief that the philosophical pair were antithetical rivals. 
By challenging these presuppositions, it is possible to obtain a different appreciation of the late ancient 
philosophical-theological landscape. Particularly, two features stand out and will guide the following 
analysis. First, regardless of whether his name is mentioned in a positive, neutral, or negative context, 
Aristotle was referred to by name with greater frequency in late antiquity than at any other time in the 
history of pre-modern Greek—at one point, in the sixth century, significantly more often than Plato. 
Second, his fate was tied to Plato’s. In other words, the study of Aristotle went hand-in-hand with the 
study of Plato. 
Given the vast amount of data—as well as its internal complexity—that must be analyzed in order 
to support these claims, an interdisciplinary approach to the evidence that offers a compound, multi-
dimensional image of late ancient intellectual history, its transmission, and its transformations seems 
justified. Specifically, we will resort to quantitative data analysis (or statistical data analysis) in order to 
offer a necessarily broad outline of the reception of Aristotle in Greek between the first and fifteenth 
centuries before transitioning in chapters three to five to a qualitative philological, philosophical, and 
theological analysis that will position Aristotle’s philosophy in dialectics with the internal logic of 
Maximos’ thought. The idea, in brief, is to offer a general picture of Aristotle’s reception between the 
first and fifteenth centuries in Greek. Comparisons to other philosophers, but especially Plato, will be 
included where appropriate. 
For these goals, the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG) is the single most important database. While 
we must note that the TLG is somewhat incomplete and to that extent flawed, both because recent 
editions of texts have not yet been uploaded and, more significantly, because what texts have survived 
and are represented in the database are in various ways accidents of history, the TLG nevertheless 
constitutes the most comprehensive repository of the pre-modern Greek corpus; it includes, according 
to the platform’s website, “more than 110 million words from over 10,000 works associated with 4,000 
authors.”90 As such, the conclusions that can be drawn from analyzing its data will be as statistically 
conclusive as will ever be possible for contemporary researchers, barring some remarkable (and 
certainly welcome) discovery of texts that are lost or unknown. Nevertheless, statistical analysis cannot 
be put on hold in the hopes of such a discovery. Moreover, it would be difficult for a discovery to be 
of such magnitude that it would substantially alter the following statistics. 
                                                 
90 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/tlg.php, accessed 03/25/2017. 
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A good indicator for whether a philosopher had drawn attention during a specific time frame is the 
number of mentions of the philosopher’s name during that interval. Clearly, this parameter cannot—
and is not meant to—offer a comprehensive and exhaustive account of the interplay of ideas in pre-
modern societies or even the way in which a philosopher’s ideas and works might have been used; it 
can, however, offer a broad, but often telling, outline of the changes in priorities or of the availability 
of leisure and financial subsidies necessary for the production of philosophical and theological works 
from century to century. These fluctuations, in turn, invite closer and more nuanced analysis through 
the resources of qualitative analysis, to be performed hereafter. To that end, this section investigates 
a series of variable datasets for the three most mentioned philosophers in pre-modern Greek between 
the first and fifteenth centuries: Plato, Aristotle, and Chrysippos.91 
 
3.1. Plato and Aristotle: Statistically Correlated Variables? 
Chart A is the most general chart in this section, since its parameters remain rather broad. This 
chart graphs the number of mentions of the lemmas “Χρύσιππος” (Chrysippos), “Ἀριστοτέλης” 
(Aristotle), and “Πλάτων” (Plato) between the first and fifteenth centuries in the TLG corpus. The 
lemmas included here and in the following charts comprise all case-derivative forms (e.g., Πλάτωνος, 
Ἀριστοτέλει, Χρύσιππον, etc.), but not morphologically-dependent terms (e.g., Πλατωνικός, 
Ἀριστοτελικῶς, etc.). Chrysippos will function, where applicable, as a control variable.92 
 
Chart A 
 
Chart A shows that in nearly every century the incidence of Aristotle’s and Plato’s names evidences 
a strong correlation. In other words, if Plato’s name rises, so does Aristotle’s; if it falls, so does the 
Peripatetic’s. For example, between the first and second centuries, Plato went from 767 to 3,067 
mentions, approximately a 299% increase; the incidence of Aristotle’s name likewise spiked from 359 
to 1700, approximately a 374% increase. In the following century, Plato’s name fell from 3,067 
                                                 
91 Although the name Ζήνων (Zenon) registers a higher number of incidences in the TLG, after the 5th century, the vast 
majority of these refers to the Emperor Zenon (425–491), not the philosopher and thus lowers the total number of 
mentions beneath that of Chrysippos. 
92 This data taken down 03/29/2017. Modifications from the main dataset presented on the TLG have been 
implemented to adjust for long range works and/or authors, varia, incerta, etc. 
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mentions to 595, a drop of approximately 81%. In that same time frame, Aristotle’s name dropped 
from 1,700 to 312, a decrease of approximately 82%. For the next three centuries, their names register 
consistent gains, both reaching their all-time high in the sixth century (Plato: 3,301; Aristotle: 4,532), 
before taking a stark, but predictable, plummet of 97.55% (Plato) and 98.5% (Aristotle) in the seventh. 
Between the seventh and eighth centuries, for the first and only time, Plato registers minimal gain 
while Aristotle decreases further. But for the following seven centuries the philosophical pair would 
again rise and fall correlatively. For instance, between the eighth and ninth century Plato registers an 
increase of 396%, Aristotle an increase of 1,480% over his all-time low; in the following century, both 
fall by 26.2% and 30.4%, respectively. During the first century of the Komnenian Renaissance 
(eleventh century), they pick up a 37.6% (Plato) and 233.4% (Aristotle) gain, but drop again in the 
second century of the academic revival by 44.3% and 62%, respectively. Thereafter they again grow 
similarly and consistently, registering a major spike in the fifteenth century over the previous century 
of approximately 212% and 376%, respectively. 
The negative and positive (or differential) correlation described above can be represented by 
plotting whether a philosopher’s name received as great an increase in mentions as the century before, 
or registered a loss of mentions relative to the century prior. Here we must use the century’s midpoints 
for the temporal axis and, again, Chrysippos as a control variable. Chart B plots these results: 
 
Chart B
 
 
What this chart displays is that an increase in mentions of Plato’s name can consistently predict a 
gain in mentions of Aristotle’s. Likewise, a drop in mentions of the one can also predict a drop in 
mentions of the other. What this chart shows particularly well is that their statistical changes follow 
each other on the positive and negative axes. It is especially important to underscore what the chart 
plots, since the time frame between 350 and 550 might give the wrong impression that Plato is losing 
mentions, while Aristotle is gaining them. In effect, during this time frame they both registered gains, 
but Plato did so at a lower rate than Aristotle from century to century. For example, between 350 and 
450 Plato gained an additional 1,088 mentions (relative to the 1,050 between 250 and 350—which is 
why the two points on the graph are so close to each other), but between 450 and 550 he only gained 
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568, which appears in the graph as a downturn in gains relative to the previous century’s gains. That 
is, he gained approximately half as many mentions between 450 and 550 as he did between 350 and 
450—but he registered gains. These gains are collective, for which reason from 250 to 550 Plato gained 
a total of 2,706 mentions over a base of the 595 mentions he had in the third century. Thus, when 
added together (595+1,050+1,088+568), his total number of mentions in the sixth-century registers 
his all-time high of 3,301 mentions. In brief, Plato and Aristotle follow each other on the positive and 
negative sides of the axis, dipping into negative numbers in years like 250, 650, 950, and 1150, but 
pushing into positive numbers in years like 150, 350, 550, 850, 1050, and 1450. By comparison, the 
incidence of the control variable “Χρύσιππος” remains largely steady across the centuries, registering 
some correlation only between the second and fourth centuries. While the pattern is not entirely 
perfect or symmetrical, it nevertheless suggests a strong correlation between Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
fortunes. 
We may attribute this outcome to the fact that Plato and Aristotle were often either discussed in 
tandem or that it was a widespread late ancient scholarly convention to turn to the one in order to 
understand the other better, as the previous section discussed. More precisely, it was most probable 
that a Platonist would turn to the Stagirite’s corpus or later commentaries and opinions on it to 
elucidate the thought of Plato. So, if the fifteenth-century debate overviewed above is a representative 
predictor, an interpretation of this data that avoids the unnecessary multiplication of explanatory 
factors is that Aristotle and Plato were mutually-conditioning variables, although we should add that 
it was more likely that Aristotle’s fortunes depended on Plato’s. This correlation becomes clearer by 
searching for how many times and how many words apart Plato’s and Aristotle’s names appear. To 
obtain this data, we searched for the combination of two lemmas: Πλάτων and Ἀριστοτέλης and 
Χρύσιππος and Ἀριστοτέλης; the latter again functions as the control variable. Likewise, we increased 
the number of words that separated the first term from the second, first ranging from 1 to 10 words 
apart, as well as 15 and 20 words apart. 
 
Chart C
 
This chart shows that the number of matches predictably increases as the search parameter 
broadens. However, we found that the data became skewed, as based on the trend line (dotted, blue), 
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results. We can attribute the noticeable rise in matches between 10 and 15 to a doubling of matches 
using one of the two terms already counted in another match. For example, the term “Aristotle” may 
appear six words before the term “Plato” and again a second time twelve words after; in this case, a 
single instance of Plato’s name would yield two matches with the term “Aristotle,” and thus give an 
overestimation of the data proximity. The average overlap under the parameter of fifteen words 
between lemmas was approximately 5%,93 which distorts the data trend and is therefore precluded 
from analysis here. So, although we graph the matches under the search parameters of 15 and 20 
words between lemmas, these only function as limits and not part of the data we will comment on. 
What matters for us about Chart C is that the correlation we found in Charts A and B is not simply 
coincidental. Authors were in effect naming both philosophers in close proximity to each other, such 
that nearly 12% (1,541/11.74%) of the total mentions of Aristotle’s name between the first and 
fifteenth centuries (13,124) was ten or less words apart from Plato’s. That may not seem like a 
particularly high percentage, but we should consider the following two points. First, the search 
parameters are already highly specific, which makes a twelve percent match rate truly rather 
remarkable. Second, the control variable only has 60 matches out of 13,124 possibilities at the most 
generous search range (10 words apart), that is, 0.46%. In other words, Aristotle’s name was about 
twenty-five times more likely to appear within ten words of Plato’s than the next philosopher 
mentioned most frequently by name in the pre-modern Greek corpus. Put differently, about one out 
of every eight times that Aristotle’s name is mentioned, within ten or fewer words Plato’s name is also. 
These findings lend some credence to Scholarios’ and Bessarion’s observations above regarding the 
treatment of the philosophical pair by “the ancients.” 
 
3.2. Aristotle through the Centuries 
Chart D nuances the statistics in chart A further by ordering the number of references to Aristotle 
according to the century when they were written. 
 
Chart D
 
                                                 
93 From a sample of 100 matches, four to five, on average, overlapped with previously counted terms. E.g., Origen, 
Against Kelsos, 2.12.21–29 and Diogenes Laertios, Lives of the Philosophers, 4.67.14–15, 5.1.3–5, 10.8.6; also for Diogenes 
Laertios, Lives of Philosophers, 3.109.6–10 overlaps with a previously counted match at sixteen words, indicating that such 
instances continue to increase as the distance between terms is broader. 
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The sixth century shows by far the highest incidence of references to Aristotle by name than any 
other century (4,532/35%) and during this century Aristotle outpaced Plato by over one thousand 
references (see Chart A). The century with the next highest incidence of mentions, the fifteenth 
century (2,245/17%), represents less than half the number of the sixth. By another take, there were 
vastly more references to Aristotle—nearly twice as many—by name in the sixth century (4,523/35%) 
than in the subsequent eight centuries (seventh to fourteenth) combined (2,480/20%). Put differently, 
more than one of every three named references to Aristotle in Greek between the first and fifteenth 
centuries was written in the sixth century. Given the subject matter of this project, it seems salient to 
note that Maximos would have received his early philosophical formation toward the end of the sixth 
century (ca. 585–600), that is, some fifteen and twenty-five years, respectively, after the deaths of the 
two authors who referenced Aristotle most in the Greek language, Simplikios of Kilikia, a Platonist 
(d. 560; 2,268 references) and Ioannes Philoponos, a Christian (d. 570; 1,069 references). 
In total, late antiquity penned nearly two-thirds of all references to Aristotle by name 
(8,464/64.5%), although these centuries only represent about a third of the time span in view here. If 
we focus on the early Christian period, that is, the second to the fourth century by Karamanolis’ 
definition, it is still the case that Aristotle’s name registers more significantly on the chart than in 
virtually any other period outside late antiquity, the fifteenth century excluded. For example, the 
second century marks the high point of references to Aristotle in the early Christian period (1,700 
mentions) and is the third highest century in total references to Aristotle, after the sixth and fifteenth 
centuries. By comparison, the Komnenian Renaissance (11th–12th c.), and its intellectual-cultural 
revival beyond Constantinopolitan walls, falls considerably short of the third century alone, with a 
combined total, for both centuries, of 1,012 references. This period was populated by such eminent 
figures as Ioannes Italos, Michael Psellos, Eustathios of Thessaloniki, Ioannes Tzetzes, and, of course, 
Anna Komnene, who gathered around her a circle of scholars—one of whom mentioned in his 
funerary oration on the Roman princess that her scholarly zeal had caused the brightness of the 
eyesight of his friend from Ephesos (i.e., Michael of Ephesos) to burn down just as the candles he 
employed to scour ancient commentaries on Aristotle in her service—that included Michael of 
Ephesos, Eustratios of Nikaia, and Georgios Tornikes. And yet, the third and fourth centuries 
combined registered a comparable number of incidences of Aristotle’s name (898) as the Komnenian 
Renaissance (1,012), marked by a difference of 114 mentions or just over 11%. Although I do not 
wish to put too fine a point on the matter, it is indicative of the intellectual-cultural prevalence of 
Aristotle in the early Christian period of late antiquity if its total number of references to Aristotle 
between the second and fourth centuries is more than twice (2,598 vs. 1,012) that of a period dubbed 
a “renaissance” in the study of Peripatetic philosophy. In brief, if we organize the top five centuries 
in descending order from highest to lowest incidences of Aristotle’s name, three of them (sixth, 
second, fifth) belong to late antiquity, and the other two (eleventh and fifteenth) made direct reference 
to those who were active in these centuries (e.g., Attikos, Proklos Diadochos, Syrianos, Simplikios). 
This hierarchy is depicted in chart E: 
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Chart E 
 
The foregoing statistics, of course, only furnish a blurry picture that can be sharpened by further 
breakdown of the data. It would be impractically unwieldy, however, and in many ways irrelevant, to 
do so for the fifteen centuries thus far considered. Therefore, for now we will handle the period 
between the second and seventh centuries, since it is more immediately salient for our objectives. 
Moreover, the distinction between “Hellenes” and “Christians,” on which the following graphs rely, 
is a moot point after the seventh century. 
 
3.3. Plato and Aristotle: A Closer Look among Hellenes and Christians 
In the foregoing sections, we have challenged the belief that Christians were hardly familiar with 
Aristotle’s thought or that if they were, that they were extremely critical or dismissive of his work. 
While I agree that these assessments are no doubt true about some Christian authors, I would argue 
that these critical receptions only contributed a handful of tesserae to an already kaleidoscopic 
transmission history of his philosophy among Christians. Before we can turn to a more detailed 
philological and philosophical account of this reception, we should first contextualize the works that 
will form part of that analysis. This contextualization can be well served by examining how widely 
Christians wrote about Aristotle relative to both their Hellene counterparts and relative to how often 
they wrote about Plato. This data can be graphed by dividing the authors between the second and 
seventh century into “Christians” and “Hellenes” and tallying the number of references that each 
group makes to both philosophers. The point is to determine whether and how often Aristotle was 
referred to by either Christians or Hellenes, and how he compared to Plato across the same two 
groups. Anonymous texts, the affiliation of whose author was unknown or undeterminable, have been 
omitted from the dataset: 
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Certain features of this chart are significant for our purposes. First, it is clear that Hellenes 
contribute by an ample margin the bulk of references to both Plato and Aristotle, even in the fourth 
and sixth centuries, where Christians come closer than in other centuries. Second, in every century the 
number of Christian mentions of Plato ranges between substantially higher (e.g., 2nd c.: Aristotle: 68 
mentions, Plato 314; 4th c.: Aristotle: 212, Plato 666; 5th c.: Aristotle: 165, Plato 727) and marginally 
higher (e.g., 3rd c.: Aristotle: 72, Plato 116; 6th c.: Aristotle: 1,566, Plato: 1,789; 7th c.: Aristotle: 57, Plato: 
60) than the number of Christian mentions of Aristotle. It is likely that this margin, particularly during 
the early Christian period, has given the impression that Aristotle had little significance for the 
intellectual identity formation of late ancient Christianity. This margin of differences can be seen by 
representing only Christian references to Aristotle and Plato on the chart in a stacked, 100% column 
graph, as in Chart G: 
Chart G
 
Half of these centuries (second, fourth, fifth) register a higher Christian mention of Plato than 
Aristotle as measured by references to his name; the other half (third, sixth, seventh) registers only 
marginal differences. However, we should note that even at the lowest points, in the second and fifth 
centuries, Aristotle’s name still visibly figures on the chart, making up about 20% of the total number 
of references in the time period. This percentage is not insignificant if we consider that, by comparison, 
between the second and seventh century, Chrysippos received less than a combined total of 100 
references by Christians, nearly eighty percent of which (73 out of 92) were by the pens of just two 
authors, Eusebios, a polemicist (23), and Ioannes Stobaios, an anthologist (50). Moreover, we should 
underscore that Maximos lived between 580 and 662, which is to say, during the time period on the 
graph that evidences the lowest differential in mentions of Aristotle’s and Plato’s names. Finally, we 
must highlight that this data only offers a partial view of the intellectual dynamics for this time frame, 
given that it only takes one factor into consideration, that is, the number of mentions of the 
philosophical pair. Equally important is the number of authors that refer to the two philosophers. 
Thus, Chart H traces the number of authors by affiliation that refer to Plato and Aristotle between 
the second and seventh century: 
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Chart H 
 
What is clearly visible from Chart H is the outstanding number of authors, both Christian and 
Hellene—although mostly Hellene—who refer to Aristotle and Plato in the second century. Likewise, 
Plato among the Hellenes consistently counts the largest number of authors from the second through 
the sixth century. But what is perhaps striking about this chart is the statistical similarity between 
Christian authors who refer to Plato and Christian authors who refer to Aristotle. This similarity can 
be exhibited better in a stacked 100% bar graph, as in Chart I: 
 
Chart I:
 
As with Aristotle in Chart F, the second century registers rather low for Christians and highest for 
Hellenes; in the third century, Christian authors drop further, but register consistently higher numbers 
in the subsequent centuries, sometimes coming within close range of Hellene authors. If we compare 
the numbers of both charts, two points stand out in particular. First, the number of authors, either 
Christian or Hellene, who refer to Plato is generally higher than that of those who mention Aristotle. 
Second, this observation should be qualified by noting that the gap between Christians and Hellenes 
who mention Plato is significantly higher than that between Christians and Hellenes who mention 
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Aristotle. Thus, we should underscore that the total number of authors who refer to Plato is higher 
than that of authors who refer to Aristotle, but that the substantial difference in that margin is largely 
made up by Hellenes, not Christians. Put differently, Christians and Hellenes refer to the Stagirite in 
similar numbers, but Hellenes consistently register a higher—sometimes substantially higher—
number of authors who mention Plato by name than Christians. 
What Chart I might suggest is that the number of Christian authors who refer to Plato is not 
significantly different than the number of Christian authors who refer to Aristotle. While in virtually 
every century all three categories—Plato among Christians, Aristotle among Hellenes, and Aristotle 
among Christians—trail Plato among Hellenes, what is significant, given our subject matter, is that 
Christian interest in Aristotle and Plato, as measured by number of authors who refer to the 
philosophical pair, does not statistically diverge as radically as scholarship may lead one to believe. The 
difference between Christian mentions of the one and the other can be seen more clearly in Chart J, 
which excludes Hellene authors: 
Chart J
 
Chart J offers a second point of reference for the significance of Plato and Aristotle in late ancient 
Christian intellectual identity formation, a point that might suggest that Plato’s relevance for Christians 
in this time frame has been overstated—perhaps, and this is significant, at the expense of Aristotle’s. 
And the crux of the problem is precisely this: that Plato’s significance has been emphasized at the 
expense of Aristotle’s. I would like to suggest an alternative possibility: Aristotle and Plato often garnered 
similar levels of interest from Christians and this fact is hardly surprising because the two philosophers 
were two sides of the same coin. Thus, if late antiquity was the golden age in the study of Aristotle, it 
was because that was also the golden age in the study of Plato: these two facts are not mutually 
exclusive, but, more likely, predictable on the basis of the datasets analyzed in this section. Finally, we 
should note that this alternative possibility for which I have argued seems consistent with the findings 
of the previous section and resonates especially well with the theses of scholars like Bessarion and 
Scholarios, which we briefly overviewed in the previous section. 
The discussion in this section has been admittedly general, but not for that reason insignificant. 
The data analyzed here, although lacking further nuance, offers a large-scale vision of Hellene and 
Christian interest in Plato and Aristotle as measured by the mention of their names. There remains, 
of course, more to be done, but it seemed necessary to me to offer a broad image of which we should 
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not lose sight even after we’ve turned our attention to the minutiae of Maximos’ background materials, 
texts, and his historical sources, to which we now turn. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
MAXIMOS OF ALEXANDRIA: 
AN UNREAD LIFE OF MAXIMOS THE CONFESSOR 
 
Tell all the truth but tell it slant— 
Success in circuit lies 
 
—Emily Dickinson, Poem 1263 
 
Introduction 
 
 Maximos the Confessor was forty-six years old when he began writing his first known work in 626 
and already possessed the thorough knowledge of philosophy and theology that would enable him to 
compose the lion’s share of his theological oeuvre in the following eight years.94 His correspondence, 
often intimate and personal, with some of the most powerful functionaries and bureaucrats of the 
Roman Empire also suggests enviable and longstanding connections in the major cities of the Empire 
and especially in Alexandria and Constantinople. It is thus remarkable that no text by his hand before 
626 exists, that no imperial record can so much as hint at his background, and that none of his friends 
or correspondents disclose any direct information that could enhance our knowledge about his birth, 
childhood, education, or geographical movements during the first half of his life. This lack of 
circumstantial evidence is aggravated by what appear to be two radically contradictory biographical 
traditions concerning his early life, one transmitted in Greek, the other in Syriac. 
 The consensus for the past millennium has held that in 580 Maximos was born from Christian 
aristocratic parents in Constantinople, where he received an elite education; at thirty he became the 
chief of imperial records under Herakleios, he abandoned civil service to enter a monastery across the 
Bosporus three years later, and assumed a central position in the struggle against imperial-driven 
Monenergism and Monothelitism, which resulted in the mutilation of his right hand and tongue and, 
on August 13th, 662, in his death at the military fortress named Schemarion near the shore of the Black 
Sea in Lazica (modern-day Georgia). 
This basic sketch of his life derives from a Greek hagiographical tradition extant in three 
recensions, as well as a complex of ancient passiones, letters, and other documents from which these 
Lives were culled.95 With the exception of passing references to his birth in a Palestinian village in a 
few late medieval Syriac chronicles, there was no apparent reason to question the Greek accounts; 
after all, nearly all the circumstantial evidence seemed to corroborate this outline of his life. Maximos 
was a regular correspondent with eminent Imperial figures, including Georgios the ἔπαρχος (prefect) 
of Africa,96 Petros, the στρατηγός (general) of Numidia who was later dispatched to Alexandria,97 
                                                 
94 See Jankowiak and Booth, “An Annotated Date-List,” in OHMC, 28–46. 
95 For more extensive commentary on the three recensions, as well as their relationship to other passion narratives and 
sources for Maximos’ life see Allen, “Life and Times,” in OHMC, 10–14. See also Neill, “The Lives of Pope Martin I,” 
91–109 and “The Greek Life of Maximus the Confessor (BHG 1234),” 46–53. 
96 Ep. 1 (PG 91:364A–392B). 
97 Ep. 13 and 14 (PG 91:509B–533A and 533B–543C); opusc. 12 (PG 91:141A–146A). 
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Konstantinos, a σακελλάριος (secretary of the treasury),98 and Ioannes, an imperial κουβικουλάριος 
(chamberlain) at Constantinople. Maximos’ correspondence with high-profile figures and implication 
with relatives of the emperor himself would of course be unremarkable quotidian fare for a member 
of the aristocracy.99 The hagiographical claims about his private and outstanding tutoring can be seen 
reflected in his writings, which earned him the epithets of “the philosopher”100 and “most holy monk, 
philosopher, martyr, confessor and great teacher of the church”101 in subsequent centuries. Anna 
Komnene even remarked that the “philosopher and martyr Maximos” and the “altogether 
contemplative and intellectual character (τὸ πάνυ θεωρητικόν τε καὶ νοερὸν) of the man, precipitates, 
as they say, dizziness for those who read [him] (ἴλιγγον παρέχεται τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν).”102 Her 
observation is significant in light of her claims about her thorough grasp of Platonic and Aristotelian 
philosophy in the proemium to the Alexiad.103 
Past scholars have assumed that the intellectual stature he acquired could only be accomplished by 
one nurtured at the capital.104 His unusually precise knowledge of aristocratic insignias has also been 
identified as evidence for his well-to-do provenance.105 In addition, the third Greek recension 
(henceforth GL3) claims that the Emperor Konstans II Pogonatos referred to Maximos as “our 
forebear” (ἡμῶν προγονικός) and requested that two patricians in full regalia escort him to the capital, 
where he was to stand trial.106 Such a gesture would likely only be extended to members of aristocratic 
extraction. The biographical account in GL3, although perhaps stylized and “unabashedly 
hagiographic,”107 seemed a trustworthy narrative insomuch as it readily accounted for all of this 
evidence by situating Maximos among the Roman elite. 
 On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Ukrainian scholar Sergei Leontevich Epifanovich 
raised the first concerns about the Greek recensions by challenging M. D. Muretov’s scholarship on 
Maximos’ life, as well as the significance of their Old Georgian translations as presented by the prolific 
Georgian scholar Korneli Kekelidze.108 Epifanovich’s works became inaccessible in the aftermath of 
the Soviet takeover and have only recently reentered scholarly discussions.109 In 1967 Wolfgang 
Lackner made a major breakthrough when he demonstrated the extensive reliance of the infancy 
narrative of GL3 on one of the versions of the Life of Theodoros Stoudites.110 Although his discovery cast 
doubt on the accuracy of some of the events recounted in GL3, it did not affect its overall 
trustworthiness or status among scholars. 1973 marked the tipping point, when Sebastian Brock 
published a transcription of the Syriac manuscript known as BM Add. 7192, folios 72b–78b, including 
                                                 
98 Ep. 5 and 24/43 (PG 91:420C–424C and 608B–613A/637B–641C). 
99 Ep. 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 27, 44–5 (PG 91:392D–408B, 408C–412C, 413A–420C, 449A–453A, 460A–509B, 617B–620C, 
641D–648C, 648D–649C). 
100 John of Damascus, imag. 2.65.1. 
101 Synkellos, Ecloga chronographica, 382:3–5. 
102 Alexiad, 5.9.3.8–14. 
103 Alexiad, proemium, 1.2.4–9. 
104 Larchet, La divinisation, 10–12. See also Salés, St. Maximus the Confessor, 16 and Booth. Crisis of Empire, 147. 
105 Ambig. 32.4, Constas, 357 n. 6. 
106 Disputatio Byziae 9, Allen and Neil, 106. 
107 Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 25. 
108 Epifanovich, Материалы, VI; see by the same author, Преподобный Максим Исповедник. 
109 See Benevich, “Maximus’ Heritage in Russia and Ukraine,” in OHMC, 460–479. 
110 See Lackner, “Zur Quellen und Datierung der Maximosvita,” 285–316. 
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a vivid translation accompanied by his characteristically insightful and thorough notes, under the title 
“An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor” (henceforth SL).111 
SL seems on its face to tell a completely different infancy story than GL3. It recounts the 
scandalous tale of a certain MSKY (ܝܟܣܡ, most likely Moschion), the illegitimate offspring of a 
Samaritan merchant and a Persian slave girl who was born in the village of Ḥeṣfin in the Palestinian 
Golan. He lost his father to dropsy at nine and his mother to a lethal fall from a pomegranate tree at 
ten, while his siblings died from freak accidents, including a vicious camel’s mauling. He was raised by 
a certain Pantoleon, “wicked and Origenist,” who renamed him Maximos (ܣܘܡܝܣܟܡ) during his time 
at the monastery of the Palaia Lavra (St. Chariton) in honor of his nephew’s son, who had died earlier. 
The account (inexplicably) picks up again some four decades later and retells how Sophronios of 
Jerusalem fell—perhaps literally—under Maximos’ spell of heretical teachings. Thereafter, the 
antihero spearheaded the Dyothelite charge against the imperial doctrines of Monenergism and 
Monothelitism that urgently sought to pacify and reintegrate disenchanted non-Chalcedonian factions 
through the revision of Christological definitions. As a result of Maximos’ heresy and impudence, the 
author of SL intimates, God rained down his wrath on the Roman Empire in the form of the Islamic 
conquests that followed on the heels of Herakleios’ armistice with Sassanian Persia. When the rebel 
was finally captured, he was confined to a female monastery—for shame, no doubt—but the 
manuscript breaks off before the end. Nevertheless, the author, a Syrian hierarch called George 
(perhaps Gregory) of Resh‘aina, who claims he knew Maximos personally, must have heard about his 
ignominious demise, given the title of his work: A Tale Concerning the Wicked Maximos of Palestine, Who 
Blasphemed against His Creator and Had His Tongue Cut Out. 
Once brought to light, this work received a range of scholarly responses. Given some of its 
outlandish claims and its virulently hostile tone, numerous scholars simply disregarded the SL as the 
incensed and fabricated ravings of an adversary;112 others have weighed its merits, but have 
nevertheless come out in favor of the Greek accounts;113 yet others have underscored the merits of 
the Syriac Life, particularly the fact that a birth in Palestine, as the Syriac Life claims, would make sense 
of Maximos’ seemingly long friendship with Sophronios of Jerusalem114 and of some of his theological 
sensitivities against a “revived” Origenism.115 No work, however, has done as much as Phil Booth’s 
Crisis of Empire to vindicate the veracity of SL and to undermine the legitimacy of GL3 and its 
purported infancy narrative.116 After his careful analysis of the data, he concludes that SL “inspires 
confidence both in its closeness to events and in its intersection on various incidental points of detail 
with other sources of the period.”117 
The jury, however, is still split concerning SL, as Pauline Allen has accurately noted: “The Syriac 
Life of Maximus has tended to polarize scholars, meeting with both negativity and unqualified 
                                                 
111 Brock, “An Early Syriac Life,” 299–346. 
112 Constas, On Difficulties, vii, for example, makes no mention of the biographical challenges raised by the SL. In fairness, 
however, the introduction to the text is allotted a very tight word limit that can be spent on other, more certain and 
illuminating, matters that have greater bearing on the work at hand. See also Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, 65; Ekonomou, 
Byzantine Rome, 79. 
113 See Maximus the Confessor, trans. A. Louth, 5–6. 
114 Louth, Maximus the Confessor, 6. 
115 Argarate, Diálogo ascético, 38–39. 
116 See Booth’s reconstruction of the unfolding scholarly divide on the question of SL and GL3 in Crisis of Empire, 143–
155. 
117 Booth, Crisis of Empire, 148. 
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acceptance.”118 Perhaps what compounds this scholarly debate in particular is the fact that the infancy 
narratives of both GL3 and SL can readily account for significant moments of Maximos’ career, while 
simultaneously being deeply problematic. SL would explain Maximos’ apparently longstanding 
friendship with Sophronios better, and his relation to the circle of the Eukratades (Sophronios and 
Ioannes Moschos) mentioned in epistolary exchanges.119 GL3, on the other hand, offers a plausible 
and rather simple reason for which Maximos regularly corresponded with the Roman elite, was familiar 
with aristocratic insignias, and was exceptionally schooled: he was an aristocrat. But both accounts 
have major drawbacks. On the one hand, the infancy narrative of GL3 (henceforth GL3i) presents an 
array of problems because it is little more than a stylistically sophisticated plagiarism. On the other 
hand, despite Booth’s claims that SL “inspires confidence,” the account’s hostile tone already 
predisposes one to be circumspect about its claims and especially those surrounding Maximos’ origins. 
The result is that we have reached a scholarly stalemate concerning Maximos’ early years. I believe 
this scholarly stalemate exists because of an imbalanced analysis of the sources. Let me be clear: 
articles, chapters, and conference presentations have done much to erode the credibility of GL3’s 
infancy account; but the infancy account of SL (henceforth SLi) has received no literary-analytical 
treatment. In other words, this stalemate stands on an imbalanced assessment of the infancy sources. 
This chapter aims at upsetting this stalemate through a two-step argument. First, it is high time SLi 
receives the literary analysis it deserves. I will argue that such an analysis demonstrates that SLi is as 
much a literary fabrication as GL3i. My conclusion is that both SLi and GL3i are not reliable sources 
of information for Maximos’ early years. This conclusion leads to the second step of the argument. 
Once Palestine and Constantinople are removed from the picture—indeed, once we have no bias in 
favor of or against any particular place of origin—what can we say about his upbringing? I will propose 
that the least problematic answer to this question and the one that accounts for the most data available 
is that Maximos was an upper-class youth who hailed from or extendedly resided in Alexandria. These 
findings fit in with the larger picture of this study by requiring a reevaluation of his thought, sources, 
and semantic range of his terminology in light of the lively study of Aristotle that we know took place 
in Alexandria during the late-sixth and early-seventh centuries. In other words, this chapter offers an 
unprecedented reconstruction of his background that has never before been considered in the 
recreation of his intellectual trajectory.120 These findings will inform and direct our subsequent study 
of his works. 
 
1. Syriac Literary Background 
 
SL is a cultural production whose literary and social context scholars have left largely untouched. 
By the time of Aphrahat the Persian Sage (270–345)—that is, some three centuries before the 
composition of SL, Syriac was already a language adorned by rich literary figures and rhetorical 
devices. This fact is surely germane to any contemporary scholar of Syriac literature, but the fact should 
be stated here at the outset to evince any ambiguity. These stylistic complements have been amply 
                                                 
118 Pauline Allen, “Lives and Times,” in OHMC, 13. Parenthetical references to scholars who hold such views have been 
left out. 
119 See Booth, Crisis of Empire, 149. 
120 The closest any scholar has come to this position is Boudignon’s “Maxime le Confesseur.” His study, however, does 
not attempt to reconstruct his intellectual trajectory; rather, it is designed to illumine the puzzling network of 
connections that Maximos had in Alexandria. 
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studied, not only in Aphrahat, about whose stylistic means an entire monograph has been written,121 
but in numerous other Syriac writers, such as Ephrem of Nisibis (306–373),122 Balai of Qennešrin (5th 
c.),123 the long-lived Mar Aba II of Kaškar (641–751),124 and Antony of Tagrit (9th c.), who even wrote 
a manual on rhetorical style.125 In this way, earlier prejudices about Syriac writers’ lack of taste for 
oratory126 have been gradually replaced with a fascination for their ample appropriation of Greek 
stylistic devices and the development of their own idiosyncratic literary and linguistic forms.127 John 
Watt notes in this regard that: “The Syrians could well have found rhetoric useful in a number of ways. 
Certainly, they had little occasion or incentive to employ secular panegyric, but they did wish to praise 
the saints and celebrate the feasts of the church, persuade or dissuade their congregations, defend 
their theological heroes, and accuse or vituperate heretics.”128 In light of Watt’s observations, it would 
be unremarkable for a learned Syrian hierarch to resort to rhetorical devices in order to “vituperate 
heretics” like Maximos.129 
To comprehend the internal structures at play in SL, it seems necessary to provide a thick 
description of the Syriac literary background, both as it developed and, more specifically, as it stood 
around the time of SL’s composition. As Watt mentioned above, Syriac frequently availed itself of 
rich rhetorical and linguistic means to undertake protracted character assassinations. Most scholars of 
late antiquity will no doubt be familiar with Gregory of Nazianzos’ scathing invective (στηλιτευτικός) 
against Emperor Julian, but around the same time Ephrem of Nisibis penned an equally antipathetic 
text, the Hymns against Julian, that drew extensively on the rhetorical tradition to lambast the Apostate’s 
memory. Ephrem often interwove rhetoric with intertextuality in order to fold his audience into 
familiar Biblical narratives and dramatize contemporary events. Thus, for example, the Syrian deacon 
employs the Biblical metaphor of the wheat and the tares from Matthew 13:24–30 to contrast his 
congregation (the wheat, or perseverant Christians) with Julian (the tare, or apostate).130 By paralleling 
current events in this way with well-known Scriptural stories, Ephrem could imply the moral of the 
story by signaling the end of the tares: they are separated from the wheat and burned in the fire. This 
rhetorical spin inflected the tone of the poetic account by proleptically foreshadowing the antihero’s 
demise. This device, in turn, invited the reader to interpret the actions of the protagonist as building 
tension leading gradually toward his cathartic doom. 
Ephrem draws especial attention to the moment of victory over the pagan Julian by recreating a 
step-by-step vivid episode where he poked fun at the Emperor’s cadaver: “I went, my brethren, to the 
bier of the defiled one/and I stood tall over it and derided his paganism/I said: Is this the one who 
exalted himself/against the Living Name and forgot that he is dust?”131 Ephrem’s subtle use of 
intertextuality, “exalted himself” (Matthew 23:12, Luke 14:11) and “dust” (Genesis 2:7), puts Scriptural 
                                                 
121 Häfeli, Stilmittel. See additionally Wožniak, “Aphrahats Metapherverständnis,” in Drijvers, Lavenant, Molenberg, and 
Reinink, 275–288. 
122 Yousif, “Les formes littéraires,” 83–92. 
123 Phenix, The Sermons on Joseph. 
124 Reinink, “Rhetorik in der Homilie,” 307–316. 
125 The Fifth Book of the Rhetoric of Antony of Tagrit, CSCO 480:317–326. 
126 Duval, La littérature syriaque, 3rd ed., 10. 
127 See in this regard Hidary, “The Agonistic Bavli: Greco-Roman Rhetoric in Sasanian Persia,” in Secunda and Fine, 137–
164 and Syriac Polemics, Bekkum, Drijvers, and Klugkist, eds. 
128 Watt, “Syriac Rhetorical Theory,” in Fortenbaugh and Mirhady, 244. 
129 For further details on this figure see Brock, “Early Syriac Life,” 332–336. 
130 Hymns against Julian, 1.4 and 2.10–11. ed. Edmund Beck. CSCO 174 (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 1957), 72 and 77–78. 
131 Hymns against Julian, 3.4 (CSCO 174:82). 
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perspective on Julian’s self-exaltation through a few, well-placed words. Ephrem continues his 
rhetorical barrage as he looks down at his vanquished foe: “This is his magnificence and this his 
pride/This is his majesty and this his chariot/This is soil that is rotten.”132 Here the shorter third verse 
continues the five-fold anaphora of the near demonstrative pronoun ܐܢܗ (this) to build rhythm and 
symmetry, only to be broken by the shocking stop with the staccato line that mirrors in its terseness 
Ephrem’s gloating over the Emperor’s corpse: he is rotting soil. The bishop of Nisibis builds 
additional layers on these stylistic devices through a sarcastic tone that inveighs against Julian’s 
presumption. He declares the Emperor’s body—the quasi-divine vessel wherein Imperial power 
resided—his “magnificence,” “pride,” and “majesty” with readily detectable sarcasm and makes fun 
of his defunct state by calling the funerary bier his “chariot,” thus mocking the Emperor’s inability to 
stand. 
Ephrem goes further by contrasting divine and earthly authority as he compares Julian’s prostrate 
posture on his “chariot” (the funerary bier) with an anthropomorphic God, who stands erect, 
thundering from a kingly chariot in his full glory.133 The third hymn underscores these contrasts 
between earthly and divine power further through the jocular refrain, which would have been repeated 
a total of seventeen times to drive home its point: “Glory to the One who clothed his cadaver in 
shame” (ܐܪܐܘܟܒ ܗܕܠܫ ܦܛܥܐܕ ̇ܢܡܠ ܐܚܒܘܫ).134 Although further stylistic devices in Ephrem’s Hymns 
against Julian and elsewhere could be studied, I offer these as representative examples of commonplace 
literary figures and rhetorical tones that stocked the stylistic arsenal with which Syriac writers often 
armed themselves against their ideological and political adversaries. Another feature of Ephrem’s 
passages considered above is his use of Scriptural intertextuality. He applied images from the Bible to 
the internal context of his works in order to texture their spiritual dimensions and to establish a 
perceptible resonance between the audience and the present. We will see these strategies again at play 
in SL; and while we must allow for significant changes in the literary use, application, and resonance 
that stylistic devices had among Syriac-speaking audiences in subsequent centuries, it should be clear 
from what follows that they nevertheless continued to develop a rich literary tradition in numerous 
genres after the time of Ephrem. We should also note that Ephrem became to aspiring Syrian literati 
the stylistic template that Gregory of Nazianzos became to Greek-speaking Romans. 
Given the temporal gap between Ephrem and George of Resh‘aina, we should offer a more precise 
idea of where Syriac literature stood around the time of SL’s composition. SL was necessarily written 
after Maximos’ death in 662, since the title includes a reference to his tongue’s excision, which was 
followed by his death a few months later. Also, Sebastian Brock is certain that BM Add. 7192 is a copy 
from no later than the beginning of the eighth century.135 So, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
time of SL’s composition can be narrowed down to a window between 662 and ca. 700. This later 
date, however, is almost certainly too late because George claims that he was a disciple of Sophronios 
(d. 638), that he personally knew Maximos (SL 5–6), and that he was a bishop with two of his own 
disciples by 636 (SL 11). Assuming that a bishop should be at least thirty years old, George would 
likely have been born no earlier than the turn of the century. If so, by 662 he would have already been 
                                                 
132 Hymns against Julian, 3.5 (CSCO 174:82). 
133 3.17 (CSCO 174:85). 
134 3.1 (CSCO 174:81). 
135 Brock, “Early Syriac Life,” 300. 
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an elderly man and likely to die not long after Maximos. So, a window of composition within a decade 
of Maximos’ death seems reasonable. 
A quick overview of the Syrian writers who lived around the composition’s probable window of 
time, such as Balai of Qennešrin, Babai the Great (551–628), Simon of Taybutheh (d. c. 68), and the 
Katholikos Mar Aba II of Kaškar, points to one of the most prolific and artistically rich episodes in 
Syriac’s long literary history. The stylistic craft of these authors, unsurprisingly, has received extensive 
scholarly attention. For example, Balai of Qennešrin’s and Mar Aba II’s homiletical works have been 
thoroughly studied with a focus on rhetorical and stylistic patterns.136 Babai the Great was the author 
of a well-known hagiography of Mar George of Izla, which Walker has analyzed for its literary 
means.137 We should add, in this regard, that Walker cautions reading literary works, like the Life of 
George of Izla, for historical purposes without regard for implicit questions of genre.138 His cautionary 
note might as well be applied to hermeneutical approaches to SL. In brief, SL was penned during one 
of the most sophisticated eras of Syriac literature and should be extended the same literary-analytical 
deference that its contemporary works have received. 
 
 
 
2. Place, Persona, and the Significance of Names 
 
SL begins with these words: “This Maximos, then, was from the village of Ḥeṣfin, for this bitter 
tare was born there, for his father was a Samaritan from Šikhar.”139 ܝܗܘܬܝܐ ܣܘܡܝܣܟܡ ܐܢܗ ܢܝܕ ܘܗ(
ܗ̣ܐܘ ܢܡ ܢܝܦܨܚ ܐܬܝܪܩ ܢܡܬ ܪܝܓ ܕܠܝܬܐ ܐܘܗ ܐܢܙܝܙ ܐܢܗ ܆ܐܪܝܪܡ ܝܗܘܒܐ ܪܝܓ ܐܝܪܡܫ ܗ̣ܐܘ ܢܡ ܆ܪܟܫ)  (SL 1). 
The birthplace of Maximos and his parental lineage constitute an extremely common topos of late 
antique biographical sources that served as more than a geographical incidental. In many such 
accounts, place and lineage frame the character and hint at the protagonist’s social expectations.140 A 
closer look at these details often reveals subtle hints at the way in which the drama will unfold. 
Some parallels from several late ancient and early medieval languages can illustrate the foregoing 
point. For instance, GL3 likewise begins, after the standard hagiographical exhortation to the faithful 
about the inspirational life of the saint, with birthplace and parental status: “So, Maximos, divine and 
Confessor, had for a fatherland the first of cities, the great Constantinople, which reason knows to 
refer to as the New Rome. And his parents, nobles of descent, were second to few in worldly 
eminence.”141 This reference to his high birth and location in the Imperial capital establishes great 
expectations that the hagiography will later unfold. One is not born of nobles in the empire’s capital 
without also having certain standards of greatness to fulfill, such as becoming secretary of the imperial 
chancery by the young age of thirty and taking on the entire machinery of Imperial power in a tragic 
contest for Christological orthodoxy. 
                                                 
136 Phenix, Sermons on Joseph and Reinink, “Rhetorik in der Homilie,” 307–316. 
137 See Walker, The Legend of Mar Qardagh, 228–239. 
138 See Walker, Legend of Mar Qardagh, 230 and “A Saint and his Biographer,” in Papaconstantinou, Debié, and Kennedy, 
eds., 31–41; and Reinink, “Babai the Great’s Life of George,” in Drijvers and Watt, 171–93. 
139 I will transliterate, when necessary, the spirantized kaph and phe with an “h.” 
140 See Walker, Legend of Mar Qardagh, 228–230. 
141 The Life of Maximus the Confessor, Recension 3, Neil and Allen, 40. See especially the introduction and its elucidation of the 
relationship between the infancy narrative in GL3 and the Life of Theodore Spoudaios. 
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A similar device can be found in the famous Chaldean account of Mar Qardaġ. After another 
similar exhortation to the faithful regarding the man’s exemplary deeds, the account turns to his 
birthplace and lineage: “So, saint Mar Qardaġ was from a great people, from the folk of the kingdom 
of the Assyrians. His father was from the famed lineage of the house of Nimrod, and his mother from 
the famed lineage of the house of Sennacherib.”142 Again, as the hagiography proceeds, the greatness 
of his character is set up by his ancestry and birthplace; in his case, however, the two lineages will later 
serve to subvert the symbols of power and authority in Sassanian Persia after he becomes a 
Christian.143 It seems that there was some degree of reader expectation for the details concerning the 
protagonist’s birth and lineage across the centuries, areas, and languages of Christian hagiographic 
literature. For example, Michael Al-Sim‘ānī expresses tangible anxiety at his initial failure to find 
information about John of Damascus’ origin.144 We can understand, then, why the hagiographer of 
GL3 may have been inclined to invent something with which his sources had failed to provide him. 
Birthplace and lineage could also serve hostile purposes in late ancient biographical accounts. A 
famous and amusing example can be found in Tertullian’s Against Marcion. After describing the horrid 
climate of Pontus, the sexual promiscuity and savagery of its people (complete with references to 
cannibalism), and the women’s performance of their house chores with battle axes, he adds: “But 
nothing is so barbaric or dismal (triste) about Pontus as the fact that Marcion was born there.”145 Here 
we can see that Marcion’s birthplace does not just serve as a biographical incidental; rather, it parallels 
his character. SL similarly deploys toponymy as a parallel to prosopography. According to George, 
Maximos was born in Ḥeṣfin (ܢܝܦܨܚ), which was a small village not far from the eastern shore of the 
Sea of Galilee in the Palestinian Golan. But the root of this village’s name, ܦܨܚ, can also double as a 
literary figure. The root ܦܨܚ is associated with boldness, insolence, and shamelessness.146 It would 
indeed be a fortuitous coincidence that Maximos was born in a village the name of which coincides 
with the character traits the author ascribes to him later in the narrative (SL 6, 9, 18, 21, 25–6). 
There is more to the opening sentence. As we had seen in Ephrem’s Hymns against Julian above, 
George resorts to the loaded metaphor of the Biblical tare to introduce his antihero (SL 1). By opening 
the work with an implied comparison between Maximos and the metaphor for apostasy, he draws 
attention to the steps that lead to the antihero’s demise and, simultaneously, foreshadows his betrayal 
of the Church. In this way, George sets the tone not only for his assessment of Maximos’ character, 
but for the literary resourcefulness he will subsequently deploy. We may conclude with some certainty 
that the opening sentence is concerned with painting an unambiguous portrait of Maximos’ moral 
persona. If so, George’s objective is to tell us who Maximos is, not where he was “actually” born. And 
while one may fairly interject that these two points are not mutually exclusive, it is equally fair to 
respond that only the former is reasonably demonstrable. It should also be noted that the latter point 
would have been hard to contest for two reasons. First, George would have been writing about events 
nearly a century past and in the aftermath of the deaths, executions, or exiles of all of the Confessor’s 
                                                 
142 The Tale of the Heroics of Mar Qardagh, Bedjan, ed., 443. 
143 For further analysis of the subversive nature of this narrative see Walker, Legend of Mar Qardagh, 141–63. 
144 Michael Al-Sam‘ānī, Biographie de Saint Jean Damascène, Bacha, ed., 6–7. 
145 Tertullian, adv. Marc. 1.1.4, Evans, ed. and trans, 4. 
146 Smith, A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 154. 
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political and ecclesiastical allies.147 Second, even if some of his confreres were still alive, none of them, 
to our knowledge, would have the linguistic prerequisite to dispute an account composed in Syriac. 
Rather, the historical trajectory and reception of Maximos’ figure suggests that exaggeration upon 
exaggeration was to be his fate. For instance, while SL refers to the excision of his tongue and GL3148 
and other sources149 add the amputation of his right hand, sources farther removed in time operate 
under the same assumption that George likely made: one may embellish one’s tale once those who 
knew the man are gone. In this vein, the Syriac Chronicle of Michael the Great (1126–1199) and the 
Anonymous Chronicle to 1234 both refer to the excision of his tongue and the amputation of his right 
hand, but dramatize the punishment by including his left hand as well.150 To take matters further, 
Muḥammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyya (1292–1350), the most famed student of the great Muslim 
polemicist Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymīyah (1263–1328), informs us that not only was the Confessor’s 
tongue excised and both hands amputated, but throws in both his feet for good measure:   اطسق هب رمأف
هناسل عُِزنو ،هلاجرو هادي َتعُِطقف.151 What these later additions suggest is a correlation between fancifulness 
and distance from events. The same is likely true concerning Maximos’ purported birth in Palestine. 
Finally, Ḥeṣfin may also be a subtle satire of a major city near an important body of water, such as 
Alexandria. Like most satires, it would invert facts for comedy’s sake: the Mediterranean replaced with 
a minute body of water (the Sea of Galilee), one of the empire’s important cities with an unknown 
village (Ḥeṣfin).152 As we will see, a satire in these proportions would not be inconsistent with other 
clearer instances in SLi that we consider in following sections. What this discussion of Ḥeṣfin indicates 
is that Maximos’ birthplace in SLi is a prosopographical, not a biographical, device; the two should 
not be uncritically identified. 
George continues the opening sentence by attributing Maximos’ birth in Ḥeṣfin to the fact that his 
Father was a Samaritan from Šikhar. Christians may have recognized this place from the pericope of 
the Samaritan woman at the well of Jacob (John 4:5–42). Of course, a Samaritan may well hail from 
Šikhar, one of the Samaritan districts, but that, again, does not seem to be the point. The triliteral root 
that forms the name ܪܟܫ suggests as much, since it readily lends itself to prosopographical senses that 
fit well with what we later find out about Maximos’ father. The root may refer to disgrace, shame, or 
                                                 
147 Booth, Crisis of Empire, 149 claims that George could not have displaced Maximos’ entire monastic career before an 
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Chronicles, like the Chronicle of Michael Rabo and The Anonymous Chronicle to 1234. See Brock, “Early Syriac Life,” 338. 
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outrage (e.g., ܐܪܟܘܫ). So, to say that the father was ܢܡ ܪܟܫ  (from “škhr”) can readily be taken as a 
periphrastic expression for “he was a disgraceful man.” Contextually, it could also refer to a lustful 
streak of his character. This sense is reinforced by the fact that the sole reference in the Christian New 
Testament to Συχάρ/Šikhar features a woman who had five husbands and was now with a sixth man, 
who, the text goes out of its way to make clear, was not her husband. This gospel episode likely 
implicated Šikhar with sexual malfeasance. What is especially particular in the logical sequence of the 
first sentence is that the fact that Maximos’ birth in Ḥeṣfin (shamelessness) is the direct result of the 
fact that his father was ܢܡ ܪܟܫ . In this light, it would be absurd to attribute Maximos’ birth in Ḥeṣfin 
to the fact that his father was from Šikhar, because Ḥeṣfin is not even in Samaria. The logic is far 
sounder if we attribute the causality to a prosopographical, rather than geographical, level. To make 
this point, we can retranslate the passage in question as follows: “He then, this Maximos, was from a 
shameless place, for it was therein (in shamelessness) that this bitter tare was born; after all, his father 
was a Samaritan, a disgraceful man.” 
This prosopographical foreshadowing is all too clearly affirmed by what follows in the narrative. 
According to the account, Maximos’ father sold “covetable vessels” ( ܐܡ̈ܐܢ ܪ̈ܐܓܝܓ , SL 1) in Tiberias 
for a living. His profession, again, further insinuates the moral quality of his persona. While in this 
city, “when he was next to the house of Zadoq, he fornicated with [his] slave girl” (SL 1). The Zadoq 
referenced here is the Jewish owner of the slave girl with whom he fornicates, and it is later noted that 
she hailed from Persia.153 What is special about this passage is that George frames the unfolding drama 
between the palindromic consonance (a familiar device to Syriac authors)154 of the roots for “covet” 
(ܓܪ) and “fornicate” (ܪܓ):  ܒܢܓ ܠܥ ܐܝܪܝܒܝܛܒ ̇ܗܒ ܝܗܘܬܝܐ ܕܟܘ ܐܓܝ̈ܓܪ ܐܢ ̈ܐܡ ܢܒܙ̇ܡ . . . ܐ ̣ܘܗ ܝܗܘܬܝܐ
ܐܬܡܐܒ ̇ܗܒ ܪܓ ܩܘܕܙܕ ܗܬܝܒ (emphasis mine). Moreover, the name Zadoq (̇ܩܘܕܙ) means “righteous” 
and serendipitously appears to parallel his role in the story, that is, he is the proverbial righteous 
neighbor wronged by a man ܢܡ ܪܟܫ . The literary license is evident here: the association with “neighbor” 
is achieved through a circumlocution, ܠܥ ܒܢܓ , (“next to”—or, idiomatically, “neighboring”; it is also 
likely that a further pun is at play with ܒܢܓ, which also means “to rob”).155 Thus, in paraphrase: “when 
he was neighboring (robbing?) the house of the righteous man, he fornicated with [his] slave girl.” The 
recreated drama here is a less-than-subtle allusion to Exodus 20:17: “And you will not covet your . . . 
neighbor’s slave girl” (ܠܐܘ ܓܪܬ  . . .ܐܬܡܠܐ ܟܪܒܚܕ) . This reference contains the semantic 
(ܓܪ/ܐܬܡܐ) and conceptual (ܐܪܒܚ/ ܠܥ ܒܢܓ ) parallels that bring to the fore the Biblical injunction 
that underscores the lascivious character of Maximos’ father. This analysis shows that Maximos’ place 
of origin was also not a fortuitous coincidence. So far, then, virtually every phrase in SLi has been a 
pun designed to represent the character, not the geographical origin, of the various agents involved. 
And the puns continue. Toponyms were not the only form of signaling prosopographical 
information. Personal names, too, could operate in this capacity. For instance, George tells us that 
Maximos’ father was called Abno (ܐܢܒܐ)—an unusual name not of Syriac derivation. Rather, 
according to Brockelmann, the word can be traced back to Hebrew (ןבא) and means “rock” (petra).156 
This, however, is no common rock. R. Payne Smith informs us that it derives from Hebrew (ןבא) or 
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curious that the mother of Theodore was called “Mary”, the baptismal name of Maximos’ mother according SL 2. 
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Chaldean (אנבא) and can be found in 1 Peter 2:8 (“A stone of stumbling and a rock of offense/λίθος 
προσκόμματος καὶ πέτρα σκανδάλου”).157 The allusion to 1 Peter 2:8 is hard to miss because ܐܢܒܐ is a 
hapax legomenon in the Syriac Bible. Coincidence here is implausible. The idea is to add a further 
layer to Abno’s persona, this time, that of stumbling and scandal. 
Unsurprisingly, stumbling and scandal is precisely what Abno’s high-run passions in Tiberias bring 
about. Predictably, the Persian slave girl becomes pregnant; when Abno’s fellow Samaritans find out, 
they offer him an ultimatum for fear that they will be laughed at: “Either give us this woman while 
she is pregnant in order to burn her to divert this scandal (ܐܕܣܚ) from us and from our people, or we 
will make you an outcast from our community” (SL 2). This pericope reintroduces Biblical 
intertextuality, this time from an episode in Genesis 38:23–24 between Judah and Tamar: “Judah 
replied: ‘Let her keep the things as her own, otherwise we will be laughed at . . . . About three months 
later Judah was told, ‘Your daughter-in-law Tamar has played the whore; moreover, she is pregnant as 
a result of whoredom.’ And Judah said, ‘Bring her out, and let her be burned’” (NRSV). The parallels 
between the two stories are hard to overlook. Perhaps at this point, the Syriac reader may have begun 
to raise a proverbial eyebrow. 
George may have sensed that proverbial eyebrow and sought to preempt or encourage it—
depending on whether one had caught on to his drift—by continuing this string of puns. For this 
reason, he adds that he has it on the reliable eye witness account of a priest called “MRTUR” ( ܡ̇ܪܘܛܪ ) 
that everything he has recounted occurred precisely as he says (SL 5). This moment is amusing, 
because he calls his witness “Witness.” Further, when Abno and the now-emancipated Persian girl 
flee, they ignominiously make their way to Ḥeṣfin (i.e., shamelessness) and avoid punishment through 
the man in command of the region, a certain “GND” (ܕܢܓ). The letters here are an abbreviated form 
of Gennadios, which is a less-than-subtle reference to those of elite extraction. 
We should stop to take stock of SLi so far. At this stage it may appear clear that a literary analysis, 
while illuminating of the internal stylistic, intertextual, and rhetorical devices of the text, also 
suggests—if not more—that SLi is little more than an inventive fabrication; its details cannot be 
trusted for similar reasons as those for which GL3i has been dismissed. But all good literature is good 
precisely because it retains some form of connection to a reality that it critiques, reflects, or distorts 
for various reason. SLi, I will argue following, is no different inasmuch as it counterintuitively points 
to the wealthy status of Maximos’ parents, which in turn allows us to draw further conclusions about 
the Confessor’s formation. 
 
3. Dropsy, Pomegranates, and Satirical Reversals 
 
Like birth, lineage, and names, the manner of characters’ deaths often discloses key aspects about 
their moral personae. The death of Maximos’ parents in SL seems to follow this general rule. 
According to SL, Abno died when Maximos was nine years old due to the “accumulation of the 
waters” ( ܬܘܫܝܢܟ ܐܝܡ̈ ), Syriac’s descriptive name for dropsy. Dropsy was a well-known and often lethal 
disease whose chief symptom was edematous tissue in various parts of the body, including the face, 
arms, and legs, which gave the afflicted a bloated appearance. Hippokrates references the condition 
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or the patient around eighty times,158 Aristotle mentions it repeatedly,159 Diokles’ fragments 112, 117, 
and 183 speak about the disease with considerable expertise,160 it shows up in Galen’s writings nearly 
fifty times,161 and myriad further references could be added to these. The disease was clearly ubiquitous 
in antiquity and was cause for major concern—according to Theophanes the Confessor, it even 
claimed the life of Emperor Herakleios.162 But like most diseases in antiquity, dropsy was not just a 
medical matter. 
In common with a long Biblical tradition, George shows a disposition to interpret tragedies and 
diseases as divine punishments (SL 18, 20, 23). Some well-known Scriptural examples are King Asa’s 
feet impairment (2 Chr 16:12), the paralytic man whom Jesus first forgives and then heals (Mark 2:1–
12), and the barrage of plagues brought on against the worshipers of Antichrist by the seals, trumps, 
and cups in the book of Revelation (Rev 6:1–14, 8:6–9:21, 16:2–21). The sentiment was just as 
prevalent among non-Christian Greeks. Apollo brought plagues, Zeus blindness, Athena mental 
impairments.163 Needless to say, Christians in later centuries also frequently interpreted diseases in 
theological ways. Maximos himself took the disease of King Asa of Judah mentioned above as his 
laxity in the pursuit of virtue late in his life.164 Predictably, Ephrem of Nisibis attributes Julian’s early 
death to divine intervention to curb the pagan’s evil designs for the Church.165 Thus, if George 
intended for a disease to signify more than a medical condition, he would simply be a product of his 
time and culture, not an isolated exception. 
Dropsy had a rather rich narrative function across a range of literary genres. One of the most salient 
examples, and one which George would have undoubtedly known, is Jesus’ healing of a man with 
dropsy (Luke 14:1–14). The pericope tells that Jesus entered the house of a leading Pharisee (τινος τῶν 
ἀρχόντων τῶν Φαρισαίων) and before him there was a man with dropsy. After he asked whether it was 
permissible to heal on the Sabbath and was answered with silence, he cured the man and dismissed 
him. The disease in this specific context has drawn some scholarly attention. In his commentary on 
the gospel of Luke, Joel Green notes that: “Also known in antiquity is the metaphorical use of ‘dropsy’ 
as a label for money-lovers, the greedy, the rapacious—that is, for persons who share the very 
condition for which the Pharisees are indicted in the Gospel of Luke.”166 He continues: “The presence 
of the dropsical man, according to this reading, would constitute a vivid parable of Jesus’ socially elite, 
Pharisaical table companions.”167 The connection between dropsy and wealth that Green proposes 
can be bolstered by considering what follows the healing of the dropsy. Once Jesus has dismissed him, 
he delivers a sermon against social pretension and class distinction. The man with dropsy thereby 
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functioned as a visual representation, perhaps a synecdoche,168 of the moral affliction of Jesus’ hosts: 
love of riches. This pericope indicates that by Jesus’ time, dropsy could be pressed into the 
metaphorical service of a diatribe against the wealthy, social elites. 
This metaphorical application of dropsy to the social elites seems to have been rather widespread. 
In the fourth century, Basil of Caesarea delivered a sermon on Psalm 14 directed against those who 
lend money with interest. In that sermon, he spoke of the various evils associated with lending and 
borrowing at interest, particularly the insatiability that it creates among those who wish to retain the 
appearance of elite class. In a telling passage, he drew an explicit comparison between such men and 
dropsies (ὑδεριῶντες), who only seem to be obese, but are in fact afflicted with a different disease than 
their appearance would suggest.169 Not long after, Basil’s erstwhile friend, Gregory of Nazianzos, made 
a similar reference in a passage that commented on Lazarus’ poverty.170 In the fifth century, the 
compiler of ancient wisdom Ioannes Stobaios reproduced another entry on dropsy functioning as a 
metaphor: “Diogenes compared money-lovers to dropsies: for the latter, even when they are full of 
fluid desire drink, and the money-lovers, even when they are full (πλήρεις) of money desire more, but 
both to their perdition.”171 Here again we find dropsy employed in parallel with the higher echelons 
of society, or “money-lovers”, one of the most common epithets ascribed to them.172 Stobaios makes 
this connection between class and dropsy more explicit elsewhere in the Anthology.173 Thus, when 
George tells us that Maximos’ father died of dropsy, it is quite possible that he is bearing indirect 
witness to his lofty social status. This possibility deserves further investigation. 
According to SLi, Abno was a merchant, but this class does not seem to fit the picture for affluence 
that anyone would stereotypically ridicule. Merchants in the Roman Empire did not rise to financial 
prominence until the Palaiologean period and even then, their affluence was short-lived. Thus, it is 
very unlikely that George would have considered a merchant and financial wealth coterminous. While 
merchants certainly did not belong to the lowest echelons of Roman society, like sharecroppers, the 
available evidence from the sixth and seventh centuries indicates that they would have also not been 
wealthy enough to be considered well-to-do, since their own station depended in large part on the 
good graces of the urban elites.174 Moreover, there is considerable data that points to the difficulty 
they had in gaining a foothold on the trade market against their easternmost Persian competitors, who 
had come to some prominence as a result of increased trade securities sanctioned and underwritten 
by the Sassanian state that were not reciprocated by the Roman bureaucracy.175 
Rather, it seems to me that the picture of the wealthy merchant derives largely from the late 
medieval rise of Venetian and Genoese traders. But such a rise in the merchant class was ephemeral 
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in the Roman Empire and only took place as late as the era of the Palaiologoi, as Michael Kaplan has 
described: 
 
Between the two <classes (i.e., aristocrats and wage-earners)>, there emerges in the sources of the 
Palaeologue period, in the fourteenth century, a category of people qualified as mesoi, intermediaries 
between the rich (who were most often aristocrats), and the small artisans and shopkeepers. These 
were merchants and manufacturers of a certain degree of wealth, but without obtaining the level 
of the aristocrats, as is demonstrated in the “Dialogue between the rich and the poor” of Alexios 
Makrembolites. This new stratification in the urban population lasted only a short time: from the 
end of the fourteenth century, the aristocracy invested extensively in urban affairs and the mesoi 
disappeared.176 
 
Thus, even when merchants in the Roman Empire did come to some considerable financial assets, 
they were manifestly not considered members of the social elite, but something of a middle class. 
Rather, the earlier one goes away from the Palaiologean dynasty, the clearer it becomes that merchants 
were on no account a characteristically affluent class. For example, by the tenth century the merchant 
class earned only an average of 18 nomisma per year to the nobility’s average of 350 or the large 
landowner’s 25; by comparison, a low-ranking member of the military ranks would earn 6.5 nomisma 
per year and the poorest in the Empire, the tenant, an average of 3.5 nomisma per year, as this chart for 
the Roman Empire ca. the year 1000 shows:177 
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Thus, earning slightly more than twice the salary of a low-rank soldier, like the κοντουβέρνιον 
(contubernium),178 would hardly lend itself to humorous remarks about wealth. 
But this chart details tenth-century income, not seventh-century income; perhaps things were 
different then? It appears not, though merchants were assigned stereotypical roles in seventh-century 
hagiographies and other literary creations, as Gilbert Dagron has shown. He concludes that: “While, 
by tradition, commerce and artisanal activity continued to rank low in the social hierarchy, it is 
nonetheless essential to note the important position of artisans-merchants throughout the hagiography 
of the seventh century.”179 In his excellent study, Dagron highlights the prominence of merchants in 
hagiography (and other literary forms), much as Abno in SL. He also points, however, to their lack of 
affluence. Therefore, we can conclude that George would not have considered a merchant a proper 
target of satire for excessive wealth. Fortunately, we know that very few in the Roman Empire could 
be considered exceptionally wealthy—wealthy enough, at any rate, that that particular feature stood 
out to others. Accordingly, we may reasonably suppose that—if dropsy is meant as a jab at Maximos’ 
provenance from affluence—the Confessor had come from not modest assets. 
Further confirmation of this theory is folded into the account of Maximos’ mother. We have 
already seen that she was a Persian slave girl who belonged to a Jew by the name of Zadoq. 
Additionally, we are told that her name was ŠNDH (ܗܕܢܫ) , which is otherwise unattested, but for 
convenience we will call her Šendeh. After Maximos, she also birthed a son and daughter, took the 
baptismal name of Mary, and a year after her husband’s death she fell from a pomegranate tree and 
died. Most of these details require some explication. 
Šendeh’s baptismal name of Mary is very likely a literary trope aimed at imitating the widespread 
practice for Zoroastrian converts to take on that name at baptism. For example, in the same decade 
that Maximos’ mother would purportedly have been baptized, the two most distinguished Persian 
converts from Zoroastrianism also took on the name Mary. The first was Hazārwi, the sister of the 
famed George of Izla (formerly Mihrmāgušnasp).180 The second was Golindouch who became widely 
known as Mary the Persian Martyr.181 These stories are known to have circulated widely. Hazārwi’s 
story in particular would have likely been known to someone from Resh‘aina (modern-day Rās al-
‘Ayn/نيعلا سأر), given the city’s close geographical proximity to the events of the Life of George of Izla 
and given its importance as a major center of learning and culture in the region. George could have 
well cast her conversion to Christianity and baptismal name in the mold of these earlier and rather 
famous accounts. Another equally likely possibility is that George plagiarized various aspects of the 
ignominious birth of Maximos from the Life of Theodoros of Sykeon (6th c.). Theodoros was born of an 
inn courtesan named Mary as the result of a “one-night stand,” to borrow Louth’s technical phrase, 
with a man of some status and connections to the Imperial court called Kosmas (Life of Theodoros of 
Sykeon 3).182 Either of these options is possible and they need not be mutually exclusive. Whatever the 
case may be, these literary connections suggest further the fictional inventiveness of SLi and the 
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historical implausibility of the details it recounts. This much becomes explicit in the case of Mary’s 
death. 
Like dropsy, the pomegranate tree from which Mary fell is a subtle hint at her elite provenance. 
Pomegranates figured extensively in ancient, late ancient, and early medieval exegetical history, 
wherein they virtually always function as symbols of wealth and high class. The phenomenon truly 
spans centuries, massive geographical expanses, and languages. For instance, in the Hebraic literary 
yield, Deuteronomy 8:8 refers to the pomegranates in the “Promised Land” as a sign of its agricultural 
richness, while Abraham marvels at them in the land of Canaan (Jubilees 13:6). Pomegranates also 
adorned ritually significant objects, including Aaron’s robe (Exodus 28:33; compare with Ephrem of 
Nisibis’ commentary183) and the capitals at the top of the pillars of Solomon’s temple (1 Kgs 7:18), 
which specifically attracted the Babylonians’ attention as they sacked Jerusalem (2 Kgs 25:17, Jer 
52:22–3). Additionally, a Jewish tradition rumored that Solomon’s coronet was modeled after the 
crown of the pomegranate tree, which would have hinted at its royal symbology.184 Aramaic/Syriac 
texts likewise offer the pomegranate an unfailingly lavish presentation, including the well-known story 
of Aḥiqar (6th c. B.C.E.) on one historical end and the Cause of all Causes (11th–12th c. C.E.) on the 
other.185 In the Qur’an, the pomegranate tree (نامر) is one of the trees of Paradise (55:66–69), an 
elegant sign of God’s artistry (6:99), and a symbol of extravagance and wealth (6:141). The Greek 
tradition had similarly associated pomegranates with the wealth of the land186 and had personified their 
beauty,187 had cast them in gold and silver as symbols of abundance and wealth,188 had represented 
them as desirable objects of foreign extravagance,189 and under certain conditions in the oneiric 
tradition signaled impending financial prosperity.190 
But the pomegranate’s symbolic aspect did not remain epiphenomenal; rather, it drew some of the 
sharpest exegetical gazes of late antiquity. Philo of Alexandria offers the sternest caution against 
interpreting trees as just trees. In On Noah’s Second Planting, he explicitly discourages seeing trees 
(including the pomegranate) as no more than roots, trunks, and branches, and urges to interpret the 
human conditions they represent.191 Perhaps following his directive, later Christians often drew 
pomegranate trees into social inequality analogies. Notable among them was John Chrysostom, who 
praised the usefulness of the olive tree and derided the hedonistic purpose of the pomegranate, which 
only served the dainty pleasures of the upper classes.192 Cyril of Alexandria echoes this sentiment, 
drawing a direct connection between the pomegranate and riches.193 The well-attested medical use of 
the pomegranate, observed by the physician Aetios of Amida (d. 575), underscores the prohibitive 
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cost of the fruit (not unlike today), which he recommends be prepared along with other expensive 
ingredients in order to drive its price up even more for the wealthiest.194 Similar medical uses of the 
fruit would have been available to Syrians through translations of Galen.195 As we approach the 
seventh century, Ioannes Klimakos offers the following striking analogy: “Haughtiness (ὑπερηφανία) 
is a pomegranate rotten from within, but externally resplendent in its beauty.”196 Even under the 
questionable interpretation that he is not drawing a direct symbolic parallel between haughtiness and 
pomegranates, he still employs this tree from among all others as a sign of opulence. The foregoing 
evidence suggests that despite the positive or negative judgment cast on them, pomegranates were 
widely considered symbols of wealth and high class across significant time periods in the 
Mediterranean basin. 
The name of the pomegranate in Syriac, especially the range of puns it could have invoked, only 
contributes to its mystique as a symbol of the upper classes. The word for pomegranate, ܐܢܡܘܪ, could 
easily be confused or associated with numerous other words derived from its triliteral root, ܡܘܪ, which 
J. Payne Smith defines as “to be or become high.”197 This triliteral form, and virtually all of its 
derivatives, have to do with exaltation, loftiness, height, and similar senses in this semantic range. 
Thus, J. Payne Smith defines ܐܢܝܡܘܪ as “lofty” or “sublime”198 and ܐܡܪܡܘܪ as “high estate,” 
“exaltation” or “great dignity.”199 Additionally, one of the several variants for Roman, ܐܢܡܘܪ, was a 
homograph of pomegranate tree; another variant, ܐܝܡܘܪ, would have been hardly distinguishable due 
to the confusability of the medial nun and yudh. The pomegranate, then, could function not only as a 
figure for wealth and class, but linguistically also lent itself to numerous possibilities for puns that its 
symbolism did little to discourage. 
Therefore, when we read that Maximos’ mother died “by means of a fall from a pomegranate tree” 
( ܕܝܒ ܐܬܠܘܦܡ ܢܡܕ ܐܢܡܘܪ ), it is appropriate to explore the imaginative limits such a phrase could convey. 
In one sense, this death could simply be a ridiculous way to die for comedic effect—like Maximos’ 
brother, who was mauled to death by “the vicious camel of some Easterners” (SL 4); but falling from 
a pomegranate is an extremely unlikely way to die. Pomegranates, especially cultivated pomegranates, 
are closer in size and shape to a bush or shrub than a tree; their branches cannot support human 
weight past the rather low stump of the trunk and are covered with thorns throughout to deflect any 
adventurous climbers. Far more probable is the symbolic nature of the episode. The connection of 
the words “fall from a pomegranate tree (ܐܢܡܘܪ)” readily evokes several Biblical passages, but 
especially Luke 14:11 (compare with Matt 23:12): ܠܛܡ ܠܟܕ ܡܝܪܢܕ ܗܫܦܢ ܟܟܡܬܢ  (“for anyone who exalts 
himself will be brought low”; emphasis mine). To be clear, these are the concluding words of the 
passage we previously referenced wherein Jesus heals a man with dropsy and after which he inveighs 
against social elitism. Coincidence stretches credibility here. The point, I take it, is to splice Maximos’ 
parents into a Biblical pericope that simultaneously discloses and condemns their financial privilege: 
“those who exalt themselves will be laid low and those who lay themselves low will be exalted” (Luke 
14:11). Indirectly, then, SLi could—ironically, no doubt—point to Maximos’ wealthy extraction, just 
as GL3i. The difference between the two accounts, then, may be less substantial than has been 
                                                 
194 Aetios of Amida, Iatricorum liber viii 47.9–16. 
195 See Merx, “Proben der syrischen Übersetzung,” 237–305. 
196 Ioannes Klimakos, The Ladder, 23 (PG 88.969BC). 
197 Smith, Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 534. 
198 Smith, Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 535. 
199 Smith, Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 535. 
 59 
 
thought. While SLi is an intentional but satirical denunciation of the Confessor’s wealthy provenance, 
GL3i is perhaps an educated guess about his available financial means. 
Further, if a satirical reversal is indeed at play here—and there is much evidence to suggest this—
it is then evident why George would have cast Maximos’ mother as a Persian slave girl. Portraying her 
as: a) a Persian, b) a Zoroastrian (by implication), and c) a slave girl would satirically invert: a) a Roman, 
b) a Christian, c) and a wealthy matrona. This satirical reversal could be similar to the one we earlier 
suggested with regard to Ḥeṣfin; it could have also implicated Maximos with the stereotype of 
“Chaldean” (i.e., Persian) magic and sorcery, although we must explore this option in closer detail 
later. Likewise, the term “Persian” (ܐܬܣܪܦ/ܐܝܣܪܦ) shared a string of comical or even negative 
associations with the Syriac root ܝܣܪܦ, which in J. P. Smith’s Compendious Syriac Dictionary can mean “to 
strip naked,” “unmask,” “put to shame” in the parel form of the verb, in passive participle “unseemly” 
or “shameful,” and in ethpali form “to be made known openly” or “come into bad repute.”200 Again, 
the semantic range of the term conveniently maps onto her persona in the narrative. Yet again, this 
evidence strengthens the case for a literary reading of the text, but, simultaneously, for skepticism 
concerning any of its points of fact. 
Finally, there remains Šendeh’s name. The final ܗ at the end of her name most likely represents an 
attempt to “Persianize” what is otherwise a universally negative term in Syriac. The triliteral root ܕܢܫ 
generally means “to torture”, “to afflict” or in certain contexts “to vex” or “to oppress”. It unilaterally 
appears, from the translations of 2 and 4 Maccabees to the Chronicle of Bar‘ebroyo and everywhere in 
between, in contexts where tyrannical authorities or foreigners inflict severe punishments on subject 
populations. It is one of the most common roots in 4 Maccabees, appearing nearly five dozen times201 
and is amply represented in 2 Maccabees.202 In these cases, the most direct sense is physical torture. 
But the term can also convey political and social oppression, as is the case in Nehemiah 5:15 ( ܗ̇ܢܘܢ 
ܢܝܕܢܬܫܡܕ ܘܘܗ ܗܒ ). It is in this way also that Ephrem of Nisibis uses the root (ܢܝܕܢܬܫܡ) to speak of the 
foreign oppressors under which Judah will suffer according to the prophecy of Micah.203 Ephrem did 
not hesitate, however, to apply the same term to his contemporary precarious political situation204 and 
was ready to transpose similar cases of oppression, such as that of the Israelites under the Philistines, 
to his present.205 The term could be used just as much with reference to ecclesiastical opprobrium, as 
in the Chronicle of Edessa, written not long before the Syriac Life.206 We had already studied the eponymic 
significance of four other characters in the story (Zadoq, Abno, Martyrios, and Gennadios), so there 
is little reason to doubt that George would have also chosen a name for Maximos’ mother that 
mirrored her persona. Given the foregoing analyses of her husband’s death, of her death, and the 
likely inversion of her origin and status, it is very possible that her name was yet another veiled 
reference to her position in the (oppressive) Roman elite. 
In sum, the foregoing literary and linguistic analyses suggest that George inverted the social status 
of Maximos’ parents for satirical effect. The comedic aspect would only make sense if they did indeed 
belong to the higher echelons of society. Thus, while the narrative seems on its face to present a rather 
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different version of Maximos’ parents’ social standing than that offered in GL3i, the collective 
evidence analyzed here seems to point to the perhaps counterintuitive conclusion that they hailed 
from the Roman elite. In other words, the coherence of George’s satirical inversions can be accounted 
for most simply by presupposing that Maximos’ parents were Romans of sufficient financial means to 
incur a cleverly veiled assault on their status. 
 
4. Motives 
 
The literary and linguistic examination offered above has shown that SLi mounts a rather 
sophisticated, multi-layered assault on Maximos’ persona. Sebastian Brock has noted with regard to 
SL: “Although the writer of the Life is an opponent of Maximus’ dyothelete theology and cannot 
resist here and there inserting and opprobrious epithet, his narrative is on the whole remarkably matter 
of fact, having none of the usual characteristics of Lives of archheretics.”207 Brock’s description of SL 
is on the whole no doubt accurate. But I would wish to add that some further nuance is now necessary. 
While SL may not be a typical life of an archheretic, that fact hardly discounts other literary dimensions 
of the work, including those we have already covered. To be clear about my position, these dimensions 
have ultimately convinced me that there is precious little—if anything at all—in SLi that deserves 
credence. 
So, we are left asking why someone would undertake such a complex character assassination. True, 
some of George’s antipathy may be attributed to his dogmatic disagreement with the Confessor’s 
Dyothelite Christology; but I do not think this fact can account for the personal tone and seemingly 
targeted derision of the text on its own. I will propose that the key lies in George’s and Maximos’ 
relation to Sophronios of Jerusalem. Once cast in this light, a few final tidbits of SLi that we have not 
yet considered make sense: Maximos’ half-Samaritan extraction and his father’s baptismal name of 
Theonas. 
I am inclined to attribute the personally-incensed tone of SL, to be blunt, to a classic case of (peer?) 
jealousy. George of Resh‘aina claims he was Sophronios’ pupil while Maximos, too, was present (SL 
6).208 He writes: “For I many times (ܢܐ̈ܝܓܣ ܢܝܢ ̈ܒܙ) encountered this one [i.e., Maximos] full of 
deplorable things, both in <his> disputes and in <his> sophistic discourses; in fact, he was full of 
lethal conceit and his tongue was swift in replies that are deceitful; indeed (ܪܝܓ) , Sophronios used to 
praise him, this Maximos, as ‘one who has a lofty mind’ ( ܡ̇ܢ ܐܬܥܕܝܕ ܥܡ̇ܐܬܝܠ ܡܠ ܢܩ̣ܐ )” (SL 6). What 
is particularly salient for our purposes is that George dwells on Maximos’ infuriatingly sophisticated 
grasp of the dialectical arts. Here the phrase “in disputes and in sophistic discourses” (ܐܬܠܡܒ ܐܬܥܒܕ 
ܡܡܒܘ̣ܠܐܠ ܣܝܦܣܕ̇ܐܬܘܛ)  is almost certainly “Christian vernacular” for the seemingly deceitful 
application of the Aristotelian syllogistic to dialectic in theological discourse. This intimate and 
personal, albeit upset, vignette provides a unique witness to someone’s perception of Maximos’ 
proficiency in the dialectical arts that echoes similar accusations often leveled at those with thorough 
instruction in the organon and its commentary tradition. This passage is also remarkable in that it implies 
through the habitual past tense and the phrase “many times” ( ܒܙ̈ܢܝܢ  ܓܣ̈ܢܐܝ ) that the time of Maximos’ 
and George’s acquaintance was not brief. If so, George has likely pointed at the most probable source 
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for his information on Maximos’ life: the Confessor himself. For it would not be unlikely, nor even 
unusual, for those engaged long-term in a small circle of discipleship, such as that which surrounded 
Sophronios, to be familiar with each other’s backgrounds—and perhaps in this same setting to develop 
profound animosity for the other. 
The period here referenced must have been in the early 630s, a time during which we know 
Maximos petitioned Sophronios to take him under his protection again, according to Letter 8.209 
George also intimates that he himself was at the council on Cyprus in 636, already ordained a bishop210 
and with two of his own disciples in attendance (SL 11). It was before this time, then, that Maximos 
had captivated the future bishop of Jerusalem’s attention, who must have praised him openly to the 
Syrian’s chagrin. The quotation, presumably by Sophronios, “one who has a lofty mind” ( ܐܬܥܕܝܕ 
ܥܡ̇ܐܬܝܠ ܡܠ ܢܩ̣ܐ ), is here likely reintroduced sarcastically and as a double entendre. George draws 
unusual attention to the critical sense of the pronouncement through a direct quotation particle (ܡܠ), 
consonance (on ܥ and ܬ) and assonance (of hboso and zqopho—“i” and “o”).211 By a different rendition, 
then, this phrase could be taken to mean Maximos’ “prideful mind.” 
A further personal motivation for the account’s vitriol could be George’s disappointment that his 
beloved teacher Sophronios sided with the Dyenergists, for whom he expresses tangible contempt 
(SL 9). In this regard, SL could be taken as his effort to exculpate his teacher from heresy. His defense, 
however, is peculiar. He lays the blame at Maximos’ feet, reiterating twice in the space of a few lines 
that it was by his deceit (ܐܬܘܝܥܛ) that the bishop of Jerusalem “was taken captive” ( ܬܬܐ̣ܕܚ ) by the 
Confessor’s error.212 The root of the word George chose to describe Maximos’ “deceit” (ܐܬܘܝܥܛ) has 
Biblical parallels in the following passages: John 7:12, Acts 8:9, Galatians 6:3, Colossians 2:4, and James 
1:26. Only two of these passages, John 7:12 and Acts 8:9, have a clearly transitive sense, as in this 
account. John 7:12 is likely not in view, since Jesus is the hypothetical “deceiver” in question in that 
passage. This leaves us with a possible allusion to Acts 8:9—the introit of Simon Magus. George seems 
to have linked both passages linguistically and conceptually: Maximos, like Simon Magus is known for 
his deceit (SL: ܐܬܘܝܥܛ/Acts: ܐܥܛܡ); like Simon Magus, he is a Samaritan by lineage. George casts 
Maximos as the sower of heresy and deceit (SL 18–20, 25) and likely draws an intentional parallel 
between him and Simon, who were both defeated by the apostolic authority in the East (SL 16–20) 
and thereafter journey to Rome to continue their malfeasance (SL 20). 
The subtle indications of Maximos’ sorcery may be hinted at further through the name his father 
took on at baptism: Theonas. His name could be an allusion to the famed fourth-century sorcerer-
turned-Christian Theonas of Nikomedia, about whom George could have learned through none other 
than Sophronios himself.213 Less likely, though perhaps still in view, is his mother’s Persian heritage. 
Persians, especially those with Chaldean roots, had long been associated with sorcery and magic. Babai 
the Great’s Acts of Saint George of Izla, written soon before the composition of the Syriac Life, makes 
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this connection unambiguously explicit with reference to one Ḥenana.214 Whatever the case, the 
invective motivations of SL appear to be interwoven with Maximos’ and George’s relation to the 
future bishop of Jerusalem and the nefarious influence George believed the former had on his 
erstwhile teacher. In this way, George’s extensive and sophisticated fabrication of Maximos’ early 
years, as well as the targeted nature of his satirical diatribe, become apparent. Booth has noted in this 
regard that “the account of Maximus’s ignoble origins is perhaps intended as a slur.”215 But in light of 
the foregoing data, it seems that more was at play than just a slur—although it certainly was also that. 
The infancy narrative offered the backdrop to Maximos’ sorcerous abilities for the purpose of 
exculpating the theological error of George’s former teacher. 
 
5. Conclusion: Maximos of Alexandria 
 
In his carefully researched and convincingly argued defense of the Syriac account’s usefulness for 
reconstructing key moments of Maximos’ career, Phil Booth concluded: “It therefore seems quite 
clear that the account of Maximus’s origins contained in the Greek Life is a fabrication, a medieval 
attempt to sanitize a controversial figure who would in fact prove a persistent thorn in the 
Constantinopolitan side.”216 Careful consideration of the available textual witnesses to the Greek 
reception of Maximos’ figure suggest, however, that Booth’s claim that GL3 is an “attempt to sanitize” 
Maximos is unfounded. If so, the question of the author’s motivations behind adapting the Life of 
Theodoros Stoudites to fit Maximos’ career remains open and will be addressed shortly. Virtually every 
extant reference to Maximos in Greek between his death and the composition of GL3 is accompanied 
by positive epithets, most of them reserved for saints. These include, in chronological order: 
- “Maximos Confessor” (Germanos I)217 
- “Maximos, philosopher and Confessor” (John of Damascus)218 
- “Maximos the holiest monk and philosophical martyr and Confessor and great teacher of the 
Church” (Georgios Synkellos)219 
- “Maximos the wisest and Confessor”; “Confessor and martyr” (Theophanes the Confessor)220 
- “The great Confessor of piety Maximos” (Nikephoros I)221 
- “The great Confessor Maximos; Maximos the wisest and Confessor” (Georgios the Monk)222 
- “Maximos the monk and Confessor among the saints” (Photios I of Constantinople)223 
- “Our holy father Maximos the Confessor” (Typikon menaion)224 
- “Maximos the Confessor” (Konstantinos VII Porphyrogenitos)225 
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These epithets represent a unilaterally positive appraisal of the Confessor and show no ambivalence 
about his status as a champion of orthodoxy and a man of great personal piety. 
Thus, we must ask: from what exactly did the author of GL3 seek to “sanitize” Maximos? Does 
Booth’s conclusion somehow assume that the author was familiar with SL or some version thereof?226 
Such an assumption would be untenable, first, because of the extreme rarity of Syriac texts translated 
or transmitted into the Greek microcosm and second, because SL has only survived in a single, 
incomplete, and adulterated manuscript.227 This last point indicates that SL never enjoyed, even in its 
native environs, as widespread appeal as the Greek Lives, for which there are forty extant 
manuscripts.228 Moreover, there is no mention in any Greek or Latin source of Maximos’ Palestinian 
provenance or ignominious birth to a Samaritan and Persian. Therefore, it seems sounder to suppose 
that the author’s choice of Theodoros Stoudites’ Life served a different purpose than “sanitizing” a 
man whom three centuries of Christian thinkers unambiguously held in high esteem. Rather, the 
compiler’s choice of a similar infancy as Stoudites’ may be attributed to two non-mutually-exclusive 
alternatives. First, simply to honor Maximos in the best way he knew: to give him a similar early career 
as that of his monastery’s patron saint. Second, because such a career—as was believed for a 
millennium—made sense of the Confessor’s sophisticated philosophical education and 
correspondence with powerful figures. Thus, although I concur that GL3’s infancy narrative is in a 
historical sense a “fabrication,” it can hardly be considered a “sanitation” of the saint’s reputation or 
a haphazard choice of unpremeditated plagiarism. 
Booth continues: “The Life of George of Resh‘aina, in contrast, inspires confidence both in its 
closeness to events and in its intersection on various incidental points of detail with other sources of 
the period.” On the one hand, Booth is correct in pointing out that SL’s later events can be verified 
through “other sources of the period.” But the same is true of the vast majority of GL3. Additionally, 
it is a logical reach to claim that SLi is credible just because later parts of SL can be independently 
corroborated, if that is what Booth intends. Again, the same would have to be said of GL3. On the 
other hand, my personal view is that Booth goes too far in claiming that SL “inspires confidence.” 
First, no source exists that can corroborate any detail about the first ten years of Maximos’ life as 
recounted by SLi. Second, as I have argued in the foregoing sections, SLi is as literarily inventive as 
GL3, which disinclines me to believe everything George tells us. We are thus left with little more from 
SLi than the claim that Maximos, somehow, was born and raised in Palestine. Frankly, that is not 
much to go on, despite Booth’s protestations to the contrary. 
In brief, while GL3i has—perhaps rightly—been discredited as an inventive literary artifice, the 
foregoing analysis suggests that SLi should share its fate. I would conclude, then, that SLi should be 
placed alongside GL3i as an unreliable witness to Maximos’ early years. That does not mean, however, 
that SLi  or GL3i have no historical value, since through their literary craft some possible conclusions 
can be made, such as Maximos’ likely provenance from the higher echelons of Roman society. 
Certainly, this point can be disputed and it cannot be proven beyond doubt, but it is not implausible 
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nor even improbable. What matters more about our analysis, however, is that SLi should join the 
ranks of unreliable witnesses to Maximos’ infancy. Accordingly, the case for a Palestinian origin must 
rely on more than the doubtful claims of George of Resh‘aina that he was born in Palestine; the same 
is true of the proponents of his Constantinopolitan origin. I would argue that this levelling move 
ultimately gets us closer to knowing something about the Confessor’s earlier years, even if much of 
his youth will remain unclear. 
Once the playing field is leveled in this way and all options are considered on the merits that extant 
circumstantial evidence affords them, it appears clear to me that neither the Palestinian nor 
Constantinopolitan origin accounts are as plausible as what I will call Maximos’ “Alexandrian origin.” 
The case for Palestine appears to me weaker even than the case for Constantinople. With the exception 
of a letter or two to a Palestinian resident (and Sophronios of Jerusalem at that!) and the nebulous 
argument that Maximos had some “Origenist” sensitivities that are supposed to have been revived in 
Palestine in the sixth and seventh centuries, no other circumstantial evidence readily links him to a 
Palestinian environment. The Constantinopolitan origin account, for its part, relies on Maximos’ 
correspondence with Constantinopolitans like Ioannes the chamberlain and, perhaps, Konstantinos 
the treasurer, but, again, this evidence is sparse. 
I would argue, instead, that an Alexandrian origin enjoys the most support from extant sources. 
While Christian Boudignon (see below) has already noted Maximos’ significant correspondence with 
Alexandrians, I believe that we are now in a better position to make a more forceful case than him for 
his Alexandrian origin. Before we begin, I would like to be clear that by “Alexandrian origin” I 
primarily envision not his birthplace (since this is simply impossible to demonstrate and ultimately 
inconsequential for our study), but his early (ca. teenage years to his forties) multi-social networks and 
especially his educational background. According to this sketch, he would have likely studied under 
the Alexandrian philosophers active at the time, especially David (see below), would have made 
connections on various levels of the city, rather than with a niche group, as was the case with his 
Constantinopolitan correspondents, and would have likely even encountered Ioannes Moschos and 
Sophronios (the Eukratades) at Alexandria and not Palestine, as Booth believes. 
We know that the Eukratades had spent time in Alexandria and had befriended Ioannes the 
Almsgiver there. Ioannes Moschos also intimates that they visited with Stephanos of Alexandria,229 a 
philosopher purportedly later called to Constantinople to further the study of Aristotelian sciences at 
the capital. If Maximos was already at Alexandria at this time, he would have been in his mid-twenties 
when he met Sophronios, which would make good sense of his frequent references to him as his 
teacher. This teacher-disciple relationship would be harder to believe if, as SL recounts, Maximos and 
Sophronios only came together (it seems, for the first time) in the 630s, a few years before Sophronios’ 
death. 
These contentions have ample support from the extant circumstantial evidence. Paul Blowers, for 
his part, has already felt a tug to suggest that Maximos may have spent some time in Alexandria in the 
company of Sophronios and Ioannes Moschos.230 Boudignon, for his part, has astutely observed that 
most of Maximos’ correspondence with high-ranking officials gravitated toward Alexandria and was 
far from casual.231 We should add that the Confessor’s epistolary exchanges with Alexandria do not 
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only point to his amicable and often confidential implication with various social layers in the city that 
included politicians and military commanders, but also academics, clergy, and monastics. Needless to 
say, the same cannot be said about either Constantinople or Palestine. 
As far as his relations with politicians are concerned, a curious episode in the Trial of Maximos 
indicates that he was known for corresponding with high Roman functionaries, such as Petros of 
Numidia.232 In this vignette, Ioannes, the former treasurer of Petros of Numidia, is brought in to testify 
against Maximos, whom he charges with dissuading the general from obeying Herakleios’ order to 
march to Egypt against the “Saracens.” What is fascinating about the Confessor’s reply is that he does 
not deny the charge, as he denies, on their face, the accusations that he hates the emperor or that he 
is an Origenist.233 Rather, he requests that the treasurer produce the letter wherein he advised the 
general not to march on Egypt or, for that matter, his letter asking for advice. The treasurer predictably 
fails to bring the letters forward, but still holds firm, averring that “I do not have the letter, neither do 
I know if he wrote to you at all. But at that time everyone in the camp was talking about these matters 
(ἐν τῷ φοσσάτῳ ταῦτα κατ’ ἐκεῖνον ἐλάλουν πάντες τὸν καίρον).”234 It is not entirely clear whether 
Ioannes is here referring to everyone talking about the Saracen (i.e., Arab) invasions or about 
Maximos’ efforts to dissuade Peter, though contextually this latter option appears more likely; if true, 
it would suggest that the Confessor’s exchanges with the strategos were, quite literally, the talk of the 
camp. What is especially clever about this episode is that although Maximos exonerates himself from 
the charge by knowing Roman legal proceedings and especially as regards the summoning of evidence, 
he does not contradict the accusation. Moreover, Maximos did exchange letters with Petros at least 
four times: Letters 13, 14, Computus ecclesiasticus, and Opuscule 12; some of these, notably, are penned 
with remarkable parrhesia and request favors or advise about major strategic matters. Finally, we should 
note that the Computus ecclesiasticus (addressed to Petros) is a defense of the Alexandrian chronology 
over what is now called the Byzantine chronology.235 
Another meaningful association in this regard was Maximos’ evidently deep friendship with 
Georgios the prefect of Africa. Somewhere between 640 and 642 the prefect had been summoned to 
Constantinople “to explain himself,” as it were, for contravening an order of the Empress Martina. In 
Letter 1 Maximos wrote to the prefect an exhortatory encomium that is highly telling of their tight 
relationship. Around the same time, Maximos sent two epistles (Letters 44 and 45) to his contact at 
Constantinople, Ioannes the chamberlain, on behalf of Georgios, to lobby in the prefect’s favor. In 
the same course of events, Maximos penned a letter (18) to the hegoumene Iannia concerning some nuns 
at Alexandria who had re-converted to Miaphysitism; what is striking about this epistle is that he was 
apparently granted the authority to write with the authority of the prefect Georgios himself.236 Finally, 
in this unfolding of events, Maximos wrote to an Alexandrian deacon by the name of Kosmas (Letter 
16) and thanked him for the consolatory note the latter had sent him on the occasion of Georgios’ 
grim summons to the capital. From these various epistolary exchanges, it is evident that the Confessor 
had become a close confidant to the most powerful Roman functionary in Africa. 
Perhaps it is germane to note, but another politically salient Alexandrian figure intimately associated 
with Maximos was his disciple Anastasios, who was not only an Alexandrian, but once held the 
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enviable political station of νοτάριος (notarios or personal secretary) to emperor Konstans II’s 
grandmother—either Eudokeia, the wife of Emperor Herakleios, or the wife of Niketas and mother 
to Gregoria, Konstans’ mother.237 Whatever the case, Anastasios again links Maximos closely to the 
Roman political elite and particularly that in Alexandria.238 Perhaps what is most outstanding of 
Anastasios’ case is that the Trial of Maximos indicates very precisely how old Maximos was when the 
two began their long life together. The aforementioned trial happened in 655, at which time the 
Confessor explicitly said that he was seventy-five years of age and to this added that Anastasios had 
been with him for thirty-seven years.239 In this case, the two would have met when Maximos was 
approximately thirty-eight years old or around the year 618; there is no reason to discount the 
possibility that they met in Alexandria, given Anastasios’ provenance from that city. If so, the earliest 
event from the mouth of the Confessor would be his encounter with an Alexandrian some eight years 
before he crafted his earliest works. From the perspective I offer here, this meeting would not be 
inconsequential for determining Maximos’ earlier movements, since he would already—or still—be in 
Alexandria at the age of thirty-eight. 
Moreover, the Confessor corresponded with several Alexandrian intellectuals, which tethers him 
further to yet another cut of the Alexandrian social fabric. For example, Letter 17 is addressed to 
Ioulianos Scholastikos and is concerned with expositing a brief account of the Church’s teaching 
concerning the Incarnation of the Lord (περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν τοῦ Κυρίου ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ 
δόγματος).240 Maximos identifies this Ioulianos as “the Alexandrian” (Ἀλεξανδρέα) and includes as a 
secondary addressee a certain Christopemptos Scholastikos who apparently was also at Alexandria. 
There is one phrase in particular in this letter that stands out. As Maximos exposited the ecclesiastical 
teaching on the Incarnation of Christ, he refers to “our father Cyril” (Πατρὸς ἡμῶν Κυρίλλου), clearly 
referring to the famed fifth-century Alexandrian bishop (d. 444), unambiguously recognizable as such 
by the Confessor’s verbatim reproduction of his phrase “one incarnate nature of God the Incarnate 
Word” (μίαν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Θεοῦ Λόγου φύσιν σεσαρκωμένη).241 It is surely tantalizing to 
interpret the first person plural pronoun in Maximos’ reference to the bishop as a geographical 
designation that implies Alexandrians, such as saying, “Cyril, the father of us Alexandrians.” It could 
also be meant as an exclusion of non-Chalcedonians, but if so, it is very subtle and fits ill with the 
context. The letter likewise discloses Maximos’ intimacy with the prefect (Georgios?), as he mentions 
in passing that he took their messages (συλλαβάς) to him.242 Maximos’ academic connections with 
Alexandrians are on further display in his Questions, and Responses for Theopemptos, who was both an 
Alexandrian and surnamed scholastikos.243 
Finally, Maximos also had clerical and monastic ties at Alexandria. We have already mentioned his 
assumption of the authority of the prefect Georgios in a letter to the nuns under the care of the 
hegoumene Iannia. It appears Maximos again addressed her a letter (Letter 11) concerning a nun who 
defected from Chalcedonianism and later returned to her former position. Additionally, some of the 
Confessor’s most vivid and personal writing is addressed to a certain Alexandrian deacon by the name 
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of Kosmas, to whom he addressed two letters (15 and 16), one of them (15), in true Alexandrian 
philosophical fashion, waxing eloquent about particulars and universals. It appears Kosmas was a close 
confidant of the Confessor, since he is referred to as the letter-bearer of the important Letter 14 to 
Petros. In this latter epistle Maximos intercedes on behalf of the Alexandrian deacon, requesting that 
he be allowed to return to serve. Here again, we must wonder at the kind of personal authority 
Maximos enjoyed in order to make a request of that nature from the supreme authority in the most 
important African city in the empire. 
In brief, a substantial amount of Maximos’ correspondence literature is addressed to Alexandrians. 
In virtually every case the letters point to longstanding relationships with the addressees. What is 
equally important to note is that Maximos’ connections to Alexandria have a certain “immersive” feel 
to them, that is, they do not give the impression that he was a passerby on a short-lived errand, but 
someone who spent the time that is necessary both to nurture relationships and to establish them on 
various social levels: political, academic, and ecclesial. This portrait would comfortably fit with the 
career of an Alexandrian aristocrat-turned-monk who had fostered meaningful and enduring relations 
with the various social enclaves of the city and who was, we can infer through the tone and preface of 
his letters, regarded highly by his addressees. 
Scholars who accept the Palestinian or Constantinopolitan accounts of Maximos’ birth have had 
to conjecture a variety of chimeric theories to account for Maximos’ close ties at Constantinople and 
Alexandria, respectively. While the interpretation I am proposing here is not without its own 
difficulties—such as accounting for Maximos’ correspondence with two relatively eminent 
Constantinopolitan figures, Ioannes the chamberlain and Konstantinos the treasurer—it accounts for 
most of the circumstantial evidence with the least explanatory principles. In this way it addresses 
Pauline Allen’s astute observation that: “. . . a Palestinian origin makes it more difficult to credit 
Maximus’ relationships with high-profile officials of the court in Constantinople and elsewhere in the 
Byzantine world, such as Peter illustris and George, the eparch of Africa.”244 Although my 
interpretation still must explain Maximos’ ties to Konstantinos and Ioannes at Constantinople, an 
Alexandrian aristocratic origin story is far more likely to account for these relations than the highly 
literarily-inflected account of George of Resh‘aina taken prima facie. After all, the Roman elite had 
the privilege of geographical mobility and moved in circles that, though often separated by substantial 
distances, were socially closer than their adjacent destitute neighbors. 
In this light, a different understanding of Maximos’ early years becomes possible and one that may 
confirm some suspicions already raised by Booth and Jankowiak.245 The seemingly long-standing 
relationship between Maximos and Sophronios has perplexed the proponents of the Confessor’s 
Constantinopolitan origin and has required proponents of the Palestinian origin account to suppose 
that Maximos met Sophronios at some point during the latter’s stay in Palestine following his travels 
to Egypt and Alexandria with Ioannes Moschos. Between 603 and 605 Ioannes Moschos and 
Sophronios travelled to Africa and spent time in Alexandria, where they met Ioannes the Almsgiver 
and Stephanos of Alexandria, as mentioned previously. Thus, it is not unlikely that they would have 
made Maximos’ acquaintance during this time if the Confessor indeed hailed from Alexandria. One 
may object that neither Sophronios nor Ioannes Moschos refer to Maximos as being in Alexandria, 
but that is because neither mentions him at all. Under this interpretation, the seemingly longstanding 
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relationship between Maximos and Sophronios, which is hinted at in Letter 8,246 may well have 
originated as far back as the turn of the century in Alexandria, even earlier than Booth and Jankowiak 
had suggested.247 
What to make, then, of Maximos’ repeated claims that he did not receive training in rhetoric?248 
After all, the claim does not appear to be the mere show of monastic humility. The renown literary 
critic Photios I of Constantinople makes this much clear in his characteristically unsparing assessment 
of the literary and rhetorical quality of Maximos’ Questions, and Responses to Thalassios: “But it [the 
treatise] is drawn out (σχοινοτενής) in style (φράσιν) and in meanderings (ταῖς περιόδοις), delighting in 
hyperbatons, both blossoming with ornateness and not striving to speak as is proper (ἐνακμάζων τε 
ταῖς περιβολαῖς, καὶ κυριολογεῖν οὐκ ἐσπουδασμένος), for which reasons turgidity (τὸ ἀσαφὲς) and 
indecipherability (δυσεπισκόπητον) run wild (διατρέχει) in his composition.”249 Although Laga has 
recently attempted to exonerate Maximos of Photios’ (and subsequent literary critics’) castigations, his 
examples are limited to a few moments where the Confessor showed some expressive refinement that 
remain, however, exceptional to his writing.250 A different rationale can account for this dissonance. 
Maximos was not an eloquent Constantinopolitan stylist, nor did he aspire to be one in any of his 
known writings. On the contrary, he was trained and wrote in a distinctive philosophical-theological 
dialect that was characteristic of Alexandria and the multifarious mosaic of the different intellectual 
currents that had crisscrossed it in the foregoing centuries. His circles and sources were not the Greek 
rhetoricians (despite his rhetorical prowess, Maximos did not read Gregory of Nazianzos for the 
winsomeness of his polished phrases), but the philosophers and fathers, both past and recent. Under 
this rubric, Maximos would be fully justified in claiming that he had no rhetorical training without 
thereby precluding a rigorous education in philosophy and what he calls the “patristic tradition” 
(πατρικὴ παράδοσις);251 his fluency in these two is incontestable on the basis of the most cursory 
reading of his texts. 
Maximos’ philosophical and theological sources are primarily also Alexandrians. With the 
exceptions of the Cappadocians and Dionysios the Areopagite—all of whom, of course, had become 
famous across the Empire, the primary sources of Maximos’ theology and exegesis are consistently 
Alexandrians: Philo, Clement, Origen, Athanasios, and Cyril, to mention a few. Though scholarship 
has explored these relations less, it would be highly unlikely for Maximos to have no exposure to the 
late Platonists, and especially the Alexandrians like Olympiodoros, Ammonios Hermeiou, etc. We will 
explore this relationship further in ad hoc detail over the course of the dissertation. 
There is another key document that would place Maximos directly in Alexandria during his early 
years. Additamentum 34 was edited for the first time by Bram Roosen in 2001 and he seems convinced 
of the attribution to the Confessor. This brief piece appears to be notes taken from lectures on 
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Porphyrios’ Eisagoge and on Aristotle’s Categories by David, a late-sixth century Alexandrian Christian 
commentator about whom little is known.252 This Additamentum is certainly not common currency in 
the widely accepted Maximian corpus and has, for various reasons, not figured in considerations about 
his intellectual career. It is possible that one of these reasons is due to the impossibility of squaring it 
with a Constantinopolitan or a Palestinian origin narrative. Nevertheless, some scholars have 
preliminarily noted that this small work would be quite meaningful for reconstructing Maximos’ ties 
to Alexandria if it proved to be by his hand.253 In light of the evidence I have presented here, the 
attribution to the Confessor does not appear to be completely far-flung. If it is in point of fact his 
writing, his Alexandrian provenance would be all but cemented. In this account, Maximos would have 
been a (likely affluent) teenager studying at the feet of a sophisticated commentator on Porphyrios 
and Aristotle in Alexandria before the turn of the century. This suggestion is borne out by the 
circumstantial evidence better than the accounts of either SL or GL3. 
I have argued that the Alexandrian origin account makes the most sense of the most circumstantial 
evidence available without requiring the unnecessary multiplication of explanatory factors. In this way, 
this account pays its debt to Occam’s razor. Perhaps this argument will take its place as a “third option” 
concerning the origin story of Maximos the Confessor. And although I will attempt to illumine several 
perplexing areas of internal logical tensions in Maximos’ thought by appealing to the imaginative 
horizons that an Alexandrian origin account would draw out, it seems that some manner of salutary 
caution and restraint is in order with respect to the Confessor’s early years. In Ambiguum 10, Maximos 
dwelled at length on the perplexing figure of Melchizedek as presented in Hebrews 7:3 and found a 
compelling contemplation or theory for him. He represented a human who had been so thoroughly 
deified that only the divine predicates were any longer known about him: “he was without mother and 
father, without genealogy, without beginning or end of days.” Perhaps Maximian scholars may agree, 
whatever their persuasions, on one point: that the Confessor would be pleased to have attained some 
of the epithets of the mysterious Melchizedek who had so thoroughly captivated his exegetical gaze 
and whose fate he may share in the absence of any further scholarly breakthroughs. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
ARISTOTLE, MAXIMOS, AND THE LOGIC OF BEING 
 
We indeed say that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so life and an 
infinite and continuous eternity belong to him, for this is what God is. 
 
—Aristotle, Metaphysics 12, 1072b29–31 
 
Introduction 
 
 The light the first two chapters of this study have shed on Maximos’ milieu opens up a range of 
analytical possibilities for understanding better the complexity of his thought. The following three 
chapters will extend these findings by articulating the logic that binds metaphysics, virtue, and 
deification together in the ascetic intellectual’s oeuvre. In this chapter, the emphasis will decidedly fall 
on re-contextualizing Maximos in the trajectory of the Aristotelian commentators in order to elucidate 
his dialectical appropriation of the Classical legacy, but especially of the late ancient complex that 
Aristotle’s philosophy had become. This approach will fill in a significant lacuna in scholarship on the 
Confessor’s relationship to Aristotle and the late ancient philosophers, which will further illumine 
largely unexplored questions belonging to Maximos’ cosmic vision. 
 Three major components constitute the problem of metaphysics, virtue, and deification in 
Maximos’ system. First, he repeatedly affirms,254 (especially in Opuscule 1), that deification does not 
result from the natural realization of the potentialities that inhere in the human substance. This is so, 
he reasons, because humans would become divine by nature (as the realization of the potential of their 
substance) and not by grace.255 But this scenario is impossible within Maximos’ theological vision for 
several reasons. For one, what is divine by nature can only be; it cannot become divine by nature because 
to do so would mean that it is composite (and divinity by definition is singular). Additionally, to say 
that something could become divine through the realization of the potential of substance would be to 
destroy the ontological divide between created and uncreated.  This would violate what scholars have 
called the Confessor’s “Neo-Chalcedonianism,” according to which he took great care to retain human 
and divine natures “unconfused,” not only in persona Christi, but, by extension, in all of human nature 
deified through Christ’s incarnation.256 The second major component of Maximos’ thought 
concerning the intersection of metaphysics, virtue and deification, exemplified in his Disputation with 
Pyrrhos, concerns the notion that the virtues are natural to humans.  For example, he affirms this by 
claiming that they were not “lately introduced from without; for from creation they lie in us.”257 He 
echoes this sentiment in Epistle 3, addressed to Ioannes the Chamberlain.258 The third major insight of 
Maximos’ corpus is the connection between the virtues and deification.259 For example, in Epistle 2, 
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he writes to this same Ioannes: “For truly nothing is more deiform (θεοειδέστερον) than divine love, 
nor more mysterious (μυστηριωδέστερον), nor more exalting (ὑψηλότερον) for humans to 
deification.”260 
Further passages could be listed that maintain these three different points, but these suffice to lay 
the groundwork. Individually, these three claims do not seem to present any difficulties, but read as a 
unit, they present a certain logical tension. If the virtues are natural to humans, and if the virtues exalt 
humans to deification, would it not appear that virtues are natural potentialities of the human 
substance by the realization of which humans are deified? 
This problem has not gone entirely unnoticed among the Confessor’s scholars. For instance, the 
famed expositor of his thought Jean-Claude Larchet highlighted a similar difficulty in his La divinisation 
de l’homme selon Saint Maxime le Confesseur.261 On his reading of Maximos, the contrast between the divine 
image and the divine likeness engenders a certain form of impasse: “The qualities that constitute the 
likeness (ressemblance) [i.e., the virtues], by the fact that they result from a spiritual becoming (devenir) 
on the one hand, and that they are gifted by God by grace (gracieusement) on the other, could appear to 
be superimposed (surajouter) on nature. But Maximos otherwise underlines the natural character of the 
virtues. Is there not a contradiction here?”262 
Larchet attempts to resolve this “contradiction” by making a compelling case for the relative 
fluidity of the lines between grace and nature for Maximos.  He then distinguishes Maximos’ 
understanding from later western medieval thought that emphasized a pura natura.263 As such, Larchet 
contrasts the image (which represents what is received) and the likeness (which represents what is 
acquired) and concludes that: “It is clear that, for Maximos, there is no solution of continuity between 
the likeness and the image.”264 Later he elaborates on this claim: “What we have said previously allows 
us to affirm (constater) that for Maximos the absence of a solution of continuity between the image and 
the likeness has less to do with the fact that the supernatural is found in the finality of nature and in 
its own dynamism than with the fact that nature is found, in its foundation and in its accomplishment, 
enveloped or conditioned by grace and the supernatural.”265 I take it that Larchet means that nature’s 
intrinsic dynamism derives from the fact that all creation is itself an expression of an ongoing divine 
grace, on which grace it depends for its existence, preservation, and movement toward its finality in 
deification.266 In other words, every facet of existence is imbued with grace, which disrupts any hard 
and fast line between nature and grace and thus eschews a static ontology. 
I concur with Larchet that the relationship between nature and grace—or the supernatural—in 
Maximos’ thought was far more fluid than for the later western Christians to whom he alludes. But 
Larchet’s analysis appears to ignore the significance of Opuscule 1 for understanding this tension.267 
What is especially important about this passage is that it unambiguously draws a distinction between 
the natural and supernatural possibilities to which the human substance (οὐσία) can aspire. Thus, even 
if natural and supernatural eventually fuse in a greyscale horizon in Maximos’ corpus—I believe this 
is what Larchet means by referring to the lack of a solution of continuity between the image and 
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likeness—this passage emphatically demarcates the visible planes of their logical differences. This 
segment of Opuscule 1 is well worth reproducing in full here, given the weight it will carry for the rest 
of this study: 
  
But, concerning the phrase ‘one operation’ (μιᾶς ἐνεργείας) that is situated in the seventh chapter 
of the Difficulties of the Great Gregory, the sense (λόγος) is clear. For I, hinting at the impending future 
condition (ἐσομένην κατάστασιν) of the saints, called ‘one operation of God and of the saints’ the 
deifying [operation] of all the saints that belongs to the hoped-for blessedness; on the one hand, it 
is of God by substance, on the other hand, it comes to belong to the saints by grace (κατὰ χάριν). 
‘And better yet,’ I added, ‘of God alone,’ since the deification of the saints by grace is the 
accomplishment (ἀποτέλεσμα) of the divine operation (ἐνεργείας), of which we do not have 
implanted by nature the potentiality (ἧς ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐγκατεσπαρμένην τῇ φύσει τήν δύναμιν). 
And of those things that we do not have the potentiality, neither do we have the act (πρᾶξιν), since 
it [i.e., the act] is the accomplishment of a natural potentiality (φυσικῆς δυνάμεως). Consequently, 
act (πρᾶξις) follows from potentiality, and potentiality from substance (οὐσίας). For act is from 
potentiality and potentiality from substance and is in the substance. Consequently, these are three, 
as they say, that follow upon one another (ἀλλήλων ἐχόμενα): the one who has potentiality 
(δυνάμενον), potentiality (δύναμις), and what is possible (δυνατόν).268 And they call ‘the one who 
has potentiality’ substance; and ‘potentiality’ that according to which we have the movement of being able to 
(καθ᾿ ἥν ἔχομεν τὴν τοῦ δύνασθαι κίνησιν); and ‘what is possible’ what is naturally possible for us to have 
become according to potentiality (τὸ παρ᾿ ἡμῖν κατὰ δύναμιν γενέσθαι πεφυκός). And if it is possible for us to 
become by nature, we have [it] according to a natural potentiality. But deification does not pertain to 
what is possible for us to become naturally according to potentiality, for it does not pertain to what 
is up to us (Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῶν κατὰ δύναμιν γίνεσθαι πεφυκότων ἡ θέωσις, οὐκ οὖσα τῶν ἐφ᾿ 
ἡμῖν); for there is no logos in nature of things beyond nature. Therefore, deification is not the act of 
our potentiality, of which [deification] we do not have the potentiality according to nature, but 
[deification belongs to] only the divine power (μόνης τῆς θείας δυνάμεως), since it [deification] is 
not the repayment (ἀντίδοσις) of just deeds for the saints, but a demonstration of the Creator’s 
liberality (ἀφθονίας); he will by condition (θέσει) make the lovers of good things that which he will 
be shown to be by nature in order that he may both be perfectly known and may remain altogether 
incomprehensible. Consequently, I did not remove the natural operation of those who will undergo 
this, the activity of whom, being finished, has naturally come to rest, displaying solely the 
undergone enjoyment of good things; rather, I only indicated the effecting power of deification 
that is beyond substance that has come to be (γεγενημένην) by virtue of the grace that belongs to 
those who have been deified.269 
This passage, on its face, would seem to complicate Larchet’s exposition above concerning nature, 
grace, and the supernatural state of deification, particularly Maximos’ emphatic differentiation between 
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the logos of nature and what is beyond nature. This is especially the case if we take Larchet’s argument 
in the context of an assertion he made earlier, that “the human is created with, within his natural 
constitution, the movement and all the potentialities (or faculties) that allow him to obtain this end 
[i.e., the end of being divinized].”270 And while Larchet is fully aware of this passage from Opuscule 1, 
this statement would seem to come into conflict with its incisive distinction between natural and 
supernatural. Larchet’s conclusion about Maximos’ ontology has recently also been, with minor 
changes, restated by Paul Blowers: “For Maximus virtue is natural because it draws out the potential 
for assimilation to God already embedded in human nature.”271 Here again the language of “potential” 
edges close to a logical contradiction of the Confessor’s statements in Opuscule 1. For what is especially 
significant about Maximos’ statements in Opuscule 1 is that he directly juxtaposes a natural conception 
of human ontology that is clearly based on Aristotle’s divisions of nature (substance, potentiality, and 
act/actuality) to a supernatural condition that cannot be obtained on the basis of the substance’s 
actualization of its potentialities; rather, it is conferred by grace in contrast to the substance’s natural 
actualization. 
To be clear, Larchet’s position regarding the fluidity between nature and grace, natural and 
supernatural, in Maximos’ thought is compelling. In this exact respect, Blowers has also emphasized 
the permeable boundaries between grace, nature, and supernatural deification in his most recent work: 
“This natural and motile goal-directedness [of beings toward God], while reminiscent of the 
Aristotelian entelecheia, represents more importantly for Maximus the graced state of being which, 
distending the creature’s ‘natural’ development, opens the creature toward the future glory of 
supernatural deification while simultaneously anticipating the dynamic interplay of divine grace with 
the creature’s own energeia, its own desire and volition.”272 What is more, Torstein Tollefsen, has 
spoken on the same topic, noting that: “To convert, however,  is one of the possibilities connected 
with an earthly existence, and the actualization of such a potential is often described by Maximus as a 
kind of movement. Metaphorically speaking, this movement is a movement towards God, and in fact it 
culminates in the deification of the creature.”273 By “convert” Tollefsen refers to one of the three 
facets of late Platonic descriptions of beings’ remaining in their cause, proceeding from it, and 
converting or returning to it, a teaching most lucidly exposited in proposition 35 of Proklos’ Elements 
of Theology. What is noteworthy about Tollefsen’s description, however, is that like Larchet and 
Blowers, he positions potentiality, actuality, and deification in close proximity in such a way that to 
the incautious reader it may seem that the creature’s self-realization by means of the movement to 
which Tollefsen refers does in fact culminate in deification. But that is not the case. So how do we 
reconcile the insights of some of the greatest living expositors of Maximos’ thought with the content 
of Opuscule 1?274 How can God both be and not be the ontological end, fulfillment, or completion of 
humanity? 
This chapter will address several aspects of this question by emphasizing the critical nuances of 
Maximos’ ontology, which are necessary for a resolution to the dilemma (which will be worked out in 
subsequent chapters).  It is, of course possible, that Larchet, Blowers, and Tollefsen were well aware 
of these nuances but forewent expositing them in programmatic form to avoid losing focus on the 
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governing questions of their own fascinating projects for the sake of pursuing a tangential matter. But 
here we make that tangential matter the center of our investigation. To be specific, this chapter argues 
that the question posed in the preceding paragraph can be resolved into a coherent vision by 
demonstrating that Maximos does not operate with a univocal ontology of creation, but rather with a 
contextually-sensitive, multivalent ontology that is rooted in Aristotelian distinctions subsequently 
expanded by the late ancient commentators. Put differently, Maximos means something different by 
“substance” or ousia, as well as its logical and semantic correlates, depending on context. We will 
differentiate and define these contextual distinctions in relation to the philosophical traditions that 
Maximos inherited as part of a larger setup of the next two chapters. 
 
1. The “Blessed Elder”: The Starting Point of Maximos’ Ontology and Teaching on Deification 
 
When and why did Maximos begin to explore the phenomenon of deification? It is almost certain 
that he articulated his teaching about deification in response to his encounter with the most enigmatic 
figure in his corpus, a “certain great elder, truly wise in divine matters,”275 to whom he alludes 
repeatedly as the “blessed elder” in the Mystagogy and Difficulties.276 The identity of this man has long 
been disputed.277 It is certain, however, that Maximos had met this elder during the formative years of 
his career and that he left a deep and lasting impression on him. For our purposes, Maximos’ 
discussion of the elder highlights the paradox of a man who had not yet, chronologically speaking, 
attained the “life of the world to come” and nevertheless manifested its characteristics in this life. We 
might surmise, then, that the monastic intellectual’s teaching of deification was in some sense his 
response to this transformative encounter. 
In this regard, Fr. Maximos (Constas) of Simonopetra has written concerning this elder that “the 
‘ideal type’ of the divinized saint described in the Ambigua is in fact a description of this saintly 
philosopher.”278 If this is true—and I am swayed by his tantalizing connection—the result is that 
Maximos witnessed the phenomenon of deification in a human nature that was able to receive it in 
the here and now by virtue of the Incarnation.279 Accordingly, the Confessor’s ontology had to reflect 
a pluriform pattern wherein the flexible existential fibers of time and eternity crisscrossed into an 
endless Christomorphic knot. Thus, the contradictions and ambiguities of creaturely existence were 
for him rooted in an eschatological reality that persistently and relentlessly shone through the lithe 
ontological veil that partitions heaven and earth. It is impossible for these reasons to speak of a 
univocal ontology in Maximos’ thought. There are various angles from which being could be 
understood in Maximos’ context and I would argue that Aristotle and the commentators provided the 
necessary resources for articulating his experience of deification in this elder. 
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2. Recent Aristotle-Maximos Scholarship and Revisiting Some Methodological Considerations 
 
As noted in the Introduction and previous chapters, recent scholarship on Maximos’ has failed to 
appreciate the extent to which he was familiar with and engaged the thought of Aristotle. In this 
regard, the most recent and forceful voice is Marius Portaru’s entry in the Oxford Handbook of Maximus 
the Confessor, entitled “Classical Philosophical Influences: Aristotle and Platonism.” In this entry, he 
has perceptively underscored the dearth of references to Aristotle’s corpus in the work of those 
researchers of the Confessor’s theology who are of an “Aristotelianizing” persuasion, as he calls 
them.280 For instance, he incisively notes about von Balthasar’s Kosmische Liturgie: “After this Aristotle-
oriented introduction, the reader would expect to find more than just two footnotes about the Stagirite 
in von Balthasar’s entire book (Balthasar 2003: 158 n.72, 240 n.158), neither of which points to a 
precise text deemed to have stamped Maximus’ vision.”281 Concerning other scholars of an 
Aristotelianizing persuasion, including Riou, Garrigues, Léthel, and Piret, he writes: “For the rest, the 
presence of Aristotle in Maximus is merely (and unintelligibly) asserted.”282 A brief survey of the 
authors he critiques here corroborates their general lack of references to Aristotle or of a concerted 
effort to illumine Maximos’ philosophical backdrop through sustained dialectical engagement with his 
non-Christian predecessors. As a counterbalance to these problems in scholarship, Portaru outlines 
what he calls a “method of research capable of underlining compelling connections between classical 
philosophers and patristic authors.”283 He distinguishes between an author A1 being 1) a source, 2) a 
positive influence, and 3) a negative influence for an author A2 depending on what use the author A2 makes 
of the author A1. Having applied this method to the Confessor’s relationship with especial attention 
to Aristotle he concludes “that we cannot speak of any direct and significant influence of Aristotle on 
Maximus.”284 
I have returned to the historiographical question here in order to differentiate my methodology 
from a prevalent approach applied by some of Maximos’ scholars. My approach here is primarily 
informed by the hermeneutical theories developed by the Argentinian essayist, novelist, and literary 
critic Jorge Luis Borges. In one of his most candid pieces on the nature of authorship, “Kafka y sus 
precursores,” Borges wrote that “In critical vocabulary, the word precursor is indispensable, but one 
ought to attempt to purify it (habría que tratar de purificarla) from any polemical or rivalrous connotation. 
The fact is that every writer creates his precursors. His labor modifies our conception of the past, as 
he is to modify that of the future. In this correlation, the identity or plurality of men does not 
matter.”285 For Borges, the advent of every new author has the power to draw together into a system 
of coherence what are otherwise disparate voices and ideas with no necessary connection between 
them. Patricia Novillo-Corvalán, a scholar of Borges’ thought, explains the significance of his 
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interpretative contributions: “In ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ Borges famously postulates a radical model 
of reading that dismantled the idea of chronological influence and proposed instead an inverted modus 
operandi in which ‘cada escritor crea a sus precursores’ [every writer creates his precursors].”286 Her 
insightful remarks concerning his capsizing of chronological influence point to a different dimension 
of interpretative interplay that can equally be applied to the study of intellectual history. 
For Borges, the creation of any text takes place in dialectical appositeness with predecessors, whom 
an author yokes together by drawing their ideas into the context of that author’s work. This action, in 
turn, alters both the past and the future as unintermittingly- and discursively-constituted realities. 
Novillo-Corvalán adds: “The richness of this process lies in the conception of a text as the confluence 
of several preexisting discourses, a hybrid composite that enters into dialogue with other texts.”287 
What is especially important for our purposes about Borges’ hermeneutical model is that it not only 
underscores the active agency of writers and thus challenges the usefulness of the more passive sense 
implied by the term influence, but that it compels interpreters to retrace the meaningful connections 
that another mind made in a different time and place as an intrinsic facet of expositing a thinker’s 
internal logic. 
In this regard, Fr. Maximos of Simonopetra has spoken of the impact that Maximos had in the 
creation of an Orthodox Christian identity: “After his death, his theology was vindicated by the Sixth 
Ecumenical Council (680–681), and so thoroughly did his voice come to resound throughout the 
Byzantine theological tradition that it is not possible to trace the subsequent history of Orthodox 
Christianity without knowledge of his work.”288 More overlooked in scholarship is the Confessor’s 
impact on the creation of his non-Christian predecessors, particularly on Aristotle and the late 
Platonists. Thus, the Aristotle and late Platonists that we encounter in the ascetic intellectual’s oeuvre 
had not, in a sense, ever existed nor had the logic that interwove their ideas in Maximos’ work been 
articulated before him. In this we see that Borges’ hermeneutical approach focuses on the 
transformative aspects that undergird the individual’s appropriative process and on the creation of 
legitimately new material by the creation of fresh contexts and connections, while eschewing what I 
ultimately consider the limiting category of “influence.” For we can hardly speak of any passive 
influences on Maximos’ thought, but only of the imaginative limits that his in der Welt sein imposed 
upon him—as indeed it does upon any thinker—and of the kaleidoscopic vision he amalgamated by 
shattering the structures of previous discourses and shoring those fragments against his age’s ruins.289 
If my arguments in chapters one and two are compelling, we should believe that a denial of 
Aristotle’s significance for Maximos severely compromises the intelligibility of his philosophical 
system. To be sure, I agree with Portaru that Maximos’ reception of Aristotle was highly 
conditioned—though the same can be said about any author, past or present.290 But his subsequent 
handling of the relationship between the two thinkers insinuates that there was none—or very little 
and indirect at that. In this, he reflects a broader assumption in the dominant scholarship on Maximos’ 
intellectual trajectory. At the same time, promoting Aristotle’s relevance for the Confessor runs the 
risk of association with the longstanding interpretative tradition of a Neothomistic persuasion that has 
been subject to extensive criticism. My study does not continue that trajectory, since its objective is to 
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recreate the Aristotle (or Aristotles) of the late-sixth and early-seventh centuries in the Roman Empire 
as the monastic thinker may have known him (or them).291 I think Borges’ interpretative lens can 
function as a corrective to these various scholarly missteps, because it shifts the center of gravity onto 
the ascetic intellectual’s active agency in the creation of his precursors and the new connections he 
created in the process, the sum of which is his cosmic vision. 
The equivocal claim has been made in Maximos’ scholarship that the Confessor’s failure to refer 
to Aristotle by name—save once and negatively at that—is indicative of his general lack of interest in 
or knowledge of the Peripatetic’s work.292 Two problems present themselves here. First, by the same 
metric Maximos would have even less interest in or knowledge of the “Neoplatonists,” none of whom 
he mentions by name. And yet, scholars agree that his thought was largely “Neoplatonic.” Second, it 
is simply not true that the ascetic intellectual refers to Aristotle by name once. For instance, in Questions 
and Doubts 126, Maximos attempts to address an etymological question by invoking Aristotle (by name) 
as an authority, since, he adds, the grammarians and rhetoricians have not spoken on the matter. What 
follows is especially significant because it indicates that Maximos’ knowledge of Aristotle is a complex 
matter: 
 
 
 
Fragment from Aristotle, On Animals, Category 
7.39, fr. 361 
Maximos, Questions and Doubts, 126 
Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ ζῴων μέμνηται ζῴου 
μάργου λέγων ὅτι γεννᾶται ἀπὸ σήψεως μεταξὺ γῆς 
καὶ ὕδατος. καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ γεννηθῇ οὐ παύεται 
γαιηφαγοῦν ἕως οὗ ἐκτρυπήσῃ τὴν γῆν καὶ εἰς τὴν 
ἐπιφάνειαν ἔλθῃ, καὶ ἐλθὸν θνήσκει τρεῖς ἡμέρας. 
καὶ <μετὰ τὰς τρεῖς ἡμέρας Et. Gud.> ἔρχεται νέφος 
μετὰ βροντῆς καὶ βρέχει ἐπάνω αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναζῇ 
μηκέτι γαιηφαγοῦν. 
 
And Aristotle, in the treatise On Animals, makes mention 
of a gluttonous animal (ζῴου μάργου), saying that it is 
spawned from the decomposition of earth and water. And 
from when it is spawned, it does not desist from earth-
eating until it hollows out the earth and comes to the 
surface, and having come [to the surface] it dies for three 
days. And <after the three days, Et. Gud.> a cloud comes 
with thunder (ἔρχεται νέφος μετὰ βροντῆς) and it rains 
over it and it comes back to life, no longer an earth-eater 
(γαιηφαγοῦν). 
Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ζῴων μέμνηται ζῴου 
μαργοῦ λεγομένου καὶ ὅτι γεννᾶται ἀπὸ σήψεως 
μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος· καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ γεννηθῇ, 
οὐ παύεται γῆν φαγὸν ἕως ἐκτρυπῆσαν τὴν γῆν εἰς τὴν 
ἐπιφάνειαν ἔλθῃ· καὶ ἐλθὸν θνῄσκει τρεῖς ἡμέρας, 
καὶ μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἔρχεται νέφος βροχῆς καὶ 
βρέχει ἐπάνω αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναζῇ, μηκέτι ἀειφάγον ὄν. 
 
 
And Aristotle, in the treatise On Animals, makes mention 
of an animal called “gluttonous” (μαργοῦ λεγομένου) and 
that it is spawned from the decomposition of the earth and 
the water; and from when it is spawned, it does not desist 
from eating earth until, having hollowed the earth, it 
comes to the surface; and having come [to the surface] it 
dies for three days, and after three days, a cloud of rain 
comes (ἔρχεται νέφος βροχῆς) and it rains over it and it 
comes back to life, no longer being an ever-eater 
(ἀειφάγον). 
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As before, I have bolded similar words and phrases to underline the connection between the two 
texts. Clearly the passage here in question is not a verbatim citation. It also differs from any other 
surviving witness to the citation, and the addition of articles as well as the curious exchange of 
“thunder” (brontes) for “rain” (broches) and “earth-eating” (gaiefagoun) for “ever-eating” (aeifagon) give the 
impression that Maximos is imperfectly reproducing the passage from memory or perhaps consciously 
modifying it to fit an ascetical context having to do with the sin of gluttony—or perhaps both. The 
Questions and Doubts was an early work (i.e., before 633); he most likely penned it during his time in 
North Africa, where his access to books was limited, requiring him to reproduce the text from 
memory.293 The point of the matter is that he references Aristotle positively by name and uses this 
frankly bizarre tale in response to an ascetical question veiled as etymological curiosity. Elsewhere in 
Difficulty 7, Maximos reproduces a paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and speaks approvingly of him, 
even if he was “foreign to Christianity.”294 In light of these cases, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that Maximos would have read the Peripatetic, even if perhaps in anthologized form—though the 
evidence we consider following might suggest a more engaged and extensive reading of his works. If 
the monastic thinker did indeed study at Alexandria and at the feet of a philosopher like David295 there 
is good reason to believe that his knowledge of Plato’s most notable disciple, as transmitted through 
the commentary tradition, would have been not limited, but complex and compendious. In this, he 
was no different than any other well-versed student of ancient texts from this time frame, who 
practiced an art of reading a text with others, both living and dead. 
 A quick survey of most extant Greek manuscripts, and especially those whose cultural value was 
held in high esteem, such as those by Plato, Aristotle, Homer, and numerous fathers, shows that these 
texts were meant to be mediated in a variety of ways. Most texts occupy only the center of the folio 
and have vast margins that were subsequently filled in with scholia or were indexed to match a set of 
accompanying scholia, sometimes written separately on account of their extensiveness.296 Some scholia 
were written in ad hoc, much like a student of ancient texts today might fill in the margins of a Loeb 
or Dumbarton Oaks series volume with notes that come to mind in the course of reading; other 
scholia, however, were so protracted that they were written in a separate tome, where they were 
systematically indexed to correspond to codified marks in the manuscript that contained the primary 
work.297 
A salient example can be found in the Dionysian corpus, which had predictably accumulated a 
substantial corpus of scholia that were historically attributed to Maximos, even if Ioannes of 
Skythopolis in fact wrote the bulk of them. In the year 827, a Roman delegation from Constantinople 
arrived at the Carolingian court with the manuscript now coded as Parisinus graecus 437, which is the 
oldest extant copy of the works of Dionysios. Although this specific manuscript contained only 
minimal marginalia, it is indexed throughout so that the reader can consult a particular scholion where 
appropriate, as the extract from Parisinus graecus 437 shows here below. During his travels to 
Constantinople, Anastasius Bibliothecarius came across a set of scholia that were meant to accompany 
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the reading of the Areopagitical corpus.298 He translated these scholia into Latin, annotated them, and 
returned to the Carolingian court with them.299 When Charles the Bald commissioned John Scotus 
Eriugena with the surely intimidating task of translating the Areopagitical corpus, it was precisely to 
these scholia that the Scot turned. Significantly, in the prefatory epistle to the translation addressed to 
his patron monarch, Eriugena expressly thanked the “wisest Maximos” for illumining the darkest 
passages in the Corpus dionysiacum.300 His reference to Maximos, of course, refers to the scholia on 
Dionysios that he was deemed to have written. What this curious moment of cultural crosspollination 
demonstrates is the irrevocable practice of reading within a network of mediated and contextually 
transmitted ideas that often aided one’s engagement with taxing thinkers like the Stagirite and the 
Areopagite. 
 
 
 
Finally, we should add that it was not only extremely uncommon but also highly impractical to 
employ (the prohibitively expensive) copies of an author’s complete work for the classroom setting.301 
Far more common were encheiridia—handbooks—that, as the name suggests, were handy for 
pedagogical purposes. These handbooks were compendia that contained select and significant 
passages from a variety of authors for classroom instruction, much as anthologies are employed in 
university courses today. But the fact that most young and aspiring Romans were reading Aristotle, 
Plato, and Galen in handbooks hardly means they did not have “direct” access to their work. Rather, 
it means that they practiced an art of reading together with a certain tradition that both offered 
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guidance on difficult matters but also elicited original contributions or responses from the reader. 
Ancient texts were thus constantly being discursively rewritten because students’ experience of reading 
a text was always already within a synoptic context that brought a wide spectrum of (often disparate) 
ideas together and engendered original responses to a diversity of opinions on perennial questions. 
 
3. Aristotle, “Aristotle,” and the Other Aristotle 
 
Resistance to Maximos’ knowledge of Aristotle, and Christians’ more broadly, has galvanized 
around the following points: first, that Christian knowledge of Aristotle would have been largely 
doxographical and not based on readings of his works; second, that Christians were consistently critical 
of the Peripatetic; and third, that Christians had identified a constellation of problematic loci in 
Aristotle’s thought that hindered their appropriation of his thought. One scholar has summed these 
loci up as follows: “(a) that Aristotle denied divine providence in the lower part of the universe; (b) 
that happiness required external goods, such as wealth; (c) that the universe was eternal; (d) that the 
soul was mortal,  being considered only as the entelechy of the body.”302 While it is true that Christians 
voiced their misgivings about some of Aristotle’s teachings, their views of the Peripatetic ranged 
widely, not only among one another, but even in their own works and depending on the specific 
purposes of their texts. And even if Christians were critical of Aristotle, the force of their preferential 
misgivings depends to a commensurate degree on their knowledge of his work. 
The point of the matter is that most late ancient Christian texts were penned by relatively, and 
sometimes impressively, intelligent thinkers who had received an exceptionally rigorous education, 
and had been trained in the art of discursive persuasion far better than contemporary curricular and 
logistical constraints allow. Thus, although my observation may seem germane, Christian writers from 
this period were master rhetors, the sharpness of whose craft has hardly been dulled by the fifteen or 
so centuries that divide us from them. As such, a robust hermeneutical suspicion about their claims is 
fully justified. In this sense, then, we must be aware of a variety of “Aristotles” in their works, such as 
Aristotle as a persona or historical figure, a rhetorically- and discursively-invented Aristotle for the 
sake of Christian polemics, or the Aristotle whose ideas and terms they widely appropriated, I would 
argue, but frequently forewent acknowledging. 
In some cases, rhetorical barrages against Aristotle likely do not even belong to the original author 
but were a later interpolation by a pious and well-intentioned scribe who nevertheless did us a 
disservice. These consideration, too, must be kept in mind. In this respect, one scholar has pointed to 
a passage in Against Eunomios 1.1.55, where Gregory of Nyssa supposedly censures Aetios for 
employing Aristotle’s evil artifice (κακοτεχνία)—meaning, perhaps, the syllogistic—to promote his 
heresy, as a sure sign of Christian disapproval of Aristotle. But such an allusion hardly accounts for 
the totality of Gregory’s complicated relationship to the Stagirite; moreover, the selection of this 
particular passage is unfortunate. 
Werner Jäger placed this allusion to Aristotle’s “evil artifice” in square brackets in his critical edition 
for good reason. Of the nine relevant manuscripts that preserve Against Eunomios, one entirely omits 
it (v=textus vulgatus editionis Parisinae, 1638 by Aegidio Morello), six (Vaticanus graecus 447, 12th c., 
Laurentianus Mediceus plut. VI 17, 10th/11th c., Lesbicus Mytilenensis monasterii S. Joannis 6, 12th c., Athous 
monasterii Vatopedi 129/118, 11th/12th c., Vaticanus graecus 424, 13th c., and Vaticanus graecus 1907, 
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12th/13th c.) present cases of interpretamentum seclusi, and only two (Ambrosianus C 215, 12th c. and 
Marcianus graecus LXIX 501, 12th/13th c.) contain the phrase without addenda.303 In other words, six 
different copyists, including the earliest witness to the work, considered the phrase on which scholars 
have built their case a clear interpolation; only the latest two manuscripts include it without misgivings 
and Aegidio Morello had the good sense of altogether omitting the interpolation in his version. Put 
simply, it is virtually certain that Gregory did not write that phrase. A different reading of this text 
shows that the Cappadocian not only possessed precise knowledge concerning the methods of 
teaching the Aristotelian syllogistic in the fourth century, but that he himself was highly proficient in 
the dialectical arts. To this point, he censures the Anomians’ reasoning as being a nonsensical 
application of syllogisms they had learned by rote in the classroom for the sake of showing off.304 
The foregoing point suggests that Gregory’s relation to Aristotle is more complex, though we may 
only consider it briefly here. In his dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrection, Gregory shows a certain 
ambiguity about Aristotle’s work. On the one hand, he (half-heartedly) finds fault with an unqualified 
notion of the soul’s mortality; on the other hand (and in the exact same phrase), he expresses his 
admiration for the Peripatetic’s research acumen and the usefulness of his psychology for his own 
inquiry, referring to him as one who “followed phenomena systematically and painstakingly examined 
through diligence the subject matter now lying before us.”305 It may thus not be universally true that 
Christians spurned the ideation of soul as entelechy or form of the body or that they rescinded the 
possibility of its mortality altogether. As I have argued elsewhere,306 Gregory does not in fact define 
the soul as “immortal” by nature in the dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrection; in other texts, he shows 
strategic pause about predicating immortality of the soul without further qualifications,307 as Origen 
had done before him.308 
I have likewise argued that Gregory in effect appropriated Aristotle’s idea of the soul as actuality 
of the body in the interest of describing the role the soul plays in the gestation of life, at birth, over 
the course of growth and psychological development, but especially in the resurrection.309 Gregory 
expands this application of the soul as form or actuality of the body in his On the Making of the Human, 
where he borrows a series of Aristotle’s images from On the Soul and the Metaphysics in tacit approval 
of the philosopher from Stageiros.310 In the Life of Moses, Gregory adopts his distinctive teaching on 
virtue as the mean between two extremes of deficiency, chiefly presented in the Nikomachean Ethics.311 
In brief, to reduce Gregory to an unqualified and uncompromising critic of Aristotle on the basis of 
an interpolated rhetorical turn of phrase in a dogmatic dispute hardly gets at the numerous layers of 
interconnectedness between Christian and Aristotelian ideas. 
The same can be said about some of the other loci communes mentioned earlier. For example, the 
idea of eudaimonia and Peripatetic ethics more broadly enjoyed significant adherents, like Origen, who 
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inveighed against the Stoics for rejecting the Peripatetic ethic, which, he says “is most suitably human 
(ἀνθρωπικώτατον) and more reasonably acknowledges (εὐγνωμόνως ὁμολογοῦντα) human good things 
than the remainder of the <non-Christian> ways of thought (αἱρέσεων).”312 Origen, of course, does 
not consistently think this highly of Peripatetics, but his words nevertheless complicate the 
representation of early Christian attitudes toward Aristotle. Indeed, even Eusebios, otherwise 
emphatic about Aristotle’s and Plato’s radical disagreement and the latter’s greater congeniality with 
Christianity, did not hesitate to employ some of Aristotle’s and Alexandros of Aphrodisias’ teaching 
on providence, choice, and human causality to contradict certain fatalist Stoic doctrines that brought 
deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) or self-rule (αὐτεξούσιον) into question.313 In this he was not alone, but 
followed the lead of other earlier Christians, like Clement and Origen of Alexandria.314 Indeed, even 
one of Aristotle’s admittedly most contentious teachings, that the universe was eternal, was gradually 
accepted by some Christians, albeit in a highly qualified way, by recourse to the doctrine of the logoi of 
creation, to which Maximos gave sophisticated expression. We may add that this position was also 
gradually accepted by Latin thinkers, like Thomas Aquinas, who defended a qualified version of the 
eternity of the world in his aptly titled De aeternitate mundi. In sum, the picture of early Christian 
appreciation of Aristotle may not be as bleak as is often claimed. 
 
4. The Rich Legacy of Aristotle’s Metaphysical Divisions of Nature 
 
A careful analysis of Maximos’ appropriation of Aristotle’s metaphysical divisions of nature 
(substance, potentiality, actuality) is critical to address the conundrum raised in the introduction. Here 
again, there is scholarly resistance. For instance, one interpreter of the Confessor’s work has noted 
that, on the one hand, the category of substance/οὐσία was a positive influence on Maximos; on the 
other, he has claimed that “The triad of essence‒power‒energy (οὐσία–δύναμις–ἐνέργεια), despite the 
similarity of words, is not Aristotelian; it can be found as such in Proclus (Elementa theologica 169), and 
                                                 
312 Against Kelsos 1.10.18–20. 
313 See On the Preparation for the Gospel 6.9.1–12 and compare to his different assessment of him in, e.g., 13.13.4 and 15.12.6. 
314 For Klemes, see: οὐκέτ’ οὖν προαιρέσεως κατόρθωμα ἡ πίστις, εἰ φύσεως πλεονέκτημα, οὐδὲ ἀμοιβῆς δικαίας 
τεύξεται ἀναίτιος ὢν ὁ μὴ πιστεύσας, καὶ οὐκ αἴτιος ὁ πιστεύσας, πᾶσα δὲ ἡ τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἀπιστίας ἰδιότης καὶ 
διαφορότης οὔτ’ ἐπαίνῳ οὔτε μὴν ψόγῳ ὑποπέσοι ἂν ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις, προηγουμένην ἔχουσα τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τὰ πάντα 
δυνατοῦ φυσικὴν ἀνάγκην γενομένην· νευροσπαστουμένων δὲ ἡμῶν ἀψύχων δίκην φυσικαῖς ἐνεργείαις τό 
τε <ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ> ἀκούσιον παρέλκει ὁρμή τε ἡ προκαθηγουμένη τούτων. Καὶ οὐκέτι ἔγωγε ἐννοῶ ζῷον τοῦτο, 
οὗ τὸ ὁρμητικὸν ἀνάγκη λέλογχεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἔξωθεν αἰτίας κινούμενον. Str. II.3. (GCS 11.1, 2.) Clement of Alexandria is 
here directly opposing the Stoic doctrine of physical causality; note, especially, the usage of the term ἔξωθεν. Compare to 
Chrysippos, SVF 3.988 and 2.974. See also Amand, Fatalisme, 104. For Origen, see “Si enim nostri arbitrii sumus, inpugnare 
nos fortasse possint aliquae virtutes ad peccatum et aliae iuvare ad salutem, non tamen necessitate cogimur vel recte agere 
vel male; quod fieri arbitrantur hi, qui stellarum cursum et motus causam dicunt humanorum esse gestorum, non solum 
eorum, quae extra arbitrii accidunt libertatem, sed et eorum, quae in nostra sunt posita potestate.” On First Principles, preface, 
5. SC 252, p. 84.111–118. See also: Εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἐκκαθάρας ἑαυτὸν γίνεται ‘σκεῦος εἰς τιμήν’, ὁ δὲ ἀπερικάθαρτον ἑαυτὸν 
περιϊδὼν ‘σκεῦος εἰς ἀτιμίαν’, ὅσον ἐπὶ ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος ὁ δημιουργός. ποιεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὁ 
δημιουργὸς ‘σκεύη τιμῆς καὶ σκεύη ἀτιμίας’ οὐκ ἀρχῆθεν κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ κατ’ αὐτὴν προκατακρίνει ἢ 
προδικαιοῖ, ἀλλὰ ‘σκεύη τιμῆς τοὺς ἐκκαθάραντας ἑαυτοὺς’ καὶ ‘σκεύη ἀτιμίας’ τοὺς ἀπερικαθάρτους ἑαυτοὺς 
περιϊδόντας· ὥστε ἐκ πρεσβυτέρων αἰτιῶν τῆς κατασκευῆς . . . γίνεσθαι ὃν μὲν εἰς τιμὴν ὃν δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν. Εἰ δ’ ἅπαξ 
προσιέμεθα εἶναί τινας πρεσβυτέρας αἰτίας τοῦ ‘σκεύους τῆς τιμῆς’ καὶ τοῦ ‘σκεύους τῆς ἀτιμίας’, τί ἄτοπον 
ἀνελθόντας εἰς τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς τόπον <νοεῖν> πρεσβύτερα αἴτια τοῦ τὸν Ἰακὼβ ἠγαπῆσθαι καὶ τὸν Ἠσαῦ μεμισῆσθαι 
γεγονέναι εἰς τὸν Ἰακὼβ πρὸ τῆς ἐνσωματώσεως καὶ εἰς τὸν Ἠσαῦ πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς Ῥεβέκκας γενέσθαι; 
On First Principles, 3.1.20, 21. SC 268, pp. 134.708–136.723. 
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in Dionysius (Hier.cael. 11.2).”315 The implication here, it would seem, is that the triad “substance-
potentiality-actuality” is a later development that cannot be traced to Aristotle. Two serious problems 
plague this assessment. 
First, this assessment shows little consideration for the plurivocity of οὐσία/ousia both in Aristotle 
and Maximos. The Stagirite, like the Confessor, boarded the topic of substance from different angles, 
depending on the purposes of his investigation. For example, the ousia he speaks of in the Categories is 
really rather different than some of the senses of ousia presented in the Metaphysics. In the former work, 
Aristotle is primarily interested in analyzing substance as the subject of predication (kategoria in Greek 
means “predicate”) of the nine secondary predicates he introduces following his exposition of 
substance. Substance, in other words, is the “what” or “who” to which or to whom predicates are 
ascribed. In the Metaphysics, by contrast, he is primarily concerned with investigating “being as being.” 
This investigation led him to consider substance in at least four ways, since in books 3 and 4 of the 
Metaphysics Aristotle encountered a defining problem for his investigation. Being is spoken of in 
different ways depending on context. For this reason, Aristotle feels the urge of clarifying what the 
exact subject of inquiry in the Metaphysics is and how to approach it. Being, Aristotle holds, may be 
plurivocal, but all terms said of being stand in a πρὸς ἕν relation;316 this kind of relation unifies disparate 
terms by rapport to a singularity. In this case, that means being in a primary sense from which all 
others derive.317 In book 4, he introduces the famous principle of non-contradiction, which holds that 
“it is impossible for something simultaneously both to belong and not to belong to something in the 
same respect.”318 This principle applies to being in the sense that the “whatness” of being that is under 
investigation must be compared in the same respect that is the subject of comparison. So, being can 
be studied from several different perspectives that yield various results without entailing logical 
contradiction, as Aristotle further argues in book 7, where he mentions that there are no fewer than 
four different senses of substance.319 Indeed, in this same book, he makes a distinction between 
substance as the individual and as subject of predication of various categories.320 Therefore, Aristotle’s 
use of substance across different works (and indeed, even within those works), such as the Categories 
and the Metaphysics, requires special attention to this guiding logical principle and the contextual 
situation of the term.321 To illustrate, in Metaphysics 1029a10 Aristotle holds that the definition of 
substance as subject of predication is insufficient (οὐ ἱκανόν) for his following purposes, which aim at 
comprehending being as such. 
The second problem with the assessment above that “The triad of essence‒power‒energy (οὐσία–
δύναμις–ἐνέργεια), despite the similarity of words, is not Aristotelian” is that it is factually incorrect. 
Though I do not wish to put too fine a point on the matter, the three terms, ousia, dynamis, energeia are 
not “similar” to those that Aristotle uses, but identical. Moreover, the Peripatetic in effect discusses 
these three terms in relation to one another no fewer than eight times and often at sprawling lengths.322 
                                                 
315 Portaru, “Classical Philosophical Influences,” 138. 
316 See further, Cataldo, “Plato, Aristotle, and pros hen Equivocity,” 237–247. 
317 See especially 1004b28–1005a11. 
318 Metaphysics 1005b19–20. 
319 Metaphysics 1028b34–1029a3. 
320 Metaphysics 1030a17–21. 
321 See further Loux, Primary “Ousia,” 72–107. 
322 See On Interpretation 23a22–26 and Metaphysics 1042b9–11, 1050a2–5, 1050b2–5, 1050b25–27, 1051b27–28, 1071b18–
21, and 1088b1–3. For further scholarly discussion, see Witt, Ways of Being, 38–95; Yu, The Structure of Being; and Panayides, 
“Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in Substance,” 327–344. 
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These terms likewise appear among other Aristotelians, like Alexandros of Aphrodisias, who, in his 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, treats this triad as a unit of commentary some four dozen times323 
and in Themistios, who also includes the triad in his commentaries on the Peripatetic in various 
places.324 This triad, to be sure, was also subsequently employed by late Platonists, including Plotinos, 
Porphyrios, Iamblichos, Dexippos, Ammonios, Proklos, Syrianos, Damaskios, Simplikios, Asklepios, 
Olympiodoros, and Elias.325 But these authors often discussed these three terms in commentaries on 
Aristotle. 
Maximos also employs this triadic schema as we saw in Opuscule 1, cited earlier, and also 
demonstrates a sophisticated grasp of the nuances of Aristotle’s ousia. This much is clear in his vastly 
understudied Two Hundred Chapters on Theology, which will here serve as the spine of our analysis of 
Maximos’ metaphysics. The complex opening decade presents several senses of substance that 
strongly suggest the ascetic thinker’s grasp of the Aristotelian commentary tradition, especially with 
regard to substance. Here substance appears as a subject of predication, as an ontologically-defining 
principle, and as an ontological complex of actuality-driven motion; we should also point out here at 
the outset that the relationship between these last two, as in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, is narrow.326 The 
decade operates on a number of triadic structures, some of which are first introduced in 1.2, such as 
first principle (ἀρχή), intermediate state (μεσότης), and end (τέλος); indefinite (ἀόριστος), immobile 
(ἀκίνητος), and infinite (ἄπειρος); and substance (οὐσία), potentiality (δύναμις), and actuality 
(ἐνέργεια).327 
It is clear that the terms of the triads are related, but different. For instance, the first principle and 
substance are the ontological starting point of beings that aims at an end or actuality through the 
intermediate state wherein the potentialities that inhere in the substance or pertain to the first principle 
are realized. The other three terms are negations of these six existential categories and are applied to 
God: “indefinite” negates a first principle or substance; “immobile” negates the intermediary state and 
potentiality; “infinite” negates an end or actuality. We will later return to the Aristotelian provenance 
of these terms.328 In 1.3, the Confessor appears to identify substance with a first principle, potentiality 
with the intermediary state, and actuality with end: “Each substance, including its own definition in 
itself, is a first principle by nature productive of the movement discerned in potentiality in it. Each 
natural motion toward actuality, conceptualized as after substance, yet prior to actuality, is an 
intermediate state, since in nature it divides both as that which mediates between them. And each 
actuality, in nature circumscribed by its corresponding logos, is the end of the substantializing 
movement (οὐσιώδους κινήσεως) conceptually prior to it.” Substance as Maximos envisions it here is 
                                                 
323 Selected examples: 534:35–36, 587:1–5, 591:12–13 and 18–22, 724:32, etc. 
324 E.g., Periphrasis on Aristotle’s On the Soul 5.3.99.32–37 and 5.3.112.3–5. 
325 See Plotinos (e.g., Enneads 6.6.9.26–28), Porphyrios (e.g., Commentary on the Timaios 2.75.12–13), Iamblichos (e.g., 
Protreptikos 112:20–22 and On Mysteries 1.4.15–18), Dexippos (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 34:12–14, 49:1–4), 
Ammonios (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 247:4–8, 250:9–11) Proklos (e.g., Commentary on Plato’s Republic 1.65.23–
24, Platonic Theology 1.102.14, Elements of Theology 77.1–2), Syrianos (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 101:28–29, 
171:35–36), Damaskios (e.g., On First Principles 1.23.15–16, 1.31.20–24), Simplikios (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s On the 
Heavens 7.421.16–17, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 8.95.15–17), Asklepios (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
142.22–23, 317.10–11), Olympiodoros (e.g., Commentary on Plato’s Alkebiades 38.22), and Elias (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Categories 180.14–17). 
326 See Witt, Ways of Being, 75–95. 
327 See Salés, Maximus the Confessor, 43, n. 3. 
328 See Metaphysics 1071b3–1073a11 and Bradshaw, “In What Sense is the Prime Mover Eternal?” 359–369 and compare 
with Terezis, “The Pair Limit-Finitude,” 71–84. 
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closely related to substance as Aristotle articulates it in select places of the Metaphysics. This substance 
is a complex of end-driven ontological dynamisms that is circumscribed by its existential principle.329 
This existential principle refers to the “what it is for x to be x,” which had been the singular most 
important question in the Metaphysics and that which has most divided scholars, whereas its dynamism, 
actualized by the realization of its potentialities, belongs to its ongoing motion toward its natural 
completion.330 
 
5. Substance, Essence, Substantial Form, and the Logoi of Creation 
 
In Aristotelian scholarship, both ancient and modern, this aforementioned existential principle is 
commonly referred to as the “substantial form” (εἶδος οὐσιῶδες) and is the essence or quiddity (τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι—“the what it was being for something to be existing”) of a substance (οὐσία) by way of 
(onto)logical definition (ὅρος). Alexandros of Aphrodisias seemingly coined the compound term 
“substantial form” in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics as a way of referring to the quiddity of a 
substance but one, additionally, that does not exist separate from its substrate; rather, it is only logically 
inferable through theoretical science, as he notes in his exposition of the Stagirite: “Having 
demonstrated that the form of substances (τὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν εἶδος) does not occur as a form, but occurs 
in respect of a certain substrate (τι ὑποκείμενον), in effect I mean matter, he [i.e., Aristotle] says that 
the demonstrative argument (ὁ δεικνύων λόγος) not only demonstrates that the substantial form 
(οὐσιῶδες εἶδος) does not occur as an essence (οὐσίαν) [in the Platonic sense], but neither do the 
remainder of the predicates [or categories], quantity, quality, and the rest. For just as the copper sphere 
occurs, but not the form of ‘sphere,’ so also white wood or <wood that is> two cubits long occurs, 
but not ‘whiteness’ (λευκότης) or ‘size’ (ποσότης).”331 This term, “substantial form,” would 
subsequently play a significant role in the late Platonic interpretations of Plato and Aristotle and was 
employed as a set phrase by Plotinos, Porphyrios, Ammonios, Syrianos, Proklos, Damaskios, 
Simplikios, Ioannes Philoponos, and David.332 
                                                 
329 Refer to Gill, Aristotle on Substance, 90–107, 172–183, and 214–226. 
330 The discussion here centers on two possible interpretations of Aristotle’s understanding of the substantial form and its 
relation to universals and particulars. One major tradition argues that substantial forms are indeed particulars and as such 
subsist and ontologically define every being and every being has a unique substantial form. See Sellars, “Substance and 
Form in Aristotle,” 688–699; Hartman, “Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence,” 545–561; Irwin, 
“Homonymy in Aristotle,” 523–544; and Witt, “Aristotelian Essentialism Revisited,” 285–298. Another tradition holds 
that the substantial form refers to a universal predicated of numerous individuals that fall under that definition. For this 
line of reasoning see Woods, “Problems in Metaphysics Z” in Moravcsik; Owen, “Inherence” 97–105 and “Particular and 
General,” 1–21; Code, “No Universal is a Substance,” in Simmons, 65–74 and “Aristotle: Essence and Accident,” in 
Grandy and Warner, 411–439; Loux, Primary Ousia; and Lewis, Substance and Predication in Aristotle. 
331 Alexandros of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 501, ll. 13–17. 
332 See Plotinos, Enneads 6.3.3.14–15; Porphyrios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, CAG 4.1, p. 133, ll. 15–16; Ammonios, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation p. 89, l. 21; Syrianos, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics p. 149, ll. 4–5; Proklos, 
Commentary on the Parmenides, p. 936, l. 32 and p. 980, ll. 35–36; Damaskios, On First Principles vol. 1, p. 218, l. 7 and p. 294, 
l. 13, Commentary on the Parmenides p. 160, l. 5; Simplikios, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens vol. 7, p. 127, l. 32, vol. 8, 
p. 227, l. 34, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, vol. 8, p. 261, l. 28, p. 286, l. 14, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, vol. 11, 
p. 7, l. 7, p. 169, l. 3; Ioannes Philoponos, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories vol. 13.1, p. 73, l. 15, p. 199, l. 16, Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics vol. 13.3, p. 242, l. 9, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption vol. 14.2, p. 118, l. 
8, p. 169, l. 31, p. 204, l. 7, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, vol. 16, p. 222, ll. 9–10, p. 224, l. 6, l. 11, l. 19, p. 225, l. 10, p. 
227, l. 14, p. 788, l. 22, David, Commentary on Porphyrios’ Introduction, p. 98, ll. 30–31, p. 99, l. 17.  
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It is thus not surprising that Maximos, squarely situated in this philosophical trajectory, also uses a 
variant on the phrase “substantial form”333 in order to make an implicit distinction between substance 
and its “substantial form;” he, however, more commonly prefers a different term when referring to 
the ontologically-defining reality of a substance. In Chapters on Theology 1.3, Maximos inserts an 
explanatory phrase to the effect that every substance already contains in itself precisely this 
(onto)logical definition: “Each substance, including its own definition in itself . . .” which he later 
identifies as the substance’s circumscribing definition (ὅρος): its logos. It would appear that the logos 
functions for Maximos in an ontologically-defining sense that is decidedly not coterminous with ousia 
or substance, since it is precisely ousia that the logos defines. Rather, the role that the logos plays here 
bears a striking similarity to that which Aristotle’s interpreters assigned to the substantial form, 
whereas the ousia is the subject defined by the logos. We should also note that referring to the essentially-
defining term of a substance as logos is not foreign to Aristotle, since he holds that “And ‘definition’ is 
a logos signifying the essence” (ἔστι δ’ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, Topics 102a3). 
In this context, then, Maximos does not identify ousia with the essential properties of a being. This 
interpretation is confirmed in 1.9, where Maximos writes that “What is known of beings naturally 
includes the interwoven intrinsic logoi as what make it [i.e., what is known of beings] demonstrable, by 
which it [i.e., what is known of beings] naturally admits of circumscription.” Here substances are 
known as what they are in an essential sense through their logos, since their intelligibility depends on 
the definition that makes them demonstrable.334 Substance, here, just is what beings are; it is not their 
conceptual or existential definition. This interpretation can be upheld from other texts, such as 
Difficulties 17.9.1, where Maximos explicitly asks concerning the logos of each particular substance (Καὶ 
αὖθις τίς ὁ λόγος τῆς τοῦ καθ’ ἕκαστον οὐσίας;), implying thereby that they are not identical; on the 
contrary, the former defines (and is responsible for the coming into being of) the latter. If logos and 
ousia would be roughly synonymous, Maximos’ phrase above would be no more than a redundant 
tautology.335 
One of the most important passages that speaks at length about the logoi is Maximos’ first extended 
exposition of this teaching in Difficulties 7.15–16. In 7.15 he begins: 
 
For who, knowing that with logos and wisdom beings were brought into being out of non-being by 
God, if he were in his mind (ἐμφρόνως) to direct the contemplative capacity of his soul to the 
infinite natural difference and complexity (ποικιλίᾳ)336 of beings and were to distinguish with the 
analytical capacity of reason the logos in conceptual form (κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν) in accordance with which 
they were created would not know that the One Logos is many logoi, distinguished indivisibly in the 
difference of things that have come into being on account of their unconfused particularity toward 
one another and themselves? And again, [who would not know] that the many [logoi] are One 
[Logos] by the relation of all things to Him [and that they] exist unconfusedly on account of Him, 
[who is] the substantive and existing (ἐνούσιόν τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατον) Word of God and of the Father 
since (ὡς) [he is] the first principle and cause of all things . . . ? 
 
                                                 
333 Maximos, Questions to Thalassios 13, l. 22 and l. 25. 
334 See further Salés, Maximus the Confessor, 30–32. 
335 For contrasts with my own interpretation, see Larchet, La divinisation, 141–151 and Blowers, Jesus Christ, 129. 
336 It is quite possible that Maximos may have borrowed this precise phrase from Ioannes Philoponos, On the Eternity of the 
World, 340, ll. 21–22. 
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The activity that Maximos describes here, by which one can distinguish the unconfused plurality of 
being, is meant to take place intellectually, with both the contemplative—or theoretical—and 
analytical capacities of the soul,337 and yields a concept abstracted from being that are the logoi or Logos 
undergirding all existence. The science described here by the Confessor bears striking resemblances 
to Aristotle’s formulations concerning the abstraction of the form or substantial form by which the 
essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of a substance can be conceptually known on the basis of the substrate wherein 
it is contemplated.338 It is possible to inquire into being as being, despite these infinite differences, 
because of the relation to the singularity of the Logos that underlies every substance. Again, this tenet 
is conceptually identical to that put forth by Aristotle in book 4 of the Metaphysics, discussed above, 
specifically with respect to the principle of relation to a singularity (πρὸς ἕν), which in this case is the 
Logos of God.339 We should also add that his use of “unconfused particularity” (ἀσυγχύτον ἰδιότητα), 
despite sharing the same root as one of the four Christological definitions of Chalcedon, more likely 
functions in light of the ontological divisions promoted in the so-called Porphyrian Tree, as 
Melchisedec Törönen has argued.340 
Maximos continues: 
 
For, containing before all ages the pre-established (προϋφεστῶτας) logoi of things that have come 
into being, by his good will he established the visible and invisible creation out of non-being in 
accordance with them, having made and making by logos and wisdom all things according to the 
necessary time, both universals and particulars. For we believe that a logos preceded and directed 
(προκαθηγεῖγσθαι) the creation of angels, a logos of each of the substances and powers (οὐσιῶν καὶ 
δυνάμεων) filling the world above, a logos of humans, [in brief,] a logos of everything receiving being 
from God so that I do not mention the particulars (ἵνα μὴ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγω). 
 
In this passage Maximos clarifies that God brings beings into existence on the basis of a pre-
established logos. While there are some similarities between the logoi as the Confessor envisions them 
here (and elsewhere in his corpus) and Plato’s forms, Larchet has convincingly demonstrated that the 
parallels are superficial rather than substantive.341 I would add that the ascetic thinker’s articulation of 
the logoi is not a Christian substitution for the Platonic interpretations of Plato’s doctrine of the forms 
that Aristotle critiqued in the Metaphysics, but a serendipitous approbatory nod to the Peripatetic in 
that he grounded the preexisting ideas of creation in a specific, really existing substrate, that is, the 
Logos of God. In this respect, it is significant that Maximos would refer to the “Word of God and of 
the Father,” in a twofold affirmation of his real existence, as “substantive and existing” (ἐνούσιόν τε 
                                                 
337 See Iamblichos, On Universal Mathematical Sciences, sect. 87, l. 14. The term ἐξεταστικόν as Maximos employs it here is 
most probably from Aristotelian derivation, which he defines in the Topics 101b2–4. Origen used it extensively and it 
figures widely in both Christian and Platonic authors of late antiquity. 
338 See Black, Aristotle’s Theory of Abstraction and Lollar, To See into the Life of Things and see Blowers’s review of this latter in 
Journal of Theological Studies 66.1 (2015), 462–464. 
339 See also, Chapters on Theology 1.17, 21–22, 32, 54–56, 59, 61, 65–67, 70, 78–80, 82–85, 97, 2.4, 8–10, 13, 16–18. 23, 27–
29, 33–34, 36, 39, 41, 43–46, 50–51, 59, 61, 74–76, 80, 82, and 98–100, as well as Difficulty 7.15–16. 
340 See Törönen, Union and Distinction, 2–9. 
341 Larchet, “La conception maximienne,” 276–283. 
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καὶ ἐνυπόστατον).342 I believe the move is partly meant to preclude a separately-existing realm of forms 
as an affirmation of a radical and transcendent Christian monotheism. 
The clue to this interpretation may be something rather germane, namely, the Confessor’s use of 
the emphatic conjunctive construction τε καὶ, which would suggest that these two words form a 
hendiadys rather than points of contrast. In this way, Maximos can both affirm the logoi, understood 
as Aristotle’s substantial forms, while also grounding them in a specific—and, presumably, archetypal 
in the strictest sense—substantial hypostasis: the Word of God. So, the logoi are not really existing 
intermediaries (such as those that Proklos proposed and termed “gods”)343 that bridge the 
imparticipable344 and radically transcendent God and creation, but the really existing singularity that 
ontologically grounds and logically binds all things to Godself. 
We must touch on one final point before returning to the opening decade of the Chapters on Theology. 
A strong indicator that Maximos’ doctrine of the logoi functions in a similar way to Aristotle’s 
substantial form or, as he calls it in the Metaphysics, substance in a primary sense, is the fact that the 
same questions surround Maximos’ doctrine of the logoi as those frequently brought up in scholarship 
on Aristotle concerning the substantial form.345 
Aristotle famously engendered a lively discussion in book 7 of the Metaphysics concerning whether 
substance in a primary sense refers to the individual and unique form of each and every substance (by 
his example, Kallias and Sokrates) or whether it refers to universals (e.g., “human” and “horse”). The 
problem takes the following form. In On Interpretation 17a37 and in Metaphysics 1038b11–12 Aristotle 
specifies that universals are predicated of the many rather than of individuals. And indeed, as far as 
Metaphysics 1038b1, it appeared that Aristotle favored the notion that substance in a primary sense, 
with the meaning of essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), is form.346 One of the key passages here is his well-known 
phrase that Kallias and Sokrates differ in matter, but not in form.347 He argues in Metaphysics 1029b29–
1030b14 that substance in the primary sense is essence (or form).348 
                                                 
342 For further analysis of Maximos’ use of these terms, but especially ἐνυπόστατον, refer to Törönen, Union and Distinction, 
103. 
343 See Proklos Diadochos, Elements of Theology, 118. 
344 Maximos infrequently calls God “imparticipable” (ἀμέθεκτος), such as in Difficulties 42.15: Πάντων οὖν τῶν κατ’ 
οὐσίαν ὑπαρκτικῶς ὄντων τε καὶ ἐσομένων, ἢ γενομένων, ἢ γενησομένων ἢ φαινομένων, ἢ φανησομένων, ἐν τῷ Θεῷ 
προϋπάρχουσι παγίως ὄντες οἱ λόγοι, καθ’ οὓς καί εἰσι τὰ πάντα καὶ γεγόνασι καὶ διαμένουσιν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ 
πρόθεσιν λόγοις διὰ κινήσεως φυσικῆς ἐγγίζοντα καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι μᾶλλον συνεχόμενα, κατὰ τὴν ποιάν τε καὶ ποσὴν 
τῆς προαιρέσεως κίνησίν τε καὶ ῥοπήν, τὸ εὖ δι’ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, καθ’ ὅν ἐστιν, εὐθυπορίαν, ἢ τὸ φεῦ 
εἶναι διὰ κακίαν καὶ τὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, καθ’ ὅν ἐστι, κίνησιν λαμβάνοντα, καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὴν 
στέρησιν τῆς αὐτῶν κατὰ φύσιν μεθεκτικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ παντελῶς ἀμεθέκτου κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχοντος, καὶ πᾶσιν 
ἁπλῶς ἑαυτὸν ἀξίοις τε καὶ ἀναξίοις ὅλον κατὰ χάριν δι’ ἄπειρον ἀγαθότητα παρέξοντος, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι, καθὼς 
ἕκαστος ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ διατέθειταί τε καὶ ἔστι, διαμονὴν ἐμποιήσοντος. Portaru’s assertion (“Classical Philosophical 
Influences,” 137) that “Maximus never calls God ‘unparticipated’” (which is the same as imparticipable), is unfounded. 
345 See Loux, Primary “Ousia,” 13–46. 
346 For further discussion, refer to Angioni, “Definition and Essence in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ vii 4,” 75–100; Charles, 
Aristotle on Meaning and Essence; Code, “Aristotle: Essence and Accident,” in Grandy and Warner, 411–439; Dahl, “Two 
Kinds of Essence in Aristotle,” 233–265, “On Substance Being the Same As Its Essence in Metaphysics Z6,” 1–27, “On 
Substance Being the Same As Its Essence in Metaphysics vii 6,” 153–179, and “Substance, Sameness, and Essence in 
‘Metaphysics’ VII 6,” 107–126; Hartman, “Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence,” 545–561; Lewis, “What 
Is Aristotle’s Theory of Essence?” 89–132; Witt, Substance and Essence; Woods, “Substance and Essence in Aristotle,” 167–
180; Yu, “The Identity of Form and Essence in Aristotle,” 299–312. 
347 Metaphysics 1034a6–8. Consult Devereux, “Aristotle on the Form and Definition of a Human Being,” 167–196. 
348 See Lewis, How Aristotle Gets By in Metaphysics Zeta; Mertz, On the Elements of Ontology; Abbate, “Acerca de la primacía del 
ΧΩΡΙΣΤΟΝ en la sustancia aristotélica,” 29–51; Wedin, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance, especially 11–36, 67–123, 138–151, 
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This claim is undergirded by his three interlinked arguments that 1) “It is clear, therefore, that 
definition belongs to substance alone” (Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός, Metaphysics 
1031a1–2), 2) that “the particular is not to be defined, for definition belongs to the universal and to 
the form” (οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι ἕκαστον· τοῦ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὁ ὁρισμός, Metaphysics 1036a29–
30) and 3) his conclusion that “And for this reason also there is neither definition nor demonstration 
of particular sensible substances, because they have matter, the nature of which is such that it admits 
of being and not being” (διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα οὔτε ὁρισμὸς οὔτε 
ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ’ ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, Metaphysics 1039b27–
29). What confounds these propositions is Aristotle’s argument that “it is clear that none of the 
universals is substance, and that none of the predicates commonly refers to a specific something but 
to an aspect” (φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ 
κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, Metaphysics 1039b35–1039a2). 
In brief, Aristotle holds that definition belongs only to substance, that universals and forms can be 
defined, that particulars cannot be defined, that primary substance is essence or form, and that 
substances are not universals. When these propositions are read together, the status of substance can 
be seen to remain in limbo because a primary substance seems in one way to be a form and forms are 
universals, but Aristotle explicitly says that substance is not universal, given that it refers to something 
specific according to Metaphysics 1029a3–35. This issue has divided the modern study of Aristotle, but 
each side with its respective subdivisions cannot be enumerated here. Briefly, Marc Cohen’s entry in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Aristotle’s Metaphysics identifies one interpretative tradition of 
this issue that believes that substantial forms refer to particulars, such that there are as many substantial 
forms as there are individuals; the other tradition has argued that Aristotle did not mean to preclude 
substance without qualification from being a universal, but rather that the substantial form refers to 
the universal of a specific species, such that it can be both predicated of many (e.g., “human” and 
“horse”) and not be reducible to any further subdivisions.349 Nevertheless, I would argue that the 
tension here, especially concerning the claim that substance is not universal, results from a univocal 
understanding of ousia on account of a synthetic reading of Aristotle that glosses over contextual 
differences that are lost when transposed into linear and propositional content. 
In his investigation of ousia in the Metaphysics, Aristotle often—though unfortunately not always—
clarifies in what regard he analyzes ousia. For instance, in 1030a17–23 he makes a rather clear 
distinction between substance meant without qualification (ἁπλῶς) and with qualification (πῶς); the 
former refers in this context to primary substance by way of definition—that is, the main undertaking 
of the work, whereas the latter refers to a substance with predicates, harkening back to substance as 
represented in the Categories.350 Moreover, he had earlier reiterated that he arrived at this former 
meaning of substance (in Metaphysics 995b5–996a18) as part of his analysis of what option, from among 
                                                 
and 197–257; Albritton, “Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” 699–707; Furth, Substance, Form, and 
Psyche; Grene, “Is Genus to Species as Matter to Form?” 51–69; Lacey, “Ousia and Form in Aristotle,” 54–69; Lesher, 
“Aristotle on Form, Substance, and Universals,” 169–178; Lloyd, Form and Universal in Aristotle; Sykes, “Form in Aristotle: 
Universal or Particular?” 311–331. 
349 See “Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 edition), Zalta (ed.), URL = 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/. 
350 Refer to Devereux, “Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle’s Categories,” 113–131; Erginel, “Non-substantial 
Individuals in Aristotle’s Categories,” 185–212; Jones, “Individuals in Aristotle’s Categories,” 107–123; Kohl, 
“Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle’s Categories,” 152–179; Perin, “Substantial Universals in Aristotle’s Categories,” 
125–143. 
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several, was most pertinent to the subject: “And since at the outset we distinguished the various ways 
in which we define substance, and of these a certain one seemed to be essence, that one ought to be 
looked into” (Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν ἀρχῇ διειλόμεθα πόσοις ὁρίζομεν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τούτων ἕν τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι, θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ, Metaphysics 1029b12–13). In this light, I would argue that the tension 
from Aristotle’s statements above results from a reduction of substance to a single meaning. These 
confusions may be attributed to the fact that the Peripatetic’s texts were based on lectures that 
presupposed an oral context that would have evinced ambiguity. But it is possible, all the same, to 
forego a search for logical contradictions in the Peripatetic’s exposition of ousia by attempting to 
discern which sense of substance would contextually make the most sense, depending on one’s own 
inquiry, as a number of modern Aristotelian scholars have insightfully done.351 
In the Categories, substance primarily has a sense of an individual and functions as a subject of 
predication.352 But this meaning is not completely foreign to the Metaphysics, as is the case when 
Aristotle calls a substance something specific and separable (τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον), like an 
individual human (Metaphysics 1039a31–32).353 Substance, in this sense, should not be taken as a 
universal, because a specific human cannot be predicated of anything. In this first sense, then, a 
substance is not a universal; it refers to a particular (see Metaphysics 1036a29–30 and 1039b27–29). But 
when Aristotle writes that substance is form or that it can refer to the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), he 
envisions substance as what he calls “primary substance” (πρώτη οὐσία, see Metaphysics 995b7, 1005a35, 
1028a32, 1029a1, 1032b2, 1037a5, 1037a28, 1037b1–2, 1054b1, 1064b10, 1069a20, 1071b5, etc.) by 
way of ontological definition and not “primary substance” in the same way that it appears in the 
Categories or even in the Analytics (e.g., 2a35, 2b4–3a8, 3a36, 3b3–25, 8a15, and 92b28–29), which refers 
to an individual, like Sokrates or Kallias. Substance, in this second sense presented in the Metaphysics 
must be identified with the form. Aristotle is unambiguously clear on this point: “and by ‘form’ I mean 
the essence of each thing and the primary substance” (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν 
πρώτην οὐσίαν, Metaphysics 1032b2–3). He later clarifies that substance in this essential or definitional 
sense refers to substance without matter (1032b14), thus confirming that of 1) matter, 2) form, and 3) 
the compound of the two, it is form that is the primary substance (since matter can be or not be and 
the compound already presupposes both and is therefore logically secondary).354 Finally, primary 
substance in this case cannot refer to the particular, since the particular contains matter, which is 
always potential and will consequently foil any attempt for a lasting definition.355 In sum, the sense of 
substance as substantial form is primarily definitional or formulaic and is concerned with explaining 
what it means for x to be x. When Aristotle says that substance is not universal, he would appear not 
                                                 
351 E.g., Halper, “A Solution to the Problem of Sensible Substance,” 666–672 and “Aristotle on Primary ousia,” 1–20; 
Lacey, “Ousia and Form in Aristotle,” 54–69; Loux, Primary ousia; Hansen, “Partikularitet og universalitet i Aristoteles’ 
formlære skitse af en position,” 91–109. 
352 Refer to Scaltsas, “Substratum, Subject, Substance,” 215–240; Allen, “Individual Properties in Aristotle’s Categories,” 
31–39; Annas, “Individuals in Aristotle’s Categories,” 146–152; Code, “On the Origin of Some Aristotelian Theses About 
Predication,” in Bogen and McGuire, 101–131; Duerlinger, “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s Categories,” 179–203; 
Engmann, “Aristotle’s Distinction between Substance and Universal,” 139–155; Jones, “Individuals in Aristotle’s 
Categories,” 107–123; Stough, “Language and Ontology in Aristotle’s Categories,” 261–272. 
353 See Abbate, “Acerca de la primacía del ΧΩΡΙΣΤΟΝ en la sustancia aristotélica,” 29–51. 
354 Compare with Metaphysics 1029a2–4. See also Dancy, “Aristotle and the Priority of Actuality,” in Knuuttila; Bechler, 
Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality; and Yepes Stork, La Doctrina del Acto en Aristóteles. 
355 Metaphysics 1039b27–1040a8. 
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to have this understanding of substance in mind, but that of substance as individual subject of 
predication. 
In this light, Maximos’ teaching of the logoi is a curious take on the relation between particulars, 
universals, and the substantial form—or logos.356 It is clear that the logoi are the pre-established ideas or 
blueprints of creation contained by God and thus the informing principles of all beings. The logoi are 
not creatures, beings or products that result from the divine will,357 but the creative divine will itself 
directed toward and manifested in the plurality of creation; they can be contemplatively discerned in 
or abstracted from all of existence. Simultaneously, Maximos holds that the logoi undergird both 
universals and particulars, for the passage from Difficulties 7.16, cited earlier, explicitly states that the 
logoi precede and direct the creation of all things, both universals and particulars. In Questions and 
Doubts, his phrase “for every one of the things that has come into being in accordance with its very 
own logos, which is in God, is said to be a part of God and to have a place in God”358 would again 
suggest that the ascetic intellectual believes that every creature has a particular and unique logos and 
thus that the logoi are not exclusively universals. This point is significant, because the realization of a 
creature’s potentialities then depends not solely on a universal and deindividuating principle, but on 
its dialectical relation to its own logos; that is, the realization of each substance takes on an irreplicable 
dynamism that is unique to the individual. 
 
6. The Logic of Internal and External Motion 
 
In keeping with the final point above, we must take up another way that the Stagirite handles 
substance in the Metaphysics, one that is primarily characterized by the study of an ontological goal-
directed dynamism that he expressed with his triadic structure of substance, potentiality, and 
actuality.359 Although this exposition of goal-directed substance is closely tied to and informed by 
substance understood in a definitional way, it resumes a more capacious understanding of substance 
as a compound of matter and form that is liable to change and that strives after a specific end. In other 
words, it is not concerned with a formulaic account of substance, but with its existential self-
outworking in space and time. The principle of continuity between Aristotle’s discussion of primary 
substance and his investigation of substance, potentiality, and actuality is the fact that substance 
remains primary over potentiality both in logical definition and in formal existence, though not 
necessarily in time.360 For every potentiality must presuppose that of which it is the potentiality, which 
is the substance;361 likewise, the realized form or substance must already exist in actuality in order to 
give rise to potentiality, such as adults who give being to an infant.362 At the same time, the matter of 
which the infant will consist exists chronologically prior and is in this sense temporally primary.363 
                                                 
356 Compare with Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 25–33; Larchet, La divinisation, 92–99. 
357 Pace Blowers and Wilken, Cosmic Mystery, 61 and Daley (trans.), Cosmic Liturgy, 119. 
358 Ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν γεγονότων κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον, τὸν ἐν τῷ θεῷ ὄντα, μέλος θεοῦ λέγεται εἶναι καὶ τόπον ἐν 
τῷ θεῷ ἔχειν. Questions and Doubts, 173, ll. 7–9. 
359 Refer to Witt’s exceptional study, Ways of Being; see also Code, “Potentiality in Aristotle’s Science and Metaphysics,” 
405–418; Frede, “Aristotle’s Notion of Potentiality in Metaphysics Θ,” in Scaltsas, Charles, and Gill, 173–194. 
360 See Metaphysics 1049b4–1051a3.  
361 Metaphysics 1049b4–13. 
362 Metaphysics 1050a4–23. 
363 See Dancy, “Aristotle and the Priority of Actuality.” 
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Elsewhere, in On the Soul, Aristotle had identified substance or form with actuality and matter with 
potentiality;364 it is commonly taken for granted that this distinction remains implicit in the Metaphysics. 
Thus, in the compound of matter and form, potentiality represents the substrate of change, that which 
can be otherwise, while the form stands for the principle of continuity between prior and posterior 
transitional states of a substance, as Aristotle argued more extensively in the Physics.365 Therefore, in 
his discussion of potentiality’s chronological priority over substance or actuality, Aristotle implicitly 
identifies potentiality with the matter that is a human potentially and only becomes a human by form 
after generation. But even here, he argues, a really subsisting actuality (such as a human or a grain of 
corn) must generate the substance wherein realizable potentialities inhere, that is, an embryo and a 
sprout per his example,366 for which reason actuality is chronologically prior to potentiality in this 
sense. 
So, on the one hand, there is a certain internal logic that guides the process of maturation, so to 
speak, of a substance by which the form that inheres in it comes to full fruition by the accomplishment 
of its natural capacities. In this respect Aristotle claims that “Everything that comes into being 
proceeds to [its] first principle and end; for ‘that for the sake of which’ [something exists] is the first 
principle, and the origin is for the sake of the end. And actuality is the end, and potentiality is acquired 
for the sake of this latter” (ἅπαν ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ 
τέλος δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις. τέλος δ’ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται, Metaphysics 1050a7–
10). Here the Peripatetic identifies the first principle of a being with its end, which is actuality, because 
the universal to which members of the same species belong is identical in form; children become 
adults when actualized, which is the actualized state that is capable of further engendering members 
of the same species. Thus, everything that comes into being aims at an end that marks its ontological 
completion and is, likewise, its principle of origin; this end is contained by its first principle as potential 
form and is accomplished when the substance is actualized. The difference, therefore, between 
substance and actuality or first principle and end is (chrono)logical.367 
On the other hand, the presupposition that an actualized substance gave rise to a substance with 
potentialities begs the question about the first substance that was capable of doing so. Aristotle points 
out, in this respect, that all substances, insofar as they are not infinite, point to a different existential 
principle, a first and unoriginated actuality that does not naturally inhere in their substance, but is 
nevertheless necessary for their existence.368 It is of paramount importance to underline that this 
actuality cannot be identified with the natural actuality of any substance, neither universal nor 
particular, because all substances would then be identical. And this identity of being cannot simply be 
the identity that particulars have with other particulars in respect of their ontological subordination to 
the same universal and whose individual differences are rooted in matter (such as Sokrates and Kallias, 
who belong to the universal “human”); rather, this identity of being would be formal, according to 
which all particulars would belong to a single universal and would be formally indistinguishable, their 
material substrate notwithstanding. Therefore, while all things exist on account of this existential 
                                                 
364 On the Soul, 412a8–11. 
365 Physics, 192a25–192b3. See also Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, especially 93–157 and 204–
255; Bianchi, “Continuity and Change in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Hankins, 49–71; and Wardy, The Chain of Change, 
especially see 93–120. 
366 Metaphysics 1049b22–28. 
367 See further, Witt, Ways of Being, 76–77. 
368 For discussion, refer to Ryan, “Pure Form in Aristotle,” 209–224. 
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principle, which is both the cause and finality of their being, it is not their naturally corresponding 
actuality; rather, it is the ontological premise of their existence. In this way, all beings owe their 
existence to it on account of its (onto)logical priority, as well as their end inasmuch as it is that for the 
sake of which they are and after which they strive. 
There are two salient ways for Maximos’ thought in which Aristotle approaches this ultimate 
existential principle or actuality. First, in Metaphysics 2 and 3, he discusses the so-called final cause, 
which he defines in the following way: “Furthermore, that ‘for the sake of which’ is an end [i.e., the 
final cause], and is one such [end] that it is for the sake of nothing else; rather, all things are for its 
sake” (Ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, 994b9–10). Later, 
in book 3, he continues this line of reasoning: “But indeed, if there is nothing in effect eternal, neither 
is it possible for there to be an origin; for it is necessary for something that comes into being to come 
into being from something and of these the last [must be] ungenerated.” (ἀλλὰ μήν, εἴ γε ἀΐδιον μηθέν 
ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γένεσιν εἶναι δυνατόν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τι τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ τούτων τὸ 
ἔσχατον ἀγένητον, 999b5–8).369 Aristotle reasons that the first term in the logical sequence cannot be 
generated; otherwise, the chain of existential sequence would regress infinitely and would make any 
investigation of these matters futile. Second, in Metaphysics 12 the Peripatetic, having considered the 
various definitions of substance and the various theories of their origination, concludes: “And since 
there were three substances, and two are natural whereas one is immobile, we must say about this 
latter that it is necessary for some eternal substance to be immobile. For primary substances belong 
to beings and if all [of these substances] are corruptible, all things are corruptible” (Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦσαν τρεῖς 
οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαί, μία δὲ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιον τινὰ οὐσίαν 
ἀκίνητον. αἵ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά, 1071b4–6). Here 
Aristotle differentiates the substances already mentioned, which are corruptible and finite, from a 
certain eternal substance that must be immobile so that its existence is not contingent on account of 
its potentiality. For this reason, he determines soon thereafter that “It is therefore necessary that such 
a principle [as the immobile and eternal substance] exist, the substance of which is actuality” (δεὶ ἄρα 
εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, 1071b20–21). By identifying the substance of this principle 
with actuality, Aristotle simultaneously grounds the first actuality on which all others hinge and ends 
the otherwise infinite regress that he was often keen to avoid. 
These passages from the Metaphysics share striking parallels to Maximos’ presentation of God in 
Chapters on Theology 1.1–1.10. Especially important is the triad, previously flagged, of indefinite 
(ἀόριστος), immobile (ἀκίνητος), and infinite (ἄπειρος) in 1.2. These terms are precisely those that 
Aristotle employs in his presentation of the first mover,370 and though Aristotle uses “eternal” (ἀΐδιος) 
at first, rather than “infinite” (ἄπειρος), to refer to the first mover, the difference is semantically 
insignificant as evidenced in 1073a10–11, where he uses “infinite” in place of eternal. Like Aristotle, 
Maximos posits the necessity that God/the first mover be immobile, indefinite, and infinite in order 
to ground the subsistence of all other beings, while remaining ontologically distinct from them.371 
The crux of the matter, then, is this: all substances, insofar as they are substances, aim at the 
realization of their inherent potentialities whereby they attain an actuality commensurate with their 
                                                 
369 See further, Richardson, “Degrees of Finality,” 327–352 and Cooper, “Plato and Aristotle on Finality and (Self-) 
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370 Metaphysics 1071b3–1073a11. 
371 Compare to Difficulties 10.95, ll. 1–8; 17.12, ll. 1–10, 23.3, ll. 9–15; and 41.5, l. 9–41.6, l. 18. 
 95 
 
existential principle or substantial form: the acorn becomes an oak, the child an adult.372 All substances, 
however, insofar as they are first potential and then actual, are not eternal and therefore exist for the 
sake of the first principle whose substance is actuality, from which they derive their logical origin and 
on which their actuality ultimately hinges.373 The two actualities, therefore, cannot be conflated: one 
refers to the accomplishment of the internal potentialities of a substance by which it is realized; the 
other refers to a substance’s logical and existential dependence on the external cause of its being, 
toward which it tends and for the sake of which it exists.374 These logical differences offer a partial 
response to the conundrum with which we opened this chapter. The following section will develop 
these critical differences further. 
 
7. Substances, Substantializing Movement, and the Asymmetry of Twofold Finality 
 
The logic of a substance’s end-directed actualization of potentialities that Aristotle presents informs 
Maximos’ ontology generally, and distinctly so in the opening decade of the Chapters on Theology. In 1.3 
he writes that “Each substance, including its own definition in itself, is a first principle by nature 
productive of the movement discerned in potentiality in it. Each natural motion toward actuality, 
conceptualized as after substance, yet prior to actuality, is an intermediate state, since in nature it 
divides both as that which mediates between them. And each actuality, in nature circumscribed by its 
corresponding logos, is the end of the substantializing movement (οὐσιώδους κινήσεως) conceptually 
prior to it.” There are evident logical ties between Maximos’ presentation of substance, potentiality, 
and actuality here and those we just covered in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.375 The substance that Maximos 
is concerned with in 1.3 is a particular substance with potentialities the realization of which allows it 
to attain its actuality. In this respect, his phrase “substantializing movement” points to his 
interpretation of a specific individual’s actualization of the self and not simply to more general 
ontological definitions. This much is clear when considered in light of the history of this phrase, which 
is prevalent among the commentators. 
The phrase occurs in a somewhat different context in earlier commentators, like Alexandros of 
Aphrodisias and Iamblichos.376 The nearest voices to Maximos’ time who employed it were Proklos 
Diadochos, Dionysios, and Simplikios, whose usage shows significant logical corollaries to the sense 
it seems to have in the Chapters on Theology. Proklos interlinked the phrase with his well-known triadic 
schema of remaining, procession, and return (μονή, πρόοδος, ἐπιστροφή)377 in the interest of 
demonstrating that substantializing movement differentiates a substance from its cause: “And now let 
it be said on the basis of realities (πραγμάτων) that movement and rest are seen in the substances of 
beings and in their actualities; for procession (πρόοδος) is substantializing movement (κίνησις 
                                                 
372 See also Difficulties 7.21–22. 
373 See Questions and Answers to Thalassios 22, ll. 110–114, 28, ll. 76–81; and especially 38, ll. 38–45. 
374 See Maximos, Questions and Answers to Thalassios, epistle, ll. 220–229; 52, ll. 103–107; 59, ll. 265–269; Mystagogy 1, ll. 75–
81; Difficulties 10.88, ll. 10–12; 23.2, ll. 1–6. 
375 Compare to Larchet, La divinisation, 112–123 and 152–153. 
376 See Alexandros of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, p. 447, l. 10 and Iamblichos, On the Mysteries 1.4.32. 
377 See Proklos, Commentary on Plato’s Republic, vol. 2, p. 248, ll. 25–27; Platonic Theology, vol. 4, p. 7, ll. 10–13, p. 58, ll. 20–
21, p. 105, ll. 8–10; Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, p. 712, ll. 38–40, p. 1048, ll. 28–30; Commentary on Plato’s Timaios, vol. 
1, p. 274, ll. 26–27, vol. 2, p. 215, ll. 23–24, p. 249, ll. 17–20, p. 257, ll. 12–13; compare to Syrianos, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, p. 127, ll. 8–10; Damaskios, On First Principles, vol. 1, p. 18, ll. 6–7, p. 80, ll. 3–4, p. 158, ll. 14–15, etc. 
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οὐσιώδης), and rest is the abiding in the causes.”378 By identifying substantializing movement with 
procession, Proklos harkened back to his triadic schema of ontological differentiation presented in 
the Elements of Theology, particularly in his thirty-fifth proposition, which holds that “Everything that is 
caused abides in its cause, and it proceeds from it, and it returns to it” (Πᾶν τὸ αἰτιατὸν καὶ μένει ἐν τῇ 
αὐτοῦ αἰτίᾳ καὶ προέισιν ἀπ’ ἀυτῆς καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς ἀυτήν, Elements of Theology 35, 1–2). Proklos 
reasons: “For if it were only to remain, it would differ in nothing from the cause, since it would be 
undifferentiable” (εἰ γὰρ μένοι μόνον, οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς αἰτίας, ἀδιάκριτον ὄν, Elements of Theology 35, 3). 
In this way, Proklos makes substantializing movement a function of the unfolding of individual 
existence, something that separates what proceeds ontologically from the cause from which it 
proceeds.379 
Simplikios, for his part, locates substantializing movement in a rather specific form of time, since 
the former is measured by the latter: “So, because time has a double nature—the one measures 
substantializing movement, and the other [is] the [movement] from without that is in actuality, [and] 
the former is so difficult to grasp in substance, if indeed it is even worthy of being called time, that 
Aristotle did not say that it measures temporal things that have an eternal substance, but [that it 
measures] those alone that come into being and are corruptible” (ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦ χρόνου διττὴν ἔχοντος 
φύσιν καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὴν οὐσιώδη κίνησιν μετροῦντος, τοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐκτὸς καὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ὁ μὲν κατ’ οὐσίαν 
οὕτως ἐστὶ δυσκατανόητος, εἴπερ καὶ χρόνος οὗτος ἄξιος λέγεσθαι, ὡς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην μηδὲ φάναι ὅλως 
ἔγχρονα τὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀίδιον [sic] ἔχοντα, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνα μόνα ὅσα τῶν γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων 
μετρεῖται. Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, vol. 9, p. 638, ll. 29–34). There are several difficult aspects 
about Simplikios’ claim here that need not detain us. But what matters for us is that he incisively 
contrasts time that measures substantializing movement with some form of time that measures motion 
from without that is in actuality. These two times differ inasmuch as one belongs to the substance’s 
realization of its potentialities as measured by and taking place in time, whereas the other form of time 
refers solely to the external motion of things that are moved by the One. By this, Simplikios seems to 
invoke Aristotle’s first mover, which explains why he would refer to movement from without as being 
in actuality (κατ’ ἐνέργειαν). The point is that Simplikios also identifies this substantializing movement 
with a substance’s process of self-actualization that is measured by time as it pertains to things that 
come into being and are liable to corruption. Implicit in the Kilikian’s text is Aristotle’s familiar point 
that a first actuality must be ontologically prior and must not be liable to corruption or change. 
These contextual comparisons strongly suggest that the substantializing movement of which 
Maximos spoke above is likewise creaturely, that is, that it occurs within the originated substances; it 
is the motion whereby a specific and individual substance is actualized in time. In this regard, it is 
significant that Maximos pairs up, in Chapters on Theology 1.3, the terms first principle-substance, 
intermediate state-potentiality, and end-actuality. I believe that he uses this pairing to make an 
ontological distinction that he will qualify further in the following chapter, where he writes: 
 
God is neither a substance, meant as unqualified or qualified substance, and therefore not a first 
principle; nor a potentiality, meant as unqualified or qualified potentiality, and therefore not an 
intermediate state; nor an actuality, meant as unqualified or qualified actuality, and therefore not 
the end of the substantializing motion that is conceived prior in terms of potentiality. He is, 
                                                 
378 Proklos, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, p. 1154, ll. 19–23. 
379 Compare to Maximos, Thal 1., ll. 34–40; 2, ll. 8–16; Questions and Doubts 173, ll. 1–7; Mystagogy 5, ll. 59–63. 
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however, a substance-causing reality while beyond substance, a potentiality-causing ground while 
beyond potentiality, and the effecting and unending state of each actuality; so, to speak concisely, 
he is causative of each substance, potentiality, and actuality, also of each first principle, intermediate 
state, and end. 
 
This chapter introduces the distinction between a substance meant in a “qualified or unqualified 
way.” Maximos had likewise employed this division in Difficulty 10.92, where he makes the distinction 
more concrete with regard to God and creatures. Here he writes that “For the divine does not admit 
of any word or thought, wherefore when we call it ‘being’ we do not predicate ‘being’ of it. For being 
is from it, but it itself is not ‘being.’ For it is beyond even being itself, meant and thought in both a 
qualified (πῶς) and unqualified (ἁπλῶς) way.”380 The distinction of “qualified” and “unqualified” with 
reference to substance or being belongs to Aristotle and can only be found elsewhere in the 
commentaries of Alexandros of Aphrodisias.381 In the Metaphysics, the Peripatetic makes 
unambiguously explicit that substance without qualification refers to substance in the primary sense, 
that is, substance by way of definition, whereas substance in a qualified way belongs to what is said 
about a substance, in an echo of the Categories: “Or perhaps is it the case that the definition, just like 
‘what it is,’ is said in a manifold way? For also ‘what it is’ in one way signifies the substance and the 
individual, but in another each of the predicates: quantity, quality, and all the others that are such; for 
just as ‘what it is’ applies to everything, but not in the same way, but to the former primarily and to 
the latter in a logically sequential way, so also ‘what it is’ applies to substance in an unqualified way, 
but to the others [i.e., the predicates] in a qualified way” (Ἤ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι 
πλεοναχῶς λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον 
τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσόν, ποιὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ 
οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ’ ἑπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, πὼς δὲ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις, Metaphysics 1030a17–23). 
Maximos uses this distinction in order to deny that God is a substance, potentiality, or actuality 
meant either by way of definition or as the subject of predication, that is, in a qualified or unqualified 
way. In doing so, he distances God from the ontological definitions he previously brought up in 1.2. 
That the Confessor’s intention is to separate God from the terminology that Aristotle and the 
commentators attribute to substances, and thus to anything that exists, is clear by the fact that he 
explicitly denies that several of Aristotle’s categories apply to God, such as the first category, 
“substance,” in 1.4, the fourth category, “relation,” in 1.7, the sixth category, “when,” in 1.1 and 1.5 
and the ninth category, “undergoing,” in 1.10. The ascetic thinker’s knowledge of the common 
philosophical parlance surrounding Aristotle’s Categories is here on clear display, especially if we 
consider that he uses set phrases that appear only in the commentators.382 For example, in 1.7, 
Maximos claims that God is precluded from the fourth category, the category of relation: “No first 
principle intermediate state, and end is absolutely precluded from every relational category (τὴν 
σχετικὴν κατηγορίαν); God, however, incomprehensibly being infinitely above absolutely every 
relation, is evidently neither first principle, nor intermediate state, nor end, nor altogether anything 
else of those things in which the category of ‘toward something’ (προς τί) can be envisioned as 
                                                 
380 Difficulty 10.92, DOML 28, p. 294. 
381 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 473.20–474.7. Compare to Asklepios, Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 386.31–387.5. 
382 See Constas, On Difficulties, vol. 1, xxii. 
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corresponding with the relational category.” His choice of words “the relational category” (ἡ σχετικὴ 
κατηγορία) belongs to the commentary tradition alone.383 Maximos is here appropriating the rich 
heritage of the commentators, but creating them as his precursors in the interest of expressing his 
own rigorous system of ontological differentiation between creation and God. In brief, he does so in 
two respects: first, to deny that any predicate is attributed to God univocally with creation; second, to 
preclude God from the ontological dynamisms that undergird substantializing motion. 
The distinctions introduced in Chapters on Theology 1.4 contain yet another, far subtler, differentiation 
that suggests how Maximos might have understood the relation between actualization and deification. 
To recapitulate, the Confessor writes: “God is neither a substance, meant as unqualified or qualified 
substance, and therefore not a first principle.” Here he echoes Aristotle’s distinction of substance in 
a qualified or unqualified way, denying of God that he is either a substance, simply said, or a subject 
of predication. He continues: “nor a potentiality, meant as unqualified or qualified potentiality, and 
therefore not an intermediate state.” This phrase, an unqualified potentiality, again echoes Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics 1050b16–19, where Aristotle argues that something that is absolutely imperishable cannot 
be potential without qualification, even though he entertains the possibility of it being potential in 
some other sense, a sense, however, that Maximos here also denies of God. But most important is the 
following phrase in 1.4: “nor an actuality, meant as unqualified or qualified actuality, and therefore not 
the end of the substantializing motion that is conceived prior in terms of potentiality.” This phrase 
both continues the symmetrical order of the previous two by denying of God the third metaphysical 
division of nature (i.e., actuality) in a qualified and unqualified way, but also breaks this symmetry by 
qualifying the sense in which God is not the end, something that he did not do for the first principle 
and the intermediate state. God is not the end of a substance’s natural process of realization meant as 
its internal ontological development. This much should be obvious based on the text of Opuscule 1, 
introduced early in this chapter, since divinity is not something naturally predicable of the human 
substance. But this qualification begs the question whether God is the end in some other respect. 
Maximos goes on: “He is, however, a substance-causing reality while beyond substance, a 
potentiality-causing ground while beyond potentiality, and the effecting and unending state of each 
actuality; so, to speak concisely, he is causative of each substance, potentiality, and actuality, also of 
each first principle, intermediate state, and end.” Maximos introduces a different set of relationships 
than those pertaining exclusively to the triad of substance, potentiality, and actuality. In the previous 
phrase he made it clear that God is not the logical end of substantializing movement. But in this 
phrase, he disambiguates in what sense God is the end by again fragmenting the otherwise symmetrical 
construction. For, while he is keen to underscore God’s transcendence of substance and potentiality, 
he does not strictly replicate that structure for actuality. Rather, he claims God is the “effecting and 
unending state of each actuality” and not that he is beyond every actuality. As before, this asymmetry 
is likely meant to draw attention to the phrase. 
The contrast between “state” (ἕξις) and “actuality” or “operation” (ἐνέργεια) was most prevalent 
among Aristotle and the Peripatetics and subsequently attracted significant attention from the Platonic 
                                                 
383 For this phrase or a variant, πρός τι κατηγορία See Porphyrios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, vol. 4.1, p. 127, l. 2, 
and p. 134, l. 17; Ammonios (e.g., Commentary on Porphyrios’ Introduction 57:7, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 54:11), Proklos 
(Commentary on Eukleides’ First Book of the Elements 51:9), Simplikios (e.g., Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 8.11.26, 8.122.6, 
8.157.1, 7.157.19, etc.), Ioannes Philoponos (Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 13.1.47.22, 13.1.83.19, 13.1.130.26), 
Olympiodoros (Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 54.3, 98.19), and, most significantly, Elias/David of Alexandria 
(Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 160:29, 206:2, 239:20, 245:21). 
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commentators. The contrast often underscored that a state is that which gives rise to an activity, that 
which makes actuality or operation possible. And while Maximos’ use of the term here is meant to 
contrast with actuality, his use is peculiar in two significant ways. First, the term is qualified by 
“effecting and unending,” a pairing that occurs for the first time in Maximos’ corpus and one that 
only appears thereafter in quotations of the Chapters on Theology, as in the works of Gregorios 
Akindynos and Nikephoros Gregoras.384 Second, the term “state” usually differs from activity in 
psychological terms; this distinction primarily derived from Aristotle’s ethics and was often referred 
to by commentators, like Aspasios, precisely in that context.385 Here, however, it seems to have a 
different sense. I believe the term is meant to convey the idea that God is the necessary condition of 
every actuality, whence the use of drastike—he is that which sets all actualities in motion as the external 
first mover (and hereby also precludes the possibility, raised by Aristotle in Nikomachean Ethics 1099a1–
5 that a state can be inactive). God is also “unending” inasmuch as he is both the eternal condition of 
all actualities (as Aristotle’s first and unoriginated cause) and the end toward which all creaturely 
motion is directed.386 The term “unending” likely echoes Maximos’ previous attribution of infinity 
(ἄπειρος) to God, which would harken back to a distinction Aristotle makes in the Physics.387 
The chapters analyzed thus far can be summarized like this: God is not a substance as the subject 
of predication or as a complex of ontological dynamisms, but is the source and foundation of all 
existential states; likewise, God cannot be attained by the realization of a substance’s potentialities, 
since God is an eternal and indefinite external cause that can be circumscribed neither logically nor 
ontologically. As such, God remains infinitely beyond any creaturely activity, which is the 
substantializing movement of a being, while nevertheless remaining the end at which all existence 
aims. 
This last point appears explicitly in Difficulties 7 in a famed passage where Maximos rebukes some 
form of revived seventh-century Origenism by appealing to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. He writes: “But not 
one of those things that has come into being is its very own end, since it is not self-causing, since it 
would also be unoriginated, without beginning, and immobile as being moved toward nothing in any 
way. For it transcends the nature of beings, as being for the sake of nothing, for which reason the 
definition concerning it is true, even if the one who said ‘the end is that for the sake of which all things 
are, whereas it is for the sake of none’ was foreign [to Christianity]” (Οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν γενητῶν ἑαυτοῦ 
τέλος ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε αὐταίτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ ἀκίνητον, ὡς πρὸς μηδέν πως ἔχον 
κινηθῆναι. Ἐκβαίνει γὰρ τῶν ὄντων τὴν φύσιν, ὡς οὐδενὸς ἕνεκεν ὄν, εἴπερ ἀληθὴς ὁ περὶ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμός, 
κἂν ἀλλότριος ᾖ ὁ λέγων τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκεν τὰ πάντα, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκεν, Difficulty 7.7, p. 82).388 
                                                 
384 See Gregorios Akindynos, Great Refutation, 1.51, l. 38 and Nikephoros Gregoras, History of the Romans, vol. 2, p. 1067, l. 
8. 
385 See Aspasios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics, pp. 39, ll.31–37, 41, ll. 25–27, and especially 78, ll. 4–8; see 
also Albinos, Didaskalikos 26.3, ll. 9–10; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 7.11.66.2, ll. 3–4; Alexandros of Aphrodisias, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 390, ll. 17–18 and Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, p. 237, ll. 20–21 and p. 253, ll. 9–
10; and Simplikios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, CAG 9, pp. 414, l. 29–415, l. 16. 
386 Compare to Maximos of Tyre’s phrase: ἔρωτα ἠράσθη κενὸν καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, Dissertations 1.5.11. 
387 See Physics 204a4–7: ἄλλως δὲ τὸ διέξοδον ἔχον ἀτελεύτητον, ἢ ὃ μόγις, ἢ ὃ πεφυκὸς ἔχειν μὴ ἔχει διέξοδον ἢ πέρας. 
ἔτι ἄπειρον ἅπαν ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀμφοτέρως. 
388 The words Maximos uses here are found as such in Origen’s Selecta in Psalmos, PG 12:1053A, though I would not 
attribute this to his ignorance of Aristotle’s specific passage in the Metaphysics, but rather to an ingenious way of using 
Origen’s own texts, with Aristotle in the background (Origen mentions Aristotle by name in this passage), to make his 
point more forcefully to his interlocutors. See also Aspasios: ἐπεὶ δὲ τιμιώτατον ἐστιν ἐν ἐκάστῃ τὸ τέλος (αὐτοῦ γὰρ τὰ 
λοιπὰ γίνεται), Commentary on Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics, p. 4, ll. 20–21. 
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The allusion to Aristotle in this passage may generally have in mind the Peripatetic’s discussion of the 
ontological priority of the ungenerated principle that puts an end to an otherwise infinite regress in 
Metaphysics 999a33–999b12; it can likewise be illumined in the context of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 994b9–
10, where the philosopher writes: “And furthermore, the end is that for the sake of which, but is such 
that it is not for the sake of anything else, but others are [for the sake] of it” (Ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τέλος, 
τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα ἐκείνου). 
Read in this light, it is possible to surmise that Maximos articulated an ontology that allowed God 
to be the end of creatures inasmuch as God is their origin and cause, while not being “the end of the 
substantializing motion that is conceived prior in terms of potentiality,” as he explicitly stated in 
Chapters on Theology 1.4. This distinction is essential, because it answers the question we raised at the 
beginning of the chapter: how can God both be and not be the ontological end, fulfillment, or 
completion of humanity? God is not the end of any substance inasmuch as God is not the actuality 
that the realization of a substance’s potentialities brings about. God is, however, the end of all 
substances inasmuch as all beings are existentially oriented toward God as the cause of their 
subsistence and activity, in whom their finality is likewise found. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
BECOMING A DIVINE HUMAN: 
THE CONFESSOR’S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ETHICAL DIALECTICS OF PERSON AND NATURE 
 
I have been crucified with Christ; and I live no more, but Christ lives 
in me. 
 
—Galatians 2:19–20 
 
Introduction 
 
 The previous chapter was concerned with articulating the various senses in which Maximos spoke 
of substance. As such, it only addressed part of the conundrum raised in its introduction, which 
identified the following tension between his insistence on the natural character of virtue (which he 
often characterizes as deifying), and his insistence that there is no potentiality in the human substance 
by the realization of which humans can be deified. In the foregoing chapter, I argued that Maximos 
does not use the category of substance univocally in his corpus, but rather employs the term in three 
distinctive ways, all of which are appropriations of Aristotle’s philosophy. Substance can refer to a 
specific being who is the subject of predicates; it can refer to the essence, substantial form, or, 
Maximos’ preferred term, the logos of a being; finally, it can refer to an end-driven dynamic substrate 
that actualizes its potentialities in space and time. As I argued, this is an important insight because it 
explains how Maximos understood that God can be and not be the end of humanity’s natural 
movement.  The central task of this chapter is to show that virtue can be understood in a similar, 
though not neatly overlapping, way. That is, virtue for Maximos can be taken as a predicate, it can be 
analyzed for its essence, and it can be regarded as an ongoing dynamism that takes place in the human 
subject. 
The modern history of the reception of Maximos’ aretology—or teaching concerning virtue, may 
be divided into at least two, for some time overlapping, stages. The first stage, which has lasted some 
four sporadic decades (ca. 1976–present) is characterized by an emphatic focus on whether the virtues 
have an ontological character or not; it has largely split scholars along religiously-affiliated lines that 
revived ancient Catholic-Orthodox theological hostilities centering on a (Neo-)Thomistic 
understanding of habitus and an Orthodox interpretation of ἕξις.389 It could be said that a second stage 
began around 1996, when Paul Blowers published a characteristically insightful article entitled 
“Gentiles of the Soul: Maximus the Confessor on the Substructure and Transformation of Human 
Passions” that, while hinting at this ongoing first stage debate, veered in a different direction. This 
article, though briefly flagging the work of previous scholars of a Neothomistic persuasion (he may 
have had LeGuillou, Garrigues, Riou, and Piret in mind), is more concerned with an illuminating 
contextualization of the Confessor’s moral psychology in what he calls a “neo-Cappadocian (and to 
some degree neo-Areopagitic) key” that focuses on the teleological use of the human passions as part 
of the “ongoing, ever-unfolding potentiality, resourcefulness, and moral-spiritual ‘utility’ of all natural 
human faculties.”390 
Blower’s article was distinct from the Catholic-Orthodox debates that raged at the time in that it 
looked backward (to the Confessor’s predecessors) and inward (to the inner workings of the human 
                                                 
389 For an overview of this dispute, see Salés and Papanikolaou, “A Power That Deifies the Human,” 24. 
390 See Blowers, “Gentiles of the Soul,” 57 and 81. 
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subject), so to speak, rather than forward (to Aquinas or Palamas) and outward (to a model of 
superimposed grace or divine energies). It has taken time for Blower’s insight to catch on.391 Soon 
after the turn of this decade, a promising series of articles, chapters, and even a dissertation were 
penned that address various aspects of the Confessor’s virtue theory in a less combative and more 
collaborative spirit than has characterized the first stage.392 For instance, in 2013 Studies in Christian 
Ethics published a special volume that contained three entries on Maximos’ articulation of virtue.393 
These were followed up the next year by an article that explores the phenomenon of the incarnation 
of God in the virtuous as the Confessor envisioned it;394 the publication of the Oxford Handbook of 
Maximus the Confessor in 2015 offered Demetrios Bathrellos an opportunity to analyze Maximos’ 
ascetical teaching, with a special focus on the Chapters on Love;395 that same year, Emma Brown 
published an article that explored the relationship between virtue and participation in God’s agape.396 
Blower’s Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World (2016) contains a lengthy 
section on virtue that especially sheds new light on its liturgical dimensions.397 Further, a recent 
collaborative article has foregrounded the virtue of love and its relationship to hypostatic particularity, 
even if at points it harkens back to the disputes of the first stage mentioned above.398 
Much, however, still lies ahead, especially given the prominence that the virtues enjoy in the 
Confessor’s complex theological oeuvre and the relatively recent development of this second stage of 
scholarly inquiry. Thus, both this chapter and the next aim to expand the field of Maximos’ aretology 
further by focusing on three aspects that remain underexamined. As previously mentioned, the various 
distinctions Maximos made in respect of substance can also be applied, but in a slightly modified way, 
to an investigation of virtue. In this vein, this chapter is primarily concerned with investigating virtue 
as a psychosomatic dynamism that is cultivated and trained through ascetic discipline. Put differently, 
this chapter seeks to exposit what it means to be virtuous and how that comes about by looking 
primarily at the human subject, though the divine elements of virtue necessarily will remain in this 
chapter’s peripheral vision. We will turn to these latter aspects in the following chapter, though it bears 
mentioning that these themes are organically grafted together in the Confessor’s thought and dividing 
them into different chapters solely functions as a tool of convenience for linear exposition that does 
not reflect a real division in his thought. 
My approach to the Confessor’s aretology in this chapter is primarily informed by comparative 
historical philology and philosophical-theological analysis, but it also looks to some twentieth-century 
theorists for some explanatory models or useful analogies, particularly those offered by so-called 
postmodern or poststructuralist thinkers like Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Michel de 
Certeau. While the application of these three thinkers’ ideas to the study of late ancient Christianity 
has been in vogue for some time, their analytical resources have not been applied to the study of the 
                                                 
391 A salient entry that followed the trend Blowers inaugurated, though still insistently comparative to western thinkers like 
Lactantius, Augustine, and Thomas, was Wilken’s “Maximus the Confessor on the Affections in Historical Perspective,” 
in Wimbush and Valantasis, 412–423. 
392 Harper’s dissertation, “The Analogy of Love” will soon be forthcoming from Saint Vladimir’s Seminary Press. 
393 See Studies in Christian Ethics 26 (2013), which dedicated substantial attention to Maximos’ teaching on virtue. Refer 
especially to the entries by Blowers (333–350), Louth (351–363), and Aquino (378–390). 
394 Salés, “Divine Incarnation through the Virtues,” 159–176. 
395 Bathrellos, “Passions, Ascesis, and the Virtues,” in OHMC 287–306. 
396 Brown Dewhurst, “The Ontology of Virtue,” 157–169. 
397 Blowers, Jesus Christ, 254–283. 
398 See Salés (with Papanikolaou), “‘A Power that Deifies the Human,” 23–38. 
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Confessor.399 And even then, my own adaptation of their work for this study is decidedly limited and 
functions primarily as an occasional analogical tool that can illumine certain complex aspects about 
Maximos’ aretology. Specifically, in this chapter I will adapt two concepts or images from Derrida’s 
grammatological work and Michel de Certeau’s La invention du quotidien to add some texture to what 
Foucault called “technologies of the self.” 
While Christianity and other late ancient philosophies disagreed with one another—as well as 
among themselves—about what cosmic narrative should inform their understanding of the good life, 
they universally agreed that the good life was the virtuous life. In order to strive after it, they developed 
sophisticated methods of self-discipline, which Foucault famously termed “technologies of the self.” 
According to the French theorist, they “permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the 
help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”400 What is important about his analysis is the causal link he 
implies between “operations” and “states”; in his view, the performance of the former leads to the 
attainment of the latter. And while I would grant that his analysis accurately describes the way in which 
a range of ascetics, Christian or otherwise, understood the relationship between their ascetical practice 
and these “states,” I would suggest that this relatively straightforward causal connection does not 
neatly fit the model Maximos envisioned. Rather, I will argue in this chapter that the “states” (of 
virtue) of which the Confessor wrote, especially in the ongoing struggle of the Christian ascetic, were 
not so much “attained” as they were constantly negotiated in this life by an unintermittent process of 
self-reflexive moral recalibration. To that effect, I will briefly draw on Derrida and de Certeau to 
introduce a pair of analogies that will function as conceptual analogies to render the Confessor’s 
ascetical teaching more legible. 
 
1. Ethics, Virtue, and Poststructuralism 
 
In his lengthy refutation Against Kelsos, Origen of Alexandria reports his adversary’s claim that “it 
is most difficult (παγχάλεπον) to change a nature (φύσιν) completely.”401 The Alexandrian responded 
that if human nature can be taught to do something “of no utility (χρήσιμα) whatever,” such as 
tightrope-walking per his example, “by means of ascesis (ἀσκήσει) and diligence (προσοχῇ),” then 
certainly it could be taught “to bring about (πεποίηκε) . . . its own blessedness (μακαριότητα)” by living 
“according to virtue (κατ’ ἀρετὴν).” We see in Origen’s retort some of the elements Foucault included 
in his definition of the “technologies of the self.” Diligence and ascesis especially come to our attention 
here as the “operations” that bring about the “state” of blessedness after which one strives. But what 
is significant about the ascetic intellectual’s analogy is that he draws a parallel between walking on a 
tightrope and navigating the intricacies of becoming virtuous. And his analogy is rather good if we 
consider that both acts are unavoidably dynamic but paradoxically have as their objective the 
procurement of a qualified stability. It would therefore be inaccurate to regard the struggle for virtue—
as Origen seems to envision it here—as a condition that is accomplished as if “once and for all.” We 
will see a similar dynamic at play in Maximos’ aretology later in this chapter. 
In La invention du quotidien, Michel de Certeau offered a remarkable analysis of the act of tightrope-
walking in a larger discussion of daily contingencies creatively applied to the “practice of everyday 
                                                 
399 The first study of which I am aware that integrates so-called postmodern thinkers is Paul Blowers’ Maximus the Confessor: 
Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World, where he made very fruitful use of Jean-Luc Marion’s idea of the “saturated 
phenomenon.” 
400 Foucault, Ethics, 225. 
401 Against Kelsos, 3.69. 
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life.” He writes: “To dance on a tightrope is to maintain from moment to moment an equilibrium by 
recreating it at each step by means of new adjustments (interventions); it is to preserve a balance (rapport) 
that is never attained and which an incessant readjustment (invention) renews while appearing ‘to 
preserve’ it.”402 What emerges from de Certeau’s excellent phrasing is that balance is at best what we 
may call an interstitial stability that, as he says, “is never attained.” It is clear in the case of tightrope-
walking that this balance is never “attained” as such because the relative center of gravity changes at 
every moment. For this reason, new movements must be executed in order to find a new balance that 
in turn modifies the new center of balance and so on. We must also make it clear that the possibility 
of falling off the rope is a constant and, in a sense, the necessary alterity that perpetually requires the 
renegotiation of one’s interstitial stability. For these reasons, we may introduce a significant distinction 
between “attaining,” understood as the definite accomplishment of a stable condition that is no longer 
in danger of falling from the rope, and “preserving,” taken as the dynamic negotiation of an ever-
changing and thus elusive balance. The dialectic between these two poles will offer us a helpful analogy 
for Maximos’ exposition of virtue in the course of the following two chapters. 
For Maximos, the life of virtue consisted in an infinite process of assimilation to the unattainable 
deity. The Confessor’s historical debt to Plato’s Theaitetos and the various traditions that appropriated 
the central insight of that dialogue for the sake of ethical treatises is apparent here. But he also owed 
a substantial debt to the Peripatetic. For example, in his Disputation with Pyrrhos he writes that “He who 
is not foolish is prudent, he who is not cowardly or rash is courageous, he who is not incontinent is 
temperate, and he who is not unrighteous is just.”403 Maximos echoes here Plato’s famous four cardinal 
virtues as found in the Laws and the Phaidon,404 but he likewise applies the vicious opposites Aristotle 
attached to these four virtues. More salient, however, is his subtle introduction of Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the virtuous mean, according to which many virtues have two corresponding vices, one of extremity 
and one of deficiency. Thus, differently than the other three cardinal virtues, the virtue of courage has 
a readily apparent vice of deficiency that Aristotle and Maximos term cowardice, and a vice of excess, 
which they called rashness.405 Let us reintroduce the analogy of the tightrope. If virtue is finding at 
each moment the virtuous mean between (generally) two vices of extremity and deficiency, then it is 
possible to err on either side of the tightrope. To be virtuous, then, is in this sense to strike a balance 
at every point, a balance that never allows one “to settle” and that is only preserved by a constant 
process of moral recalibration. We may wonder, however: What lies at the root of this dynamism? 
Why, in other words, could the virtuous life not be such that an agent, after a given time, finally 
“settles” and is no longer subject to this dynamism? 
We now turn to our second explanatory analogy, which is drawn from the insights of 
poststructuralist linguistics. Between 1906 and 1911 Ferdinand de Saussure delivered a set of lectures 
at the University of Geneva entitled Course in General Linguistics. In this groundbreaking work, de 
Saussure made a now famous distinction between langue (language) and parole (speech). The former is 
an abstract system of conventions, rules, and signification that is independent from its individual 
interlocutors; the latter refers to particular instantiations of langue by speakers. Most salient for our 
purposes is de Saussure’s discovery of what he called “The First Principle,” which holds that: “The 
link (lien) between the signifier (signifiant) and the signified (signifié) is arbitrary,” which he later 
                                                 
402 “Danser sur une corde, c’est de moment en moment maintenir un équilibre en le recréant à chaque pas grâce à des 
nouvelles interventions; c’est conserver un rapport qui n’est jamais acquis et qu’une incessante invention renouvelle en 
ayant l’air de le «garder».” De Certeau, L’invention, 143. 
403 Disputation with Pyrrhos, PG 91.311A. 
404 See Laws 964b5–6 and 965d2–3; Phaidon 69b2–c3. Compare to Republic 504a5–6; 
405 See further Nikomachean Ethics 1144a36–1144b6 and Protreptikos, fragments 39–40. Compare with Politics 1323b33–36a; 
Various Fragments, cat. 1, tr. 6, fr. 52, ll. 98–101. 
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simplified by finding that: “The linguistic sign is arbitrary.”406 Linguistic signs comprise a system of 
signification (langue), but are only coherent because they differ from one another. Thus, when de 
Saussure claims that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, he means that there is no “essential” connection 
between the linguistic sign and the object named by it. Rather, language communicates because 
linguistic signs stand in a relationship of difference to one another. 
Decades later, the French theorist Jacques Derrida critically developed de Saussure’s theory by 
stressing that the infinite differences among words point to a constitutive alterity that makes signifiers 
possible, while simultaneously betraying their own insufficiency. For example, “book” signifies not 
because of an essential link to the (generally) rectangular object made of bound pages that it names, 
but because the grammatological conglomerate “book” is not “boot” is not “booth,” and so on. By 
the same token, “book” on its own is in effect meaningless. Derrida thus concluded further than de 
Saussure that there was no linguistic link to a “transcendental signified,” that is, a meaning beyond 
context. On this basis, he came to his famed conclusion that “There is no beyond-text (hors-texte).”407 
Rather, all meaning is negotiated within the structures of language; these structures, in turn, become 
“culturally sedimented” over time, by use, by convention, and by replication. The language of 
“sedimentation” seems appropriate here, because it is a gradual process that gives the illusion of 
stability, much like the sediment at the bottom of bodies of water, but dissolves into a cloud of debris 
under the pressure of the “other.” Seen from this perspective, post-structuralist linguistics and de 
Certeau’s image above are similar, particularly in the fact that past “stabilities” cannot be trusted, being, 
as they are, characterized by their own insufficiency. What we can take away from these two conceptual 
analogies then, is that no act of balancing presupposes the permanence of an interstitial stability; in 
effect, precisely when one mistakes interstitial stabilities for something more than they are is one most 
likely to fall from the tightrope. 
If we transfer these ideas and conceptual analogies to the realm of ethics, understood as a social 
group’s moral axiology, we may find that language and ethics behave in strikingly similar ways. 
Languages and ethics change over time; they differ from nation to nation and social status to social 
status. If so, ethical norms are arbitrary just as linguistic signifiers. Therefore, ethical behavior is not 
praised by virtue of an essential or transcendental link to a “moral absolute,” but because it operates 
within a socially-sedimented, mutually-intelligible network of ethical parameters that make morality 
simultaneously possible and insufficient. From this viewpoint, ethical behavior, like language, is always 
in what Derrida called “freeplay” in his essay “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences” (1966, English translation 1970). The arbitrariness of ethics, like that of language, however, 
should not be emphasized at the expense or occlusion of the interstitial centers of gravity that become 
sedimented in societies over time. And yet, these interstitial centers of gravity are context-sensitive—
indeed, they can be nothing else. Objections to Derridean linguistic theory frequently overlook this 
fact by claiming, as one will inevitably hear, that “all is relative” and that “there is no meaning.” 
Two brief ripostes to these familiar, but unsatisfactory, critiques can be offered. First, they disregard 
an important factor of poststructuralist linguistic theory. The arbitrariness of the link between signifier 
and signified does not void language of communicative possibilities; in fact, it does quite the opposite 
in that it takes systems of linguistics seriously by deferring meaning to their constructed determinants. 
Second, relativizing the claims of any system is a welcome safeguard against ideological colonialism. 
The danger of the sedimentation of discourse is its ability to coopt the totality of a society’s vision and 
to eclipse, as it were, the imaginative possibilities of the “other.” Accordingly, history knows countless 
instances in which a social group sought to impose its own moral vision upon another by some avenue 
                                                 
406 De Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, 100 (emphasis of the author). 
407 Derrida, De la grammatologie, 227 (emphasis of the author). 
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of force; worst among these offenders were those who wondered at the resistance they encountered 
from the “morally inferior other” to adopt a foreign vision. 
We are still left wondering: how does this linguistic analogy cohere with late ancient ascetic ethics 
in the Roman Empire? I would suggest that virtue, as Christian monastics of the Roman Empire 
understood it, behaved much in the same way as the analogies we have so far introduced, though we 
should venture further nuances. It seems to me that what it means for a person to be virtuous is 
contingent on at least two significant variables: society and the self. Let us offer an analogy. It is 
virtually certain that the prized virtues of twenty-first century American corporate entrepreneurship 
would be classed as vices among seventh-century ascetics: “ambition” would with some certainty be 
considered greed, “strategic decision-making” and “corporate restructuring” would probably come 
across as misanthropy, and “successful image projection” would likely be regarded as pride and some 
vice associated with theft. And for all that, twenty-first century moral subjects would have to configure 
their ethical self, in part at least, in dialectic relation to the prescriptive norms that pertain to their 
corresponding social groups. 
And this is the second variable: the moral self is an unfolding complex of intra- and 
intersubjectivity, whose path to virtue is as much determined by external social power structures as by 
internal networks of psychosomatic dynamics that simultaneously empower and debilitate the 
possibilities of active engagement with reality. Aristotle offers an illumining parallel to this second 
variable in arguing that the arithmetic mean between “much food” and “too little food” is not the 
“right amount of food” for everyone because of the bodily differences between one person and 
another. For that reason, he says, six pounds may be far too much food for one who has only now 
begun training, whereas they would be far too little for Milon of Kroton, the wrestler who famously 
gained his strength by exercising with a calf that grew day by day.408 Aristotle’s analogy shows that 
virtue is not only contingent on society, but also on the moral subject. For this reason, he memorably 
concluded that ethics is “an imprecise science.”409 As we will see following, I attribute much of 
Maximos’ internal ethical logic to the Peripatetic and, to that degree, it reflects similar concerns and 
premises. 
The Confessor’s articulation of each agent’s virtue will be squarely determined by reference to the 
“particular logoi” (rather than universal logoi) of each person, an idea we flagged in the previous chapter. 
This distinction has significant ramifications for his ethical teaching. If the divine logoi of beings are 
unique and individual, then so are the paths that beings must follow to return to the source of their 
existence. For this reason, it is impossible to speak of a “one-size-fits-all” model of ascetical discipline. 
Rather, the seasoned monastic showed, in his capacity as an influential teacher writing for posterity, 
practical sensitivity to the various stages of development through which the monk might go. This 
sensitivity is especially apparent in his aphoristic Chapters on Love and Chapters on Theology. These two 
treatises are, so to speak, “layered,” in order to reflect the various developmental stages of the ascetic’s 
moral psychology. That is, most chapters hold a different insight depending on where in the ascetical 
struggle a monk might find himself. Naturally, for those of us outside the ascetical cycle, the variety 
of these insights may be at best foreign, at worst, completely illegible, but that should not discount the 
tangible reality that his wisdom resonated with centuries of subsequent monastics, who affirmed the 
practical value of the Confessor’s teachings.410 
                                                 
408 Nikomachean Ethics 1106b1–5. 
409 Nikomachean Ethics, 1098a21–1098b3. 
410 Perhaps an illuminating analogy for the uninitiate in monastic life is the experience of reading, as an adult, a book that 
was especially impactful during childhood. One may think of the Grimm’s Brothers tales, for instance, where new layers 
of meaning, of especial interest to psychoanalysts in the Freudian and Jungian traditions, emerge beyond what a child may 
be expected to see. Perhaps the clearest indication of the long-lasting impact that Maximos’ ascetical writings had on the 
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2. The Practical Aim of Monastic Authorship and Maximos’ Contextual Asceticism 
 
 Maximos hardly wrote on his own initiative before the outbreak of the Monenergist controversy 
(ca. 634). When he began to write (ca. 626), he was already quite an old man by late ancient standards.  
We might suppose that, as most ascetics, he had greater interest in dedicating himself to a serene life 
in contemplation of God, rather than writing about it or than he had in carving out his own position 
amid a constellation of spiritual authorities whom he vocally considered his superiors in every positive 
regard. These are, of course, the characteristics that elicit monastic fandom and earned the Confessor 
a sizeable following, close and far, that was eager to hear his wisdom as a man advanced in divine 
affairs. Only hereafter was he compelled to write, it seems. His personal charisma and commanding 
presence subsequently proved instrumental in steeling Dyenergist and Dyothelite opposition to 
Imperially-sanctioned Christology, as scholarship has noted.411 
The lateness of his writing could suggest his aversion to set anything in writing, though it is clear 
that when he began to write, he did so at an alarmingly prolific pace, producing the vast majority of 
his works in the span of some eight years. It is possible that he found a redemptive quality about 
writing about those things that he considered far better to live in practice. Derek Kruger has illumined 
more generally the practice of monastic authorship by articulating how ascetics aspired to imitate a 
Christ-like kenotic quality by means of the written word.412 For this reason, the Confessor could 
transpose the rigors of the disciplined life to parchment and thus, literally, “materialize” a spiritual 
dimension of tonsured existence for future generations. We should stress, however, that this practice 
of writing ought not be reduced to a self-centered avenue to procure his own spiritual advancement. 
Rather, at the outset of most of his writings he presented a key, so to speak, to approaching his treatises 
so that the manner of reading them itself became a way of bearing out their contents in living form 
for the benefit of the reader. 
The kenotic quality of monastic authorship and the key to unfolding the written contents of a work 
were predictably common in Maximos’ epistolary dedications to those who had commissioned the 
piece. The Confessor rehearsed the tropes of self-abasement with great skill in virtually all of his 
prologues; but in some sense, he also subverted or relativized the enterprise of writing on the ascetic 
life by embedding in the words a primer, so to speak, for action. His proemium to the Chapters on Love 
furnishes a vivid example of this admonition: 
 
Note, Father Elpidios, that in addition to the treatise On the Ascetical Life I have also sent to your 
blessedness the treatise On Love, equal to the four gospels in the number of its centuries of chapters; 
while probably worthy of your expectation in no way, it is nevertheless not inferior to our ability. 
Be this as it may, your holiness should know that these are not the yield of our own thought; on 
the contrary, having traversed the words of the holy fathers, having collected therefrom the sense 
that contributes to the subject, and having in the most summary fashion reconciled many senses in 
a few phrases—in order that they may become readily visible together for the sake of easy 
memorization—I sent them to your blessedness, beseeching you read them with right judgment 
and in them seek after benefit alone, while overlooking the charmless style and interceding on 
behalf of my mediocrity, barren as it is of any spiritual contribution. Further, I beseech this also: 
                                                 
subsequent development of medieval Roman monasticism can be appreciated in the outbreak of the Hesychast 
controversy. In this regard, Gregorios Palamas’ Triads can be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the Confessor’s ascetical 
teaching in light of the new and recent ideas of Latin provenance that Barlaam the Calabrian introduced. 
411 See Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 48. 
412 Writing and Holiness, 2004. 
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that you not consider what has been said distressing, since I have carried out an order; I mention 
the foregoing given that at present we who distress with words are many, whereas those who teach 
or are taught by deeds are altogether too scarce.413 
 
In this prologue, some common monastic themes emerge that will continue throughout his works: he 
insists on his inability to compose the treatise and stresses that it is beneath the dignity of the 
addressee, but not because of a lack of effort, lest he insult the recipient by suggesting that he 
undertook the task at hand with indolence; he predictably attributes the wisdom of the treatise to the 
insights of the fathers rather than to himself; and he requests that the recipient pray on his behalf, 
specifically, for his “mediocrity.” From Maximos’ protestation, it would appear that the priest Elpidios 
had requested his thoughts concerning love and the ascetic life. And while the Confessor obliged him, 
it is quite possible that the last phrase cited above is meant as a cautionary note about how properly 
to handle the text. Reading it alone, or even discussing it, without applying it will bring no benefit to 
the reader. 
 This warning is highly reminiscent of Aristotle’s treatment of virtue proper at the beginning of 
book two of the Nikomachean Ethics. Here Aristotle likewise voiced his preoccupation that the 
proverbial student (traditionally believed to be Nikomachos his son) might miss the point of the 
treatise, when he writes: “So, given that the present study (πραγματεία) is not for the sake of theory as 
the others (for we are not investigating so we may know what virtue is, but so that we may become 
good, since [the former] would be of no benefit [in this regard]), it is necessary to investigate that 
which pertains to deeds (πράξεις) [and] how they ought to be performed, because they are primordial 
(κύριαι), particularly (καὶ) for the quality that character states come to acquire (καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι 
τὰς ἕξεις), as we have stated.”414 Like Maximos, the Stagirite was concerned that by articulating a theory 
of ethics in written form, the whole object of the endeavor would be lost. He did not pen the treatise 
in order to theorize about the nature of virtue, but so that the reader could become good. He is 
sardonically incisive about this point a few pages later: 
 
But no one will ever be able to become good on the basis of not performing these [virtuous deeds]. 
Rather, the many do not practice them; on the contrary, when they resort (καταφεύγοντες) to 
discussion (λόγον), they consider themselves to be philosophizing and that in this way they will be 
upright fellows (σπουδαῖοι). They do something similar to the infirm, who, while hearing the 
doctors zealously, nevertheless undertake none of the [remedies] prescribed (προσταττομένων). 
Therefore, just as the latter will not have the body in a good condition (οὐδ’ . . . εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σώμα) 
by being ‘healed’ after this manner, neither will the former [have] the soul [in a good condition] by 
philosophizing after that manner.415 
 
The fundamental concern that the reader may simply read, rather than practice, the ideas inscribed in 
a treatise on ethics had not waned in the millennium that separated Aristotle from Maximos. 
Possibly for this very reason, the Confessor set out a “guide,” so to speak, that laid out a series of 
warnings and suggestions for the reader of the Chapters on Love. He writes after the opening lines 
quoted above: 
 
Nevertheless, one should pay especially painstaking attention to each of the [individual] chapters, 
since not all of them, I suspect, are readily comprehensible to everyone; on the contrary, for many, 
                                                 
413 Chapters on Love, prologue. 
414 Nikomachean Ethics 1103b26–31. 
415 Nikomachean Ethics 1105b11–18. 
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many require considerably careful examination, even if they seem to have been expressed rather 
simply. Perhaps, then, something beneficial for the soul might become manifest, having been 
revealed on their basis. Yet, it will certainly be manifested by the grace of God to him who reads 
without overwrought thoughts, with the fear of God, and with love. But to him who takes either 
this work or whatever other in hand, not for the sake of spiritual benefit but for the purpose of 
hunting for phrases in order to reproach him who has compiled them and, on that basis, 
establishing himself, as he supposes, as wiser than the former, nothing useful in any way will ever 
become manifest. 
 
The Confessor’s words here amount to an injunction to be an “active reader,” so to speak, but not a 
contentious one. In other words, he believes that the text (and others, if read according to the rubrics 
he sets out in this one) is only beneficial to the reader as long as the reader approaches it “without 
overwrought thoughts, with the fear of God, and with love.” But on closer inspection, his admonition 
is peculiar, because he enjoins the reader to approach the text “with love,” that is, the central theme 
of the treatise.416 Does it not seem counterintuitive to be expected to read a treatise on love with 
precisely that love which one is meant to acquire in the course of reading that treatise? 
 A similar dilemma emerges in Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics, albeit in a slightly different form, 
before the passage we cited above at 1105b11–18. The Stagirite had considered whether acquiring 
virtues was analogous to acquiring an artistic skill, but after considering the matter carefully, he 
concludes that artistic skills and the virtues are not analogous, because the products of artistic skills 
have merit in themselves. Acts that appear virtuous, by contrast, are not enough in themselves, 
because: 
 
the one who acts must act in a certain condition (πως ἔχων): first, knowing, then, deliberately 
choosing (προαιρούμενος)—and deliberately choosing [courses of action] for their own sake (δι’ 
αὐτὰ)—and third, acting while being firm and unwavering (βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων). In the 
case of having the other artistic skills, these [conditions] are not taken into account (συναριθμεῖται), 
but just knowing; but in the case of having the virtues, knowing avails little or nothing, whereas the 
other [conditions] are not worth little, but everything (οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται), since [virtue] 
comes about (περιγίνεται) on the basis of repeatedly doing just and temperate [deeds] . . . . It is 
rightly said, then, that it is by doing just deeds that the just person is produced (γίνεται) and the 
temperate person by temperate [deeds]. But no one will ever be able to become good by not 
performing these [virtuous deeds]. 
 
Aristotle’s argument is clear: knowledge of virtue does little or nothing to produce a virtuous agent; 
rather, one becomes virtuous by acting virtuously. Maximos’ injunction in the epistolary dedication of 
the Chapters on Love, cited above, replicates the same logic. The reading of the Chapters on Love is 
intended to be accompanied by a specific activity, that is, by the practical exercise of the virtue of love 
as applied to the very treatise that offers direction on its pursuit. In this way, it is not only the 
conceptual content of the treatise that matters, as if intellectively learning about love were to make 
one any more loving; rather, it is the practical exercise of love as applied to the reading of the treatise 
On Love that makes for the transformative character of the work. The Chapters on Love, then, can be 
considered in this light a treatise on monastic ethics that is self-aware of its written status but contains 
                                                 
416 The fear of God and the simple thought likewise crisscross the work. See Chapters on Love 1.2–1.3 and 1.93. 
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in its introductory letter the key to its effectivity as a tool in the formation of the reader’s moral 
psychology.417 
 This strategy was not limited to the Chapters on Love, which indicates a certain consistency in the 
monk’s writing endeavors. Maximos often encouraged his readers to exercise a certain form of 
disposition or practice when reading the texts that he penned and these practices had a pedagogical 
purpose that was meant to be applied to the very reading of his works. For instance, the longest of his 
works, the Questions and Answers to Thalassios, which consists in a series of exegeses of Scriptural 
passages in the interest of grasping better the nature and operation of the passions, encourages his 
readership not to consider his interpretations the definitive spiritual word on the matter: “And I 
beseech you who are most saintly (τοὺς ἁγιωτάτους ὑμᾶς) and all those who, as may be the case (ὡς 
εἰκός), will come across this writing (γράμματι), not to turn the things said by me into the standard of 
the spiritual interpretation of the passages.”418 Instead, he suggests that the passages should aid in 
bringing about a higher and truer understanding that is obtained through listening to and learning 
from others in the humility that the Confessor himself models by relativizing his own insight on these 
matters. This dynamic also reflects the very genre of the work, which took the form of an erotapokriseis. 
Indeed, when the readers act in this virtuous capacity, Maximos says that the fruit they bear is none 
other than God, who is made present to the ones by means of the others. 
The object of the practice of Scriptural interpretation as he exposits it in the Questions and Answers 
to Thalassios, then, is to make God present, but not solely on the basis of the words, but on the basis 
of the approach to them. After all, he notes, the Logos cannot be contained by any interpretation; that 
does not mean, he implies, that the Logos cannot be made present by the manner in which the 
hermeneutical endeavor is executed. He draws a complex analogy to makes this point: 
 
For the divine Logos is like water to all manner of plants, and to offshoots, and to animals—I 
mean, to humans who drink him, the Logos (τοῖς αὐτόν φημι τὸν λόγον ποτιζομένοις ἀνθρώποις)—
as becoming manifest analogically to them in knowledge and in practice through the virtues as a 
fruit shown forth in relation to the quality of the virtue and knowledge in each and becoming 
manifest to some through others (ὡς καρπὸς προδεικνύμενος κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ποιότητα τῆς ἀρετῆς 
καὶ τῆς γνώσεως καὶ γινόμενος δι’ ἄλλων ἄλλοις ἐπίδηλος); for he can in no way be circumscribed by 
anyone and he resists being imprisoned within a single insight on account of his natural infinity (ἑνὶ 
γὰρ οὐδέποτε περιγράφεται καὶ μιᾶς ἐντὸς οὐκ ἀνέχεται διανοίας γενέσθαι διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἀπειρίαν 
κατάκλειστος).419 
 
As with the Chapters on Love before, the introductory epistle to the Questions and Answers to Thalassios 
sets out a program whose objective is a dynamically transformative pedagogy that is accomplished 
through the activity one applies to the reading of the work. 
The Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer presents a peculiar case inasmuch as the addressee is unnamed, 
but receives, nonetheless, a substantial dedicatory epistle. In the letter, Maximos identifies the scope 
of the Prayer as the performance, by those who recite it, of all those things that the Logos did in his 
Incarnation.420 For he reasons that it is right to comprehend the significance of the prayer and 
subsequently to put it into action.421 Previously in the epistle, he had drawn a bold link between his 
addressee and Christ—particularly in the action of benevolent condescension—opening the 
                                                 
417 From this perspective, it is of course unremarkable that copyists preserved the epistolary dedication intact. 
418 Thal, ep., ll. 89–92. 
419 Thal, ep., ll. 99–107. 
420 Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, ll. 62–74. 
421 Comm LP, esp. ll. 64–66. 
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dedication so: “It is my master himself, guarded by God (θεοφύλακτόν), whom I have received, present 
in his most praiseworthy letters, who is always present and is altogether incapable of being absent in 
the spirit; and similarly, in imitation of God by the abundance of virtue, he has not refused to hold 
converse with his servants . . . . For this reason, when I wondered at the greatness of his 
condescension, I mixed fear for him with desire and constituted from both—fear and desire—one: 
love.”422 I take it that Maximos meant to highlight how humbled he, an unworthy monk, had been by 
receiving a letter from a man of such stature that in reaching out to him, he had displayed the Christ-
like quality of condescension.423 
And yet, the epistolary dedication is not as straightforward as it may appear. Frankly, there are 
perplexing elements in it. Unlike most of Maximos’ correspondence, it does not specify the name of 
the person addressed—unless one were to venture to take the adjective of the addressee, theophylakton 
(Θεοφύλακτον), as a personal name, which I simply consider a stretch. More confounding, however, 
is that the recipient is addressed throughout in the third person singular, rather than in the customary 
second person. The form of address is so peculiar that George Berthold, the translator of the English 
version, made an understandable judgment call and took artistic license in rendering all third person 
pronouns in the second person, and turned all participles (which in Greek have no person) into finite 
verbs in the second person. These peculiarities likely point to something more. If taken in light of the 
previous analyses of Maximos’ dedications, it is altogether likely that this one serves yet again a 
pedagogical purpose and, specifically, that it functions as the key to the active or performative 
interpretation of the text. In this case, as in the others, the ultimate objective is to bring about a certain 
form of character-molding activity. But here, specifically, that activity is to do precisely that which the 
Logos did in his Incarnation.424 In other words, the reader is meant to become an “imitator of Christ,” 
who takes on not only the characteristics, but also the proper activities of Christ. 
From this perspective, I would suggest that the lack of an addressee is entirely deliberate and I also 
doubt that it had a single, specific recipient. Rather, the lack of an addressee, I take it, is meant to fold 
each and every reader of the letter into its contents, given that its words could apply to anyone who 
read it with the objective of accomplishing its purpose. For this very reason, the objective of the work 
(to act as the Incarnate Logos) and the titles of the addressee (i.e., Christological titles) converge. In 
other words, Maximos believed that the object of the Lord’s Prayer is the Christification of the 
supplicant; this contention is especially borne out by his interpretation of the opening phrase “our 
Father,”425 which he takes as a foreshadowing of our eschatological sonship in Christ. The work is 
thus addressed to all of those who pray the Prayer; they are, moreover, meant to become the addressee 
in the course of reading its interpretation by putting it into action. Maximos made the identification 
of the reader with the addressee possible by his unusual apostrophe to the designated recipient in the 
third person. Perhaps the most transparent indication of this open-ended address can be found in the 
title, preserved by virtually all relevant manuscripts without variation: A Brief Commentary on the Prayer 
Our Father for a Given Lover of Christ (εἰς τὴν προσευχὴν τοῦ Πάτερ ἡμῶν πρός τινα φιλόχριστον ἑρμηνεία 
σύντομος).426 The generality of the recipient is not only meant to lack specificity, but also aims at 
designating the character of the true addressee: the one who is transformed into the recipient through 
the praxis of what lies in the treatise. 
                                                 
422 Comm LP, ll. 3–7, 8–11. 
423 Compare to Thal 59, ll. 230–232; 61, ll. 85–89; 62, ll. 52–57; Qu Theop ll. 118–123; Myst 24, ll. 247–251; Diff Thom 4, ll. 
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426 CCSG 23, p. 27, ll. 1–2; for further reference, see the critical apparatus for line 2. 
 112 
 
While one may argue that the work was indeed addressed to a specific person who, out of monastic 
humility, chose to remain concealed from potential readers, that practice would fall outside of 
Maximos’ traceable modus operandi and of early medieval monastic epistolary practices in the Roman 
Empire more generally. On the contrary, there are very few epistolary dedications in which he does 
not draw an array of flattering comparisons between God (or a person of the Trinity) and the recipients 
that especially praise their practice of virtue. For instance, his opening address to Thalassios in the 
Questions and Answers to Thalassios refers to him as a “man of God”427 who has shown forth the “ever-
flowing spring of divine knowledge”428 and who, invoking 1 Corinthians 2:10, has “searched the depths 
of the Spirit with the Spirit.”429 This activity, of course, belongs to the Holy Spirit, who “searches the 
deep things of God” according to the Scriptural passage to which he alludes here. He likewise praises 
the fact that his practical application of virtue has been such that his soul has imprinted this divine 
quality on his very flesh in order to provide a visible model for others to follow.430 
Perhaps more poignant is the prefatory epistle the Confessor sent to Thomas that accompanies the 
later Difficulties (or Difficulties 1–5). In it, he replicates the Christological quality of divine condescension 
that we already saw in the Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer.431 But he went further in his praises as he 
considered the result of Thomas’ practical application of wisdom: 
 
Since you have acquired an unvarying character state of undeviating contemplation on the basis of 
a diligent zeal in divine affairs, you have become the most temperate lover, not only of wisdom, 
but of its, beauty, oh greatly beloved of God. And the beauty of wisdom is a practical knowledge 
or a wise praxis, the characteristic of which—since it is fulfilled by both—is the principle of divine 
providence and judgment; in accordance with it, you have intertwined the mind with sensation 
through the Spirit, demonstrating how God truly is of such a nature as to make the human in the 
image of God, and have rendered familiar the wealth of his goodness because you have lavishly 
shown forth in yourself, by the beautiful mixture of opposites, God embodied by means of the 
virtues, in whose imitation—since you have matched his exaltation in [your] self-emptying—you 
have not foregone lowering yourself as far as me by inquiring about those matters the knowledge 
of which you possess by experience.432 
 
Here again the various themes we have considered emerge, such as theomimesis through self-abasement 
and the necessity to apply in practice that which one possesses intellectually. In this regard, his striking 
conclusion is that Thomas has made God embodied by means of the virtues. It is, therefore, not out 
of character for Maximos to intend for the reader of the Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer “to embody 
God” through the practical application of its contents. 
 Further dedications could be examined, but we may already draw some conclusions from those we 
have considered. His ascetic teaching was occasional and therefore contextual. Its general objective 
was not the abstract exposition of a theme but the transformation of character through a simultaneous 
exposure to and practical application of the subjects he had been called on to address. By framing his 
ascetical works in this way, he was able to extend the rigors of embodied monastic life to the practice 
of individual or communal reading. As such, the act of reading the Confessor’s treatises was meant to 
be a self-reflexive transformative activity marked by a dialectic of learning and self-adaptation. If so, 
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his works should be understood in light of their dynamic contextual occasionalism and the network 
of relations and concerns from which they originated, as Blowers has astutely observed: “What is 
demanded, especially in assessing the work of a thinker whose theology is as intricate and nuanced as 
Maximus’, is the kind of thick description that elicits not only the internal intelligibility or consistency 
of his literary corpus but also the often subtle signals that his work has once been addressed to live 
audiences . . . .”433 It is often easy to lose sight of this last point when studying texts composed so 
many centuries ago. Nevertheless, it is essential to underscore the significance of the living recipients 
of these texts because, as far as their articulation of moral psychology is concerned, they presume a 
living subject. 
  
3. Virtue, Part One: Psychosomatic Ethics, Motion, and Hypostatic Dynamism 
 
We have suggested previously that Maximos had a variety of interlinked understandings of virtue 
and these, we may add, stem precisely from the living subject that virtue presupposes. In this section, 
we will be primarily concerned with sketching out the ascetic intellectual’s articulations as they concern 
psychosomatic relations and the hypostatic unfolding of the moral self in the active negotiation of 
virtue. As such, this section remains, so to speak, a skeleton that we will fill out in the remainder of 
this study. To focus our attention, we can ask the following questions: what is the relationship between 
the body and the soul vis-à-vis virtue? What does it mean that a dynamic being is virtuous? Does this 
imply that the subject becomes increasingly static as the subject becomes increasingly virtuous? And 
if not, what relation does the subject’s past have to the subject’s future possibilities? As before, I 
believe many of these questions can be fruitfully illumined by setting them in dialogue with Maximos’ 
more general appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophy. 
 The Peripatetic tradition was well known in the Hellenistic and Late Ancient periods for promoting 
the radical coextension and co-implication of body and soul. The origin of this idea can be traced to 
Aristotle and it predictably underwent substantial appropriations for different ends in the philosophies 
of subsequent generations. Aristotle’s first book of On the Soul offers a critical catalogue of existing 
psychologies whose merits and demerits he assesses. In light of the frankly overwhelming array of 
theories he considers, the originality of his own can hardly be overstressed. The philosopher of 
Stageiros promoted a radically naturalistic psychology whose appeal has hardly waned at any point in 
the history of philosophy. This much is true of many early Christian thinkers, such as Gregory of 
Nyssa, Nemesios of Emesa, and Maximos, as well as of Islamic philosophers, like ibn Rushd, who 
wrote three separate commentaries on On the Soul. For all of these philosophers, one of Aristotle’s 
most valuable insights was the unbreakable link between body and soul as constitutive elements of the 
human species. We cannot here treat the psychologies of all of the former thinkers with the nuance 
and care they deserve, so we will press on to the Confessor’s own articulation of psychosomatic 
relations and then consider their implications for virtue. 
 In Difficulty 7, Maximos addressed what may be with some qualification called a “neo-Origenist” 
interpretation of a passage from Gregory of Nazianzos’ Oration on Love for the Poor that spoke of humans 
as a “portion of God that has flowed down from above” (μοῖραν ἡμᾶς ὄντας Θεοῦ καὶ ἄνωθεν 
ῥεύσαντας) and that referred to our “contest and battle with the body” (ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πάλῃ καὶ 
μάχῃ) that is yoked to us for the purpose of instructing us in our worthiness. We can infer from 
Maximos’ arguments that this passage from the “unimpeachable standard of the Orthodox faith,”434 
Gregory the Theologian, had been used as a prooftext to support an Origenist belief in the 
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preexistence of the soul, its motion away from unity with the divine, and its subsequent interment in 
a body as the result of its fall. Maximos here famously reversed this “Origenist triad” of rest—
motion—origin to origin—motion—rest.435 Intrinsic to this argument was his understanding of the 
human as a single species constituted by two elements that are (onto)logically simultaneous, 
completely coextensive, and that develop in unbroken continuity with each other. Maximos articulates 
the relation between body and soul lucidly in Difficulty 7.40 and 7.31, though these by no means exhaust 
his discussion of the matter. 
In Difficulty 7.40, the Confessor vehemently argues for the inseparability of body and soul by 
drawing heavily on Aristotle’s Categories and its commentary tradition. He writes: 
 
For if they [i.e., body and soul] are parts of the human, as has been promoted, the body and the 
soul coincide, and the parts necessarily are subject to reference to the “[category] of relation” (for 
the whole is definitely predicated of them), and those that are thus termed, [that is] “of relation,” 
belong both completely and necessarily to the [category] of logical simultaneity with respect to their 
origin, since, by coming together as parts, they complete a whole form, being separable from each 
other only conceptually for the purpose of the distinction of what each is in [its] substance. 
Therefore, it is impossible for soul and body, as parts of the human, to pre-exist or post-exist each 
other chronologically, since the so-called principle “of relation” would be violated. 
 
The psychosomatic view Maximos presents here does not only derive from Aristotle’s On the Soul, but 
is fiercely backed by a sustained appeal to the logical rules of the Peripatetic’s Categories, two of which 
he invokes by name: the category of “relation” (πρός τι) and the category of “logical simultaneity” 
(ἅμα).436 He argues that if the aggregate of body and soul is the constitutive condition of a single form, 
then the whole can be predicated of the part (also known as synecdoche) and the parts must be 
(onto)logically coextensive. In his own words, the parts can only be separated for analyzing their 
substance, but any other form of separation would destroy their relationality and thus their existence. 
Put differently, body and soul cannot exist in separation from each other. So, he negates the 
proposition that the body can preexist the soul or that the soul can preexist the body. He likewise 
precludes the possibility that the one could go on existing after the other is gone, which follows from 
the principle of their logical simultaneity. As can be supposed, this position has serious implications 
for his eschatology—but more on that later. By precluding the possibility that body and soul can exist 
in separation from each other, he introduced the makings for a complex interaction and mutual 
influence between body and soul. 
Earlier in the same Difficulty, though clearly making the psychosomatic assumptions above, 
Maximos held that the soul transmits its attributes to the body and elevates it with itself to deification. 
In this way, humans mediate the divine to the created order as each being is capable of receiving it: 
 
The human has come into being through God [as constituted] from soul and body because of his 
[God’s] goodness, for the purpose that the rational and intellectual soul given to him [i.e., the 
human] . . . may, on the one hand, be deified owing to its longing for God out of the whole power 
of its complete love . . . and may attain the likeness, and, on the other hand—in line with the 
knowledgeable providence for what is lower [i.e., the body] and the commandment enjoining to love 
one’s neighbor as oneself—[that the soul] may prudently keep the body close and, through the virtues, 
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[may] consider it its fellow-servant and [may] acquaint it with God, mediating through itself the 
indwelling of the Maker and making him who bound them the indissoluble link of the immortality 
[they will be] given ‘in order that what God is to the soul, this the soul will become to the body’ 
and that the Fashioner of all things will be shown to be one, through humanity residing in all beings 
in a way commensurate to their capacity [to receive him] . . .437 
 
This passage also expresses an unbreakable link between body and soul and adds one of the 
Confessor’s central ideas, that is, that the deification of the soul extends to the body and through the 
body to the entire created order. Maximos elaborates on this idea at much greater length in Difficulty 
41, where he also considers the ways in which humans were intended to overcome the five divisions 
of nature in themselves (created/uncreated, intelligible/sensible, heaven/earth, paradise/inhabited 
world, male/female) by functioning as a “certain natural bond” (σύνδεσμός τις φυφικὸς) between the 
extremes of the universe.438 But in this part of Difficulty 7, he is concerned with establishing the idea 
that the attributes of the soul can be transmitted to the body. 
I do not think the sense of his words is as obscure as it may perhaps seem. The bodily actions are 
extensively determined by the sedimented behavioral conditions the soul acquires over protracted 
periods of time. As such, the body acts under the influence of the character states (ἕξεις) of the soul. 
The influence, of course, goes both ways. The body can also exert its might and main on the soul 
through pleasure and pain—Aristotle’s quintessential emotions with which virtue and vice are 
concerned, as well as through other forms of “natural” passivity, such as hunger, thirst, and 
exhaustion.439 At the same time, the Confessor did not regard the body-soul direction necessarily 
negative, given that he believes that there are virtues of the body that may at times even aid the soul.440 
The context of both passages in Maximos’ Difficulty 7 should stand here in the foreground. The 
Confessor’s driving argument throughout the Difficulty is that the Origenist model that begins at rest, 
undergoes motion, and results in origin is flawed. He finds that a reversal of this triad makes better 
sense of the creation narrative and, indeed, of the goal-directedness of human actions. As he articulates 
it, humans were first created and were thereby set in motion by God; this natural motion that results 
from the transition from non-existence into existence may only come to rest in the source that 
originated that movement to begin with, as we partially overviewed in the previous chapter. All of 
human life in this world, however, is situated in the intermediate stage of this triad, the stage of 
“motion” and is accordingly unavoidably dynamic as created beings strive after the ultimate end of 
their existence and coming to rest in the object of their desire.441 
Because Maximos articulates his virtue theory within this triad of origin—motion—rest, he 
frequently associates activity and motion (a familiar idea present in Plato’s Timaios and Aristotle’s 
Physics and Metaphysics). Motion (κίνησις), however, embraces a much wider sense than that which we 
commonly ascribe to it. For Maximos, motion does not exclusively, or even primarily, refer to 
locomotion, for which he was in the habit of using the term φορά; rather, it conveys an internal sense of 
development of the self that is inextricable from Aristotle’s metaphysical divisions of nature 
(substance, potentiality, actuality); likewise, in subsequent centuries, it became intimately bound to the 
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late Platonic triad of remaining, procession, and return. Finally, Maximos interwove these various 
strands into the tapestry of his own imagination by linking them to his doctrine of the logoi (principles) 
of creation and the tropos (manner) of human existence. 
The inherent ontological undertones of motion predictably implicated it in an ethical network of 
dynamic relations within this cosmos. Maximos expresses this idea clearly in Difficulty 7.21–22. Here, 
he claims that a virtuous person: 
 
has shown the end to be identical to the beginning, or rather, that the end and the beginning are 
identical, since he has come to be a genuine spokesperson of God, given that the goal of each thing 
is believed to be its origin and end, the former as that wherefrom he has received being and 
participation in what is good by nature, and the latter since, by unerringly conducting [himself] in 
accord with it [i.e., the beginning] in both mindset (gnome) and deliberate choice (proairesis), he 
finishes the praiseworthy race through diligence, by virtue of which he becomes God, receiving 
from God to be God, since by deliberate choice he adds to the beauty that belongs by nature to 
[existing] in accordance with the image the likeness through the virtues by means of his natural ascent 
and conformity to his own origin. In his case, moreover, the Apostolic expression in him we live, 
move, and exist is fulfilled.442 
 
Although Maximos uses various images of motion that convey a sense of locomotion, his application 
is clearly metaphorical. These images serve to express a form of psychosomatic development that 
conforms to nature as defined by the logos of being. Maximos confirms this idea about the virtuous 
agent in the following lines: “For he comes to be in God through attentiveness by not corrupting [his] 
logos of being that preexists in God, and moves in God according to the logos of well-being that preexists 
in God, because he acts through the virtues, and lives in God according to the logos of eternal being 
that preexists in God.”443 Especially relevant from these three distinctions is the logos of well-being, 
since this logos points to the ethical quality with which one should imbue one’s existence through the 
virtues. 
Here we encounter again Maximos’ famed distinction, mentioned already in passing, between logos 
and tropos, in its proper onto-ethical context, so to speak. The relationship between these two terms 
should be clarified for the sake of precision. Luis Granados García’s definition succinctly gets at the 
heart of the matter: “In the human being, the logos of nature corresponds to his unity (body and soul), 
whereas the tropos is the specific configuration of his dynamic being (configuración específica de su ser 
dinámico).”444 Especially accurate is his definition of the tropos as the “configuración específica de su ser 
dinámico,” because it conveys the two poles of this dynamism: the human has a “specific 
configuration,” since it belongs to a particular hypostasis, but it is, precisely for that reason, dynamic. 
The hypostasis is, in the present, unfolding on the stage that belongs in this triad to well-being, which 
is intrinsically characterized by motion. This motion must be understood as a hypostatic unfolding 
wherein ethics and ontology are mutually-conditioning variables. That is, who we are is affected by 
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what we do and what we do is affected by what we are. We had already discussed this inter-relational 
idea as we analyzed the prologue to Maximos’ Chapters on Love in light of Aristotle’s own explanation 
of how humans become virtuous; it likewise seems to be at play here. This dynamism did not remain 
epiphenomenal or abstract for Maximos, as we saw in his ingenious prologues, but undergirded and 
informed his ascetical theology throughout. 
A good case of the foregoing observation can be found in one of his earlier works, the Chapters on 
Theology, which contains a collection of aphorisms that were intended to shape the moral outlook of 
the monastic in the pursuit of virtue. Chapter 1.35 represents many aspects of Maximos’ ascetic 
worldview in the characteristically pithy style of this genre. He writes: 
 
Whatever things exist in time are being fashioned in accordance with time and, having been 
perfected, they are brought to a standstill, thereby having ceased from growth according to nature. 
Whatever things God’s science effects in the realm of virtue, when they have been perfected, they 
move again for increase, for their ends have established the starting points of further ends. For, he 
who through the virtues puts an end to the ground of corruptible things in himself, in accordance 
with the practical life has made a beginning of other more divine configurations, for God never 
rests from good things, of which there is also no beginning.445 
 
In this chapter, the Confessor contrasts the natural growth of beings, which ends when they reach 
their biological potential, to the psychological or aretological growth of humans, which is 
unambiguously unending as the Confessor envisions it. For this reason, he writes that what is perfected 
in terms of virtue becomes liable to further increase that is determined on the basis of the previous 
configuration. And yet, this position entails a tension. How can perfection have degrees? Is not the 
point of perfection that it cannot be, to be obvious, “perfected” any further? While it would be 
convenient to attribute this tension to a linguistic ambiguity that can be resolved by rendering the 
passage otherwise than I have above, that simply will not do. Maximos uses the participial form 
τελειωθέντα from the verb τελειόω that is hardly ambiguous and means “to perfect”; he does not use 
other potentially ambivalent terms like “attain,” (τυγχάνω), “bring to completion” (ἐξεργάζομαι), or 
“finish” (τελέω) that could indicate a broader semantic range. So, I think we must take him on his own 
terms and determine what he means by saying that something perfect can be perfected further. 
 I would argue that there are two poles in this equation, by virtue of which Maximos expresses his 
opinion that in the realm of virtue, one perfection leads to another and becomes the starting point of 
a new, more divine configuration. The first and perhaps most evident is the fact that the finite human 
strives, through virtue, to be assimilated to and thus reflect the infinite God. The process, accordingly, 
could be nothing other than infinitely unattainable. But this need not mean that the human does not 
approximate the divine even if the human cannot conclusively reach or attain the divine (which is 
uncircumscribable). Perhaps a valid analogy to illumine this point can be found in the Poincaré 
expansion in mathematics, also known as the asymptotic expansion or asymptotic series—from the 
Greek ἀσύμπτωτος (i.e., not coinciding or literally “not falling together”). A formula may yield an ever-
closer approximation to a point of convergence between a function and a point on an axis; the function 
becomes increasingly closer to the axis with each new variable, but it remains, for all that, infinitely 
beyond convergence. This answer addresses the fact that one may indeed be approximating a point of 
convergence without necessarily ever reaching it. In mathematics, thus, one speaks of a tendency to x 
(whatever x may be), but the function and axis will never coincide. This model, however, does not 
explain how something that is perfect can be perfected further. 
                                                 
445 Chapters on Love 1.35, trans. Salés. 
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 This second point can be elucidated by turning to a peculiar discussion in Aristotle’s tenth book of 
the Nikomachean Ethics, where Aristotle considers different senses in which we understand perfection. 
He holds that some activities are perfect in and of themselves, provided that certain conditions are 
met, while other activities are only perfect when they reach their goal or objective.446 He gives the 
example, for the latter case, of the construction of a temple, where none of the activities that are 
undertaken in order to make the temple are themselves perfect, since their objective is not contained 
in themselves, but in the completion of the temple.447 In this sense, then, the perfection in view here 
is one that is only accomplished when the final cause or purpose is brought to term, but one does not 
ascribe perfection to any one of the intermediate steps, because they are not self-sufficient and, on 
their own, rather meaningless—such as the action of striking a stone with a hammer once without 
considering further that it is to extract stone from a quarry for the purpose of fashioning a column 
for a temple. All of these actions, in brief, are understood in respect of a larger whole to which they 
contribute and that can eventually be finished, such as making a temple (that is not the Sagrada 
Familia). This parallels Maximos’ first instance of perfection above, that of natural growth, which 
comes to an observable end to which earlier stages contributed but none of which would in itself be 
considered perfect. That is clearly not the case as far as assimilation to the divine is concerned. 
There are other actions that Aristotle considers to be perfect in themselves, which require neither 
reference to an externality wherein they find their perfection, nor which would be more perfect if they 
were to be prolonged in time. Per his example, if one sees an object, it does not matter whether one 
sees it for one minute or two seconds for one to be able to say that one has seen that object; similarly, 
if one feels pleasure for a moment or for a protracted period of time, the temporal duration of the 
feeling does not negate that one felt pleasure in both moments. Thus, the quality inheres in the very 
action itself and is not supplemented by temporal duration or other considerations of that type. 
Aristotle applies this definition in the case of virtue and makes the following claim: “And preferable 
in and of themselves are those things in the case of which one seeks nothing aside from their activity. 
And the activities in accordance with virtue seem to be such things.”448 Here Aristotle indicates that 
one does a virtuous action for the sake of the virtuous action itself and not for some higher goal by 
virtue of which the action is perfected: the virtuous action is perfect in itself.449 Maximos makes a 
similar distinction in his writings, though in some he layers the reasoning behind the good or virtuous 
deed further by dividing Christians into three classes: those who do the good for fear of punishment, 
those who do it for a promised reward, and those who do it for its own sake.450 This last sense is most 
ideal and the most predominant in his ascetical writings. 
Maximos’ logic in Chapters on Theology 1.35 seems to operate in the same way as Aristotle’s, especially 
in that it makes a clear distinction between actions done for the sake of something else and those 
whose perfection is found in themselves. If one has acted virtuously, it is fair to speak of the perfection 
of that virtuous action in itself, given that it is done for the sake of nothing else. But the Confessor 
likewise appears to understand that the performance of these virtuous activities determines what he 
calls “starting points” for future virtuous activity. We may harken back to our analogy of tightrope-
walking to elucidate these dynamics. If one takes a step on a tightrope and does not fall, it is fair to 
say that one has taken that step “perfectly” for the intrinsic object of that step—to move forward on 
the tightrope without falling—has been accomplished. But that does not mean that that step does not 
                                                 
446 NE 1173b–1177a2. 
447 NE 1174a21–35. 
448 NE 1176b6–9. 
449 Compare to Chapters on Love 2.35–38, 3.47. 
450 Mystagogy 24, CCSG 69, ll. 1057–1075. 
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condition one’s future steps. For instance, one will not be able to step forward again with the same 
foot one put down and is, to that degree, limited by the previous action. 
The same is true of virtue. One may act humbly in a particular instance, but that humble action has 
now determined what it means to be virtuous in the future. Perhaps, one may now need to be 
temperate or attentive in order not to become proud because of a previous humble deed—this 
progression seems to have been a constant ascetic preoccupation.451 And the successful 
accomplishment of these two virtues, in turn, will create a new hypostatic dynamic condition, or 
“configuration” as Maximos calls it, that will determine one’s further steps in the balancing act of 
remaining virtuous, and so on. For this reason, he was in the custom, as was Evagrios,452 of offering 
advice on what virtues tended to bring about specific temptations to vice, or, alternatively, what virtues 
tended to be produced by other virtues, as can be appreciated in the opening decade of the Chapters 
on Love and elsewhere in his works.453 
We can conclude that there is for Maximos a sense in which sustained performance of virtuous 
deeds foments and in some respects facilitates further performance of virtue, but each new progressive 
step toward virtue is accompanied by a very real possibility of failure that cannot be discounted by 
reason of previous successes. And, it appears, this eminent fallibility was rooted not only in the body, 
but in the complete constitution of the human being; every human faculty was prone to a particular 
pitfall that required incessant self-examination and ascesis in order to preserve the “balance” of virtue. 
In this sense, then, it is possible to look to the continuous string of self-sufficient perfections that are 
the virtues, by which one undertakes the infinite task of being assimilated to the divine. 
 
4. The Greatest Question Mark in Virtue: Emotions, Character Stability, and Apatheia 
 
 In 1934, the native Kievan Nikolay Berdyayev published Судьба человека в современном мире (The 
Destiny of the Human in the Contemporary World), a treatise lamenting that philosophy had escaped its long 
captivity to theology only to land in the far crueler and more methodical hands of modern science. In 
his philosophical exposition of love, he critiqued earlier Christian theologians—specifically, Isaac the 
Syrian, Ioannes Klimakos, and Maximos the Confessor—for promoting the love of God at the 
expense of loving others. He writes that “For this reason, Christians have often been so tough, so cold 
hearted and insensitive in the name of virtues aiding in their salvation.”454 He continues some lines 
down: 
 
A contrast was also demarcated between natural and supernatural love. And it seemed that spiritual 
and perfect love, that is, the highest, did not resemble love in the least; rather, it was impersonal, 
abstract, inhuman. Common sympathy and compassion are more gracious and more similar to love 
than this theological virtue. This is one of the most painful problems in Christian ethics. It indicates 
that Christians have been unable to receive the fullness of divinely human truth and that it is 
difficult for the human to unite the love of God and the love of humanity, love of the Creator and 
love of the creature. Love of the creature more generally, of animals, plants, minerals, of the earth 
and the stars, has not been developed in Christian ethics at all. It is a problem of cosmic ethics and 
it still has to be formulated . . . . Indeed, love for one’s neighbor, for the human who bears the 
                                                 
451 Compare to Maximos, Chapters on Theology 1.26–28; Chapters on Love 1.30, 1.46, 2.8–9, 2.14, 3.62, 3.84; see also Evagrios, 
Praktikos 13. 
452 See Praktikos 6, 11, 13–15, 44, 58, 70, 81, 84, 89. 
453 E.g., Chapters on Theology 1.25–30; Chapters on Love 2.39–49, 3.74. 
454 Berdyayev, Судьба человека, 4.5. 
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image and likeness of God, was understood only as a means of salvation, as an ascetic exercise in 
virtue.455 
 
The sentiments Berdyayev expresses here have not fallen on deaf ears, especially, perhaps, on a 
contemporary audience’s. And yet, given our brief overview of Maximos’ concern for the deification 
of the entire universe, Berdyayev’s claims are not without some misdirection. 
Rather, I think that the social context to which the political exile was responding was a very 
particular instantiation of Orthodoxy as he remembered it from the late Romanov Russian Empire. 
His own exposure to a series of patristic figures seems primarily popular and it is unlikely that much 
of it derived from his formal higher education at the Faculty of Law at the University of Kiev (1894–
1897), from which he was expelled for involvement in student Marxist demonstrations. It strikes one, 
rather, as the memory of his ecclesiastical contemporaries’ proof-texting, a practice for which he had 
little appreciable fondness. Perhaps this broader sentiment can be appreciated in an inflammatory 
article he published in August of 1913 by the name of “Гасители Духа” (“Spirit Quenchers,” see 1 
Thessalonians 5:19), where he charged his contemporary ecclesiastical leadership with a form of 
intellectual, but especially spiritual, paralysis that occasioned the death and decomposition of the 
Church’s body; it was a form of complete imaginative stagnation that made of the ecclesiastical body, 
in his words, a rotting corpse.456 For him, the problem was precisely the inert appeal to bygone masters 
of the spiritual life in the interest of bolstering the credibility of his contemporaries’ models of spiritual 
direction. The option he proposed was to overcome this stagnation by casting off the clothes 
Christianity had worn in its infancy and to grow into the fullness of its spiritual body. For him, this 
act of freedom as he envisions it in Судьба, largely amounts to a strategic withdrawal from Patristic 
authority. 
A cursory and selective glance at the early Christian figures to whom he expressly refers could give 
the impression that his criticism did not materialize from the thin Parisian air he breathed as he wrote 
this work. For instance, the first chapter of the first century of Maximos’ well-known Chapters on Love 
states that “Love is a good disposition of the soul, in accordance with which one prefers no being to 
the knowledge of God; and it is impossible for one who has a passionate proclivity for any worldly 
thing to come to the character state of this love.” This line on first inspection lends credence to 
Berdyayev’s valid concerns and would seem to replicate the traits of that “theological love” he had 
critically identified above. Humans cannot reach this form of love of which Maximos speaks as long 
as they prefer any being to God; they can never attain it as long as they have a “passionate proclivity” 
(προσπάθεια) for any earthly thing. As such, it might seem that the monastic intellectual is here 
encouraging detachment from others as a form of self-centered isolation wherein goodness is done to 
one’s neighbor only in the utilitarian interest of attaining a higher state of godliness. It is easy to see 
how such a passage could quickly be decontextualized and spun to promote a certain form of spiritual 
discipline. It is far more difficult to find out why this passage represents in abbreviated form the 
cosmological theology of Maximos, a theology that has recently been positively appraised from various 
directions for offering an articulation of cosmologically-engaged Christian ethics, indeed, the first of 
its magnitude hailing from the Grecophone Christian context. It is likewise a complex affair to 
                                                 
455 Berdyayev, Судьба, 4.5. 
456 He writes: Низшая физическая плоть церковности омертвела и сгнила. И спасения можно искать лишь в 
раскрытии ее духовной плоти. Дело архиепископов Никонов и архиепископов Антониев и есть гниение 
физической плоти церкви, ее ветхих одежд, предназначенных для младенчествующего человечества. Ныне 
выросло человечество из этих ветхих одежд и должно облечься в новую духовную плоть. In Русская молва 232 
(August, 1913). Here he is especially pointed in his criticism of Archbishops Nikon and Antoniy, who for him embody 
the decomposing body of the Church, in large part due to its attachment to material wealth. 
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determine what this seemingly detached state is. It most frequently was referred to as ἀπάθεια (apatheia) 
and it has remained a cornerstone of eastern Christian asceticism until the present. 
 
4.1. What Is Ἀπάθεια (Apatheia)? 
The belief that early Christian ethics were largely Stoic in inspiration remains the prevalent scholarly 
voice; it is predicated under the assumption that Aristotelian philosophy, and especially Peripatetic 
ethics, had little appreciable impact on its formation of a distinct moral psychology and social ethic. 
Accordingly, most interpretations concerning the development of Christian ethics privilege Stoic over 
Aristotelian ethics—if it is even accurate to say that the latter has been entertained as a possibility. The 
foregoing assumptions often overlook or simplify the philosophical complexity of late antiquity, as we 
have shown in chapter 1. To the point of ethics, for example, the very first extant commentary on any 
of Aristotle’s works is Aspasios’ (ca. 80–ca. 150) Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics, which the 
Peripatetic philosopher penned at around the same time that some of the latest texts that now 
constitute the Christian New Testament were being etched on papyrus. This remarkable commentary 
would have an eventful afterlife. 
As Anna Komnene gathered around herself a circle of scholars to write commentaries on the works 
of Aristotle that had no commentary yet, it is remarkable how much text (commentary on books 1–4, 
7 and 8) of such an ancient work—about one thousand years old by her time—had survived when 
extensive portions of the writings of Aspasios’ famed Christian contemporaries, such as Irenaios of 
Lyon and Clement of Alexandria, had been permanently lost. This fact speaks to the cultural relevance 
this commentary possessed. Its importance is also attested to by the frequency with which a range of 
authors mention its contents, as well as the author.457 It is likely that Maximos knew portions of this 
commentary or that he had inherited some of its concepts indirectly, as we have briefly suggested in 
the foregoing chapter. I will show how Aristotle’s and Aspasios’ ethical insights would prove deeply 
formative in the Confessor’s own articulation of the ascetic discipline, even if he would ultimately take 
his monastic ethics in a direction that he deemed best suited for his own purposes. 
Apatheia (ἀπάθεια) is one of the organizing principles of the ascetic life and consistently emerges as 
one of its highest ideals. This term, however, has proven remarkably difficult to understand and 
therefore to translate satisfactorily: dispassion, passionlessness, impassivity, etc. all fail to capture the 
semantic range of this psychological state. I will make the case here that for Maximos, the term is best 
understood as “emotionlessness” because it really does mean the complete absence of passions 
(understood “negatively”) or emotions (understood “neutrally,” as it were).458 This may at first seem 
symptomatic of Berdyayev’s critiques overviewed above, but a closer inspection in effect shows that 
emotionlessness as Maximos understood it was not a negation of existential human faculties nor the 
sacrifice of profound human impulses on the metahuman altar of sanctity; rather, it was a different 
                                                 
457 See Alexandros, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 41, ll. 26–28, p. 59, ll. 6–8, p. 379, ll. 379, ll. 3–6, Commentary 
on On Sense Perception, p. 10, ll. 1–4; Porphyrios, Life of Plotinos 14, ll. 13; Simplikios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 
CAG 9, p. 131, ll. 12–16 (commenting on Aspasios’ and Alexandros’ disagreement), CAG 9, p. 422, ll. 18–25, and especially 
p. 423, ll. 12–13, where Simplikios refers to Aspasios’ writing as “most convincing” or “most trustworthy” (ἀσφαλεστέρα). 
458 For an excellent overview of the question of apatheia and the emotions more generally, see Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of 
Mind, especially see 181–210, 343–370, 385–398. See also Clark, The Origenist Controversy, 76–77; Hunter, “The Language 
of Desire: Clement of Alexandria’s Transformation of Ascetic Discourse,” 95–111; a series of classical essays remain: 
Viller, “Aux sources de la spiritualité de saint Maxime,” 156–184, notes 331–336; Miquel, “Peira,” 355–361; Schönborn, 
“Plaisir et douleur,” in Heinzer and Schönborn, 273–284. See also Wilken, “Maximus the Confessor: The Emotions in 
Historical Perspective,” especially 413–416 and Blowers, “Gentiles of the Soul,” 58–65; Williams, “Macrina’s Deathbed 
Revisited,” in Wickham and Bammel, 227–246. Compare to Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire; Inwood, Ethics and Human 
Action, especially 173–175. 
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way of approaching them and understanding their constitutive function in the outworking of the 
deiform moral self. 
Maximos’ scholars agree that Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrios of Pontos had considerable impact 
on his articulation of a practical spirituality system, including his understanding of the emotions in the 
unfolding of ascetic subjectivity. The first of the Questions and Answers to Thalassios begins the 
investigation of the treatise proper by posing the question that lies at the core of the work: “[Are] the 
emotions (πάθη) in and of themselves (καθ’ αὑτὰ) evil or [are they] evil depending on use? And I mean 
pleasure and pain, desire and fear, and those that follow upon them (τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα).” To this, 
Maximos offers the following reply: “These emotions, just as the rest, were not primordially 
(προηγουμένως) created along with the nature of humans, since they would also complete the definition 
(ὅρον) of nature. I say, having learned from the great Gregory of Nyssa, that these were introduced by 
the fall away from perfection and latched onto the more irrational part of nature; through them, instead 
of the divine and blessed image, the likeness of irrational animals immediately became apparent in the 
human in logical simultaneity (ἅμα) with the transgression.”459 At first, this passage, like Chapters on 
Love 1.1 cited above, would seem to ratify Berdyayev’s concerns. After all, it would be difficult to find 
a text that is more unequivocal about the fact that these emotions are not originally part of what 
defines a human. Maximos expressly says that they resulted from the fall and attached themselves to 
that part of human nature that is more irrational. 
 This passage must be understood in the context of Gregory of Nyssa’s discussion of the same 
subject matter, for which a pair of passages are relevant. The first is a brief description of the 
conditions the human underwent in consequence of the fall that can be found in his On Virginity. The 
link to this passage is a discussion of the loss of resemblance to the divine archetype and the 
introduction of evil to the world on account of humanity’s misuse of deliberate choice (προαίρεσις).460 
A stronger connection, however, can be found in Gregory’s dialogue On the Soul and the Resurrection. In 
a protracted section of this treatise, the bishop of Nyssa discusses the nature of the emotions with his 
sister Makrina. She asserts that anything that is not proper to the divine nature should not be attributed 
to the human soul either, because the soul is fashioned in the image of the divine nature. For that 
reason, spiritedness and desire, which we do not see in the divine nature, should not be attributed to 
the soul by way of an essential definition, nor should any of the emotions that come from these.461 
Rather, Makrina makes an emboldened case for why desire (ἐπιθυμία) and spiritedness (θυμός)462 are 
not constitutive of human nature;463 indeed, she describes them as accretions or warts (μυρμηκίαι) that 
have latched onto the soul as a consequence of the fall.464 
                                                 
459 Thal 1, ll. 5–12. Τὰ πάθη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων προηγουμένως οὐ συνεκτίσθη, ἐπεὶ 
καὶ εἰς τὸν ὅρον ἂν συνετέλουν τῆς φύσεως. Λέγω δέ παρὰ τοῦ Νυσσαέως μεγάλου Γρηγορίου μαθών, ὅτι διὰ τὴν 
τῆς τελειότητος ἔκπτωσιν ἐπεισήχθη ταῦτα, τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ μέρει προσφυέντα τῆς φύσεως· δι’ ὧν, ἀντὶ τῆς θείας καὶ 
μακαρίας εἰκόνος, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῇ παραβάσει διαφανὴς καὶ ἐπίδηλος ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γέγονεν ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων 
ὁμοίωσις. 
460 See On Virginity 12.2, ll. 12–17, 20–22, and 32–52. Francois Vinel, the French translator of the Questions to Thalassios, 
seems to think that On Virginity is the most significant source of inspiration for Maximos here. I do not think so, because 
the section from On Virginity to which he alludes does not explicitly discuss the emotions, but rather the loss of the human 
faculties and the widespread devolvement of the human species to something more akin to the animal kingdom. 
461 See GNO 3.3, pp. 34–48 for the complete discussion. 
462 It is curious that she would pick this pair. See GNO 3.3, p. 34, ll. 5–7 and forward; compare to Plato, Kratylos 419d8, 
Sophist 228b2, and Republic 440b1–2; see also Aristotle, On the Soul 432a24–26. Refer further to G. Pearson, Aristotle on 
Desire, 34–39. 
463 Warren Smith has made a compelling case that Makrina is very much relying on Aristotelian taxonomical categories to 
make her case. See Passion and Paradise, 63. 
464 This image and choice of words are seemingly meant to recall the statue of the god Glaukos, drawn every year from 
the sea covered with barnacles and other maritime flora. See Plato, Republic 611d. 
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The similarity between Maximos and Gregory is here apparent. Particularly, the cornerstone idea 
that the emotions follow from the fall and that they were not initially created along with human nature 
spans both texts. I would add, however, that the specific emotions to which Makrina refers—desire 
(ἐπιθυμία) and spiritedness (θυμός), and those that Thalassios raised for discussion—pleasure (ἡδονή), 
pain (λύπη), desire (ἐπιθυμία), and fear (φόβος), are, with the exception of desire, not quite the same. 
Spiritedness and desire were the two non-rational faculties of the soul that Plato had famously 
described as two winged horses pulling a chariot controlled by the rational part of the soul in Phaidros 
246a. As such, they are not, strictly, emotions per se, but the emotive faculties; they are the organ, so 
to speak, by which humans can emote in certain ways. Therefore, there is some difference in terms of 
what precisely is in view in On the Soul and the Resurrection and in Thalassios. We should add, however, 
that the distinction between the emotive faculties and the emotions as such is not consistently upheld 
or, alternatively, that they were sometimes used equivocally. 
Gregory’s ideas expressed through Makrina, specifically that nothing (here: the emotions) should 
be attributed to the soul by way of essential definition that is not also attributed to the divine belonged 
to the Peripatetics. Aspasios had already articulated this position lucidly in the second century. The 
opening paragraph of his Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics makes the following point: 
 
For if indeed we were without a body, there would be no need, as far as our nature is concerned, 
to have any other action than contemplation. But now, the nature of the body, since it is yoked 
together with bodily pleasures and pains, of necessity makes us be concerned with temperance, 
self-control, and many other such virtues, which, it does not seem, pertain to God on account of 
the fact that he participates of neither bodily pleasures nor pains. Consequently, we seem to take 
on the greatest concern regarding ethics out of the necessity of the body, since justice and prudence 
. . . fall far short of God. Rather, we have need of them on account of the injustices and oppressions 
that occur at the hands of others. As for the divine: it seems to exercise solely contemplative justice 
upon us and to continue therein.465 
 
Aspasios makes the case that the training of the emotions for virtue is only due to bodily contingencies, 
such as pleasure and pain, Aristotle’s two distinctive emotions that dispose us to virtue or vice, as 
mentioned in the previous section. The point of contrast, he argues, is the divine, which has no 
pleasure or pain and as such is engaged in an eternal act of contemplation that is not liable to the 
alteration that can be seen in humans on account of their corporeal reality and the dynamism of the 
emotions. Thus, both Aspasios and Gregory presuppose that the bodily element introduces a 
contingency with respect to the emotions that is not predicated of the divine and that is, to some 
degree, problematic in humans. The point of contrast to this mutability is the relative stability that 
pursuit of virtue gradually establishes in the character of the agent and by virtue of which the agent 
comes to resemble the divine’s immutability.466 
                                                 
465 καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἄνευ σώματος ἦμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἄλλο ἔχειν ἔργον ἢ τὴν θεωρίαν, νῦν δὲ ἡ τοῦ 
σώματος φύσις ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις συνεζευγμένη σωματικαῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ 
σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων τοιούτων ἀρετῶν, ὧν οὐκ εἰκὸς μετεῖναι τῷ θεῷ διὰ τὸ μήτε ἡδονῶν 
μήτε λυπῶν σωματικῶν μετέχειν. ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὖν τοῦ σώματος φαινόμεθα τὴν πλείστην περὶ τὰ ἤθη ἐπιμέλειαν 
πορίζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις . . .  πολὺ μὲν λείπονται τοῦ θεοῦ. δεόμεθα δὲ αὐτῶν διὰ τὰς ἀδικίας 
καὶ πλεονεξίας τὰς ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων γινομένας, ἐπεὶ τό γε θεῖον εἰκός ἐστι δικαιοσύνῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνῃ χρῆσθαι τῇ 
θεωρητικῇ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖν. Aspasios, Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics, p. 1, l. 14–p. 2, l. 4. 
466 For Gregory, see, e.g., Commentary on the Song of Songs 5, GNO 6, p. 272, ll. 13–19. For Aspasios, see Commentary on the 
Nikomachean Ethics, p. 25, ll. 25–30; p. 33, ll. 21–27; but compare to p. 30, ll. 33–35 and p. 34, ll. 21–26, where he 
differentiates between bodily and psychological virtues, as well as divine and human, and that it is the latter and the latter 
that are to be investigated. 
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What follows Gregory’s overture concerning the emotions is peculiar inasmuch as it blurs the 
otherwise clear distinction of teacher (Makrina) and student (Gregory) so far diligently observed. Here, 
Gregory challenges Makrina’s contention that the emotions are not part of human nature.467 Makrina 
had made the case that it is in accordance with a certain rational principle that virtue is, precisely, 
virtue, and that the emotions should not be considered an intrinsic part of human nature because they 
often contend with this rational principle, which essentially defines humans. I have elsewhere made a 
connection between her approach to essential predicates and that which Aristotle outlines in the 
Categories. I contended that: “Following Aristotle’s taxonomical logic, Makrina seeks to define the 
human soul not by reference to what it has in common with other living things, but by reference to 
what separates it from them. For that reason, she can assert that spiritedness and desire, or cowardice 
and rashness, do not differentiate humans from animals, since the latter equally possess these 
characteristics.”468 If this observation has merit, the individuating principle that makes for the 
taxonomical differentiae in the case of humans is reason, which, according to the Cappadocian, animals 
do not share. So, if the emotions come in conflict with that which makes humans what they are, they 
should not be considered part of their essential definition. The argument Makrina here expresses 
seems to be lifted directly from Aristotle’s Nikomachean Ethics 1102b17–19, which likewise refers to 
the emotions’ contention with this rational principle, though it adds (as Makrina does shortly hereafter) 
that they are capable of cooperating with or participating of reason and thus to be rational themselves, 
even if only by extension.469 
To counter Makrina’s claim that the emotive faculties should not be considered proper to the 
human, Gregory builds his case on Scriptural instances where emotions were praiseworthy, such as 
Daniel’s desire and Phineas’ spiritedness.470 Makrina initially takes a step back in her position and, 
while insisting on the fact that the emotions cannot define human nature, she acknowledges their 
positive potential: “Consequently, if reason (λόγος), which is in fact characteristic of [our] nature, were 
to exercise rule over the external accretions . . . no given one of these kinds of motions [i.e., the 
emotions] would operate in us in service of vice, but fear would produce obedience, and spiritedness 
what is courageous, and timidity precaution, and the desiring impulse would procure for us divine and 
undefiled pleasure.”471 This position could have represented a compromise between her understanding 
of the emotions and that which Gregory initially favored, but she in fact reverses her initial stance by 
admitting further that virtue, which is a divine quality, would be impossible without desire and 
spiritedness.472 As I have shown elsewhere, this exchange amounts to an affirmation of a transformed 
Aristotelian moral psychology and a veiled rejection of a handful of Stoics, like Chrysippos and 
Epiktetos.473 The “emotions” as presented here are in effect capacities of the non-rational part of the 
soul as identified by both Plato and Aristotle. So, to eliminate these capacities would be coterminous 
with the erasure of the complex human subject and a negation of the psychological holism that 
Gregory and his Cappadocian confreres championed in their Christological campaigns. 
On this reading, Gregory hardly promoted an ascetical theology that demanded the extinction of 
the emotive faculties as such. Rather, he sought after their consistent operation in line with right 
                                                 
467 See Salés, “Can These Bones Live?” (forthcoming). This exchange makes one wonder whether this much of the dialogue 
may have had some basis in earnest sibling disagreement. 
468 See Salés, “Can These Bones Live?” (forthcoming). 
469 See Salés, “Can These Bones Live?” (forthcoming), note 88; see also Konstantinou, Die Tugendlehre Gregors von Nyssa, 
46–48. 
470 GNO 3.3, p. 38, ll. 16–19. 
471 GNO 3.3, pp. 42, l. 13–43, l. 1. See Salés, “Can These Bones Live?” (forthcoming). 
472 GNO 3.3, p. 45, ll. 13–19. 
473 See Salés, “Can These Bones Live?” (forthcoming), nn. 91–99; see also Aristotle, Nikomachean Ethics, 1102b25–28, 
1104b21–27, 1105b19–1106a3, and Eudaimian Ethics 1220b7–1221a15. 
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reason, by which these various capacities produce virtuous actions. This line of reasoning is grounded 
in his understanding of the emotions as situated at a midpoint (μεθορίῳ) in the soul and liable to incline 
in one direction or another.474 For this reason, they are always a potential force, one that can operate 
for virtue or vice. The emotions, then, are for Gregory morally neutral; they are positive when they 
align with right reason, and negative when they fight against it.475 
Although Maximos invokes Gregory by name and clearly calls this exchange in On the Soul and the 
Resurrection to mind, he does not innocently and uncritically replicate the Nyssen’s position. At least 
two substantial differences separate Maximos and Gregory. First, the two did not share the same 
protology; so, by re-contextualizing some of the latter’s claims about the emotions into his own 
framework, he in fact assigned them a new meaning. Second, he regards the emotions “in themselves,” 
as Thalassios put it, as a long-term ontological and metaphysical problem. 
For Maximos, the creation and fall of humanity were virtually concurrent events. When humans 
fell, “the likeness of irrational animals immediately became apparent and manifest in the human in 
logical simultaneity (ἅμα) with the transgression.”476 It is important to note that the Confessor 
underscores the concurrence of the events by means of a repetitive adverbial enjambment—
“immediately” and “in logical simultaneity”—in the interest, I believe, of highlighting their logical or 
theoretical sense; he does not primarily have in mind a chronological sequence in this passage. From 
this perspective, his use of the technical term ἅμα (in logical simultaneity) points to more than a simple 
modifier. This concept was one of Aristotle’s tertiary categories that would subsequently carry great 
theological burdens on its proverbial shoulders, including extensive use in Trinitarian debates in the 
Greek and Arabic Christian traditions, where it functioned to describe the logical simultaneity of 
Father, Son, and Spirit,477 as well as in psycho-somatic relations, as we have seen in the previous 
section.478 What defines this category of logical simultaneity most especially is that the omission of 
one component necessarily entails the omission of the other. 
Thus, in his mind, the fall and the similitude to irrational animals are identical; we must stress that 
the Confessor is not thinking here of a diachronic progression of events, as if the human first sinned 
and then acquired likeness to animals. Therefore, it is significant that he does not say that the state of 
irrationality followed from (for which he would have likely chosen the verb ἕπομαι) the fall, but that it 
became “apparent” and “manifest” simultaneously with the transgression. Blowers has commented 
very perceptively on this passage and noted that “By making Adam’s paradisiac impassibility more a 
                                                 
474 On the Soul and the Resurrection, GNO 3.3, p. 39, l. 17. 
475 Compare to Aristotle, Nikomachean Ethics 1102b25–28. 
476 Thal 1, ll. 10–12. Τὰ πάθη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων προηγουμένως οὐ συνεκτίσθη, ἐπεὶ 
καὶ εἰς τὸν ὅρον ἂν συνετέλουν τῆς φύσεως. Λέγω δέ παρὰ τοῦ Νυσσαέως μεγάλου Γρηγορίου μαθών, ὅτι διὰ τὴν 
τῆς τελειότητος ἔκπτωσιν ἐπεισήχθη ταῦτα, τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ μέρει προσφυέντα τῆς φύσεως· δι’ ὧν, ἀντὶ τῆς θείας καὶ 
μακαρίας εἰκόνος, εὐθὺς ἅμα τῇ παραβάσει διαφανὴς καὶ ἐπίδηλος ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γέγονεν ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων 
ὁμοίωσις. 
477 See Aristotle, Greek and Arabic: Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ· οὐδέτερον 
γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ ὕστερόν ἐστιν· ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται (“Logical simultaneity” is simply and most 
primordially called the origin of those things that [takes place] in the same time; for neither is first nor later; and “logical 
simultaneity” is called these things in respect of time), Categories, 14b24–6. For comparison, see the translation of Aristotle’s 
Categories in Badawi:  لاقي«  اـعم » دحاو سيل هنإف ،هنيعب دحاو نامز ىف امهنوكت ناك اذإ نيئيشلا ىف قيقحتلاو قلاطلإا ىلع ؛ارخأتم لاو  امدقتم امهنم
.نامزلا ىف »اعم« امهنإ امهيف لاقي ناذهو and Georr: سيل هناف ؛هنيعب دحاو نامز ىف امهنوكت ناك اذا نييشلا ىف قيقحتلاو قلاطلاا ىلع اعم لاقي 
.نامزلا ىف اعم امهنا امهيف لاقي ناذهو .ارخاتم لاو امدقتم امهنم دحاو See also Thawdurus Abū Qurrah’s On the Existence of God and the 
True Religion, where he writes that the Father’s headship over the Son and his procession of the Holy Spirit “Were not by 
means of a female or intercourse, and there was no pregnancy, and no upbringing, and no antecedence; on the contrary, 
they are in logical simultaneity” (. اعم مّهنكلو .قبس لاو ةيبرت لاو ،لمح لاو ،عامج لاو ىثُنأب سيل Dick, 225. (The addition of tanwin 
fatha on اعم is mine). Compare to Salés, “Aristotelian as a Lingua Franca,” notes 36–37. 
478 E.g., Difficulties to Ioannes 7.41, DOML 28, p. 138, ll. 9–12. 
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theory or a potency than an actuality, and by making the Fall almost instantaneous with Adam’s 
creation, Maximus indicates that humanity, historically speaking, has known . . . passibility virtually 
from the beginning: the ambiguity of historical human life is precisely the persistence of unnatural 
passion under the guise of natural passion.”479 In other words, for Maximos there was never in the 
reality of human existence a condition in which humans knew no difference between virtue and 
“emotions in and of themselves.” Human existence has been, for as long as we have known it, 
characterized by the fallibility of the emotions, which is rooted in their capacity to be otherwise. 
Unlike for Gregory, these emotions “in and of themselves” pose an existential problem for 
Maximos. While the Nyssen was content with finding that the emotions were at a “midpoint” in the 
soul from which they could incline in a positive or negative direction, Maximos’ complete ascetical 
machinery was dedicated to the struggle to attain emotionlessness. And yet, the ascetic thinker did not 
promote this position out of a misguided sense of “mysopathy,” so to speak. On the contrary, the 
psychological capacities or faculties that enable emotive responses are, to be sure, an essential attribute 
of the human for him; indeed, they are the tripartite soul that Plato and Aristotle had already discussed 
at length, consisting in reason, desire, and spiritedness. The problem for Maximos, rather, is that 
Gregory is right: these faculties can potentially act in accordance with virtue or vice. At stake, then, is 
the contingency or potentiality that accompanies these so-called “emotions in and of themselves,” not 
the negation of these existential structures of the human soul. It is for this reason that Gregory and 
Maximos do not speak of the elimination of the irrational faculties of the soul (desire and spiritedness), 
but, as Wilken has put it, of their “transformation.”480 
Correlatively, there is no such thing for Maximos as “just an emotion,” that is, a “neutral” emotion, 
except in abstraction.481 In Chapters on Love 3.71, for instance, the Confessor only envisions the 
emotions as irreducibly blameworthy or praiseworthy: “A blameworthy emotion of love is that which 
engrosses the mind in material things; a praiseworthy emotion of love is that which conjoins it even 
to divine things. For those things in which the mind spends time are also those in which it develops 
(πλατύνεσθαι); and to those in which it develops, it likewise turns both desire and love: whether in 
divine and its appropriate and intellectual things or in the fleshly things and in the passions.” There is, 
needless to belabor, no mention here of a neutrality where the emotions can abide and be “just 
emotions.” For this reason, it would seem to be of no benefit to speak of emotions “in and of 
themselves” because no such thing occurs in the embodied human existence; those considerations are 
only really possible via a transposition to analytical language that has little bearing on the practical 
concerns of the ascetic. 
Rather, faculties are always already engaged in one way or another and, because they are proper to 
a diachronically-situated being, they are disposed to act in specific ways that have slowly become 
sedimented through repeated (virtuous or vicious) behavior. Put simply, one cannot extract the 
emotions from their personal history and assess whether they are good, bad, or neutral in isolation 
from the chronological entity wherein they reside. Every new present further conditions and defines 
the performative possibilities of every future. It is possibly for this reason that Aspasios began his 
Commentary by pointing out that the emotions and the pursuit of virtue are inescapable for all beings 
who are subject to corporeal existence. In taking a similar approach, Maximos is in fact assigning great 
                                                 
479 Blowers, “Gentiles of the Soul,” 69. 
480 Wilken, “Passions in Historical Perspective,” 412. 
481 There is, of course, a difference between “emotion” and “undergoing,” understood as a certain function of the soul as 
opposed to an external activity that happens to a subject. Bathrellos implies this distinction in “Passion, Ascesis, and the 
Virtues,” in OHMC, 291. Compare to Gregory of Nyssa: ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ τῆς ζωῆς τέλος ἀρχὴ θανάτου ἐστίν, οὕτως καὶ 
τοῦ κατ’ ἀρετὴν δρόμου ἡ στάσις ἀρχὴ τοῦ κατὰ κακίαν γίνεται δρόμου. (“Just as the end of life is the beginning of 
death, so also the rest from pursuit of virtue becomes the pursuit of vice”), Life of Moses, 1.5, ll. 16–18. 
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value to embodied humanity and acknowledging the various forces that exercise their pull on the 
deliberating agent. For these reasons, it is far more productive to investigate the intrapersonal dynamic 
negotiation of the patterned behaviors that enable agents to act virtuously. 
So, Apatheia, or emotionlessness, does not refer to the extinction of certain fundamental faculties 
of the human soul. It is important to consider here that Maximos says that the emotions Thalassios 
listed “latched on to the more irrational part of nature.” Following Classical anthropological 
definitions, this statement would tacitly introduce a significant distinction between the non-rational 
faculties of the soul, desire and spiritedness, and the emotions that “latched on” to these seemingly 
already existing faculties of the soul. Even though Thalassios listed desire, one of the two non-rational 
psychological capacities of the Classical tripartite soul, among the emotions he included in his inquiry, 
it appears the Confessor indulges the equivocal application of the terms in order to address the general 
thrust of the Libyan hegoumen’s question. As Maximos articulates his answer, it appears clear that he 
does not understand the ascetic struggle as an effort to suppress or eliminate the non-rational faculties 
of the soul, but to use them appropriately: “But even the emotions become good in the virtuous, 
when, having wisely turned them from corporeal affairs, they arrange them with a view to the 
acquisition of celestial affairs.”482 Later he continues: “in the case of the wise . . . they use these 
emotions for the elimination of a present or impending vice and for the acquisition and preservation 
of both virtue and knowledge.”483 
More important than good use of the psychological faculties, however, is the cultivation in virtue 
that makes a morally good application possible in the first place. For that reason, I would argue that 
emotionlessness as Maximos envisions it refers to a specific configuration of the psychological 
capacities (which can incline to virtue or vice) that empowers agents to act virtuously and to avoid 
behavior that leads to vicious character states. Maximos lets on to this understanding of apatheia as he 
defines it: “Apatheia is a peaceable constitution of the soul by virtue of which it [i.e., the soul] becomes 
hardly-moved toward vice.” (Ἀπάθειά ἐστιν εἰρηνικὴ κατάστασις ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἣν δυσκίνητος γίνεται πρὸς 
κακίαν). Three points about this definition need some elucidation. 
First, he describes emotionlessness as a “constitution,” (κατάστασις). The ending of the noun, -σις, 
most often refers to a condition or state that is arrived at as the result of a process (e.g., analysis, 
dialysis, etc.). The prepositional prefix κατά most likely points to a relative fixity of this constitution, 
in the same way, to draw on our governing analogy, that language or ethical codes become sedimented 
over time, but are not, for that reason, altogether immutable. In brief, the term conveys a sense of 
relatively fixed arrangement or configuration after a specific pattern. Also, the prepositional prefix 
does not have destructive or deviating undertones, such as the prefix ἀπό- could potentially convey. 
So, it has a constructive sense, so to speak, and for that reason does not refer to a neutralization or 
suppression of human psychological capacities. Rather, the general sense points to a relatively stable 
configuration or arrangement that has as its object a morally beneficial psycho-behavioral pattern. 
The second point concerns his choice of the adjective δυσκίνητος to describe the constitution of 
the emotionless soul. Quite literally, the term means “hard to be moved.” It is fair to ask why the 
Confessor did not describe this constitution as “unmoved” (ἀκίνητος) rather than “hard to be moved” 
given the definitiveness that the alpha privative in apatheia may imply. In other words, why not describe 
an alpha privative noun with an alpha privative adjective? I take it that emotionlessness, despite the 
strong sense alpha privatives often convey, is not an absolutely permanent condition, but one that is 
yet liable to (qualified) alteration. This may well be the case given that Maximos famously and firmly 
held that the complete cessation of human activity occurs only after death,484 so it would be inadequate 
                                                 
482 Thal 1, ll. 18–20. 
483 Thal 1, ll. 28–30. 
484 See Chapters on Theology 1.50–60. 
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to describe a contingent terrestrial condition (which is still liable to the distension of time) in absolute, 
rather than qualified, celestial terms. Aristotle found that the same was true about eudaimonia, which 
should not be predicated of anyone until that person’s death—and perhaps not even then, since that 
person’s name and memory may yet suffer even after death. 
Finally, Maximos juxtaposes apatheia to vice (κακίαν). It is difficult to know what precisely Maximos 
intends in doing so, because the diametric opposite of vice would seem to be virtue, but he was not 
in the custom of calling apatheia a virtue. The Confessor expresses a variety of relations between 
apatheia and virtue more generally, but none of these classes apatheia as a virtue, a point that he has in 
common with Evagrios. In some cases, both Maximos and Evagrios articulate a productive 
relationship, where love (agape) is engendered by emotionlessness (apatheia).485 They also speak of 
apatheia as a form of peaceable constitution of the soul, as in Maximos’ definition above, which is 
similar to Evagrios’ definition of emotionlessness in Praktikos 64 as “calm” (ἥσυχος) and in 67 as 
“unperturbed” (ἀτάραχος). Maximos, like Evagrios, likewise calls emotionlessness a character state 
(ἕξις), which the former often links directly to the virtues,486 whereas the latter explicitly identifies the 
psychological “constitution of prayer” as an “emotionless character state” (Κατάστασίς ἐστι προσευχῆς 
ἕξις ἀπαθής).487 For these reasons, it does not seem that they regard emotionlessness as a virtue proper, 
despite having an intimate link to it. For these reasons, emotionlessness can hardly be understood in 
the negative senses that Berdyayev more broadly applied to ascetics, but as a certain sedimented 
psychological structuring of the moral self that empowers the monastic subject to act virtuously. If so, 
it is probably more accurate to think of apatheia as Evagrios and Maximos articulated it as a form of 
long-sedimented “moral muscle memory” that aims at preempting the fallibility of the equipoised 
emotive faculties of the soul. It is not in any case their negation, neutralization, or annihilation. 
 
4.2 Apatheia, the Gnomic Will, and the Natural Will 
The outbreak of the Monothelite controversy in the 640s compelled Maximos to articulate with 
greater precision why the emotions represented a significant ontological problem in soteriological 
perspective than the context of his previous writings required. Specifically, I would argue that one of 
the leading concerns during the Monothelite controversy had to do with the relationship between 
deliberate choice, the emotions, and emotionlessness (apatheia). Nevertheless, the bulk of scholarship 
on the Monothelite controversy is dominated by historians of dogma who have focused on Maximos’ 
Christology and have accordingly sought to discover and express his Christological system by 
comparing his writings on the person of Christ to assess their consistency. No idea has garnered as 
much attention in this respect as his explanation of the “gnomic will” (γνωμικὸν θέλημα), which he 
contrasted with the “natural will” (φυσικὸν θέλημα) in his later, Monothelite-era writings. 
In synthesis, the indirect witness to Monothelite concerns suggests that they were uncomfortable 
with pronouns with the prefix “dy-” (Dyenergism, Dyothelitism, etc.) because they risked resurrecting 
Nestorianism. After all, it seems that the will (θέλημα) is specific to the person, so that if Christ had 
two wills, so also he would be constituted by two persons, which had long been considered a heretical 
proposition that originated with—or, at any rate, that was attributed to—Nestorios. Another 
Monothelite concern was that two wills, if radically free as human and divine wills must be, could will 
opposites. In other words, could the human will of Christ will something different than his divine 
will?488 From a Dyothelite perspective, Monothelites represented a modified form of Apollinarianism, 
for they denied a psychological given of Christ’s soul (the will) and under Gregory the Theologian’s 
                                                 
485 See Maximos, Chapters on Love 1.2; Evagrios, Praktikos, prol., ll. 47–51. See also chapters 66–67 and 81. 
486 Thal 56, ll. 37–43; Diff Ioan 20.3, ll. 4–10. 
487 153 Chapters on Prayer 52; PG 79.1177C. 
488 See Op 16, PG 91:193AB. 
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oft-quoted aphorism, “what is not assumed is not healed,” the will would likewise need to be assumed 
to be saved. 
Ultimately, Maximos found Monothelite arguments unconvincing due to their ontological 
equivocations. The core of his argument in his later Opuscules and the Disputation with Pyrrhos is that will 
does not belong to the level of person, but to the level of nature, which is instantiated in a hypostasis; 
that is, the will is a universal attribute of the human species, not a designation of hypostatic or personal 
particularity. Rather, the use of the will is that which first manifests the particular, the personal. And 
every human will is conditioned by the agent whose will it is; these agents, in turn, are limited, fallible, 
and do not possess absolute knowledge, for which reason they must deliberate about the good. The 
fact that humans must daily make decisions from within this context over time sediments certain 
behavioral patterns that further constrain or limit their range of imaginative possibilities. Humans, in 
brief, though universally endowed with a “natural will,” are also debilitated by the fallibility of their 
individual, self-conditioned finitude. The result is the gnomic will: a specific mode or manner of willing 
that is proper to humans only in their fallen state and that is characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, 
and is burdened by relatively settled patterns of behavior that constrain their possibilities to pursue 
virtue. We may say, then, that there are as many gnomic wills as there are human persons, as the 
gnomic will refers to the personal use of the natural will and the sedimented behavioral patterns that 
further condition its future alternatives. To be clear, then, the gnomic will is not a natural human 
faculty, but a quality or mode of use of the natural will itself that is inextricable from the limitations 
of human existence. Once understood in this sense, it is altogether predictable that the Confessor 
would deny that Christ had a gnomic will. In his opinion, Christ had a fully deified natural human will 
that according to its deified condition only ever willed in accordance with the divine will.489 
Scholars of the formation of Christian dogma have expressed dissatisfaction with Maximos’ denial 
of a gnomic will in Christ. Raymund Schwager, for instance, concluded that this denial amounts to a 
crippling flaw in the Confessor’s soteriology.490 Perhaps more positively, Basil Studer thinks Maximos 
intentionally left certain tensions that this teaching implied without a resolution.491 More recently, Paul 
Blowers has expressed what I consider the most insightful and frank concern about Maximos’ denial 
of the gnomic will in Christ. He admits that: “For years I have been perplexed as to why Maximus the 
Confessor, in his articulate christological [sic] formulations in the seventh century, ultimately decided 
that Jesus Christ, as fully human, had only a natural human will (θέλημα φυσική) [sic], and so forcefully 
ruled against the possibility that he also had a ‘gnomic’ (or ‘deliberative’) will (γνώμη) in the manner 
of fallen human beings. In the words of Maximus’ own beloved predecessor, Gregory Nazianzen, 
‘what is not assumed is not healed.’”492 By alluding to the Cappadocian here, he clearly implies that if 
Christ had no gnomic will, which is so characteristic of humanity, then he has not healed that aspect 
of human nature. This idea surfaces more definitively some pages later, where Blowers continues: 
 
But here is the rub—and I am certainly not the first to point it out. Does this reversal in his 
Christology, this denial of γνώμη in Christ, do justice to the drama of Gethsemane? If, as Maximus 
indicates, the Christ of the passion has, in volunteering himself to die, ‘used’ fear itself in a new 
mode (τρόπος), redeeming those ‘natural’ passions that are intrinsic to human beings and a part of 
their deep-seated inclinations and aversions, can he do so without himself experiencing the 
                                                 
489 See Op 3 and 7, especially. 
490 Schwager, Der wunderbare Tausch, 141–147. 
491 “Allerdings ist damit die letzte Antwort auf die Fragen, zu denen der Glaube von Chalzedon aus seiner inneren Dynamik 
heraus getrieben hatte, noch nicht gegeben worden.” Basil Studer, “Zur Soteriologie des Maximus,” in Heinzer and 
Schönborn, 246. 
492 Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus on Gnomic Will (γνώμη) in Christ,” 44. 
 130 
 
vacillation informed by the love of life and fear of death? And on a grander scale, can a Christ 
without γνώμη truly redeem the tragically individuated γνῶμαι of created beings and thus achieve 
the ‘gnomic’ reconciliation that Maximus earlier projects as a universal goal?493 
 
Blowers’ concern is, of course, well taken. It is important to note that he here refers to what has 
become a popular scholarly interpretation concerning Maximos’ later Christology in light of 
Monothelitism, that is, that he (implicitly) “retracted” his earlier belief that Christ had γνώμη 
(gnome/mindset) and προαίρεσις (proairesis/deliberate choice). This interpretation of Maximos’ later 
Christology is ubiquitous, so one can expect to encounter it in virtually any dogmatic scholarship that 
addresses his writings during this time frame. Blowers’ legitimate concern made him turn to the 
Damascene to determine whether he might provide a way forward, but concludes that he provides no 
real answer either.494 
It is possible that a coherent dogmatic reply has already been, preemptively, offered to Blowers’ 
legitimate concern. Demetrios Bathrellos’ excellent study of the Confessor’s articulations of Christ’s 
nature, person, and will in The Byzantine Christ offers, I believe, a satisfactory reply to this conundrum 
from a dogmatic perspective.495 The riposte would go something like this: In the subject of Christ, 
whose hypostasis is the Logos, the human will is active; it operates by virtue of its hypostasis, which 
is the Logos. The human nature of Christ, including his will, is fully deified; accordingly, it willingly 
and rationally surrenders its natural impulses (such as the avoidance of death due to fear, as expressed 
in Gethsemane) in the interest of the divine plan or will (βουλή) that is identically willed by the Logos. 
Thus, although there is a single object that is willed (θελητόν), it is willed by two wills, thereby 
expressing the non-contradictoriness of the divine and human wills of Christ. To have the same object 
of will does not in any way negate that two wills may will the same thing.496 Therefore, Christ’s natural 
human will is not illusory, but real. The fact that it consistently wills that which the divine wills does 
not negate Christ’s human will; in effect, it calls into question the normalization of the gnomic will. 
From this perspective, the goal of Christ’s Incarnation is not to show us what it does not mean to be 
human, but what it means to be human, and that, deified. Put differently, Christ does not need to 
assume a gnomic will because it is not a natural characteristic of the human species; its redemption, 
rather, lies in the voluntary choice of humans to conform their wills to that of Christ, and to the 
Father’s by extension. 
I would offer another, perhaps more philosophically-sensitive, reply that I have already partially 
suggested above. Maximos did not refuse to ascribe a gnomic will to Christ in his later Dyothelite 
writings solely for the reason that Christ assumed everything that is human save sin—to which the 
gnomic will is unavoidably interlinked, but because it is logically incoherent to say that Christ can 
assume a gnomic will. The gnomic will refers to a particularized and specific manner of willing that is 
attributed to the level of hypostasis. As such, there are as many gnomic wills as there are human 
hypostases (and we must be clear that Christ has/is no human hypostasis). The gnomic will is not, in 
Aristotelian terminology, a universal, but a particular instantiation or realization of a capacity that is 
universal. For that reason, it would not only be impossible, but non-salvific for Christ to assume a 
gnomic will, for which gnomic will would he assume? And in what way would that assumption be 
salvific, not only for everyone else’s gnomic wills which he did not assume, but for that individual? It 
would simply amount to Christ’s unnecessary and tragic replication of a flawed modality of using the 
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natural will that has inflected a person’s life with ambivalence and sedimented patterns of behavior 
that curb the pursuit of the good. Consequently, it is impossible for Christ to assume any gnomic will, 
because there is no such thing as a “universal” gnomic will for him to assume. 
And yet, for all their logical coherence and philological subtlety, these two answers still strike me 
as in part unsatisfactory and, for another part, as “dodging the bullet” of what truly lies at the heart of 
Blowers’ discomfort with Maximos’ resolution to deny the gnomic will of Christ.497 These are, 
nonetheless, the answers that may be produced from a dogmatic perspective and are perhaps the best 
replies that can be offered from within the presuppositions of this methodological framework. I 
believe there is another angle of approaching the matter, though it would be pretentious to call it a 
“fringe” or “minority” opinion, given that it has yet to be formulated and assessed by experts on these 
matters. 
My interpretation of the Confessor’s final decision to negate Christ’s gnome differs from dogmatic 
theologians in two crucial regards: first, I do not think Maximos retracted anything at all, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, by rejecting the idea that Christ had a gnomic will, gnome, or proairesis. To be 
clear, I see no radical break, no ninety-degree turn, no lack of logical continuity between Maximos’ 
earliest writings and his Dyothelite works on the matter of the will, including Christ’s will. I would 
argue, rather, that it was precisely the challenge of Monothelitism that compelled Maximos to crystalize 
and express a belief he had held all along and clear hints of which are readily apparent in his earliest 
works. Second, my interpretation of Maximos’ articulation of the will, either in Christ or humans more 
generally, approaches it from an untested angle, that of moral psychology and the Confessor’s ascetical 
context. Put differently, I believe that the dogmatic aspects of Maximos’ Dyothelite writings have been 
emphasized at the expense of the ascetical dimensions of those works despite this simple but 
inescapable truth: the Confessor was an ascetic writing to ascetics about how to be ascetics through 
the imitation of Christ. I will argue in what follows that from this angle, Maximos’ supposed 
“retraction” is in fact his boldest affirmation of teachings he had espoused from the very beginning 
of his writing career. As before, the rich and multi-layered Peripatetic—and, to a lesser and derivative 
but still relevant degree, Stoic—textures of Maximos’ psychology of the will must be covered in 
critical-summary form. 
 
4.2.1. Aristotelian and Stoic Backgrounds of Morality and Deliberate Choice (proairesis/προαίρεσις) 
In 1954, R. A. Gauthier published a landmark essay, “Saint Maxime le Confesseur et la psychologie 
de l’act humaine,” which traced significant parts of Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of the will to 
Maximos via the Damascene, elucidated the Confessor’s understanding of the will, and then evidenced 
how it helped constitute the Angelic Doctor’s own. In Gauthier’s assessment, Maximos’ explanation 
of the thelitic—or willing—faculty (θέλημα) could well be the most original aspect of his work.498 An 
especial strength of Gauthier’s study is his nuanced contextualization of the Confessor’s ideation of 
the will in light of the Aristotelian and Stoic analyses of action. Gauthier gives pride of place to the 
Stagirite himself, followed by Alexandros of Aphrodisias, Aspasios, Nemesios of Emesa, and 
Chrysippos.499 And while his contributions for his time were monumental and remain illuminating 
even today, they can be complemented through some major advances in the field of Aristotelian 
studies concerning the arc of decision-making, action, means, and ends in the Peripatetic ethical 
tradition. 
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Let us begin with Aristotle himself. The two most salient works concerning deliberate choice and 
the movement to enact what is chosen are On the Soul (book 3) and Nikomachean Ethics (books 3 and 
6). On the Soul 3 can be taken as a large-scale attack on what is now termed “Sokratic intellectualism” 
in the jargon of historians of philosophy and scholars of ancient philosophy. Sokratic intellectualism 
refers to an idea that Sokrates expressed in several of Plato’s dialogues, which goes as follows: if one 
knows the good, the result is that one does it. The Peripatetic disagreed. His objections, however, were 
not solely based on the rather clearly counterfactual nature of the claim (for instance, a physician who 
smokes acts contrary to the theoretical knowledge which that physician acquired in the course of the 
formal education imparted in medical school); his argument exposes a critical flaw in the rationale 
Sokrates gave: “And generally we see that the one who possesses the healing art (τὴν ἰατρικὴν) is not 
[continuously] healing (ἰᾶται), so that the primordial [reason/cause] (κυρίου) for acting in accordance 
with knowledge (κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην) is something else, but not knowledge.”500 Aristotle’s argument is 
clear. If knowledge is the reason for which one acts, then one would always be acting out that 
knowledge, rather than at certain times (or not at all). For that reason, he discounts knowledge as the 
primordial cause of action. 
The Stagirite offers a different account of choice than that which Plato attributed to Sokrates. 
According to Aristotle, there is a difference between the theoretical and the practical mind (νοῦς).501 
As far as choice and action are concerned, the practical mind is engaged. The practical mind, as he 
explains it, is not itself the faculty that moves, but it is the faculty that apprehends or perceives the 
object of desire and is thus an unavoidable constituent of the chain of action. For this reason, he 
claims that: “The mind is always correct,”502 for as long as the sensory organs of the body are working 
in proper order, the practical mind has a perception of the object of desire that is not subject to 
rightness or wrongness—it is simply there. By contrast, the faculty that causes movement itself is what 
he calls “appetency” (ὄρεξις), which is a form of desire (ἐπιθυμία) to pursue a certain object that 
appears in the practical mind of the appetent (ὁ ὀρεγόμενος). He adds, however, that the process is 
not always as consistent as this description might suggest. Rather, there can be a conflict of appetencies 
when reason (λόγος) and desire (ἐπιθυμία) have a different good in view.  He attributes this truncation 
of the human decision-making process to the temporally distended nature of sensate beings. For that 
reason, something that may appear like a good in the present (and for which desire has an appetency) 
may not be a good in the future (to which reason has an aversion, or, at any rate, it does not have an 
appetency for it). Consequently, one may through reason forego a present pleasure for the sake of a 
future good that reason projects beyond the present. 
Aristotle gives a fuller psychology of choice in the Nikomachean Ethics 3 that additionally takes 
formed dispositions into consideration. He situates his discussion in the context of voluntary actions 
for which one is praised or blamed. At the outset of this discussion he restates the findings of the 
previous book, which showed that virtue is concerned with emotions (πάθη) and actions (πράξεις), 
since virtues are those states that dispose one’s emotions in a certain way that translates to specific 
actions that are praised or blamed.503 Of these actions, some belong to what is voluntary (τὸ ἑκούσιον) 
and some to what is involuntary (ἀκούσιος), but it is only the former that are praised or blamed.504 
After defining a series of acts that are voluntary and involuntary, he concludes that those acts are 
voluntary the origin of which lies in the agent. Accordingly, even those acts that are produced by 
spiritedness or desire are voluntary, for, he reasons, it would be absurd to deny that the agent is the 
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same on the basis of the different causes (i.e., spiritedness, desire, or reason) of the agent’s actions.505 
Soon after he adds: “And it seems that the non-rational emotive faculties (τὰ ἄλογα πάθη) are not 
inferior to humanness (ἀνθρωπικὰ), so that the actions of the human also [derive] from spiritedness 
and desire. In effect, it is absurd to class these as involuntary.”506 
Having, then, classified what is voluntary and involuntary, he investigates what exactly deliberate 
choice (προαίρεσις) is; he determines that it belongs to the category of what is voluntary, but possesses 
a more restrictive sense.507 Therefore, he makes a distinction between the enkratic (continent) and the 
akratic (incontinent) person: the latter acts after having desired but not after having chosen, but the 
former acts after having deliberately chosen, but not (necessarily) after having desired.508 As a corollary 
conclusion, Aristotle determines that deliberate choice belongs to those things that are “up to us” (τὰ 
ἐφ’ ἡμῖν).509 He continues by noting that all choice is then voluntary, even if not all voluntary actions 
are choice.510 Choice is differentiated by the fact that it includes both a rationale (λόγος) and discursive 
engagement (διάνοια). He notes linguistically that it is for that reason that deliberate choice (προ-
αίρεσις/pro-airesis) is so termed, because something has been chosen (-aireo) before or instead of (pro-) 
something else.511 
Having defined all of the above, he goes on to consider the object of our deliberation and finds 
that we do not deliberate (βουλευόμεθα) about ends, but about means and only about those that are 
up to us (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) and that can be effected through our agency.512 Thus, per his examples, doctors 
do not deliberate about whether to heal a patient, but about how to do so, and rhetors do not deliberate 
about whether to convince the audience, but about how to go about it.513 So, he concludes by claiming 
that deliberate choice is: “a deliberate appetency (βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις) of that which is up to us.”514 This 
definition is followed by his most peculiar belief about decision and action: he does not intersplice a 
further moment in the deciding process between decision and action. One does not, in his formulation 
of psychodynamics, see something that is desired, choose that which is desired, and then do that which 
is desired. For him, the action is itself the choice. Nothing separates the two.515 The best example he 
gives to illustrate this idea is found later in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethics, where he draws a 
parallel between the valid conclusion of a syllogism and the human action/choice that follows from 
the deliberative process.516 The two are immediate logical corollaries mediated by nothing at all; that 
is, action and choice are immediate. 
In light of these findings, he proceeds to a rather lengthy afterword to deliberate choice that also 
functions as a preface to individual virtues. The purpose, it seems, is to show that virtues and vices, 
as well as good or bad character states, just are natural continuations of that which is voluntary. For 
that reason, he claims that “And if it is up to us to do good things and bad things, and likewise not to 
do [them], and this is [what it means] to be good or bad [persons], consequently being upright and 
wicked is up to us.”517 Here, I take it that by “upright” and “wicked” he means the long-term 
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sedimented character state of an agent. He offers a variety of examples in which persons are regularly 
punished because they committed a legal offense that was up to them to avoid. Curiously, however, 
Aristotle focuses especially on legal transgressions that are due to established character states of the 
agents, rather than those committed due to a so-called “crime of passion.” He reasons about offenders 
who violate the law due to ignorance or a moral defect of some sort “But they themselves are 
responsible (αἴτοι) for having become such a kind [of person], since they live carelessly, and for being 
unjust or undisciplined; some acting wickedly, others leading [their lives] in binge drinking (πότοις) 
and the like, for the activities make everyone such as they are. This is clear on [the example] of those 
who are training for whatever contest or performance: they spend [their time] practicing.”518 The point 
Aristotle is driving at is that virtues and vices must be classed as voluntary because the actions by 
which they are constituted are themselves individual voluntary actions that over time have a 
determining effect on the character state of an agent.519 He argues that the difficulty of dispositions, 
as opposed to actions where one can see their beginning and end, is that their formation is 
imperceptible, like the development of a disease. It is in this sense, then, that we say that the virtue or 
vice of a person is voluntarily chosen and not imposed, as it were, from without, its imperceptibility 
notwithstanding. In other words, the psychological state that one acquires, even if it limits and largely 
defines one’s possible courses of actions, is freely chosen and voluntary. To become virtuous or 
vicious, then, does not for Aristotle entail a rejection of the freedom of the agent; rather, the acquired 
virtuous or vicious character state is the collective evidence of past deliberate choices. 
Much of Aristotle’s account of choice has been critiqued, defended, and cautiously appropriated 
for the past two millennia, so that it would be impractical and indeed impossible to do justice to this 
immense range of opinions and hermeneutical traditions in this forum. For that reason, we will limit 
ourselves to that which is most immediately relevant for our understanding of Maximos himself. Two 
features demand special attention. The first is the ethically-inflected sense of “use” (χρῆσις); the second 
is the relationship between emotions and deliberate choice. 
Stoics have largely been credited with the invention of the category of factors that are good or bad 
based on the use one makes of them through one’s deliberate choice, but a closer inspection of the 
surviving evidence seems to contradict this widely-held opinion. The identification of a category of 
variables whose goodness or badness was directly linked to the use one makes of them belongs to 
Aristotle.520 Perhaps this idea has been overlooked because it only survives in fragments of the 
Peripatetic’s otherwise lost works, but that is no reason to credit the philosophical invention of this 
category to the Stoics, since our understanding of the Stoics stands to benefit by taking this factor into 
consideration. In a work preserved in fragmentary form by Alexandros of Aphrodisias that went by 
the name The Divisions, Aristotle in effect refers, in a larger discussion concerning eudaimonia, to a 
category of factors that are good or bad depending on use: “and the [category of] ‘potentials’ are those 
to which ‘using well and badly’ is proper” (δυνάμεις δὲ οἷς ἔνεστιν εὗ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι).521 The 
category of “potentials,” refers to things that are not intrinsically good or bad, but can be either 
depending on how they are employed. This idea is fully consistent with Aristotle’s logic in other works, 
such as the Nikomachean Ethics, where he likewise refers to actions that are inherently wrong and that 
do not, for that reason, fall within the considerations of the doctrine of the mean. He gives the example 
of adultery: one cannot adulterate with the right person at the right time and with the right 
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psychological disposition and expect the action to be virtuous, because adultery is by definition a 
negation of those variables that make actions virtuous.522 
A further examination of the reception of the Peripatetic corpus likewise reveals that Stoics, even 
though they frequently disagreed with Aristotelians about a number of things, were neither foreign to 
Aristotle’s ethics nor did they reject his ideas—including that of use—in their totality. Brad Inwood 
has already pointed out this connection in studying Seneca’s definitions of anger and comparing them 
to those that the Stagirite expressed in On the Soul. He writes concerning Seneca’s De ira: “Given the 
prominence of the preexisting debate between Stoics and Peripatetics on this issue [i.e., 
anger/ira/θυμός], it is only fitting and not at all surprising that at the beginning of the work, shortly 
after giving a Stoic definition of anger, Seneca adduces a version of Aristotle’s definition from the De 
Anima (1.3). Not only is this the only other definition credited to a specific school, but Seneca 
introduces it by saying ‘Aristotle’s definition is not far from ours.’”523 Specifically, the idea here is that 
Stoics, in line with Aristotle’s earlier definition, sought to employ the emotions in such a way that they 
could be made morally profitable. And Seneca himself, though otherwise less than generous to his 
contemporary Peripatetics,524 acknowledges the similarity of Stoic and Aristotelian teaching 
concerning the emotions. 
It is for that reason hardly surprising that in De ira 2.17.2 he writes: “‘Weak’ he says ‘is the soul that 
lacks anger.’ That is true, if it has nothing stronger than anger. It is advantageous to be neither thief 
nor prey, nor tenderhearted (misericordem) nor cruel (crudelem): this soul is far too soft, that soul far too 
hard; let the wise man be temperate and apply himself with strength, not anger, to deeds that must be 
done with resolve (et ad res fortius agendas).”525 Seneca here clearly echoes what in formula is Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the virtuous mean. What is significant is that Seneca has subsumed it to the Stoic doctrine 
of apatheia, such that he no longer speaks of “anger” (ira), but of “strength” (vis), this latter term, of 
course, understood with its Latin double entendre as “strength of character” or “virtue.” Inwood takes 
this passage as a rejection of so-called Aristotelian metriopatheia by claiming that “The mean, it turns 
out, is apatheia rather than metriopatheia.”526 This moment in Stoic-Peripatetic relations is significant, 
because it identifies Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean with the transformation of one’s dispositions to 
the emotions into virtuous character states that fundamentally alter the character or quality of the 
emotions themselves. This sense of apatheia furthers our understanding, partially outlined thus far 
when we handled Gregory and Evagrios, by suggesting that the alpha-privative in apatheia was not 
meant to negate psychological faculties—even for some Stoics, but qualities that are predicated of 
individuals by virtue of the character states they come to acquire. 
In this regard, Epiktetos (55–135 CE) offers another instance of a Stoic who was a rough 
contemporary of Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE) and who likewise applied Aristotle’s ethical insights to a 
Stoic teleology. Of especial importance was his use of the Aristotelian category of “that which is up 
to us” (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), which functions as the determining factor in the pursuit of the good Stoic life as 
he envisioned it. Indeed, the whole of Epiktetos’ Handbook gravitates toward the creation of a certain 
untroubled disposition that is cultivated by gaining a robust understanding of those things that are up 
to humans and those that are not. But the determination of that which is up to us goes beyond a 
simple descriptive category, since it is meant to result in a person’s detachment from externals (e.g., 
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one’s spouse, money, sickness) and to assess them as what they are in abstraction from their relational 
situatedness. For instance, he recommends: “When you are to kiss your child or your wife, [say to 
yourself] that ‘you are kissing a human’; for after it [i.e., the human] dies, you will not be disturbed.”527 
Epiktetos here transforms the application of Aristotle’s category of “what is up to us” and employs it 
in the formation of a distinctly Stoic worldview that operates under the widely-held Stoic assumption 
that only virtue is necessary for happiness. On this point, Stoics and Aristotelians disagreed, for the 
latter openly considered external goods constitutive of happiness. Against this background, we may 
see the logic behind Origen’s conclusion, as previously cited in chapter 3, that the Peripatetic ethic “is 
most suitably human (ἀνθρωπικώτατον) and more reasonably acknowledges (εὐγνωμόνως 
ὁμολογοῦντα) human good things than the remainder of the <non-Christian> ways of thought 
(αἱρέσεων).”528 
Aristotle promoted a different understanding of happiness that involved the training of the moral 
self to emote in a certain way, but not as Epiktetos articulated it here nor, despite their continuity of 
name and school, the way later Peripatetics expressed it through the term metriopatheia. The Stagirite 
never used the term metriopatheia, which appears for the first time with Krantor the Academic (4th c., 
BCE)529 and only acquired some minor currency around the first and second centuries of the Christian 
era.530 Thereafter it rapidly fizzled out and hardly enjoyed widespread use in extant Greek texts, where 
it counts about one hundred instances in the eighteen centuries that it was in use in pre-modern Greek 
times. By contrast, Aristotle employed the term apatheia a total of nine times. Two of these are 
especially relevant for us, given that they appear in his Nikomachean Ethics (1104b24) and Eudaimean 
Ethics (1222a13). 
In both instances, Aristotle’s concern is the same, that “everyone” defines the virtues as apatheia. 
Thus, he writes in the Eudaimean Ethics: “We say that we become wicked through pleasures and pains, 
by pursuing and fleeing them or as is improper or the ones that one ought not to [pursue or flee]. For 
this reason indeed, everyone readily defines the virtues as emotionlessness (ἀπάθειαν) and serenity 
concerning pleasures and pains and vices as the opposites.”531 What is peculiar about his revisiting of 
the theme in the Nikomachean Ethics is that he adds a significant qualification: “They become wicked 
on account of pleasures and pains, by pursuing and fleeing these, or the ones they ought not to, or 
when they ought not to, or in the manner that one ought not to, or in whatever other ways that logic 
defines the like. And for this reason, they define certain virtues as belonging to emotionlessness 
(ἀπαθείας) or to serenity (ἠρεμίας), but [they do] not [define them] well, because they speak without 
qualification and do not add ‘as one ought’ and ‘as one ought not to’ and ‘when,’ and the rest.”532 In 
both cases Aristotle seems to have encountered proponents of the idea that the virtues stem from 
apatheia. And what is significant here is that he does not reject the idea: in Eudaimean Ethics for all 
purposes he presents it as a logical conclusion of his presentation; in Nikomachean Ethics he merely 
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adds that if the virtues do in effect belong to apatheia, that it is necessary to add further qualifications 
to obtain a better definition. Neither case, however, demonstrates that Aristotle was averse to defining 
the virtues, in some sense, as related to apatheia. 
Apatheia became a contested term, particularly among the subsequent Peripatetic commentators on 
the Nikomachean Ethics or Aristotle’s philosophy more generally. For instance, Alexandros of 
Aphrodisias did not consider it possible to obtain a state of apatheia, only of metriopatheia, except 
perhaps for the divine—and this very assumption already points to a logical Christian conclusion.533 
For his part, the anonymous commentator on the Nikomachean Ethics (2nd–3rd c.) shows uncertainty 
about how one may be virtuous if one understands apatheia as elimination of the emotions from the 
soul.534 Mercken has assessed the anonymous commentator’s ideas: “The scholiast remarks on the 
strength of EN 1104b24-5 that the doctrine which defines virtue as apatheia is older than the Stoa, and 
notes Aristotle’s correction: virtue is not an unqualified apatheia, but a qualified one, that is, only in 
regard to faulty passions.” I am inclined to agree with these assessments, particularly that apatheia, as 
Aristotle understood it, referred to a virtuous constitution that diminished the motile effect of the 
blameworthy operations of the emotive faculties, but it was not, again, their unqualified negation or 
suppression. Thus, Mercken seems right to me in saying that he envisioned a qualified apatheia. 
Somewhat different than these two is Aspasios’ Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics, which elaborates 
at great length on how pleasure and pain are the most generic of emotions and that virtue does not 
entail their eradication, but disposing them to act in accordance with right reason. And based on that 
rationale, they are not considered contrary to reason but can even themselves be called reasonable by 
extension, as Aristotle had elsewhere stated.535 In this way, though they are non-rational movements 
of the soul, they can be habituated to act in accordance with right reason and to come to be known, 
by co-extensive predication, by the name of the virtuous dispositions associated with them.536 
The relative ambiguity toward the term among the non-Christian Peripatetics took a different turn 
in the hands of the Palaiologean commentator Eustratios of Nikaia, but his comments significantly 
illumine various ways of regarding apatheia among Christians from a distinctly Aristotle-centric 
perspective. For example, in his Commentary on book 1 of the Nikomachean Ethics, he identifies the goal 
of human existence, the reason for which one leads one’s life (παράγεται) in this present world (ἐν τῷ 
παρόντι κόσμῳ), as what the “wise men of old” (τοῖς πάλαι σοφοῖς) called eudaimonia. He curiously holds 
that in order to attain this state, one must first begin with a moderation of the emotions (metriopatheia) 
that ought to culminate in emotionlessness (apatheia), “which,” he adds “is called ‘blessedness’ 
(μακαριότης) among us [Christians].”537 Later, he equates apatheia with the practical goal of human life 
that leads to the “first good” (πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἀναφέρεται) and differentiates it from truth 
(ἀλήθεια) inasmuch as the latter is concerned with contemplative approximation to the divine.538 
Apatheia is, as he understood it, concerned with actions and he notes that the actions that come from 
virtuous character states (he seems to consider apatheia a character disposition to act in accord with 
virtue) are in effect the better or more useful of the two.539 
Eustratios’ parting thoughts on apatheia prove the most insightful as a Christian take on the term, 
since he is one of very few writers ever to consider apatheia in relation to deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) 
                                                 
533 Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, p. 239, ll. 4–8. 
534 Anonymous Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics, p. 127, ll. 5–20. 
535 See NE 1102b12–19. 
536 For Aspasios’ fuller discussion, see Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics, pp. 42, l. 26–45, l. 22. It bears mentioning 
that Aspasios never comments on the term apatheia itself, not, at any rate, in the surviving parts of his Commentary. He only 
once remarks on the apathes (the man incapable of feeling) and does so in an unflattering way. 
537 Eustratios of Nikaia, Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics, p. 4, ll. 25–32. 
538 Eustratios, Commentary, p. 7, ll. 25–29. 
539 Eustratios, Commentary, p. 53, ll. 30–32. 
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and as such offers an invaluable testament to the limited imaginative possibilities concerning the 
association of the two. In a longer passage concerning the virtue of prudence (φρόνησις), the Nikaian 
remarks on the formation of various virtuous dispositions, such as prudence and courage, where 
reason is yet made the “lord” (κύριον) and “master” (δεσπότην) of the non-rational emotions (τὰ πάθη 
. . . τῆς ἀλόγου) and, in a sense, subdues them or sets them aright (κατορθούμενα). What follows, 
however, is fascinating. Apatheia is different from these virtues, and indeed it is the “highest” (ἄριστόν) 
and “most prominent” (ἐξοχώτατον) of them all, inasmuch as it transcends the “flesh,” which “is yet 
bound (δεσμούμενον) to nature (τῇ φύσει) on account of deliberate choice (προαίρεσιν).”540 In this 
specific passage, Eustratios directly associates proairesis or deliberate choice with a constrained 
operation of the human will, which is “bound to the flesh.” In his calculation, apatheia enables the 
human to transcend the deliberative stage of human existence by going beyond the flesh and its 
desires. In other words, he likewise finds deliberate choice to be a problem inasmuch as it points to 
the margin for error in human calculation. While the impact on Eustratios of Maximos’ own 
philosophy of will could be explored further, it would take us too far afield and must be only flagged 
here as a down payment for a future project. But it should be enough to note the significance of such 
a construal of deliberate choice by one of the few Greek Christian commentators on Aristotle’s 
Nikomachean Ethics. 
 
4.2.2. Did Maximos’ Retract Christ’s Gnome and Proairesis? 
We are now in a position to consider more fully Maximos’ so-called retraction of a gnome (γνώμη) 
and deliberate choice or proairesis (προαίρεσις) in Christ.541 To be clear, before we begin, parallels can 
only be drawn between gnome and proairesis in Maximos’ earlier and later writings, since he coined the 
term gnomic will only in the course of the Monothelite controversy, so that he could hardly “retract” 
this idea in his later writings. In his first Opuscule Maximos defined gnome and proairesis, along with a 
number of other terms.542 For him, gnome indicates an appetitive and relatively settled disposition to 
choose that which a process of deliberation believes to be most conducive to an end. Here he 
replicates, nearly word for word, Aristotle’s position that we do not deliberate about ends but about 
means.543 The second term, proairesis, refers to the decision-making process by which one weighs 
different options and settles on the means that are most likely to attain an end.544 Maximos’ definition, 
again, is virtually identical to Aristotle’s: “They say that deliberate choice is a deliberate appetency of 
those things that are up to us to do” (Προαίρεσιν εἶναι φασιν ὄρεξιν βουλευτικὴν τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν 
πρακτῶν)545 and Aristotle defines deliberate choice as a “deliberate appetency of those things that are 
up to us” (καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν).546 The deliberative moment in 
deliberate choice poses a problem for Maximos. Bathrellos adds, more generally, that “To have gnōmē 
and proairesis means to be subject not only to ignorance but also to mutability, to the possibility of 
committing evil deeds, to passions and to actual sinfulness.”547 For this reason, Maximos predictably 
precludes the two terms from Christ.548 The question here is whether the Confessor in fact reverses 
his opinion or simply expresses one of its dimensions more precisely. 
                                                 
540 Eustratios, Commentary, p. 334, ll. 6–8. 
541 For further discussion of this controversy, see Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 148–174; Larchet, La divinisation, 338–346 
and 558–563. 
542 Op 1, PG 91:13B–16D. 
543 See Op 1, PG 91:16D. 
544 See Op 1, PG 91:17C; Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 149. 
545 Op 1, PH 91:16BC. 
546 NE 1113a11–12. Compare to Maximos, Op 1, PG 91.16C. 
547 Byzantine Christ, 149. 
548 Compare to Op 1 PG:9120A, 24B, 28D–29B in Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 149. 
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We must begin with the earliest writings where these terms come up. Bathrellos articulated the 
most recent systematic exposition of Christ’s will and deliberate choice.549 After having covered the 
stance Maximos “ultimately” adopted in the course of the Monothelite controversy, he notes: “But 
Maximus had not always thought in this way. In some of his works that pre-date the monothelite 
controversy, he seems to have taken a more positive stance vis-à-vis the gnōmē and proairesis. In fact, 
instances in which gnōmē and proairesis are considered as neutral terms or even have positive functions 
abound.”550 Bathrellos’ analysis of Maximos’ use of these two terms, gnome and proairesis, is certainly 
insightful inasmuch as he sets out to show that they “indicate particular acts of his [i.e., Christ’s] human 
willing.”551 But this is in part an unintentional smokescreen. Even in his later Monothelite writings, 
Maximos was not primarily concerned with “particular acts of Christ’s human willing,” except 
inasmuch as they could be misinterpreted as neo-Nestorianism if unqualified by the fact that Christ 
acted out the human and divine wills in a single hypostasis, that of the Logos. Rather, the psychological 
dimension of the problem was whether Christ had a will (θέλημα)—whatever attributes one may wish 
to ascribe to it—that could potentially oppose the divine will or, alternatively, that could will other 
than the good. From this perspective, I would argue that Maximos had the same concern before and 
during the Monothelite controversy. Bathrellos points to three texts that presumably indicate Christ’s 
particularized human willing which, given his setup of the question, may imply its association with a 
potentially flawed gnome and proairesis: Thalassios 61, 21, and Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer. 
Thalassios 61 considers the effects of the fall on the human species, with especial attention paid to 
the mind. Maximos plays on the sound between pleasure (ἡδονή/‘edone) and effort (ὁδύνη/‘odyne) to 
indicate how the mind’s distraction with and attention to the former immediately introduced the toils 
and efforts of this life for our ancestor, Adam. Christ, of course, functions as Adam’s antithesis and 
accordingly becomes subject to passibility in order to overturn its effects by teaching humans how to 
turn the mind away from sensory pleasures and to employ the natural intellectual desire of the mind 
(ἔφεσις νοῦ) in our longing for the cause of our being. In this regard, Bathrellos writes: “Maximus 
wrote that Christ accepted willingly (βουλήσει) that he should die.” He adds that the Confessor later 
defines will (βούλησις) “as a particularized will (ποιὰ θέλησις), and though he does not specify where, 
it is likely he has Opuscule 1—a Monothelite document—in mind, since Maximos does not define 
βούλησις in Thalassios 61.”552 
It is certainly possible that Maximos here may be indicating a “particularized will” in Christ, but 
the context is not concerned with that question, so that inserting a definition he gives of βούλησις 
over a decade later may cause us to overlook the text’s internal logic. But even if we do consider this 
definition, it strikes me as perhaps an over-translation to render the term ποιά as “particularized.” This 
translation is very good in conveying the sense that a personal—or particular—component lies behind 
it, but I believe the error is to attribute that particularity to Christ’s human will (which Maximos never 
explicitly does in this passage), rather than to Christ’s hypostasis, to which level all “particularized 
wills” belong to begin with. And this is clear from the term ποιά, which perhaps more precisely means 
“qualified.” In other words, the βούλησις that Maximos seems to have in mind here is one that is not 
abstract, but is applied to a specific person, and that person is the Logos. 
But that is not all. Maximos does not apply βούλησις equally to all of the agents he considers in 
Thalassios 61. In the next sentence he contrasts Christ’s βούλησις to condemn death in nature with the 
nature of human action to accept his grace: humans must act “in accordance with the will” (κατὰ 
                                                 
549 See Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 149–151. A discussion of this topic is also found in Larchet, La divinisation, 558–563, as 
well as in Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 214–218. 
550 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 149. 
551 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 150. 
552 Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 150. 
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θέλησιν) in “preserving” (φυλάξαντες) the commandments.553 The natural asymmetry of the agents 
here considered is clear enough, but is further corroborated by the fact that in the very same sentence 
(in fairness, Maximos’ sentences are very long) he attributes yet again the more unstable character of 
the human will to those who must preserve the commandments “gnomically” (γνωμικῶς). The term the 
Confessor uses here that I roughly translate as “gnomically” is unequivocal: it is simply the adverbial 
form derived from the term gnome (γνώμη) that he applies to humans who strive to preserve Christ’s 
commandments in their fallen state. It is, of course, significant that in this passage Maximos does not 
employ the same term for Christ, regardless of whether the application is to him as man or God. 
Rather, he disambiguates Christ’s unchanging character by noting that his Incarnation is not subject 
to τροπή or ἀλλοίωσις, that is, to any form of variability or alteration.554 
The following instance Bathrellos considers is found in Thalassios 21. He makes the case in this 
passage that “Christ moved voluntarily according to his will (κατὰ θέλησιν γνώμῃ).”555 Closer 
inspection of the passage shows that that is precisely the opposite of what Maximos says, as can be 
seen by reproducing the passage here below in parallel for easier comparison: 
 
Thalassios 21, CCSG 7, p. 129, ll. 40–56.  
Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ παθητῷ κατὰ τὸν Ἀδάμ, ὡς 
ἔφην, διὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αἱ πονηραὶ δυνάμεις ἔσχον 
τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀφανῶς ἐγκεκρυμμένας τῷ 
περιστατικῷ νόμῳ τῆς φύσεως, εἰκότως ἐν τῷ 
σωτῆρι θεῷ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ θεωροῦσαι κατὰ φύσιν διὰ 
τὴν σάρκα τὸ παθητὸν καὶ δοκοῦσαι πρὸς ἀνάγκης 
περιστατικῶς ὡς ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν κύριον 
κεκτῆσθαι τὸν νόμον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ κατὰ 
θέλησιν γνώμῃ κινούμενον, προσέβαλον . . . 
Therefore, since, because of sin, the wicked 
powers hiddenly held the energies concealed in 
the passible [part] that belongs to Adam, as I 
said, due to the contingent law of nature, it was 
appropriate that they see in the salvific God 
according to nature the passible [part] of Adam 
[that is passible] due to the flesh and that it 
appear to them that the Lord necessarily also was 
created contingently as a simple human, subject 
to the law of nature, but not being moved in the 
will (thelesis) by a [deliberating] mindset 
(gnome) . . . 
 
To be clear, there is no doubt that Thalassios long predates the Monothelite and even Monenergist 
controversies. And this passage is hardly proof that Maximos held the view that Christ’s will was 
moved by gnome; in effect, it appears to be the exact opposite, for the negative particle here applies to 
the relation that gnome has to thelesis: the will is not moved by gnome. What follows corroborates this 
interpretation. The Confessor argues that it was exactly through his non-hesitation and inaccessibility 
to the blameworthy passions and the temptations that follow from them that Christ “triumphs on our 
behalf and certainly not for himself” (ἡμῖν προδήλως ἀλλ’οὐχ ἑαυτῷ τὴν νίκην ποιούμενος) by 
“remaining inaccessible and untouchable to them [i.e., the passions/tempations]” (ἀπρόσιτος μείνας 
αὐταῖς καὶ ἀνέπαφος).556 This pre-Monothelite document indicates that Maximos, at least by the 
penning of Thalassios, already believed that Christ’s will was not subject to a deliberative moment by 
which he could err. 
Most indicative of this belief is his hendiadys—a rhetorical device employed to underline a central 
idea by repeating two similar terms—“inaccessible and untouchable” that points to the impossibility 
that Christ could, in the process of deliberation (which he denies he had by precluding a deliberating 
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mindset/gnome in his will/thelesis), go astray. And yet, for all this, Maximos is explicit about the fact 
that Christ assumes the passible element of human nature, that is, the non-rational faculty that we 
associate with emoting. According to the dramatization he recreates, the blameworthy passions and 
their temptations attempted to seize on the opportunity that presented itself when Christ became 
subject to the passible element of human nature, even if their hopes turned out to be unfounded. Put 
differently, Maximos has yet again not denied here the passible—or emotive, if one will—element of 
Christ’s nature; he emphatically asserts that Christ assumed all that belonged to the contingent (i.e., 
fallen) state of nature save sin. By this he is clear that Christ could suffer pain, thirst, and such non-
blameworthy affections; but he does not deliberate about the good or the means to accomplish it, 
since this position would impute ignorance or a conflict of wills to him. Considered from this 
perspective, he is not, in the end, inconsistent with his later Christological positions. 
Bathrellos points to a third passage which, as I interpret it, further indicates that Maximos had long 
held the view that Christ’s choices were not the result of deliberation that would be liable to error. 
The passage in question here comes from the Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, one of his earliest works. 
To be clear, the Confessor explicitly attributes a gnome to Christ in this passage and this has been taken 
as proof that he earlier held the belief that Christ deliberated. There is no denying that the ascetic 
thinker attributes a gnome to Christ, but this fact in itself is hardly remarkable and cannot on its own 
be pressed into the service of the “retraction thesis.” Years later, in the Monothelite-era Disputation 
with Pyrrhos, Maximos presents the fruit of his diligent study and reflection, over years, on the nature 
of gnome in the Scriptures and ecclesiastical authorities and he presents the unsettling conclusion that 
the term has twenty-eight different meanings in the Scriptures and Fathers.557 Bathrellos claims that 
Maximos “unwittingly and unnecessarily mentioned” this foregoing point,558 but I consider this 
assessment unfair and, frankly, incorrect, as a careful analysis of the passage in question shows. 
The text that immediately precedes this discussion of the twenty-eight senses of gnome attempts to 
define the elusive term. The conclusion is that it is not a substance, by which I take it the conversation 
partners mean an actually existing thing that is itself subject to predicates, which should be clear from 
the fact that Maximos foregoes attributing to gnome the initial predicates listed in Aristotle’s Categories. 
Therefore, Pyrrhos claims that the gnome, according to Cyril of Alexandria is a “manner of life” (τρόπος 
ζωῆς).559 Maximos partially accepts the definition, but expands it by interjecting in a highly telling way: 
“It bears mentioning that it is the manner of life in accordance with virtue or vice . . .” (‘Ο τρόπος τῆς 
κατ’ ἀρετὴν, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἤ κακίαν ζωῇς . . .).560 By inserting this caveat, he makes it clear that gnome is 
that mindset that is disposed to act in ways contrary to or according with nature. Accordingly, he 
defines it as “nothing other than a will [subject to] qualification” (ἡ γνώμη οὐδὲν ἕτερός ἐστιν, ἤ ποιὰ 
θέλησις).561 
Soon after they discuss whether the virtues are natural or acquired. In a nominal, but not 
substantial, departure from Aristotle,562 Maximos defines the virtues as natural, as we had seen in the 
previous chapter, but subsequently makes space for, if not their “acquisition,” the fomentation of that 
state that enables them to come forth. He explains that the reason they do not appear universally in 
all humans is because humans do not practice equally those things that belong to nature; it is for this 
reason that the ascetic discipline has been developed as a means to return the human to a natural state 
of being that is free from not only the blameworthy passions, but the equipoised ability of the 
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emotions to incline in opposing directions, by accomplishing which states, one is able to reflect the 
natural state of being. It is precisely in response to this claim that Pyrrhos asks (seemingly rhetorically) 
whether it is a blasphemy to impute a gnome to Christ, since he would, accordingly, be liable not just 
to deliberation, but to going astray. And the hypothetical error here is not just the possibility of going 
astray, but what it implies: a denial that Christ’s human will is perfectly deified and, accordingly, that 
it could will contrary things than the divine will. In Opuscule 16, another Monothelite-era document, 
Maximos had made it clear that the difference of substance (divine and human) does not necessarily 
express opposites: “if they [the wills are] different according to substance, [this] I too accept, but the 
rationale that says they are opposed is false.”563 It is therefore not necessary to oppose human and 
divine wills simply on account of their ontological differences. Rather, Maximos continues in the 
Disputation with Pyrrhos, it depends on the sense in which one understands gnome. Here, then, Maximos 
explains that he has found twenty-eight different senses of the term and that it is crucial to determine 
what the orthodox contingent means by denying that Christ has a gnome and why one should exercise 
this nuance in Christological discourse. Therefore, I do not think the Confessor’s answer is either 
“unwitting” or “unnecessary.” On the contrary, it reflects his philological sensitivity to the 
hermeneutical range of a contested term. 
In light of this discussion, we can now return to Maximos Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, where he 
does in fact attribute a gnome to Christ. The passage reads as follows: 
 
Having restored nature to itself, not only because, having become human, he [i.e., Christ] kept his 
gnome emotionless and untorn by [divine or human] partisanship in relation to nature—not even 
being shaken from its [i.e., gnome] absolute fixedness to accord with nature against those who 
crucified [him], but rather choosing the opposite instead of life, death on their behalf, as also his 
voluntary suffering demonstrates, [this suffering] being attained in the human-loving disposition 
of him who suffered, but also because he abolished enmity when he nailed the ownership title of sin to 
the cross, by reason of which nature indefatigably waged war against itself, and calling those from afar 
and near, that is, those under the law and those outside the law, and obliterating the wall of partition, he 
made manifest the law of the commandments in teachings, making the two into one new human, making peace and 
reconciling us through himself with the Father and to one another, keeping our gnome no longer in opposition 
to the principle of nature, but just as we are unchanging in respect to [our] nature, so also we are 
[to be] in respect to [our] gnome.564 
 
The most significant aspect of this passage is not that it attributes a gnome to Christ, but, explicitly, an 
“emotionless” gnome, that is, the gnome that reflects the state of apatheia after which ascetics strive. In 
other words, the gnome that Maximos here envisions is one that is not liable to those psychological or 
deliberative pitfalls that later became the contentious staples of the Monothelite controversy. Thus, a 
gnome qualified in this way is entirely different than that which concerned Maximos the most during 
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135–153. Compare with Eph 2:14–17. 
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the Monothelite era. Significant in this regard is that Maximos refers to Christ’s gnome as not only 
“emotionless” (ἀπαθῆ), but as astasiaston, certainly a curious word for this context. The main sense of 
this term is drawn from the political strife that results when warring factions want to accomplish 
different objectives. As such, it intrinsically refers to a division of opinions or wills. The term here, 
needless to say, refers to the opposite of this political strife on account of the alpha privative. It is 
almost certainly an over-translation to render the passage, as I have, as “untorn by [divine or human] 
partisanship in relation to nature,” because the “sides” are unclear here, given that they could refer to 
conflicting goods in Christ’s will or a conflict between his human and divine wills. Regardless, 
Maximos denies this option, so it really does not matter what the hypothetical factions are. In effect, 
the conclusion of this passage is striking, because it already points to the fact that our gnome is meant 
to follow the pattern Christ offers by making our own gnome unchanging, that is, as his, emotionless. 
We should also consider a relevant passage beyond those to which Bathrellos pointed that is found 
Maximos’ reply to the forty-second question in Thalassios. The question here concerned how Christ 
could have been made sin without knowing sin. Maximos takes this opportunity to make two claims that 
are significant for our present analysis. The first is the affirmation that humanity in the (virtually 
hypothetical) prelapsarian state was, in fact, emotionless by grace.565 The Confessor expands on this 
idea further. In articulating the means by which Christ healed human nature after the fall, specifically 
with regard to gnome and proiresis, he argues that Christ by nature became passible on our behalf and 
thus “became sin,” but, he adds, “not knowing gnomic sin on account of the unchangeability (διὰ τὴν 
ἀτερψίαν) of his proairesis.”566 True, Maximos here attributes proairesis to Christ, but not without 
qualification. As in the passage we analyzed above from the Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, where 
Maximos qualifies Christ’s gnome as “emotionless” (apathes), here also he qualifies his proairesis so as to 
show that it was not liable to that dangerous alterity that characterizes human fallibility. To claim, 
then, that Maximos “retracted” his earlier ascription of a gnome and proairesis to Christ is to overlook 
the unambiguous qualifications he had already added to both these terms across his earlier writings. 
In light of the four texts we have analyzed here, it becomes apparent that he did not, in effect, 
retract his position concerning the gnome in Christ. In some texts, as in Thalassios 21, he explicitly denies 
that Christ was moved in his will by gnome. By contrast, where he does refer to Christ’s gnome, as in the 
Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, he qualifies it in such a way that he reflects a continuity of concern that 
Christ’s will must not be changing, not, at any rate, in the sense that the emotions or non-rational part 
of his human soul can be liable to error. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of his moral 
psychology and especially by focusing on the threat that he believed the ambivalence of the emotions 
posed to humanity, it is clear that the Confessor did not retract his initial position with regard to the 
gnome or proairesis of Christ. Rather, from his earliest writings Maximos believed that Christ’s human 
will was not liable to the equivocal movements of non-virtuous human emotions. I would conclude, 
therefore, that it is at best imprecise to say that the Confessor “retracted” his earlier positions. We 
should also note in closing here, that this may not be surprising because the question of Christ’s 
immutable character had already come up before in the writings of several authors whom the ascetic 
intellectual knew well. In the wake of Origen’s famed passage in On First Principles that described the 
fall of minds on account of satiety—save one, who was Christ—the course was set for determining 
what it means that the immutable God became a human. Perhaps in this regard the most eventful 
discussion that took place was between Areios and Athanasios in the fourth century and the questions 
                                                 
565 Thal 42, ll. 7–9. 
566 Thal 42, ll. 23–24. 
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they posed there echoed in posterity.567 I would add that these concerns yet again reared their heads 
in Maximos’ writings, both in the earliest and in the latest. 
  
                                                 
567 This much can be appreciated from a seemingly real question Areios posed to the Nikaian faction: Καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει, 
ὥσπερ πάντες, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τρεπτός, τῷ δὲ ἰδίῳ αὐτεξουσίῳ, ἕως βούλεται, μένει καλός· ὅτε μέντοι 
θέλει, δύναται τρέπεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς τρεπτῆς ὢν φύσεως. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ’, φησί, ‘καὶ προγινώσκων ὁ 
θεὸς ἔσεσθαι καλὸν αὐτὸν προλαβὼν ταύτην αὐτῷ τὴν δόξαν δέδωκεν, ἣν ἂν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔσχε μετὰ ταῦτα’· 
ὥστε ἐξ ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὧν προέγνω ὁ θεός, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν νῦν γεγονέναι. Against the Arians, 1.5.8, PG 26:21C. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE DAY AFTER THE SABBATH: 
VIRTUE, ACTIVE PASSIVITY, AND DEIFICATION 
 
He who carries out the sixth day in accord with the Gospel, having 
already mortified the first motions of sin, through virtue reaches the state 
of emotionlessness, deserted by every vice; he keeps the Sabbath in the 
mind, even from the very simple impression of the passions. And he who 
has crossed the Jordan is transferred into the land of knowledge, wherein 
the mind, a temple mystically built by peace, becomes the abode of God 
in the Spirit. 
 
—Maximos the Confessor, Chapters on Theology 1.53 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter articulates virtue’s relation to what I will call the paradox of “active passivity” and 
deification. The concluding section of the previous chapter argued that Maximos had denied, 
throughout his career, a gnomic or proairetic element in Christ’s volitional faculties, which earned him 
considerable scholarly criticism. This chapter investigates a further dimension of this conclusion. 
Specifically, Maximos did not stop at denying a gnomic element in Christ, but promoted this condition 
as ideal for all humans. In effect, his entire eschatology and doctrine of deification is predicated 
precisely on his controversial assertion that the gnomic or proairetic will must ultimately be transcended. 
For instance, in Difficulty 7.11, he paints an “image” of the age to come by explicating 1 Corinthians 
15:28. His interpretation of what it means that “the Son subjects” those who are willing “to the 
Father,” which brings about the destruction of death, the “last enemy” is as follows: 
 
that which is up to us (τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), that is, self-determination (αὐτεξουσίου), (through which death 
made its entry among us) . . . will have voluntarily and wholly given way (ἐκχωρηθέντος) to God, 
rightly subjecting itself to [his] ruling by abstaining from willing anything else than what God wills, 
as the Savior himself says to the Father, typifying in himself our [future] condition: ‘Yet, not as I 
will, but as you [will].’ And after him the God-honored Paul, as if having already denied himself and 
being no longer cognizant of his own life, [says]: ‘And I live no longer; rather, Christ lives in me.’568 
 
The monastic intellectual anticipated a scandalized response to what seems to be the loss of human 
self-determination, long valued as an axiom of patristic ethics. He attempted to appease the reader by 
using Aristotle’s set phrase, common among the commentators: “Do not be disturbed (Μὴ ταραττέτω) 
at what is said.”569 The allegedly assuaging argument that follows concludes with the phrase that his 
                                                 
568 Diff 7.11, DOML 28, p. 88. 
569 See Cat 3a29. Compare to Didymos the Blind, Commentary on Ecclesiastes 7–8:8, 232, l. 26; Evagrios, Praktikos 46, 
Ammonios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, p. 46, l. 20n and p. 47, l. 9; Simplikios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 
CAG 8, p. 97, l. 4 and p. 147, l. 7, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics CAG 9, p. 141, l. 35; Ioannes Philoponos, Commentary 
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Monenergist detractors would later adduce as evidence for his earlier espousal of Monenergistic 
views:570 
 
For I am not saying that the destruction of self-determination takes place, but rather [that] a both 
firm and unwavering disposition that accords with nature [takes place], that is, a gnomic surrender, 
so that we may desire to receive being moved from the same [place] from which we have being, as 
when the image ascends to the archetype . . . and thereafter it [i.e., the image] is not in the condition 
nor has the ability to be moved elsewhere (καὶ ἄλλοθι φέρεσθαι μήτ’ ἐχούσης λοιπὸν μήτε δυναμένης); 
or, to speak more clearly and truly, it [the image] is not capable of willing [to be moved elsewhere], 
since it has received the divine energy, and better yet, it has become God by deification and delights 
all the more in the ecstasy from those [properties] that are and are thought to be its own by nature, 
on account of the grace of the Spirit that has overcome it; and it shows that God alone acts [when 
it is in this condition], with the result that through all there is one sole activity of God and of those 
worthy of God, or rather, of God alone, since—as befits his goodness—he wholly interpenetrates 
the worthy (μόνον ἔχουσαν ἐνεργοῦντα τὸν Θεὸν δείξασαν, ὥστε εἶναι μίαν καὶ μόνην διὰ πάντων 
ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀξίων Θεοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ μόνου Θεοῦ, ὡς ὅλον ὅλοις τοῖς ἀξίοις 
ἀγαθοπρεπῶς περιχωρήσαντος).571 
 
Maximos clearly thought this passage would reassure a disturbed reader. But on first glance, his 
elaboration of the will’s voluntary surrender makes things worse. Now self-determination is not only 
surrendered, but it is altogether robbed of any activity whatever; humans lose all agency through a 
radical inability to act and it is God, rather, who acts in them. And yet, Maximos signals in the first 
phrase his departure from the idea that self-determination is destroyed (“I am not saying that the 
destruction of self-determination takes place”) and employs a perplexingly positive tone throughout 
this passage to describe future events that apparently sideline human action completely (“one sole 
activity of God and of those worthy of God, or rather, of God alone”).572 
Thus, at least two tensions emerge. First, how can Maximos hold that human self-determination is 
not destroyed when humans have neither the condition nor the ability of willing? Second, it is not 
contextually clear how passivity and the surrender of the will are related to deification.573 Maximos 
only says that the image (here simply a circumlocution for a person) has become (γεγενημένης) God by 
deification, but does not spell out by whose agency, God’s or the human’s, nor does he express 
whether a relationship holds between the agency of the two. To address these tensions is to address 
the central conundrum of our investigation, raised in the introduction to chapter three. These tensions 
can only be discussed by building on several key findings from the previous chapters, by putting Christ 
and virtue at the center of this chapter, and, to be more specific, by articulating the relationship 
between virtue and deification made possible in Christ. Accordingly, I argue that human preservation 
of and perseverance in virtue are the conditions of and for deification, respectively. 
                                                 
on Aristotle’s Categories, CAG 13.1, p. 66, l. 18 and p. 69, l. 7; Olympiodoros, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories p. 70, l. 25n; 
Elias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, p. 174, l. 18. 
570 Maximos refers back to this phrase in the long citation from Opuscule 1, PG 91.33A–36A, reproduced in the 
introduction to chapter three. 
571 Difficulty 7.11. 
572 See Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of Perpetual Progress,” 158. 
573 See Larchet, La divinisation, 581, n. 215. See his references to Völker, Maximus Confessor, 480 and Sherwood, Earlier 
Ambigua, 145, especially n. 40. 
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1. Virtue, Part Two: Christ, the Substance of the Virtues 
 
The incidence of the term “virtue” (ἀρετή) in Maximos’ corpus is astounding. This term registers 
more instances than nearly any other, with the few and predictable exceptions of God (Θεός), logos 
(λόγος), nature (φύσις), and soul (ψυχή). For example, in the Questions and Answers to Thalassios, virtue 
appears 368 times, in the Difficulties to Ioannes 187 times, and it can be found over 100 times in both 
the Chapters on Theology and in the Questions and Doubts. That is, in just four works, Maximos uses the 
term “virtue” more than 700 times. By way of comparison, he employs the term more frequently than 
the terms Jesus, Christ, or their combination. This statistical comparison, however, hardly points to 
the Confessor’s subordination of Christology to aretology (an odd thing to suppose about a man who 
died due to his adamantine opposition to Imperial Christology). On the contrary, virtue and Jesus 
Christ are two sides of the same coin. 
In the Difficulties to Ioannes, the Confessor calls Jesus Christ the “ousia of the virtues,”574 which 
suggests the inseparability of Christ and virtue in his thought: 
 
For if the ousia of virtue in each person is not doubted to be the one Logos of God—since the ousia 
of all the virtues is our Lord Jesus Christ himself, as it is written: who by God became wisdom, justice, 
holiness, and redemption for us575 (he evidently has these things said about him absolutely, as being 
wisdom itself, justice, and holiness, and not as [said] about us qualifiedly, as in [saying] “a wise 
human” or “a just human”)—evidently every human participating in virtue according to a steady 
character state (ἕξιν παγίαν) undoubtedly is participating in God, [who is] the ousia of the virtues.576 
 
This passage needs several points of clarification. The opening lines follow an important three-fold 
progression consisting in (1) Logos of God, (2) Jesus Christ, (3) God. The ousia of virtue in each 
person is the (1) Logos of God; this is so because (2) Jesus Christ himself is the ousia of all the virtues, as 
Scripture says (“who . . . became wisdom, justice, etc.”); accordingly, those who participate in virtue 
participate in (3) God, who is the ousia of the virtues. Is this change of divine referents significant? It 
is clear that Maximos assumes the fluid identification of Logos of God, Jesus Christ, and God as the 
ousia of the virtues. Less clear is why he introduces the distinction of three divine referents at all.577 He 
does not explicitly make anything of the distinction—in effect, the second term, Jesus Christ, sounds 
like a parenthetical aside. 
Yet, this parenthetical aside is crucial. In the previous paragraph, Maximos denied that the Logos 
can be participated in, nor in fact be related to anything whatever: “. . . he is neither called, nor thought, 
nor is in his entirety anything else among recognizable things, since he is beyond substance 
(ὑπερούσιος), and he is not participated in at all by any being whatsoever.”578 In Chapters on Theology 1.7, 
Maximos likewise precludes any relationship between God and anything else: “God, however, 
incomprehensibly being infinitely above absolutely every relation, is evidently neither first principle, 
nor intermediate state, nor end, nor altogether anything else of those things in which the category of 
                                                 
574 See Difficulties 7.21. 
575 1 Cor 1:30. 
576 Difficulty 7.21. 
577 See Salés, “Divine Incarnation,” 168–169. 
578 . . . οὔτε λέγεται οὔτε νοεῖται οὔτε ἔστι τὸ σύνολόν τι τῶν ἄλλῳ συνεγνωσμένων, ὡς ὑπερούσιος, οὐδὲ ὑπό τινος 
οὐδαμῶς καθ’ ὁτιοῦν μετέχεται. Amb. 7.20; DOML 28, 100 (emphasis mine). 
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‘to something’579 can be envisioned as corresponding with the category of relation.”580 God, 
accordingly, is also imparticipable. In light of these caveats, the intercalation of Jesus Christ—the 
Incarnate Word of God—as the ousia of the virtues between two imparticipable divine referents (who 
are also the ousia of the virtues) is understandable.581 Maximos likely identified the cognitive dissonance 
in claiming in the previous paragraph that the Logos is imparticipable, and in stating, immediately 
after, that the virtue in each person is the Logos of God. What matters here is that Maximos includes 
Jesus Christ in the equation and attributes to him the same title, “ousia of the virtues.” 
The sequence Logos of God—Jesus Christ—God is illumined by Maximos’ well-known phrase in 
the next paragraph: “For the Logos of God, who is also God, wills always and in all things to 
accomplish the mystery of his embodiment.”582 Here again the Logos of God and God appear 
together, but so does the concept of embodiment or incarnation.583 The most likely explanation for 
why Maximos carries on with these distinctions is to underscore the central role that Jesus Christ plays 
in the drama of salvation and deification.584 In effect, structurally that is precisely where Maximos puts 
him in the longer citation above. The imparticipable Logos of God wills to be incarnate in all things; 
this becomes fact in the person of Jesus Christ through whom the Logos can be Incarnate in all things 
and, concomitantly, through whom all things can participate in God and be elevated to deification. 
The sequence of the divine referents, in other words, reflects the sequence of salvation and deification. 
We are still left with the question: what does it mean that Jesus Christ is the ousia of the virtues? 
The answer may not be self-evident. Perhaps the most intuitive interpretation of the phrase, “ousia of 
the virtues” is to interpret ousia as “essence,” understood as what Aristotle called τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι or, put 
differently, “what it means for x to be x.” This interpretation is not unlikely given Maximos’ further 
clarifications. First, he says that Jesus Christ is the virtues and they are not predicated of him in a 
qualified way as they are of other humans. That is, Jesus Christ is “wisdom itself” and “justice itself” 
and “holiness itself;” other humans are “wise,” “just,” and “holy.” Thus, it seems Maximos 
understands Jesus Christ as the essence in the sense of form (of the virtues) that is attributable to 
particulars, but none of which exhausts the absolute.585 Accordingly, this “essence” or “form” of virtue 
becomes instantiated in the virtuous.586 Second, the monastic intellectual claims that the virtuous 
“participate” in God. This phrase would again suggest that God is the form or essence of the virtues 
and that humans only have them by extension, that is, by participation. The same logic demands the 
conditionality of human virtue. Humans can be not virtuous. By contrast, what characterizes Jesus 
Christ, as we had seen in chapter four, is the unconditionality of his goodness and virtue through a 
                                                 
579 The fourth category of Aristotle. Cat 4, 1b27. 
580 Ἀρχὴ πᾶσα καὶ μεσότης καὶ τέλος, εἰς ἅπαν τὴν σχετικὴν δι᾿ ὅλου κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἤρνηται· Θεὸς δὲ, καθόλου 
πάσης σχέσεως ὑπάρχων ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ἀνώτερος, οὔτε ἀρχὴ, οὔτε μεσότης, οὔτε τέλος εἰκότως ἐστίν, οὐδέ τι τὸ 
σύνολον ἕτερον τῶν οἷς ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἡ τοῦ πρός τι δύναται κατηγορίαν. Th. Ec. 1.7. PG 90.1085. 
581 See Larchet, La divinisation, 96–97, 460, and 474; Salés, “Divine Incarnation,” 166–169. Compare to Dionysios, On the 
Divine Names, chapters 5–6. 
582 Βούλεται γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος καὶ Θεὸς τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐνσωματώσεως ἐνεργεῖσθαι τὸ μυστήριον. 
Amb. 7.22; DOML 28, 106. See also Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 73–78. 
583 Contrast with the stark examples Maximos offers in Difficulty 33.2. 
584 See Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, 205. 
585 It is certainly true that Maximos has taken over, in part, Gregory’s idea that God is absolute virtue. Gregory expresses 
this idea in his Life of Moses, GNO 7.1, p. 4, ll. 10–15. Compare to Sheldon-Williams, “The Greek Christian Platonist 
Tradition,” in Armstrong, 502–503 and Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of 
Perpetual Progress,” 151–171. 
586 See Salés, “Divine Incarnation,” 167–169. 
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thoroughly deified human will. Because Jesus Christ cannot be other than good on account of his 
deified will, he can be identified with the unconditional. 
This interpretation satisfactorily explains everything except what it means that Jesus Christ—a 
human—is the “essence” (understood as form) of anything other than himself. We may grant that 
“God” or even the “Logos of God” can be “instantiated” in the virtuous. We might even grant that 
“Christ,” in some highly qualified sense, can be “instantiated” in the virtuous, as martyrologies often 
describe. But how can one particular human, Jesus Christ, be “instantiated” in any other human? 
Regardless of this apparent paradox—or perhaps contradiction—Maximos does not equivocate on 
this point: he explicitly refers to “our Lord Jesus Christ” in the passage from Difficulty 7.22 we are 
considering. No other term could more expressly refer to the humanity of the Incarnate Logos of 
God, which was in everything save sin identical to humankind. The interpretation of ousia as “essence,” 
understood as form, though partly illustrative, conceals a different and more radical aspect of 
Maximos’ Christology. 
The express identification of God or of the Logos—let alone Jesus Christ—as the ousia of the 
virtues is unprecedented in Greek. We can hardly determine what the ascetic intellectual means by 
looking for a parallel expression in the writings of his predecessors. Gregory of Nyssa comes closest, 
when he refers, in the Life of Moses, to God as absolute virtue.587 It is not the same, however, to identify 
God and virtue and to call God (or any other divine referent) the ousia of the virtues. Only a few late 
ancient thinkers explore the relationship between ousia and virtue or the Platonic ideas and virtue and 
none of them is particularly illuminating for our discussion.588 The expression that God (or any divine 
person) is the substance of the virtues appears for the first time in Greek with Maximos. We are 
dealing, in brief, with a proposition that is peculiar to the Confessor. So, the question remains, how 
can a human be the ousia of the virtues? And what does ousia mean in this context if the explanation I 
have offered above is unsatisfactory? 
In elucidating the Christology of Leontios of Jerusalem and Leontios of Byzantium,589 Maximos 
foregrounded his axiom that Jesus Christ’s human nature was enhypostatized in the Logos and 
accordingly encompassed the totality of human nature. Larchet has elucidated the implications of this 
Christological position: “Once enhypostatized, [Jesus’] human nature receives hypostatic 
particularities, but it receives them from the divine hypostasis, that which particularizes it, that is to 
say, distinguishes and differentiates it, but does not individualize it. The fact that the human nature of 
Christ does not have a human hypostasis but exists enhypostatized in the divine hypostasis of the 
                                                 
587 Life of Moses, GNO 7.1, p. 4, ll. 10–15. 
588 (Pseudo-)Alexandros of Aphrodisias refers to the virtues as the telos of substance (understood as an individual) in his 
(spurious?) Problems of Ethics, p. 131, ll. 15–17. Elsewhere he denies that the virtues are ousiai (Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, p. 88, l. 14), on which see also Syrianos’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 183, ll. 31–34. Later in the 
same work Alexandros argues against the ideas or forms in relation to the virtues as ousiai (p. 823, ll. 4–8). The closest 
any author, to my knowledge, comes to discussing the “ousia of virtue” is Iamblichos, in the Protreptikos, p. 8, ll. 10–14 
and Hierokles in the Commentary on the Golden Pythagorean Verses, 21.4, ll. 6–8. Syrianos (Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
p. 114, ll. 4–5) and Damaskios (Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides p. 122, ll. 27–28) both discuss how virtue perfects a 
substance, but here they both have in mind particular individuals in the Aristotelian sense of ousia and are not concerned 
with defining what the “essence” of virtue is. The closest, perhaps, that anyone comes to a similar identification around 
Maximos’ time is Ioannes of Skythopolis in his scholia on Dionysios’ works, where he writes that God is the ousia of the 
good (scholion to the Divine Names 144.1, l. 10). 
589 See especially Leontios of Byzantium, Nest. et Eutych. PG 86.1280 and Adv. arg. Sev. PG 86.1945) and Leontios of 
Jerusalem Adv. Nest. 1.11; PG 86.1445 and 2.1; PG 86.1532. 
 150 
 
Word, allows him to include in a certain way in itself all individuals encompassed by human nature.”590 
What Larchet points to here is that Jesus Christ is not a composite of two hypostases, a divine and 
human hypostasis, but rather that the single hypostasis of Jesus Christ is the Logos of God, who has 
assumed all of human nature. The position Maximos espouses here is not simply that long 
encapsulated by Gregory of Nazianzos’ oft-quoted aphorism in the Letter to Kledonios, “what is not 
assumed is not healed;” rather, Maximos takes this theological tenet to its logical conclusion and sees 
in Christ’s assumption of the totality of human nature his assumption of the nature of each and every 
individual of the species. The Confessor doubtless means precisely this, since he uses himself as an 
example: “He [the Logos] assumed me whole (ὅλον) with what is mine.”591 
So, we return to the question at hand, what does it mean that Jesus Christ is the ousia of the virtues? 
In chapter three we had studied the conceptual richness of the term ousia in Aristotle and Maximos 
and we can extend those findings to our present discussion. One would be pressed to articulate a 
different interpretation of ousia in the case of the Logos and God that does not just mean “essence” 
in the Aristotelian sense of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. But the case of Jesus Christ cannot have this restrictive sense, 
even if it is one of its senses. So, I would argue that ousia in the case of Jesus Christ also refers to his 
psychosomatic substrate. That is, Jesus Christ is the psychosomatic being, the body-soul entity, of 
virtue in an absolute, but embodied, sense. This much is clear in that both the Logos of God and God 
are the ousia of the virtues by derivation because Jesus Christ is the ousia of the virtues. That is the logical 
sequence in Difficulty 7.21, quoted above: the ousia of virtue in each person is the Logos of God because 
“our Lord Jesus Christ himself” is the ousia of the virtues; therefore, anyone who participates (first) in 
virtue (which is only possible through the psychosomatic complex that constitutes the human species) 
through a steady character state participates (second) in God.592 Virtue must occur in a human 
substratum, given that it is a particular form of psychosomatic self-configuration. And this is why 
Jesus Christ must come first in the equation, the Logos and God second. 
Jesus Christ is thus the ontological and ethical vinculum that in himself unifies humanity and 
divinity. Because he did not assume a human hypostasis but human nature whole, he is the substance 
or substrate (ousia) of the virtues in each human nature.593 That is, the virtuous just are Christ in 
substance or substrate, if not in hypostasis. We already saw that virtue is attributed to humans in a 
qualified way and to Jesus Christ in an absolute way. Ironically, the predicates of absolute virtue do 
not result from his divinity, but from his assumption of the whole human nature. In other words, 
because Jesus Christ has no human hypostasis, human nature as assumed and deified in himself 
extends to all humankind and is not individuated by a human hypostasis. The Logos of God, in turn, 
can take flesh in all of humanity on condition of virtue through his hypostatic union to human nature 
in the person of Jesus Christ. In this way the Logos of God is incarnated in the virtuous without 
violating either nature or hypostasis.594 
                                                 
590 “Une fois enhypostasiée la nature humaine reçoit des particularités hypostatiques, mais elle les reçoit de l’hypostase 
divine, ce qui la particularise, c’est-à-dire la distingue et la différencie mais ne l’individualise pas. Le fait que la nature 
humaine du Christ n’a pas d’hypostase humaine mais existe enhypostasiée dans l’hypostase divine du Verbe lui permet 
d’inclure d’une certaine façon en elle-même tous les individus qu’englobe la nature humaine.” Larchet, La divinisation, 371. 
591 ὅλον με προσλαβὼν μετὰ τῶν ἐμῶν. Op. 9; PG 91.128. 
592 See Salés, “Divine Incarnation,” 168–169. 
593 For further instances where Maximos refers to Christ’s assumption of human nature in general see, Op. 3, PG 91.48B, 
4, PG 91.61B, 7, PG 91.81CD, 8, PG 91.105C, 16, PG 91.189C, 20, PG 91.237A; Thal 61, CCSG 22, p. 91, ll. 106–108; 
Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, 30, SC 250, p. 248, etc. 
594 See Difficulty 5.24, 31.7, 42.26, and 63.2. 
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This interpretation of Maximos may be striking, but there is much in his corpus to support it. 
Throughout his works the Confessor reiterates the idea that God or the Logos of God takes body, 
form, or flesh in the virtuous.595 And it should not be otherwise, for human restoration should be an 
operation as if “from within”596 by virtue of which nature remains inviolate. For example, in the 
Chapters on Theology, the ascetic intellectual explains: “In Christ, since he is God and the Logos of the 
Father, the whole fullness of divinity dwells in bodily form by ousia;597 in us, however, the fullness of divinity 
dwells by grace whenever we gather all virtue . . . in ourselves.”598 Here Maximos again invokes Christ, 
God, and the Logos in the same breath that he does ousia, and unsurprisingly attributes the fact that 
“the fullness of divinity dwells” in us through grace to the virtues. The Confessor draws a direct link 
between Christ and the virtuous human, in both of whom the fullness of divinity dwells in bodily form. 
As before, the virtues form the bond that unites Christ and human. 
Later in the same work, Maximos makes this bond explicit: “In the man engaged in the practical 
life, the Logos, being thickened by the ways of life of the virtues, becomes flesh.”599 The corporeality 
that virtues confer upon the Logos in a human subject is again noteworthy.600 Elsewhere, in the 
Questions and Doubts, Maximos offers an extended allegorical interpretation of the Logos’ body parts 
and makes this fascinating connection: “So, the body of the Logos is the substance (ousia) of the 
virtues, such as goodness, meekness, and the like.”601 What is peculiar about this passage is the 
corporeality of the virtues; virtues, in other words, do not exist ad abstractum, but must always and in 
particular ways be instantiated in human hypostases. This idea is not inconsistent with the rest of 
Maximos’ theology, since we had already seen that the Logos of God wills to be embodied always and 
in all things. By his assumption of human nature whole, the Logos can be embodied in each 
instantiation of that nature. In other words, God becomes the flesh of every human whose nature is 
receptive to the divine by means of the virtues.602 In such cases, Jesus Christ becomes the substance 
of the virtues as the substrate wherein they reside and are manifested in bodily form.603 All of human 
nature is the body and soul of the Incarnate Logos of God, but not every hypostasis is necessarily 
Christified, since Christification hinges on the human voluntary self-configuration on the divine 
pattern of Jesus Christ.604  
 
2. The Paradox of Active Passivity and the Identity of Divine-Human Action 
 
In the introduction to this chapter we noted that Maximos, despite his protestations to the contrary, 
seemed to eliminate human activity, even the volitional faculties, in deification. To address this 
difficulty, we must return to the same passage where the Confessor called the Logos, Jesus Christ, and 
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602 Compare to Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 190–191. 
603 Compare to Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 215–216. 
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God the substance of the virtues. Following the threefold progression that we examined, Maximos 
describes what happens to him who participates in God through a steady character state: 
 
. . . he has sincerely and by deliberate choice cultivated the natural seed of the good and has shown 
the end to be identical to the beginning and the beginning to the end, and better yet, that beginning 
and end are identical, since he has become a genuine advocate of God (given that the goal of each 
thing is believed to be its beginning and end—the former as that wherefrom he has received being 
and participation in the good, and the latter as conforming to it [i.e., beginning]); by gnome and by 
deliberate choice he has completed through diligence the praiseworthy course that undeviatingly 
leads to it [i.e., beginning]; accordingly, he becomes God, receiving from God to be God, because 
to the beauty that belongs to the image by nature he, by deliberate choice, has added the likeness by 
means of the virtues through both the natural ascent and affinity to his own beginning.605 
 
Maximos includes gnome and deliberate choice as intrinsic to the “praiseworthy course” that leads to 
God by cultivating the “natural seed of the good.” This last phrase is similar to the Confessor’s 
assertion in the Disputation with Pyrrhos that virtue is natural to humans and can be revealed through 
ascetic practice.606 And here, as in Pyrrhos, the risk recurs that deification (if the virtues are deifying) 
may result from human effort. Maximos does little to discourage this interpretation. He expressly says 
that humans are able through gnome and deliberate choice to complete the praiseworthy course that 
leads to God. But he does not quite articulate the relationship between gnome and deliberate choice 
and the subsequent step, “becoming God.” The lack of clarity may be attributed to the words that 
follow, καθ’ ὅν, which I have idiomatically rendered as “accordingly” to reflect their ambiguous 
character. 
There are two possible interpretations of this ambiguity and neither discourages misreading 
Maximos as claiming that deification results from human action. First, καθ’ ὅν might refer to the only 
likely grammatical antecedent, δρόμον (course). This interpretation is supported by the translations 
that both Robert Louis Wilken and Fr. Maximos Constas provide of the passage. Wilken renders it 
“And through this course one becomes God”607 and Fr. Maximos “Having completed his course, such 
a person becomes God.”608 If so, the Confessor could be interpreted as saying that when the human 
completes the course, the human becomes God as a result of completing the course, which is manifestly 
the consequence of human effort. On this reading, it is simply unclear where human action ends and 
divine action begins or which action is responsible for what—this uncertainty is rooted in the verb, 
γίγνομαι, which needs to specify no active agent, only the subject of transformation. Thus, is 
deification just completion of the course? That is, is deification obtained when the course is complete, 
like a trophy for running well? Or is deification a natural potential attainable by human effort? 
Undoubtedly, Maximos would disagree with either proposition. 
The second alternative is both grammatically unlikely, and theologically hardly any better than the 
first. On this count, καθ’ ὅν, where ὅν is taken as a neuter (rather than masculine) relative pronoun, 
could refer to the entire preceding phrase as its antecedent, as if saying, “in accordance with everything 
that we have said above.” Grammatically, this would be unusual. And conceptually, it hardly relaxes 
                                                 
605 Diff 7.21. 
606 See Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 121–122 and 217; Larchet, La divinisation, 382. 
607 Wilken and Blowers, Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, 59. 
608 Constas, Difficulties, DOML 28, 105. 
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the tension, since the basic drift of the preceding phrase is virtually the same as in the first 
interpretation: by gnome and deliberate choice one completes the praiseworthy course that leads to the 
beginning, that is, to God. Here, again, the lines between human and divine agency with regard to 
deification are blurred. My take on this passage is that Maximos did not anticipate that someone would 
misunderstand his argument, because proposing that divinity can be attained through the realization 
of one’s natural potentialities would be incoherent. For this reason, he says with detectable irritation 
as he boards the topic in Opuscule 1 (about fifteen years later) that in this passage “the sense (λόγος) is 
clear.”609 And yet, his realization that the words in question lent themselves to this unplanned 
ambiguity can be detected as he incisively and repeatedly iterates that deification is neither the result 
of the natural realization of a human potentiality nor the reward for good deeds, as we saw in chapter 
three. In this sense, Opuscule 1 reiterates the same argument that he had already expressed in Difficulty 
20.2–3. 
The clue to explicating this passage lies in Maximos’ following addition, that humans “receive from 
God to be God.” This verb can signify two different forms of agency. Transactions that involve 
“receiving” usually involve an active giver and a passive recipient. Here, naturally, God is the active 
agent who bestows deification, humans the passive subjects who receive it.610 Nevertheless, I would 
argue that God’s conferral of deification does not minimize or eliminate the significance of human 
involvement. It is one thing to claim that humans deserve deification or that they actualize deification as 
a natural potentiality of their substance and another that humans must prepare to receive deification. 
Maximos hints at human involvement in the deified state in Difficulty 7.11 and 7.21, cited above, by 
referring to the role that deliberate choice plays. While he writes that the activity belongs to God and 
to those worthy of God, or rather, only to God, this last addition does not, as I will show, minimize 
the relevance of human action for attaining deification.611 As he considers the case of Paul, Maximos 
underscores the apostle’s transcendence of all cognitive activity and his attainment to a steady spiritual 
state that was followed by his passive experiencing of the “assumption” to the third heaven.  
Larchet has eased the foregoing tension by articulating the two-sided dimension of deification that 
consists in the Logos of God willing always and in all things to accomplish the mystery of his 
embodiment but doing so only in the worthy.612 According to him, there is no contradiction in 
Maximos’ belief that God will be, in Paul’s words, “all in all” but also that he only takes a body in the 
worthy, because God’s presence in the unworthy does not mean his energy is active in them. Rather, 
he attributes this dissonance to the difference implicit in nature being deified totaliter, and the individual 
hypostasis that instantiates nature rejecting the operative capacity that its nature, deified in Christ, 
offers it as a possibility. 
Therefore, being the recipient of deification does not entirely cancel out the necessity of human 
action. Being “worthy of God” presupposes a preformed capacity to undergo deification. This 
preformed capacity originates in the free exercise of the human volitional faculties. Maximos makes 
this much clear in Difficulty 7.11 and 7.21, where he explicitly identifies self-determination, gnome, 
and/or deliberate choice as the psychological faculties by which humans configure themselves to 
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receive deification.613 Concurrently, this means that God does not deify humans against their wills. 
Rather, the degree to which one is deified is contingent upon one’s virtuous and self-configured 
receptivity to the divine energy. Maximos suggests these degrees again in his exegesis of Paul’s rapture 
to heaven in Difficulty 20, as well as the psychological dispositions at play.614 And yet, we should be 
clear that being virtuous is not identical to deification, nor does virtue realize a natural potential by 
which one becomes divine; rather, virtue configures the self in such a way as to be receptive to 
deification, as Paul was according to Maximos. We might say that virtue is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for deification. The sufficient condition is the Logos’ gracious self-giving in the Incarnation 
and subsequent embodiment in the virtuous who can receive him.615 
These findings lead us to consider the paradox of passive activity. From the foregoing it is clear 
that humans play a role in deification, even if it is not active understood as an operation of the self on 
the self that results in deification. Rather, humans are passive in the sense that they receive deification; 
they do not deify themselves, nor do they naturally realize deification as a potentiality of their 
substance.616 But humans are active inasmuch as they are responsible for the virtuous self-
configuration through which they can undergo deification. In this light, it is clear what Maximos means 
in claiming that virtues are natural in the Disputation with Pyrrhos.617 Humans have the natural capacity, 
not for deification, but for reaching the state, by according to nature through virtue, in which they can 
undergo deification. Even though this state is not an action, but rather a condition or character state 
(ἕξις) that renders the human receptive to deification, that does not mean it is not voluntary nor that 
the human is not actively responsible for it. 
At this stage, we must recollect Aristotle’s argument, overviewed in the previous chapter, that 
persons are responsible not only for their actions, but for the voluntary character states from which 
their actions originate and which their actions themselves create. Let us look at Aristotle’s argument 
again. First, he writes that “And if it is up to us to do good things and bad things, and likewise not to 
do [them], and this is [what it means] to be good or bad [persons], consequently being upright and 
wicked is up to us.”618 He offers the example of those who commit legal offenses on the basis of their 
character states and argues that: “But they themselves are responsible (αἴτοι) for having become such 
a kind [of person], since they live carelessly, and for being unjust or undisciplined; some acting 
wickedly, others leading [their lives] in binge drinking (πότοις) and the like, for the activities make 
everyone such as they are. This is clear on [the example] of those who are training for whatever contest 
or performance: they spend [their time] practicing.”619 Aristotle’s point is that the voluntary does not 
refer solely to individual actions, but, because actions are voluntary and the repetition of voluntary 
actions forms character states, that character states are themselves voluntary by extension. 
Maximos assumes a similar version of Aristotle’s notion of the voluntary. Even if deification is not 
a human activity, undergoing deification still implies human voluntary consent, since deification 
operates through the human character states that are developed by the exercise of the volitional 
faculties. The ascetic intellectual clarifies this idea in Difficulty 7.26–27. Here he is speaking about three 
                                                 
613 Compare to Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 159–165. 
614 See Difficulty 20.2–4. See also Larchet, La divinisation, 480 and 583. 
615 See Blower’s fascinating exposition of this theme in relation to Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of the gift. 
Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 257–258. 
616 See Op. 1, 91.33A–36A and Difficulty 20.2–4. 
617 See Pyrrhos, PG 91.309B. Compare with Tollefsen’s commentary in Christocentric Cosmology, 121–122. 
618 Nikomachean Ethics 1113b12–14. 
619 Nik Eth 1114a4–10. 
 155 
 
modes of understanding deification: as pleasure, passivity (or susceptibility), and joy. We will focus on 
the second. Concerning passivity, Maximos writes: “And [it is called] passivity (πεῖσειν), since it is an 
ecstatic power (ἐκστατικὴν δύναμιν) that makes the passive active (πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ πάσχον 
ἄγουσαν).”620 Fr. Maximos Constas has already identified the Aristotelian subtext of this passage in his 
edition, pointing to On the Soul 425b–426a, where the Peripatetic discusses the various sensory 
capacities of the soul and the ways in which these become active through external factors. 
This particular formulation of active passivity—though Aristotle only considered it from a bio-
psychological perspective—attracted the attention of a number of late Platonists and of Dionysios the 
Areopagite. For these thinkers, the soul could acquire a certain form of suitability or fitness 
(ἐπιτηδειότης) that enabled it to receive the divine,621 whereas for Dionysios, it commonly referred to 
an ability to participate in existence in a way appropriate to each being.622 Maximos continued this 
tradition by paradoxically attributing an active role to the passive. For this reason, he finds a logical 
(though not ontological) line of continuity between human action (of self-configuration that disposes 
the self to receive the divine) and divine action (that confers deification upon those capable of 
receiving it), without confusing the two activities.623 Immediately following, in 7.27, he adduces as an 
example the familiar image of iron in the forge. According to this metaphor, the fire makes the iron 
“active.” The iron does not by nature burn, but by proximity to the flame (i.e., through a virtuous 
character state) it exercises the same activity as the fire, even if it is, in another sense, the passive 
recipient of the heat that it is capable of receiving. Accordingly, when humans undergo deification, 
they play a part in it inasmuch as they are the voluntarily self-constituted subject wherein deification 
takes place in and through their virtuous character states.624 And through deification they are elevated 
to the status of an active agent, where their activity is identical to God’s, just as fire and red-hot iron 
are identical in the action of burning. 
For Maximos, the divine-human identity of action was more than metaphorical. We have now laid 
the ontological and Christological foundations for the possibility of identity of divine-human action, 
but should explore further the embodied dynamics that Maximos envisions as constituting this 
dialectic. A telling passage can be found in his Chapters on Theology 1.57, which reads: “Knowing the 
sixth day to be the symbol of the accomplishment of the practical life, let us fulfill every requirement 
of the deeds of virtue in it in such a way that the passage ‘and God saw as many things as he did, and 
look, they were very good’ might also be said of us.” In this highly allegorical passage, Maximos 
explicitly identifies, through a citation from the opening creation sequence in Genesis 1, the action of 
God and the virtuous actions of humans. When humans act in accordance with virtue, their action is 
identical to the divine action. 
In Difficulty 8.4, Maximos applies this idea to the inequality that exists in the world. God does not 
intervene in the world to change inequality, Maximos tells us, not because he is reticent—he wills 
always and in all things to be embodied—but because humans fail to embody the divine in themselves 
through virtue. Elsewhere, in Questions and Answers to Thalassios, Maximos boards a similar idea when 
prompted to interpret John 5:17: “My Father until now is working and I am working.” God has not 
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only brought the world into existence, according to the Confessor, but is also seeking to gather back 
together all things in himself by overcoming gnomic difference (γνωμικήν διαφοράν).625 When gnomic 
difference is overcome, the grace that can deify all things is made manifest and “through it God 
becomes a human (δι’ ἥν γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος ὁ Θεὸς).”626 It is especially important to highlight in this 
passage that the Confessor attributes the operating grace to the divine in the human. Thus, in both of 
these instances we see that for Maximos the identity of divine and human action in deification is not 
simply an anticipated eschatological factum, but an existential dimension of this life. This brings us to 
our final question. 
 
3. Evermoving Rest: An Eschatological Reflection of Virtue? 
 
What relationship is there between this world and the next, between virtue in this life and the 
human condition in the next? Some insinuations to this question can be found in Questions and Answers 
to Thalassios 22. This question receives a relatively brief response that elucidates 1 Cor 10:11 by asking 
“If in the upcoming ages God will show us his wealth, how is it that we have encountered the end of 
the ages?” Maximos’ strategy is to divide the “ages” in two: the first age leads to the incarnation of 
God, the second to human deification. These two ages, as Maximos exposits them, evidence spatio-
temporal aspects and are related to history, but history and the ages are not entirely coextensive.627 
The two ages also refer to a singular movement of divine condescension and human deification that 
crisscrosses the fabric of time and eternity.628 Accordingly, human deification and divine incarnation 
are coterminous. When the divine is instantiated in the human and the human instantiates the divine, 
the chasm between created and uncreated, between heaven and earth is bridged. Even so, these 
instantiations are partial and occur only when humanity incarnates the divine through virtue. The 
implication seems to be that there is, as it were, a “final” stage that is the fulfillment of these partial 
occurrences. 
In Chapters on Theology 1.51–60, Maximos investigates the relationship between deeds, virtue, and a 
finality to human action, understood both as an end that is sought out and as the terminus of action. 
This decade is especially difficult because the Confessor articulates the relationship between deeds 
done in this world and their repercussions for the afterlife through a multilayered allegorical 
interpretation of Israel’s inheritance of the Promised Land in tandem with an expanded version of the 
Genesis creation narrative. It is likely that the Confessor’s allegorization of this speculative subject is 
a deliberate strategy to avoid hard lines of eschatological demarcation, as he does in other works more 
explicitly.629 Here we will limit ourselves to chapters 1.51–55, which form a tight-knit unit. 
Maximos begins the decade thus: “The sixth day, according to Scripture, presents the completion 
of beings [that are] subject to nature; the seventh circumscribes the motion of what is of a temporal 
character; and the eighth hints at the manner of the condition beyond nature and time” (1.51). Here 
the sixth day alludes to the opening creation sequence of Genesis, which ends with the completion of 
all existing things. The seventh day, the day on which God rested, similarly suggests the necessary 
ontological limits of all things that have come into being by pointing to the end of their natural 
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motion.630 We should note here that Maximos is intimately linking time and motion in a way that calls 
Aristotle’s Physics to mind.631 The point is to introduce a terminus of creaturely motion that assumes 
the dialectic between the first mover and all subsequently moved beings. Finally, the eighth day is a 
vague placeholder for what happens to creatures once they have ceased from their natural motion.632 
Maximos will elucidate the eighth day in the following chapters. 
Maximos continues: “He who carries out the sixth day only in accord with the Law, fleeing the 
tyranny of the passions actively oppressing the soul, crosses fearlessly through the sea into the desert, 
keeping the Sabbath by rest from the passions only. But he who crosses the Jordan, also leaving behind 
this very state that rests only from the passions, comes into the inheritance of the virtues” (1.52). This 
chapter marks a slight shift away from the Genesis creation narrative and allegorically considers what 
the results of adhering solely to the Law are. He presents this state that only rests from the passions 
or vices as incomplete, needing yet to cross over into the Promised Land through the Jordan. It is 
there that one “comes into the inheritance of the virtues.” It is possible that Maximos is making a 
psychological distinction here between simple observance of the Law as a helpful, but not altogether 
satisfactory, strategy of self-configuration and virtue as a more developed modality of self-
transformation that enables human reception of the divine in the “Promised Land.” 
This interpretation is confirmed in the following chapter, where the Confessor presents the Gospel 
as the completion of the Law and the perfection of the human on a higher level: “He who carries out 
the sixth day in accord with the Gospel, having already mortified the first motions of sin, through 
virtue reaches the state of apatheia, deserted by every vice; he keeps the Sabbath in the mind, even 
from the very simple impression of the passions. But he who has crossed the Jordan is transferred 
into the land of knowledge, wherein the mind, a temple mystically built by peace, becomes the abode 
of God in the Spirit” (1.53). It is clear here that Maximos considers the Gospel to take the believer 
further than the Law. First, this person is able to mortify the “first motions of sin” and even to reach 
the state of apatheia. This person goes beyond the one described in 1.52, who only rests from the 
passions but does not altogether transcend them in the mind. Second, the Sabbath of this person is 
not just a rest from the passions, but it is a rest of the mind itself that is even beyond “the very simple 
impression of the passions.” The importance for the cessation of noetic activities will soon become 
apparent. Thus, the person who lives in accordance with the Gospel can enter the Promised Land; 
there, that person’s mind becomes the residence of God in the Spirit through peace.633 
The next two chapters are the culmination of the themes that the decade handles. The Confessor 
writes: 
 
He who divinely has completed the sixth day in himself with presentable deeds and thoughts, and 
who with God rightly has concluded his deeds, has transcended in his understanding every 
subsisting thing subject to nature and time and has transposed himself into the mystical 
contemplation of the ages and eternal things. He is keeping the Sabbath not knowing with his 
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mind, in the total abandonment and transcendence of beings. And he who has also been deemed 
worthy of the eighth resurrects from the dead, I mean, from all things after God, sense-perceptible 
and intelligible, words and thoughts, and lives the blessed life of God—since he is both called and 
is life in the true and proper sense—so much so that he even becomes God by deification (1.54). 
 
The first two lines resume some of the themes we had previously covered, and especially the idea that 
the virtuous who act with “presentable deeds and thoughts” act just as God (“with God rightly has 
concluded his deeds”). But what is striking here is that this person is capable of transposing himself 
into the “mystical contemplation of the ages and eternal things.” The idea here is that such a human 
has come to know the logoi of beings and no longer sees the world as it is familiar to us, but rather, 
sees God in all things through their logoi. This interpretation is based on Maximos’ identification of 
the logoi as the eternal principles behind existence that can only be seen “mystically,” an idea that had 
surfaced earlier in the Chapters on Theology 1.49–50. 
What follows in this chapter, however, is striking. Now, this person keeps the Sabbath by not 
knowing with the mind. Dionysian echoes, particularly from the Mystical Theology, are clearly audible 
here.634 There is more, however. It appears that Maximos has reintroduced the idea that the human 
can only undergo deification through an utter passivity that entails—or rather, results precisely from—
the gnomic surrender, as he claimed in Difficulty 7.11. Because the divine cannot be apprehended by the 
senses, or even the intellect,635 the only manner of union with the divine is through susceptibility to it; 
noetically, it is only possible by the cessation of the intellect’s natural activity.636 This state of utter 
passivity opens, in turn, the way to—but does not directly bring about—deification.637 Only those 
who keep the Sabbath in the mind are susceptible to deification on the eighth day. And yet, there is 
an express continuity between the eighth day and the sixth. Maximos implies that those worthy of the 
eighth day are those who have “rightly concluded their deeds with God.” This phrase signals the 
familiar idea of divine-human identity of action we have previously analyzed.638 Finally, the context 
suggests that deification, or the eighth day, is both a direct continuation of God’s creative activity as 
begun in Genesis 1 and 2 and its exaltation to a higher state that is not contained in nature. 
Maximos interprets these ideas for us in the next chapter: “The sixth day is the absolute fulfillment 
of practical natural activities concerning virtue; the seventh is the completion and cessation of all 
natural contemplative concepts concerning ineffable knowledge; and the eighth is the transposition 
and transcendence to deification of the worthy” (1.55). Here the parallel between God’s completion 
of his creative activities in Genesis 1 and humanity’s completion of the activities concerned with virtue 
recurs. As concerns the seventh day, the Confessor corroborates that it brings about the complete 
cessation of noetic activity, as seen in the previous chapter. Curiously, however, he cautions in this 
same chapter that: “Not one of the heavenly or earthly powers will be able to know such things in any 
way at all before experiencing passivity, except for the blessed divinity itself, maker of these things” 
(1.55). This passage insinuates again a final condition that comes to term due to passivity. And yet, we 
have previously noted that Maximos does not entirely consider this passivity without activity. How 
does he explain the tension? 
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The Confessor’s eschatological vision may be closely associated with his paradox of “evermoving 
rest,” which occurs in several works. For our purposes, two passages are especially relevant. In one 
segment of Questions and Answers to Thalassios 59, Maximos interprets what the phrase, inspired in 1 
Peter 1:9 “The salvation of the souls is properly the end of faith” means. This phrase leads him to an 
extensive chain of definitions defined by other definitions. I have indexed this citation by definitional 
sequences to facilitate commentary: 
 
(1) And the end of faith is the true revelation of the one believed in; (2) and the true revelation of 
the one believed in is the ineffable interpenetration of the one believed in in proportion to the faith 
in each; (3) and the interpenetration of the one believed in is ascent of the believers to the beginning 
that is in accordance with the end; (4) and the ascent of the believers to the proper beginning in 
accordance with the end is the fulfillment of longing; (5) and the fulfillment of longing is the 
evermoving rest of those longing around that which is longed after.639 
 
Several points of clarification are in order. The first sequence introduces the virtue in question, faith, 
and claims that its end is the revelation of God (the one believed in). Perhaps Maximos means that 
faith passes away,640 though it seems more likely that “end” refers to the objective of faith, as Sherwood 
has suggested about Maximos’ linguistic usage in a different context.641 The second sequence gives 
weight to this interpretation, because faith is the means by which God subsequently interpenetrates 
believers.642 Some earlier themes recur here. Specifically, God’s interpenetration of believers 
presupposes their passivity; nevertheless, their passivity does not invalidate their actions, such as those 
that lead to the virtue of faith. The importance of actions is reflected in that God interpenetrates the 
worthy in proportion to their faith.643 Here, as elsewhere, Maximos upholds the importance of both 
poles in deification, human and divine; their interdependence is strict.644 
The fourth sequence calls to mind some of the themes in Difficulty 7, such as the contradiction of 
the Origenist scheme of rest—motion—origin. Like in Difficulty 7, Maximos thinks that rest is only 
possible in the presence of the object of one’s longing. One, however, does not simply come to rest. 
Rather, the Confessor speaks in the fifth sequence of a paradoxical “evermoving rest.” In the absence 
of this paradox, it would seem reasonable to suppose that one could tire or come to satiety. Gregory 
of Nyssa had famously expressed the idea of an eternal epektasis in response to satiety in his Life of 
Moses. Maximos retains the element of eternal motion that staves off satiety, but also embraces rest as 
a logical correlate of nature.645 So, on the one hand, all beings reach their natural creaturely limits and 
come to rest. On the other hand, due to their preformed (virtuous) character states—in this passage 
                                                 
639 τέλος δὲ πίστεώς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ πιστευθέντος ἀληθὴς ἀποκάλυψις· ἀληθὴς δὲ τοῦ πιστευθέντος ἐστὶν ἀποκάλυψις ἡ 
κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ πίστεως ἄρρητος τοῦ πεπιστευμένου περιχώρησις· περιχώρησις δὲ τοῦ 
πεπιστευμένου καθέστηκεν ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ τέλος τῶν πεπιστευκότων ἐπάνοδος· ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν 
ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ τέλος τῶν πεπιστευκότων ἐπάνοδός ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ἐφέσεως πλήρωσις· ἐφέσεως δὲ πλήρωσίς ἐστιν ἡ 
περὶ τὸ ἐφετὸν τῶν ἐφιεμένων ἀεικίνητος στάσις· Thal 59, ll. 123–131 
640 See Difficulty 21.8–9. 
641 See Polycarp Sherwood, The Earlier Ambigua, 95. See also Difficulty 15.6–7, but contrast with Op. 20, PG 91.228B. 
Compare also to Riou, Le monde et l’Église, 53. 
642 See also Difficulty 7.32, 10.32 and 48, and 31.2. 
643 See Difficulty 7.16, 10.85, 21.16. Compare to Dionysios, Ecclesiastical Hierarchies 6.3.6, PTS, pp. 119–120, Celestial 
Hierarchies 7.2 (PTS, pp. 28–29), and Divine Names 4.1 (PTS, p. 144, ll. 3–5). 
644 See also Difficulty 42.17. 
645 See Difficulty 15.8–10 for further elucidation of this theme. 
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faith specifically—humans undergo eternal motion around the subject of their longing, God.646 
Further, the motion they undergo belongs to them as the subjects wherein it occurs and which their 
virtuous self-configuration makes possible by rendering the self susceptible to the divine. 
The next five sequences bear out these dynamics: 
 
(6) and evermoving rest is the both continuous and unintermittent enjoyment of that which is 
longed after; (7) and the continuous and unintermittent enjoyment is participation in the divine 
things beyond nature; (8) and participation in the divine things beyond nature is the likeness of the 
participants to that which is participated in; (9) and the likeness of the participants to that which is 
participated in is the participants’ identity of activity received through likeness to that itself which 
is participated in; (10) and the participants’ identity of activity received through likeness to that 
which is participated in is the deification of those deemed worthy of deification.647 
 
In the sixth sequence, Maximos tells us that the eternal aspect of “evermoving” derives from the 
“continuous and unintermittent enjoyment” of what humans long after. In speaking about 
“enjoyment,” the Confessor implies the psychological disposition of a human that conditions the 
experience of God as “enjoyable” (or its contrary).648 Here, then, we see that the virtuous character 
states that humans develop over the course of their lives are of great importance for the afterlife. By 
extension, it does not seem that the Confessor would leave much space for a “change of heart,” so to 
speak, in the afterlife. Because humans have ceased from any natural activity and only undergo the 
divine energy in themselves—Maximos is unequivocal on this point, there appears to be no real 
opportunity for changing one’s character states to alter the positive or negative experience of the 
divine. If there is to be a universal hypostatic deification, its conditions must somehow be met before 
the natural cessation of individual, hypostatic activity.649 The Confessor, however, rarely entertains 
such speculative possibilities, so any conclusion will at best be tentative. 
The next four sequences establish the link between enjoyment of the divine, participation in the 
divine, likeness to the divine, and becoming the divine. This sequence will be familiar from our earlier 
analyses of the Difficulties. These four sequences (onto)logically follow each other. To be in the state 
where one enjoys the divine is to participate in that which is beyond nature; to participate in what is 
beyond nature results in likeness to the divine.650 Here, as before, Maximos links human and divine 
activity through their mutual similarity. This identity of activity, in turn, just is deification. The 
Confessor identifies deification more expressly here than elsewhere with the divine activity—or 
energy—at work in those who participate in God. In this way he can account for the eternity of action 
that undergirds this paradoxical state of evermoving rest: “rest” refers to the cessation of every natural 
                                                 
646 Compare to Difficulty 10.10, 32, and 106–116, 13.3, and 21.5. 
647 ἀεικίνητος δὲ στάσις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἐφετοῦ διηνεκής τε καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἀπόλαυσις· ἀπόλαυσις δὲ διηνεκὴς καὶ 
ἀδιάστατος ἡ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων καθέστηκε μέθεξις· μέθεξις δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τὸ 
μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων ὁμοίωσις· ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων ὁμοίωσίς ἐστιν ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν 
πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων δι’ ὁμοιότητος ἐνδεχομένη ταυτότης· ἡ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ἐνδεχομένη 
κατ’ ἐνέργειαν δι’ ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον ταυτότης ἐστὶν ἡ θέωσις τῶν ἀξιουμένων θεώσεως· Thal 59, ll. 
131–141. 
648 See especially in this regard Difficulty 10.108. 
649 Compare to Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 251–252, von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy (trans. Daley), 358, and Tollefsen, 
Christocentric Cosmology, 183. 
650 Compare to Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 168–169. 
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human activity; “evermoving” refers to the never-ending operation of God in those worthy of God. 
What is significant here is that this activity belongs properly to God but becomes the activity of 
humans by extension inasmuch as they have configured themselves to be no different than God save 
in substance. 
In Thalassios 65, Maximos puts the paradox of evermoving rest in cosmological perspective. Here, 
all beings subject to creation, and thus to motion, must also come to a standstill. He claims: “For this 
reason, nature (since it exists temporally in the cosmos) has altering change due to the terminal rest of 
the cosmos and to the tendency of time to alteration; and when it [nature] comes to be in God, on 
account of the natural singularity of him in whom it has come to be, it [nature] will have an evermoving 
rest and a stability of identical motion, coming to be eternally around what is identical and one and 
unique, which [rest/stability] reason knows to be the immediate, steady foundation around the first 
cause of those things made by him [i.e., God].”651 In this passage, Maximos zooms out in order to 
attribute the finitude of nature to the limitations of all creaturely existence. All nature must come to 
rest because it is ontologically circumscribed by its own insufficiency. 
What is especially salient about this passage is that Maximos qualifies evermoving rest further 
through an apposite phrase: evermoving rest is a rest that is ever in motion by means of the identity 
of nature’s activity to God’s activity. It is clear that the Confessor has in view deified nature 
(specifically within the human agent), wherein the divine activity is operative. As before, however, the 
activity of (human) nature is not, strictly, its own, since it has fully come to rest and occurs, as it were, 
from without. Rather, activity is attributed to human nature for the two reasons we have previously 
proposed: it takes place in a human as its subject and it does so through gnomic inclination to do what 
the divine wills. Humans thus conform their wills completely to the natural, deified will of Jesus Christ 
by which humans become Christ, the substance of the virtues, and say: “Yet not as I will, but as you.” 
The final point we must consider is how Maximos came to the conclusion of an “evermoving rest.”  
While Maximos developed this idea in part as a response to Origenism, its complexity presupposes 
a wider theological vision that was not constrained to the Origenist controversy, a point Tollefsen has 
already partially made.652 Rather, I would argue that the paradox of evermoving rest is a natural 
continuation of the dynamism that characterizes virtue in this life. On this reading, the condition of 
evermoving rest is the (eschato)logical conclusion of the dialectics of virtue by which one is assimilated 
and becomes susceptible to the divine activity, that is, to deification. 
In Chapters on Theology 1.35, partially analyzed in chapter four, the Confessor contrasts the finality 
of nature with the endlessness of virtue: “Whatever things exist in time are being fashioned in 
accordance with time and, having been perfected, they are brought to a standstill, thereby having 
ceased from growth according to nature. Whatever things God’s science effects in the realm of virtue, 
when they have been perfected, they move again for increase, for their ends have established the 
starting points of further ends.”653 In chapter four, we had already explained the tension inherent in 
further perfecting something perfected. What is important to us about this passage is its reference to 
                                                 
651 Διόπερ ἐν μὲν τῷ κόσμῳ ὑπάρχουσα χρονικῶς ἡ φύσις ἀλλοιωτὴν ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου 
πεπερασμένην στάσιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ἑτεροίωσιν τοῦ χρόνου φοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεῷ γινομένη, διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ 
γέγονε μονάδα, στάσιν ἀεικίνητον ἕξει καὶ στάσιμον ταυτοκινησίαν, περὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν καὶ μόνον ἀϊδίως 
γινομένην, ἣν οἶδεν ὁ λόγος ἄμεσον εἶναι περὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πεποιημένων μόνιμον ἵδρυσιν. Thal 
65, ll. 541–549. 
652 See Tollefsen, Christocentric Cosmology, 75. 
653 Chapters on Theology 1.35. 
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a paradoxical interplay between perfection that is achieved (the end) and the infinitely elusive object 
that is striven after (further ends).654 Nature must eventually come to rest. Virtue, by contrast, when 
perfected, moves to further perfection. This process is never-ending for an apparent reason: the 
complete identity of the finite to the infinite will never take place; the two are incommensurable.655 
Thus, nature and virtue are not the only points of contrast in this chapter: virtue itself manifests an 
internal dialectic of stability and movement. We should call to mind the metaphor of de Certeau’s 
tightrope that we offered in chapter four. In de Certeau’s analysis, stability is preserved by the 
unintermittent renegotiation of an everchanging balance. There, I argued that virtue for Maximos can 
be understood similarly. Missing from our analysis then was the Christological reason for why the 
negotiation of virtue is endless. Since Christ is the substance of the virtues, the act of preserving 
likeness to him—or to the divine, which is the same—must be endless. The absolute will always 
transcend its qualified instantiations that configure themselves on its elusive patterns. 
Thus, if the preservation of virtue is a self-configurative exercise in Christo-/Theomimesis what 
differentiates virtue in this life from evermoving rest in the next? While both exhibit the same dialectic, 
a stability that is preserved through eternal motion, the key difference is the activity of the agent. In 
this life, humans are responsible for how they employ their natural activity as a process of self-
transformation and for the ensuing, voluntary inclination of their will that results from these 
activities;656 in the next life, humans cease from any natural activity altogether and are moved, rather, 
by God. The point of continuity between the two is the never-ending motion around an unattainable 
object of desire that forever assimilates to itself those who long after it, but remains eternally 
transcendent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The object of this chapter was to explore the precise relation between virtuous human actions and 
deification. That is, do human virtuous deeds have any bearing on deification? The response to this 
question concludes the investigation of this study by bringing the findings of the previous chapters 
together and articulating a possible resolution to the central tension first identified in chapter three. 
We found that Maximos held human activity and passivity in simultaneous tension as the condition 
of and for deification, an idea we termed the “paradox of active passivity.” This paradox holds 
simultaneously that human deeds do not actualize deification but nevertheless are its precondition. In 
this respect, Aristotle’s understanding of character state formation by the repetition of voluntary 
actions informs Maximos’ description of the will that, through virtue, becomes receptive to the divine 
and indeed does not will differently than the divine. 
Accordingly, the divine activity and the human activity coincide on the level of intentionality and 
become identical. To have the divine activity operative in the self just is deification. And while that 
activity is, after the cessation of human activity, not the activity of the human properly speaking, agents 
that make themselves passive and receptive to the divine are elevated to the status of active agents 
through the divine activity that operates in them. The divine and human activity are thus identical, 
even if they belong to two different subjects. This differentiation in union and union in differentiation 
                                                 
654 See Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of Perpetual Progress,” 161. 
655 See Op 1, PG 91.9A and especially 24C, where Maximos refers to satiety as the infinite satisfaction of enjoying the 
object of desire. 
656 See Difficulty 71.5. 
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is possible through Christ, the substance of the virtues, who in himself unites, but keeps distinct, 
human and divine nature. God is thus embodied in all the virtuous, for it is no longer God alone who 
wills always and in all things to be incarnate, but also those humans who have acquired an identity of 
will with the divine and are accordingly deified to the degree that God is humanized in them. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation illumines the understudied vinculum between virtue and deification in the thought 
of Maximos the Confessor. Given the current landscape of Maximian studies, this dissertation was 
faced with a two-fold task to accomplish this objective. The first step was to promote a radical revision 
of Maximos’ socio-intellectual background, both generally as concerns the relevant strands of late 
ancient philosophy that informed his ascetic teaching and specifically as concerns his early career and 
scholarly formation. Within this contextual thick description, the second part of the dissertation 
analyzed a perplexing tension that arises from three interrelated claims Maximos made over the course 
of his writing career. First, he generally qualified the virtues as deifying; second, he asserted that the 
virtues are natural to humans; and third, he categorically denied that deification results from actualizing 
a natural human potentiality. Thus, the question we posed was whether Maximos was inconsistent or 
perhaps, within the imaginable horizons of his thought world, whether these tensions pointed to a 
subtle but creative distinction concerning the will and the ethics of self-formation that established a 
new spiritual-ascetic paradigm for future Roman intellectuals and monastics. The vast corpus of 
writings that engaged his thought, particularly during the humanistic renaissances under the Komnenoi 
and Palaiologoi suggest that the latter option was the case. In brief, then, we have considered the 
formation of a historically determinative moment in the conceptualization of asceticism and human-
divine relations through a thick description of one of the Roman Empire’s most celebrated thinkers. 
Part one of this dissertation offered an extensive revision of Maximos the Confessor’s background 
that primarily challenges two fronts. Chapter one engaged a historiographical front in the modern 
representation of late ancient philosophy. I contended that modern western European scholarship 
exhibits numerous crippling colonial assumptions about “Neoplatonism” that continue to distort or 
limit our understanding of a remarkably complex constellation of philosophical movements and 
counter-movements that spanned the better part of four centuries. I likewise considered alternative, 
non-western scholarly sources, such as the historical-philosophical work of the Russian scholar Vasiliy 
Polisadov, who painted a different picture of Neoplatonism’s status in the course of Greek philosophy 
and its continuity with the classical tradition. Far from being an embarrassing moment of a 
discursively-bygone era, the interrogation of early modern western scholarship in a postcolonial light 
in effect illumines the often-invisible thread that even now unites past and present logics of exclusion. 
The decolonization of western curricula in order systemically to transform its assumptions about what 
passes for valid or critical scholarship, as well as what constitutes philosophy, is still pending. Put 
differently, decolonial theory is not a lens that magnifies past imperfections, but an indelible tint that 
highlights the continuity of chronologically and discursively transmuted prejudices and assumptions. 
The findings of chapter one are significant for various reasons and fields. Perhaps the most 
immediate consequences may be felt in sub-branches of philosophy and religious studies, such as late 
ancient philosophy and early Christianity. How do colonial prejudices inform not just the study of a 
figure like Maximos, but that of most early Christian thinkers, indeed, of most late ancient thinkers? 
If, in fact, Aristotle’s philosophy was far more prevalent during this time frame than scholarly 
consensus currently suggests, what implications would that entail for fields like New Testament studies 
(which are currently dominated by Stoicizing interpretative lenses), early Christianity (dominated by 
Platonizing and Stoicizing interpretative lenses), and late ancient art history? How, in turn, does that 
affect the telling of Christianity’s early encounters with Islam and its continued exchanges with 
Judaism? What role did Aristotle’s philosophy play in interreligious and intercultural dialogue? Put 
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differently, what is the significance of a common philosophical current in politically-shifting new 
matrices of power and the imaginable limits of religious self-representation? Questions like these lead 
to broadening concentric circles of intellectual crosspollinations and the complexity of early 
Christianity that decenters the prevalent assumption that Christianity was and is, primarily, a “western” 
phenomenon. In this regard, Syriac, Arabic, Coptic, and Ethiopic Christianity, to name a few, have yet 
to be given their due. The availability of opportunities and resources to promote research of 
understudied Christianities points to the enduring legacies of what Ramón Grosfoguel calls a state of 
colonialidad (coloniality) that can only with great difficulty and concerted effort be gradually destabilized 
and transformed. 
It is truly difficult to envision, for instance, a collective scholarly dismissal of the term “Byzantine” 
to describe the Roman Empire between Constantine I and Constantine XI. While this term may be 
convenient for scholarly discourse, that convenience underpins colonial assimilatory strategies. 
Perhaps the same can be said about how names are rendered in English from their originals. It is, for 
example, as unthinkable to refer to John Sebastian Bach, Michael of Cervantes, Nicholas Machiavelli, 
or John-Jake Rousseau as it is to speak of Aristoteles, Platon, Gregorios of Nazianzos, or Emperors 
Konstantinos, Ioustinianos, or Eirene. And at the same time, Arabic and Syriac names are preserved—
as far as possible—in their Orientalized state to make a clear demarcation between easterners and 
westerners: Yaħya ibn ‘Adī (not John son of Adi) and Ħunayn ibn Isħaq or Ħunayn bar Isħaq (not 
Johnny son of Isaac). The addition of special Latin characters to represent the various Arabic and 
Syriac letters (here ي ع ح ܚ ), while useful for philological reasons, further entrenches the division by 
otherizing even the representation of these names. 
Chapter two promoted a radically new assessment of Maximos the Confessor’s early and formative 
years. In part, this chapter incorporated the findings of chapter one by underscoring the socio-
intellectual salience of Aristotelian philosophy in the curricula of the late-sixth century, a testament to 
which can be found in Maximos’ notes on David’s lectures. But the bulk of the chapter was concerned 
with challenging the straightforward historical or biographical validity of the Syriac Life (SL). I 
contended that scholars have not yet adequately illumined the literary and linguistic pliability of SL, 
with the result that its claims have largely been assessed on a historical-factual continuum to which 
they are inadequately adapted. Rather, the account is rich in metaphors, tropes, and numerous other 
literary devices that signify more than may appear on first inspection. 
My analysis and interpretation concluded that SL is not a reliable authority for piecing the 
Confessor’s early years together—the fact that it omits nearly forty years of his life, of course, is one 
of its major shortcomings. Its limitations, however, do not entirely foreclose its possible uses. After 
all, metaphors can be literarily true inasmuch as they point to certain social realities or class dynamics. 
In this case, several symbolic events in Maximos’ early years could be taken as veiled references to his 
wealthy provenance and the distinguished pedigree of his philosophical formation. These two pieces 
of information, of course, cannot be conclusively demonstrated and must be assessed, in turn, by 
specialists in Syriac literary conventions. Nevertheless, I would hold that a literary approach to SL 
does greater justice to its genre and illumines the internal nuances of a cultural production that 
emanated from a rich tradition of Syriac belles lettres. 
A strategic withdrawal from both hagiographical traditions, Greek and Syriac, concerning the 
Confessor’s early days opens a critical space for considering his educational options. As stated in 
chapter two, Maximos’ actual place of birth (irretrievable, in my opinion) would not have determined 
the range of educational opportunities available to a youth of, ostensibly, wealthy extraction. Gregory 
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of Nazianzos and Basil of Caesarea, it is well known, hailed from Cappadocia, and nevertheless 
received professional education in Athens and the latter ascetic inspiration in Egypt. Accordingly, the 
question was whether anything about the Confessor’s education could be determined. 
To be sure, Maximos himself affords us very little autobiographical evidence and not much is 
otherwise available to pin down his early movements. Nevertheless, I argued in chapter two that the 
most plausible theory places him in Alexandria during his formative years. Three major pieces of 
evidence would hint in this direction. First, the majority of his correspondence was with Alexandrians. 
This correspondence, moreover, engaged several social tiers—aristocrats, bureaucrats, clergy, 
scholars, and male and female ascetics—which would suggest an extensive network of relations 
formed over time. His letters also exhibit remarkable parrhesia, especially if we consider that he (a 
monk) boldly addressed illustrious figures like Peter in order to request very particular favors (e.g., the 
reinstatement of the deacon Kosmas). Similarly, he was invested, in abortive circumstances, with 
unprecedented political authority when official functionaries were summoned to the capital “to explain 
themselves.” That Roman officers would put such power in the hands of a monastic is not only 
remarkably unprecedented, but may well hint at his earlier involvement in the bureaucracy; in effect, 
this theory would account for his demonstrable knowledge of Roman law if we trust the exchanges 
represented in the record of his trial. 
Second, Maximos’ modes of inquiry and technical philosophical-theological vocabulary are most 
consistent with an Alexandrian intellectual idiom, as our numerous philological analyses in the body 
of the dissertation strongly suggest. While one might argue that he could have acquired this modus 
operandi indirectly through a mentor trained in this methodology, a compelling reason should be 
articulated for evincing my simpler, Occam’s razor-abiding explanation. Moreover, such an account 
would also have to consider the presence of particular Alexandrian expressions in Maximos’ works, 
expressions, we should note, that were well known in other parts of the Empire, such as the capital, 
as consistent with the “manner of speech of the Alexandrians” (τῶν ἀλεξανδρέων γλώσσῇ).657 
Third, the dossier of notes on David of Alexandria’s lectures that survives under Maximos’ name 
should be studied with greater care to determine its authenticity. This is especially pressing if no 
compelling reason remains—other than two questionable pseudo-biographical infancy accounts—for 
situating him in Palestine or Constantinople. If this dossier is, in fact, by Maximos, it is quite possible 
that an intellectual biography of the man in a new key will need to be written. The implications would 
have substantial bearing on contextual interpretations of his liturgical, ascetical, and speculative 
writings. Perhaps this revision would especially affect work of scholars who have promoted the 
relevance of (a Neo-Thomistic) Aristotle for interpreting Maximos work, but only inasmuch as he 
foreshadowed Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In brief, the Confessor’s own scholarship could 
benefit from decolonizing strategies. 
Part two is a constructive evaluation of the Confessor’s work in this new key. The interpretation 
of the monastic intellectual’s work with a view to Aristotle’s philosophy and the subsequent 
developments of the commentators not only aided in the identification of certain tensions in his 
thought, but also offered the internal resources by which to address them without necessitating 
extrapolations from other time periods and frames of thought. 
                                                 
657 A humorous reference to this “manner of speech of the Alexandrians” appears in the Miracles of Saint Artemios, which 
was written during Maximos’ lifetime. See Miracle 45, p. 18, ll. 15–16. Special thanks to Anthony Kaldellis for pointing 
out this reference. 
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Chapter three considered the relevance for understanding Maximos’ doctrine of virtue and 
deification by studying the multivalence of Aristotle’s ousia. Two of Aristotle’s works are especially 
important to exposit the various senses of ousia: the Categories and the Metaphysics. Ousia, as we noted, 
could certainly denote, in some cases, an ontological fixity that Aristotle more commonly expresses as 
form, entelechy, or, through the unwieldy phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. But that was not the sole, and often 
not even the primary, meaning of ousia. The term could also refer to a really existing substrate with 
teleologically-oriented realizable potentialities. In this case, ousia signifies a specific something (τόδε τί) 
and the scope of its ontological possibilities. Additionally, Aristotle employed ousia, primarily in the 
Categories (though we noted instances in the Metaphysics where the meaning of ousia from the Categories 
is at play) as the subject of predication. 
These various conceptualizations of ousia were particularly important for determining the semantic 
and conceptual range of Maximos’ own use of the term. Our analysis showed that the Confessor 
fluidly moved through the various senses that Aristotle had established and even made his own 
contributions to a revised Aristotelian metaphysics, particularly through the doctrine of the logoi. This 
contextualization of ousia matters as we try to ascertain what or who precisely undergoes deification 
and on what ontological level deification is predicated. In other words, when someone is deified, what 
exactly is the passive subject of deification? In this line, deification (following Hausherr’s and Larchet’s 
arguments against the Neothomistic interpretative tradition of the Confessor’s thought) is not simply 
a conditional predicate of the human subject. That is, deification does not take place purely on an 
imitative moral plane, as Garrigues, Riou, and others in their tradition have held. Rather, ontology and 
an ousia’s very mode of existence are, in Aristotelian (and Maximian) philosophy, indissociable. To be 
something—anything—means to be in a way. 
The relevance of this particular exposition of Aristotle’s ousia is the ontological dynamism it implies. 
Accordingly, it would be inaccurate to speak of an absolute “essentializing” impetus in either Aristotle 
or Maximos. Rather, ousia thus conceptualized recognizes certain limitations and constitutive 
necessities of created beings (embodiment, chronological distension, finitude), but precisely by not 
framing these ousiai in absolute terms invites exploration of the existential dynamism of be-ing. In their 
own way, Aristotle and Maximos did conceive of what poststructuralism has called the “transcendental 
signified,” in this case as an ontological, rather than grammatological, referent. Nevertheless, on both 
counts these philosophers eschew a particularly strong version of it. For Aristotle, the phrase that 
Latin Scholastics rendered as essentia or quidditas (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, ST I.84.vii; compare with ibn 
Sina’s ةيهام (mahiyyah) in al-Ilāhiyyāt min Kitāb al-Šifā’ 1.5 and 6.2) should not be abstracted from its 
dynamic modalities. The phrasal construct τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι literally means “the what it was being for it to 
be existing.” The openness of the grammatical tenses here employed does not foreclose ontological 
liminality. Similarly, for Maximos the logoi of creation certainly are “essentializing” inasmuch as they 
refer to a certain creaturely fixity that is situated in the divine. And yet, here too if the logoi are 
“essentializing” they are also personalizing by virtue of the uniqueness of each individual whose logos 
they are. Thus, the logoi do not so much point to essential fixity as much as they refer to a dialectic of 
universality and particularity in and through which creatures return to the divine source of their origin. 
It is exactly in this dialectic that ethics are both founded and negotiated: the active being of a 
substance cannot avoid existential modalities. All being, in as much as it is be-ing, must also be in some 
way. If chapter three had inquired about Aristotle’s and Maximos’ articulation of the whatness that is 
both the locus and substrate of subjectivity, chapter four explains salient features corresponding to 
the dynamic configurations of its howness. The guiding image for practices of the self was inspired by 
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de Certeau’s description the act of tightrope walking. On this account, fixity or stability is interstitially 
attained by incessant interventions that preserve a balance that is never attained. Simultaneously, we 
expanded this metaphor to include the constitutive sedimentations of behavioral particularities that 
form what Maximos called “divine configurations” that, when they have come—in respect of virtue—
to perfection, move to further perfections in the never-ending process of striving after the divine. 
In this regard, we especially explored the features of Aristotle’s moral psychology that informed 
Maximos’ volitional theory, particularly as the Confessor developed his distinctive teaching on the 
natural and gnomic will and the slight adjustments he made to Aristotle’s proairesis (προαίρεσις) or 
deliberate choice to accommodate his contextual Christological expediencies. The volitional nature of 
character states as the Peripatetic articulated it was especially important to Maximos. According to 
both thinkers, human dispositions are themselves voluntary and constitutive aspects of the decision-
making self. These dispositions are formed through sustained repetition of actions of similar moral 
value (e.g., acting courageously, kindly, mercifully, wisely, etc.) that in turn determine new interstitial 
negotiations of virtue (to continue with de Certeau’s tightrope metaphor). 
Thus, we could speak of a dialectic of fixity and fluidity with respect to virtue as Maximos 
understood it. But we should be clear about what each of these references. Fixity does not refer to the 
social conditions that contextualize moral axiology, especially since these social conditions are 
constantly shifting; rather, fixity (and it is a qualified fixity at that) refers to the behaviorally-sedimented 
patterns humans create in their moral self when they exist in a certain way over time. I say this fixity is 
qualified because the psycho-ontological dynamism of the human substance is liable to change. 
Simultaneously, the liability to change of these sedimented patterns does not foreclose their 
determinative effects for the horizon of operable human possibilities. Humans do not act hors-contexte, 
indeed, there is no hors-contexte of selfhood. Rather, moral possibilities are negotiated from within the 
intricacies and depths of ethical subjectivity. 
This final point is especially important for Maximos’ denial of a gnomic will in Christ. Salvation and 
progress in divine matters cannot be accomplished through a Deus ex machina moment that cancels out 
the embodied experience of the moral self but by a reintegration and renegotiation of the moral self’s 
complexity and orientation toward the divine from within the moral self. Far from the pitfalls some 
scholars noted in the Confessor’s denial of this gnomic will in Christ, it would be difficult to 
conceptualize a more robust soteriological affirmation of the inviolability of chronologically- and 
socially-situated personhood. Salvation, for Maximos, operates from within the incarnated limits of 
human existence, not from without. Hypostatic particularity must here remain the inner sanctum 
wherein the divine and human coincide. 
Chapter five explored this dialectic between divinity and humanity further by drawing some logical 
conclusions from Maximos’ denial of Christ’s gnomic will. I especially drew attention to the paradox of 
active passivity that I argued was both the condition of and for deification. In the face of certain death 
at Gethsemane, Jesus voluntarily surrendered his will to the Father’s. This gesture becomes a symbol 
for human subjection to the divine will. As the human will surrenders to the divine will, however, the 
two wills become one: the human will is deified, the divine will humanized. “Those who bring 
themselves low will be exalted” (Luke 14:11). By this coincidence of activity, the human makes the 
self increasingly susceptible to undergo more fully the divine activity or energy. The deifying energy, 
we found, elevated the passive human subject to the state of an active agent. Here again Maximos had 
drawn on Aristotle’s articulation of active patients, though in a different context. We note that the 
cessation of human activity, by which deification is undergone, negates neither the volitional character 
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of deification nor the disposition-forming force of human actions that determine the experiential 
quality of deification. Rather, the final state of the human being is one of passive activity framed by a 
paradoxical “evermoving rest” that preserves humanity fixed in the divine through an infinite 
approximation to the unattainable. 
We have thus addressed this study’s central conundrum. It is natural, that is, in keeping with the 
divine plan, for humans to be deified. Deification is not to be found within human nature. The virtues, 
however, are and are natural in the sense that they enable humans to cleave to the divine will (βουλή). 
So, humans cannot operate deification in themselves through ascetic practice, but they can structure 
their psychosomatic susceptibility to the divine energy to undergo, in a way appropriate to themselves, 
the deifying grace that God universally grants. Whether the divine energy remains active or inactive in 
each person is a matter of quotidian choice through which the infinity and uncircumscribability of the 
divine can be seen in the human body “as in a mirror, enigmatically” (1 Corinthians 13:12). 
To conclude, the implications of this study’s findings may be outlined here in summary form to 
point to further research. The relevance of this dissertation may extend to the various fields that 
intersect herein. Theology and religious studies will benefit from an in-depth case study of a seventh-
century articulation of Christian morality that, to judge by the bulk of monastic engagement with the 
Confessor’s writings, exerted considerable force on medieval and modern articulations of Greek 
asceticism and its bearing on divine-human relations. Certainly, one of the most important 
appropriations and expansions of Maximos’ monastic philosophy occurred some seven centuries later 
as Hesychasts sought the sources from which their contemplative practices had originated. For 
Gregory Palamas, it was Dionysian spirituality in a Maximian key that stood behind the way of life he 
ardently championed in the Triads. 
The history of (western) philosophy may likewise benefit from this study. Maximos’ growing 
reputation as possibly the greatest premodern Greek Christian philosopher should draw the attention 
of a field that has traditionally sidelined nearly all “Byzantine” philosophy. It is especially telling here 
that standard history of philosophy courses only consider Dionysios (and, far more rarely, John of 
Damascus) from among “Byzantine” thinkers and only because of his importance for Thomism. 
Presumably, this curricular choice reflects the assumption that Europe was submerged in the dark ages 
and accordingly that little good could possibly emanate from its impoverished state. Regardless, to 
sidestep a figure like Maximos in the trajectory of western philosophy is not an innocent preference 
for certain philosophical emphases and accents, but systemic myopia. 
We may add that the bulk of John of Damascus’ work, particularly his scholastic compilations, like 
the Source of Knowledge, have often been approached with a blind spot the size of Maximos the 
Confessor. Not only does the Damascene directly reference Maximos by name repeatedly, but 
substantial portions of his most characteristic doctrinal conclusions are lifted directly from the 
Confessor’s works. It is difficult to estimate the impact that the Damascene had in the Arabic Christian 
world on account of the contemporary nascent state of Arabic Christian studies as a field in its own 
right. The immense majority of Arabic Christian manuscripts, such as those housed in Saint 
Catherine’s monastery on Mount Sinai, and indexed nearly a century ago in Georg Graf’s monumental 
Geschichte der Christlichen arabischen Literatur (1944–1953), have not yet been edited, translated, or 
published. And yet, the few works that have seen light, particularly the treatises of Thawdurus Abū 
Qurrah and Yaħya ibn ‘Adī, already hint at strong methodological connections, possibly through the 
Damascene, to the Confessor’s own creative synthesis of philosophy and theology. 
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In effect, the Confessor’s synthesis of religious motifs with the philosophy and methods of 
Aristotle and the commentators extends beyond the Christian fold. For instance, the Letters of the 
great Persian Sufi master, Abū al-Qasim ibn Muħammad al-Junayd al-Baġdādī evidence strong 
conceptual and formulaic parallels to Maximos’ articulations of oneness (ἑνότης) and union (ἕνωσις) 
with the divine. The Persian’s compelling vision of ديحوت (tawħīd/oneness) with God through ةبحم 
(maħabbah/love) is predicated on a rigorous philosophical apparatus that overlaps with numerous 
Maximian theses. For example, a similar idea to the Confessor’s Neochalcedonian formulation of 
“union without confusion” (ἕνωσις ἀσυγχύτως) with God emerges transmuted in al-Junayd’s Kitāb al-
fanā’ fī al-mušāhadah (Book on Annihilation through Contemplation), where he intimates that following ءانف 
(fanā’/“loss of self”) there is ءاقب (baqā’/”subsistence of self”). In brief, the link between Christian and 
Islamic spirituality through figures like Dionysios and Maximos who digested and “monotheified” late 
Platonic/Aristotelian categories deserves further exploration. 
Finally, an intellectual biography of Maximos has long been needed. One could rightly despair of 
writing a historical account of his life—nearly half of it, I believe, is irretrievable. But if my contention 
that the Confessor received philosophical training in Alexandria has merit, a substantially thicker and 
more programmatic account of his intellectual trajectory is thinkable. Such a reconstruction of his 
intellectual trajectory would be no less significant in view of the fact that he had one foot in the pre-
Islamic and one foot in the post-Islamic Roman Empire. We should recall that his long-term mentor, 
Sophronios of Jerusalem, surrendered the city to the Rashidun caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaţţab in April 
of 637 and succumbed to grief, the story goes, the following year. As such, Maximos stands as the 
latest witness—known to Greeks, Syrians, and Arabs—to the Aristotelian tradition in the Roman 
Empire before the study of the Peripatetic in Baghdad eclipsed the dwindling cultural influence of the 
lands where specters of Aristotle paced back and forth, lost in the depths of thought. 
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 This dissertation investigates the relationship between virtue and deification in the thought of 
Maximos the Confessor (580–662) by re-contextualizing his work in an Aristotelian trajectory of 
development characteristic of the Alexandrian philosophers. The dissertation exposes colonial 
prejudices in modern historiography that first divided Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy into two 
neatly defined schools of thought and interrogates the validity of holding that Aristotelian philosophy 
had all but disappeared from late antiquity in the Greek tradition. I contend, instead, that multilateral 
interest in Aristotelian philosophy had peaked around the time of Maximos. By repositioning Maximos 
in Alexandria, in a radical revision of the two prevailing theories—that he was from Constantinople 
or Palestine—the dissertation seeks to draw attention to Alexandrian nuances of his thought, 
particularly with regard to Aristotle’s philosophy, that have been neglected. Thus reframed, the 
dissertation examines a tension at the heart of Maximos’ teaching of virtue and deification: if the 
virtues are natural to humans and they are instrumental in humanity’s deification, why does Maximos 
hold that deification is not the result of the actualization of potentialities of the human substance? 
The dissertation moves to show, instead, that Maximos had appropriated Aristotle’s ethics and 
metaphysics to explain this tension. The creation of habitual dispositions in the human psychosomatic 
compound through actions does not invalidate the non-contingency of God’s gift of deification; 
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rather, these dispositions are the necessary condition for human susceptibility to God’s gift of 
deification. The dissertation thus seeks to affirm both poles: the necessity of human striving and non-
contingency of God’s gift of deification. 
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